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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Sources.

The topic of our research involves Martin Luther's role in the First Antinomian Controversy in Wittenberg during the period 1537-1540. More specifically, it entails a theological analysis of the three disputations held during the
climax of the controversy, 1537-1538.1 They form a self-contained unit within
the collection of Luther's later disputations,2 which in turn are an important corn1The following are the primary sources: Die erste Disputation gegen die
Antinomer (WA 39 I, 364-417; Praefatio: 360-64; Nachtriige: 39 II, 414-419). Die zweite
Disputation gegen die Antinomer (WA 39 I, 03-85; Praefatio: 419-22; Nachtriige: 39 II,
419-425); Die Dritte Disputation gegen die Antinomer (Promotionsdisputation des
Cyriacus Gerichus) (WA 39 I, 496-584; Praefatio: 489-496). There was a fourth
antinomian disputation held two years later which has traditionally been
grouped with the three primary ones: Die Promotionsdisputation von Joachim
Marlin (WA 39 II, 124-44). This disputation will not be analyzed but merely
referred to. The first disputation has been reedited by Rudolf Mau and issued in
a new edition: Martin Luther Studienausgabe, vol. 5, ed. Hans-Ulrich Delius (Berlin:
Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1992), 245-325. The text of the disputation is preceded by a scholarly essay on the manuscript tradition of the disputation (specifically the relationship between the Textrelationen), as well as by the positiones
antinomicae, and Luther's praefatio.
2See Hermelink's introduction to Luther's disputations (both before and
after 1533) as well as his remarks on Luther as Disputator, WA 39
A recent dissertation by a Roman Catholic scholar examines Luther's later disputations from the standpoint of christology. See, Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in
Martin Luthers spaten Disputations, Dissertationen theologische Reihe, 41, ed.
Bernhard Sirch (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag Erzabtei St. Ottilien, 1990). Unfortunately, its treatment of the antinomian disputations is inadequate. More will be
said about this work below.
1

2
ponent within the literary corpus of the mature Luther.3 Each of the disputations
is loosely based on a set of theses prepared by Luther specifically for that purpose.4 Some of the main themes of the disputations were included in an open
letter which Luther wrote in 1539 in order publicly to renounce the antinomians
and categorically to reject their theology.5 Although the disputations are vital
documents for a full understanding of Luther's position on the law, they were
lost for a long time and were only discovered and published by the Melanchthon
scholar Paul Drews at the end of the last century.6 The theses and disputations
3The disputations themselves of course are not written by Luther but
represent summary transcripts [Nachschriften] of the proceedings made by his
disciples, although in most cases only Luther's responsio to a given argumentum
has been preserved rather than an account of the whole. Usually Luther himself
wrote the accompanying set of theses [Thesenreihe]. See below ch. 3 for more on
the nature of academic disputations in general as well as Luther's role in the
antinomian disputations in particular.

disputation: Disputatio D. Martini Lutheri. Contra quosdam Antinomos (WA 39 I, 345-47); second disputation: Disputatio secunda D. Martini Lutheri
contra Antinomos (WA 39 I, 347-50); third disputation: Quinta disputatio D. Martini
Lutheri, contra Antinomos. Because the third and fourth disputations lapsed (as
will be explained in ch. 2) the third disputation, which later proved necessary,
was based on the fifth set of theses. Hence, the fourth and final disputation
(Marlin's licentiate examination) was based on the sixth set of theses: Disputatio
sexta D. Martini Lutheri contra Antinomos (WA 39 I, 358). Although we offer a
structural analysis and summary of the Thesenreihen in ch. 3, we will not discuss
them since anything important in them is taken up in the disputations.
4First

5Wider die Antinomer (WA 50, 468-477). Luther wrote an even more

abrasive and sarcastic tract in 1540: Wider den Eisleben (WA 51, 429-444) in order
to defend himself against the charges brought by Agricola.
6 Disputationen Dr. Martin Luthers in den Jahren 1535-1545 an der

Universitdt Wittenberg gehalten, ed. Paul Drews (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and
Rupprecht, 1895). That is the reason that the St. Louis edition of Luther's works
(as indeed all the Gesamtausgaben preceeding it) has only the Thesenreihen but no
disputations (W 2, 20, 1629-49).

3
have never before appeared in English so that with the translation alone we are
forging new ground.? While it would have been interesting also to investigat
Luther's sermons to see how he preaches parenesis, that would have made an
already long dissertation too long.8
State of Research
At the First International Congress for Luther Research in Aarhus (1956)
the German Luther scholar Heinrich Bornkamm made the perceptive observation
that up till that time the enormous volume of research devoted to the writings of
the young Luther had been disproportionate to their importance when compared
with other Reformation documents and that the Lutherforschung of the future
would need to concentrate its efforts much more than previously on the older
Luther, for it is just his mature writings that point the way he wanted theology
and the church to go after his death.9 The antinomian disputations fit into this
?Curiously, not even the Thesenreihen were included in the American
Edition of Luther's Works. Fortunately, the decision was made to include at least
Luther's last polemical writing against the Antinomians (specifically against their
leader John Agricola) in the form of an open letter addressed to Agricola's archenemy, Caspar Giittel, a pastor in Eisleben: "Against the Antinomians" AE 47,
107-119.
8The monograph by Gerhard Heintze, Luthers Predigt von Gesetz und

Evangelium (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1958), is inadequate. A good critique of
Heintze's book is offered by Martin Schloemann, Natiirliches und Gepredigtes
Gesetz bei Luther: eine Studie zur Frage nach der Einheit der Gesetzesauffassung Luthers
mit besonderer Berucksichtigung seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den Antinomern
(Berlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1961), 37-42. Heintze's Lutherdeutung has a
distinctly Barthian character. Consequently, it is not surprising that his understanding of law and gospel is influenced more by Agricola than Luther. The
Agricola-Barth axis will be noted as we proceed.
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category and provide a classical example of Luther's warning against the false
teachers whom he knew would inundate the church after his death. The disputations are important not only for the light they shed on the doctrine of the law but
because Luther shows how antinomianism constitutes a threat both to the church
and to theology as a whole.10
If one wants to come to a better appreciation of Luther's understanding of
the law and its relation to the gospel, one cannot avoid coming to grips with his
disputations against the antinomians. And yet oddly enough these have received
very little scholarly attention. It is commonly agreed among Luther scholars that
there is still a dire need for an exhaustive theological analysis of the 1537-1540
antinomian controversy, and especially Luther's Thesenreihen and disputations.11
9 Lutherforschung heute, ed.

Vilmos Vajta (Berlin, 1958), 11. He further
said: "Die Hauptmuhe wird die biografische Forschung in Zukunft auf den alten Luther
verwenden miissen. Die Lebensstrecke von 1532 bis zu seinem Tode ist fast ebenso lang
wie die von 1517-1532, aber die ihr gewidmete Literatur ist nur ein geringer Bruchteil
von dem, was fiber den jungen Luther und die Kampfzeit bis etwa zum Augsburger
Reichstag 1530 geschrieben worden 1st." It is interesting to note that, generally speaking, German Luther-scholarship has been more interested in the young Luther
than Scandinavian, especially Swedish, scholarship.
10Joachim Rogge, Johann Agricolas Lutherverstdndnis unter besonderer

Beriicksichtigung des Antinomismus (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1960) 188,
observes that one can see from Luther's disputations "daj3 er den Antinomismus
nicht als Sondermeinung zu einem Einzelproblem ansah, sondern als ein Verhiingnis,
durch das die gesamte Theologie und Kirche unter ein falsches Vorzeichen geriet."
11This has been recognized most recently by the Danish scholar Steffen

Kjeldgaard-Pedersen in his very scholarly dissertation, Gesetz, Evangelium und
Busse: Theologiegeschichtliche Studien zum Verhdltnis zwischen dem jungen Johann
Agricola (Eisleben) und Martin Luther (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), 22, which he wrote
under Leif Grane. The topic of this monograph is not the 1537-1540 antinomian
controversy but rather the relation between the young Agricola and Luther up to
1527. Hence, the work provides us with valuable background information.
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The need for such an analysis has also been duly noted by Gerhard Ebeling, who
himself has made a significant contribution to Luther scholarship in his careful
analysis of some of the later disputations on justification, but in particular in his
magisterial work on Luther's disputation De homine.12 He promised many years
ago that something would be forthcoming, but that promise unfortunately has
never been realized.13 Finally, the Luther Congress in Lund (1977) confirmed
that the antinomian theses and disputations had been sadly neglected and
needed to be carefully studied in the future. Because the congress discussed
many of the questions that we too will need to answer, we now highlight the
main problems that were raised.14
1.Questions relating to the structure and content of the disputations in
WA 39 I, 342-584.
2. Various questions about the way the law is to be understood.
a) Luther's interpretation especially of those Old Testament passages
in which God's law is praised.
b)The pedagogical use of the law (the exposition of the Decalogue,
the bringing up of children), which was called an usus puerilis legis.
c) The tertius usus legis (partly in comparison with FC SD VI).
12Gerhard Ebeling,

Lutherstudien, vol. 2: Disputatio de homine, (Tubingen:
J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1971-1982).
13"Zur Lehre vom triplex usus legis in der reformatorischen Theologie,"

in Wort und Glaube (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), 68.
14The official Report: "Gesetz und Evangelium im Antinomerstreit" in
Luther und die Theologie der Gegenwart: Referate und Berichte des Fiinften Internationalen Kongresses fiir Lutherforschung, ed. Leif Grane and Bernhard Lohse
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupredit, 1980), 156-64.
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d) The complex: natural law—Decalogue--law of love. How does
Luther understand the lex aeterna?
3. Question about repentance
a)What is meant by the term bonum propositum in this context?
b) How do Luther and Agricola differ on repentance?
4. Is there a development in Luther's theology, that is, does the mature
Luther understand law and gospel differently than at the outset?
5. Some remarks on the concept of humilitas.
Although it is not our intention systematically to examine and report on
each of these questions in a formal way, they will nevertheless all be treated in
the course of our discussion somewhere, some of course in greater detail than
others, and we will offer some answers in chapter four.
The work that has been done specifically on our topic is virtually negligible, although some valuable research has been done on the historical background to the controversy of 1537-1540. We will begin by briefly reviewing this,
noting particularly those aspects that are pertinent to our own investigation. The
section will conclude with a short discussion of those works that bear directly on
our topic.
The first major work on John Agricola and his involvement in the antinomian controversy was written by Gustav Kawerau.15 This book is a masterpiece in its own way and still remains the only complete biography of Agricola
even though many details have had to be corrected and supplemented by later
research. The most valuable aspect of the book is the way it works with the
Kawerau, Johann Agricola von Eisleben: Ein Beitrag zur
Reformationsgeschichte (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1881).
15Gustav
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sources. Its biggest deficiency, on the other hand, is that it focuses exclusively on
historical events without attempting to understanding them within the context of
his theology. In other words, the sources are read as purely historical documents
with no account taken of their theological content.16 This lacuna was to some
extent filled with the appearance of the monograph by Joachim Rogge.17 He
builds on the work of Kawerau but goes further. His aim is to develop a picture
of Agricola as we know him from his own writings rather than what Luther says
about him. Hence, Rogge is the first one to work carefully with the Agricolacorpus in an attempt to come to some understanding of his own theological
position but at the same time to see it against the background of Luther's
theology, for the latter, it is assumed, forms the origin of Agricola's theology and
so the criterion by which it is to be assessed.
The third piece of work on the background of our controversy is the Bonn
dissertation by Gustav Hammann.18 Actually, Hammann had originally intended to deal with the antinomian controversy 1537-1540 as well as the discussion
about the law after 1548. Then after looking at the sources he realized he needed
to confine his research to just the first (he calls it the second) antinomian controversy of 1537-1540. But when he discovered how little had been done on the
background to this controversy, he reduced the scope of his topic even further so
161bid, 185, Kawerau suggests that the three main problems that the
"antinomian" dispute revolves about are: 1) the nature of repentance; 2) its place
in the Heilsprocef3; and 3) the manner in which it should be preached.
17Joachim Rogge, Johann Agricolas Lutherverstandnis: linter besonderer
Berficksichtigung des Antinomismus.

Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus innerhalb der
Wittenberger Theologie von 1524-1530, Bonn diss., 1952 (unpublished).
18Gustav
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that now it focuses only on the period 1524-1530 and analyzes the two important
wings of Wittenberg theology that develop during that time: nomism as represented by Melanchthon, and antinomianism as represented by Agricola. The
work is both historical and theological and makes a significant contribution to the
topic of the Reformation and orthodoxy. Hammann points out in the foreword
that his aim is not to investigate Agricola's theology as a whole but only those
aspects that touch on the antinomian controversy.19 First, he wants to consider
his theology within the context of Reformation theology, and secondly, to
discover how he came to diverge from Luther's theology and develop his own
antinomian brand of Reformation theology. In a word, Hammann attempts to
show how in the course of the preliminary antinomian dispute (which, as we will
see in the next chapter, culminates in 1527) Agricola moved from a position of
consensus with his teacher to one of dissensus.20 He does this by first establishing
Agricola's theological approach (and especially his understanding of the law) on
the basis of a careful analysis of his Lukaskommentar (probably the best source for
his theology). He then looks at his position vis-à-vis Melanchthon in the
controversy of 1527 and contrasts both of their positions with that of Luther.21
191bid., IX.
20We note in passing that there are two schools of thought when it

comes to explaining the Reformation as an historical phenomenon. One (and this
seems to be the majority position) sees the unity of the Reformation movement as
a consensus in a series of different points; the other views it as the differences in
this apparently unified movement.
21Although not relevant for our purposes, Hammann also examines the

Confessio Augustana in the crucial areas of repentance, works, and faith and good
works, and finds the same nomistic emphases coming out there and he found in
Melanchthon's Articles of Visitation, which he prepared for the Saxon Church
visitation.
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Hammann argues that it was Melanchthon's nomism that first triggered
Agricola's antinomianism and that both had to be corrected by Luther in different
ways for pulling apart law and gospel. This research certainly represents the
most comprehensive work to date on the relationship between Luther,
Melanchthon, and Agricola, all of whom played a role in the antinomian
controversy of 1527.22 Whether it is a completely accurate portrayal of the three
positions or a little too schematic will have to be left to later historical research to
determine.
The most recent work on Agricola (specifically the young Agricola) and
his relation to Luther has been done by the Danish scholar Steffen KjeldgaardPedersen.23 This treatment of the relation between Luther and Agricola differs
from that of Kawerau, Rogge and Hammann, all of whom the author describes
as representative of the developmental approach to the problem of explaining the
differences between Luther and Agricola,24 because instead of trying to find the
differences between the antagonists in their separate development away from an
22Also

important, but on a much smaller scale, is the work by Ernst
Koch, "Johann Agricola neben Luther: Schulerschaft und theologische Eigenart,"
in Lutheriana. Zum 500. Geburtstag Martin Luthers von den Mitarbeitern der
Weimarer Ausgabe, ed. Gerhard Hammer and Karl-Heinz zur Miihlen. Cologne
and Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 1984.
23Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse: Theologiegeschichtliche Studien zum Verhdltnis zwischen dem jungen Johann Agricola (Eisleben)
und Martin Luther.
24Another important work, exclusively on Agricola (hence the reason
for our referring to it only in the footnotes), which fits into this same category,
comes from Susi Hausammann: Bufle als Llmkehr und Erneuerung von Mensch und
Gesellschaft: eine theologiegeschichtliche Studie zu einer Theologie der Busse (Zurich:
Theologischer Verlag 1974). Of all the works on Agricola, this one presents him
in the most sympathetic light.
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earlier consensus, or more typically, in Agricola's shift away from Luther's Reformation position, Kjeldgaard-Pedersen tries to show that a theological
divergence exists between Luther and Agricola from the very beginning, and that
this is not to be sought in their theological opinions but quite simply in the way
in which they do theology, that is, read and hear scripture.25 But why then did
the confrontation between them come so late? Here Kjeldgaard-Pedersen
distinguishes between Sache and consciousness: the differences were there all
along, he contends, but the parties to the dispute only became aware of them
some time later. He is just as critical of attempts to offer an explanation for
Agricola's deviation from Luther's Reformation position as he is of attempts to
rehabilitate Agricola (which is one of the aims of Rogge) by interpreting his "unLutheran" ideas in the most favorable light. He opposes the genetic approach to
the understanding of Agricola's development on the grounds that it uses
statements taken out of context to prove things external to the text. In contrast,
his primary interest is in listening to the text itself.26
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen's book falls into three parts. The first investigates
Agricola's work up to 1526. The second part deals with a systematic
investigation of the relations between Luther and Agricola. The Luther sources
used as the basis of comparison are those dealing with biblical texts and ideas
which Luther first wrote on during Agricola's first Wittenberg period and which
25Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium and Busse, 31.
26Ibid.,

32, n. 17. He points out that Agricola, like Luther, did not leave
behind any closed theological system, but a series of exegetical works and
various writings in answer to concrete problems. Hence, in view of the nature of
the sources, we cannot ask exclusively about what is said and meant but must
also ask how it works theologically. Both questions must be asked (34).
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have assumed an important place in Agricola's own theology.27 The author
wants to compare Agricola and Luther to bring out characteristic differences that
will shed light on the later controversy. He does not work with the assumption
that Agricola took over Luther's teaching of law and gospel and later distorted it,
but rather posits that the two theologians have a fundamentally different
Ausgangspunkt. Hence, the decisive thing for Kjeldgaard-Pedersen--and this
finally is why the question of which Luther-texts are used in the comparison is
not of such great moment—is not concerned with this or that detail of Luther's
influence but the way that Agricola uses Luther.28 In the third part of the book
the author shows how, in his opinion, his findings can contribute to current
issues in scholarly debate, particularly the question of what constitutes Luther's
genuine Reformation thinking. It is in this spirit that Kjeldgaard-Pedersen enters
into lively discussion with three authors whose works represent a position that
he himself fiercely disavows, namely, that Luther's Durchbruch marks the
beginning of his Reformation theology proper and that his later, mature theology
stands in marked contrast to his earlier Augustinian theology. This position, first
articulated by Ernst Bizer and supported by others with minor variations, that
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen critically examines and rejects in the final part of his book.
In spite of the criticism that we will inevitably have to raise against his findings, it
27Priority is given to those Luther-texts which Agricola probably knew

or at least had the possibility of knowing when he addressed problems on which
his teacher had already commented or on which he had an opinion.
28Ibid., 213-14. For this reason Kjeldgaard-Pedersen has no intention of

undertaking a detailed comparison of the respective "theologies" of Agricola and
Luther.
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must be said that the great merit of his work is the careful textual analysis that he
provides and his great attention to detail.29
Apart from those books which may touch on antinomianism or deal with
some of the questions connected with it,30 there are really only four works which
deal with the our topic or at least with aspects of it. We begin with the two
shortest. The article written by Heinz Eisenhuth is a brief survey of the history of
the antinomian controversy, the teaching of Agricola, and Luther's position on
the basis of the disputations.31 This essay is the most fruitful for our own work.
The author approaches the topic by positing two theses which, in his opinion,
sum up Luther's stance in the discussions, and which he then subdivides into
several sections to show how each thesis is worked out.
29We

agree with his complaint that modern Lutherforschung tends to be
in too much of a hurry to proceed from one controversial issue to the next
without taking the time to enter into discussion on the basis of a detailed analysis
of the texts. This method, in our opinion, is the only way to proceed without
leaving oneself open to the charge of pure arbitrariness. Of course, already the
very selection of texts, let alone one's own interpretative approach and
presuppositions leaves plenty of scope for subjectivity!
30The following are the most important: Albrecht Peters, Gesetz und
Evangelium, vol. 2 of Handbuch Systematischer Theologie, ed. Carl Heinz Ratschow
(GUtersloh: GUtersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1981); Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und
Freiheit: Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche
Parainese, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968); Lauri Haikola,
Usus Legis, (Upsala: n.p., 1958; reprinted Helsinki, 1981); Hans Joachim Iwand,
Glaubensgerechtigkeit: Lutherstudien, ed. Gerhard Sauter, 2d ed. (Munich: Chr.
Kaiser Verlag, 1991); Gerhard Ebeling, "Zur Lehre vom triplex usus legis in der
reformatorischen Theologie," in Wort und Glaube. 3d ed. (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr
(Paul Siebeck), 1960); and James Nestingen, "Luther: The Death and Resurrection
of Moses," in Dialog 22 (1983): 275-279.
31Heinz Erich Eisenhuth, "Luther und der Antinomismus," in, In
Disciplina Domini: In der Schule des Herrn, Tharinger kirchliche Studien, vol. 1
(Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1963), 18-44.
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The first thesis: lex non est docenda, is treated under the following heads: a)
Nature and effect of the law, where Eisenhuth looks at the lex naturae and the
Decalogue under the theme: lex est ostensio peccati; b) Law and Gospel, where he
shows that, in spite of their exclusivity, they are indissoluble connected with each
other. The law must be interpreted in the light of the gospel. Thus he argues that
paedagogus in Christum is the proper definition of the law.32
The second thesis: peccatum omnino mortuum est is treated under the
following heads: a) Christ and the law, where he shows that for faith the
demanding and accusing law has been abolished. The law is now newly
grounded in Christ. b) The law, repentance and justification. Here he tries to
show that in repentance the word of the judging and gracious God is affirmed.
Faith and repentance cannot be separated. As Luther says, we are now justified
imputative but not yet formaliter. Hence, the Christian encounters the law both as
lex impleta and as lex implenda. It is in this section that Eisenhuth argues against
the idea of a tertius usus legis and instead follows Joest and Althaus. c) Law, Holy
Spirit, and church. Here he stresses that the Holy Spirit works through the law,
contra antinomos, but not as gift. Luther differs with the antinomians also on the
matter of ecclesiology: The ecclesia is indeed already sancta, but it is that only per
synecdochen. He rejects the false eschatology of the antinomians which sees the
church already now pure and holy. Invoking the idea of the twofold righteousness, Luther says every Christian can be seen in a twofold way: in praedicamento relationis (= justification is imputative), and in praedicamento qualitatis (the
reliquiae peccatorum must be combated expurgative).33
32Ibid., 9-13.
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The foregoing ideas, which represent a brief summary of Luther's position
as drawn up by Eisenhuth, will be explained and discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
In the final section he reflects on the significance of the rejection of
antinomianism for the church. He says that Luther advances nothing essentially
new in the disputations in comparison with his earlier teaching, only he presents
it in a tighter form. However, this statement will need to be nuanced more
carefully in the light of our discussion of the relation between early and later
Luther. All in all, this essay, while not yielding any groundbreaking insights, is a
good summary of some of the main arguments presented by Luther in the three
disputations within their historical context.
The second essay to address our topic, and probably even more important
than the foregoing because of its critical approach, is that by Rudolf Hermann.34
He stresses that Luther does not talk so much about the cancellation or
abrogation of the law as of its having been overcome by Christ. Hence, even
though the law continues for Christians, insofar as they are still sinners, they can
nonetheless exult over its conquest because through faith in Christ it can no
longer harm or condemn them. Hermann wants to underscore the fact that the
position Luther takes vis-à-vis the antinomians never leads him to the point
where Christ as the bringer of salvation becomes superfluous. Christians can
never get beyond Christ because he is always the evangelizator pauperum et miserorum,35 for the abiding validity of the law continues to remind them that they
33Ibid., 13-21.
34Rudolf Hermann, Zum Streit urn die Uberwindung des Gesetzes: Erikterungen zu Luthers Antinomerthesen (Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger,
1958).
35WA 39 I, 538, 11-12 (3 AD, Arg. 18).
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are sinners. Hermann argues that Luther understands the law in basically
functional terms; that is, the law is described more in terms of what is does than
what it is; the law is not so much a statute as a principle. Thus, as Luther says, the
law is anything that discharges the duties of the law. That which is constitutive
of the law is not really a court and a signature (this he does not explain), but its
function, namely, the verberare animum and premere cor, thus the pressure on the
conscience.36
Hermann also examines Luther's rejection of the antinomian argument
that repentance is based not on the violatio legis but on the violatio filii. Where the
gospel has also to take over the office of the law it will inevitably mean that the
gospel is deprived of providing certain comfort to those tortured by the grave
Anfechtungen caused by the devil. The antinomians, on the other hand, could
claim that Luther himself makes a law out of the gospel, inasmuch as he too can
find the law in the beneficia Christi (considered as a motive of repentance).37
Hermann raises an important point when he observes that decisive for
Luther's understanding of repentance is the matter of transition
[abertragungsproblem]: the concern that at the right time (which is reserved to the
Holy Spirit) the penitent conscience embraces faith and does not let itself be
detained or interrogated by the law.38 Particularly important are his reflections
36Ibid, 19-20; cf. WA 39 I, 536, 14. There is some similarity here between

Hermann's emphasis and that of Th. Harnack, Luthers Theologie mit besonderer
Beziehung auf seine Versohnungs- and Erlosungslehre (Munich: Ch. Kaiser Verlag,
1926; original, 1862).
37Hermann, Zum Streit urn die Uberwindung des Gesetzes, 22-25.
38Ibid., 28.
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on the problem of the fulfillment of the law through Christ, especially on how
Luther uses the terms primum and insuper (or deinde). If the first is equated with
the forgiveness of sins (justification), then what Luther describes as happening
next through the work of the Holy Spirit in sanctification seems to go beyond the
forgiveness of sins. But is not the Spirit already fully given with the forgiveness
of sins? This problem will be taken up again later.
Without a doubt the monograph by Martin Schloemann, although it
concentrates more narrowly on just one problem: the unity of the law in Luther,
and in the antinomian disputations in particular, is an outstanding piece of
scholarship and has proved very helpful in arriving at a clearer understanding of
the relation between the natural law and the preached law.39 He contends that
these two laws are one, both in terms of what they demand (content) and what
they do (office). In fact he argues that Luther understands all laws, whether
natural, divine, or human, as fundamentally one, because of their common
demand, and sets them all in antithesis to the gospel. Hence, Luther in this
mature writings never distinguishes between laws in such a way as to make the
gospel the highest form of the law (nova lex or lex spiritualis), as he did in his
earlier years under Augustinian influence, but rather he holds to the unity of the
law and sees it in contradistinction to the gospel4o Furthermore, he holds that
39Martin Schloemann, Natiirliches and Gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther: eine
Studie zur Frage nach der Einheit der Gesetzesauffassung Luthers mit besonderer
Beriicksichtigung seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den Antinomern.
40Schloemann in the course of his work engages in debate with two

scholars, both of whom he criticizes because they represent a type of Lutherdeutung which fails to distinguish between law and gospel: J. Heckel. Lex
charitatis: eine juristische Untersuchung iiber das Recht in der Theologie Martin Luthers
(Munich: Verlag der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1953); A. Siirala,
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for Luther the theological and spiritual office of the law, namely, to punish and to
drive to despair (the Strafamt and Zornesamt) is fundamentally given with every
law, even if it is not preached. Moreover, the preached law does not demand
anything "higher" than that already demanded by the law of nature, but it
clarifies and sharpens that demand and shows that its author is God. The
preaching of the law refers back to, and reminds us of, the natural experience of
the law, which is always present. In this the Christian preacher is just following
Moses, who was simply an interpreter and illustrator of the law written on the
hearts of all people.41 Finally, Schloemann argues that one of the most effective
ways that Luther countered antinomianism was through a renewed presentation
of the condemning universality of the law and the fact that this is inextricably
rooted by nature in the earthly existence of human beings.42
The final work to be considered is an unpublished dissertation written by
Gerd Rosenberger.43 Since this covers the same subject area as our own research
Gottes Gebot bei Martin Luther (Helsinki: n.p., 1956). Both works attribute to
Luther a supralapsarian approach to the conception of the law. The difference
between them lies in the fact that Heckel, being oriented to Barth, operates more
"christocentrically" (pp. 20, 51,173), while Siirala, being oriented to Lundensian
theology, operates more "theocentrically" (pp. 46ff., 53ff., 186-7). By beginning
with a single will and word of God, understood as lex spiritualis, gottliches
Naturgesetz, ewiges Gesetz, Gottes Gebot etc, they break up Luther's conception of
the law from within. This problematical approach, first noted by F. Lau, Leges
charitatis: drei Fragen an Johannes Heckel in Kerygma und Dogma 2 (1956): 76ff, has
found its way into the Luther-literature which is theologically dependent on
them. It is clear from the sources used that such an approach works almost exclusively with the writings of the early Luther, before he understood justification
and learned to distinguish between law and gospel. For a critique of Heckel and
Siirala (Siirala basicallys follows Heckel), see Schloemann, 10-22, and 51, n. 235.
41Schloemann, Natiirliches und Gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther, 104-105.
42Ibid., 131.
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it warrants a more detailed description. The chief difference between this work
and our own lies not only in the conclusions (at least in regard to the use of the
law in the Christian life) but also in the approach. Rosenberger's work is thematic and basically nonhistorical. It treats the disputations as dogmatic assertions
instead of as a response to a set of arguments which itself is part of Luther's continuing debate with the antinomians within his own camp. Since we do not have
the full dialog (the antinomian arguments or syllogisms normally encapsulate the
position Luther is opposing, or which he shows must at least be qualified), the
missing data has to be inferred or presupposed." Because Rosenberger does not
analyze any of the arguments as whole units but simply uses them to construct
an outline of Luther's position on key topoi, he takes no account of how Luther
argues his case against the positiones of his antinomian opponents.45
43Gerd Rosenberger, Gesetz and Evangelium in Luthers Antinomerdisputationen (Mainz Diss., 1958).

"The most reliable sources to assist in reconstructing the theology of
the antinomians are first of all their own positiones antinomicae, and secondly
Agricola's own writings. These will be investigated in ch. 2.
45We note in passing that this purely systematic, nonhistorical approach
to the sources is one of the major weaknesses of another dissertation mentioned
above: Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers spdten Disputationen. This
work covers all of Luther's later disputations (from 1533 onwards) and not just
the antinomians disputations. It may be possible to treat the other disputations
in a purely thematic way because they do not presuppose the complex historical
background that we find associated with the antinomian disputatons. Although
the focus of Schmidt's research is christology (specifically, his task is to determine
whether Luther stands in the christological tradition of the early church), as part
of his background work he refers to the key Luther-texts in areas germane to our
work such as the nature of the law, Christ and the law, the law-gospel dialectic,
contrition and repentance, faith and love, and the twofold justification in connection with the simul iustus et peccator thesis. However, even here the treatment
is disappointing, especially from a Lutheran point of view. His main interest lies
in discussing subjects that have traditionally been a source of dispute between
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His work falls into three main sections: A. The unfulfilled law; B. The
fulfilled law; C. Law and gospel. These sections are then subdivided. Under A.
he treats the universality of the law and the use of the law; under B. Christ as the
end of the law, the abiding Amt of the law, and the freedom of the believer from
the law in the writings of early Luther. The final section has no subdivision but
attempts to show that the tertius usus legis is grounded in the relationship of law
and gospel. He works extensively with Wilfried Joest but we cannot always
agree with his criticism. He maintains, on the basis of a survey of key writings
from Luther's earlier period (from 1520 onwards) that, in contrast to the antinomian disputations, Luther knows of no use of the law there that norms the
Christian life or the battle of believers against sin. Even though at this point the
antinomian disputations are unique, Rosenberger does not see any contradiction
here with Luther's earlier statements. Rather, he argues that already in the young
Luther law and gospel are grounded in the will of God, even if the line of the
tertius usus legis is only drawn out much later. Hence, he claims that the third
use can be inserted quite naturally into Luther's theology of the law, without
contradicting his basic thesis that law and gospel are fundamentally antithetical.
However, he does not see it grounded in the law per se as the perfect divine rule
for a God-pleasing life, but rather in the fact that the believer, understood
exclusively as totus iustus-totus peccator, still needs a norm to live as God intended
[noch einer Richtschnur bedarf, um in der gewollten Ordnung des Schopfers zu leben].46
This matter will need to be taken up in chapter 4 and discussed again in the light
Lutherans and Catholics. See also Rudolf Keller's review in Luther: Zeitschrift der
Luthergesellschaft 66/1 (1995): 47-48, which, while it tries to be as charitable as
possible, also criticizes him for ignoring the historical background entirely.
46Gerd

Rosenberger, Gesetz and Evangelium, 104.
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of our own analysis of the disputations. It is sufficient at this point to say that
Rosenberger takes over many of Joest's insights but does not follow him in his
attempt to reinterpret the tertius usus legis of later Lutheranism along evangelical
lines by replacing it with the usus practicus evangelii.
Method of Approach
Now that we have discussed the sources and state of research we may proceed to outline the problems connected with our area of research and to state
clearly what we ourselves will attempt to show. We turn first to the historical
problem. As will become clear from Chapter 2, where we discuss the historical
background of the antinomian controversy, it is impossible to separate history
and theology. Consequently, the next chapter provides the theological background to the early antinomian controversy culminating in 1527 with the altercation between Agricola and Melanchthon over the use of the law in connection
with the visitation of the churches. Luther attempts to forge a settlement but it
does not last. During the major controversy of 1537-38, which is our area of
concentration, the key themes of a decade earlier are repeated with ever new
variations. Moreover, our picture of antinomianism will be considerably clearer
after our analysis of the document which the antinomians themselves circulated,
the positiones antinomicae, setting out their theology in thetic form. This will be
supplemented by an overview of Agricola's understanding of the law based on
one of his key documents 47 The main body of our research comes then in
main concern is with Lutherforschung and not Agricolaforschung;
our interest in Agricola research is not for its own sake but only insofar as it
sheds light on the antinomian controversy and allows us better to understand the
thinking of Luther. See Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium and Busse, 25-33
for a discussion of Agricolaforschung. In taking the approach we do, we realize
47Our
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chapter 3 with the translation and discussion of the three disputations (preceded
in each case by a translation and analysis of the respective Thesenreihe). This is
followed in chapter 4 by an attempt to pull together the chief insights to emerge
from our analysis in chapter 3 and to focus this research on those issues which we
will specific below as constituting the goal of our work. The conclusions will be
set out in the last chapter.
Since we are the first to undertake a systematic analysis of all the
argumenta and responsiones contained in each of the three disputations (at least in
recension or Relation A) in an attempt to examine Luther's way of doing theology
with the view to better understanding his answer to the antinomians, there is no
one single piece work which we can engage in ongoing discussion. Where
isolated arguments have been discussed in the literature mentioned above they
will be referenced.
Because there is considerable repetition of ideas we cannot discuss each
relevant topic in full every time it emerges in an argumentum or responsio. The
discussions reflect a natural unfolding of Luther's own position, often being
briefer at the beginning and fuller towards the end, so that the discussion of
topics in the second and third disputations will be more complete than in the
first. On the other hand, the first disputation is more replete with crossreferences than the second and third because once a major theme has been crossreferenced, it will not be repeated every time it recurs. The value of the crossreferences, especially within the antinomian disputations themselves, but also to
the other later disputations (and some times even beyond that) is that they
that we are numbered among those whom he criticizes for a onesided approach
to Agricola research which is narrowly interested in Agricola's theology of the
law and where it deviates from that of Luther.

22
establish the continuity of a line of thought (in some case the opposite) as well as
the coherence and consistency of Luther's thinking. Where Luther's position can
be supported by parallel references it lends weight to his argument and makes it
difficult to sustain the charge that it is purely arbitrary, inconsistent or without
precedent. Therefore, in the light of what we have said, there is a certain
unevenness to the discussion in chapter 3: in some places it is short, while in
others it is quite lengthy. There is also an unfolding of the argumentation.
Luther's position vis-à-vis antinomianism cannot be properly appreciated until
the final arguments have been heard. Furthermore, we have at places provided
summaries of Luther's exposition of key ideas. Sometimes these precede a
discussion of a new occurrence of that topic in order for us better to appreciate
any new accent or development of thought. At other times summaries may come
at the end of our discussion of an argument in order to sum up the main points
that have been made. In a work of this nature involving such a huge volume of
arguments and data it is necessary now and then to take stock and provide
periodic summaries.
Although, as we said above, the interaction with secondary literature is at
times minimal in chapter 3, in chapter 4 we will enter into a fuller discussion with
the literature in the areas that we single out for special attention. While clearly
our chief concern is with the antinomians disputations, we will permit ourselves
the liberty now and then to enter into a more general discussion of a topic within
our area of concentration. However, conclusions will only be drawn on the basis
of the data that we have analyzed, discussed and demonstrated. Whether or not
our conclusions can be corroborated by parallel references in the wider Luther
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corpus, while certainly always interesting, is finally of no importance for our
project.
Theses and Areas of Concentration
Our major task is to analyze the data of the disputations and to try to gain
a picture of how Luther responds to the threat posed by a rampant
antinomianism within sections of the evangelical churches. The nature of the
disputation is such that he is often forced to take arguments proposed by the
opponents, as his starting point, rather than those of his own, which may at times
hinder him from being as clear as he is when he is writing and lecturing.
In addition to our translation, analysis, and discussion of the three
antinomian disputations, we wish to focus our attention on several key areas
which should assist us in clarifying Luther's position and method of argumentation vis-à-vis the antinomians. To this end we wish to put forward the
following theses, not so much to defend in a formal sense, but to help guide and
focus our discussion.
1)Luther does not simply react to Agricola's antinomianism by overemphasizing the law (which would only lead to a nomian or "pronomian" error
in the opposite direction), but rather shows the impossibility of driving a wedge
between Christ and the law, for he claims that if the law is rejected Christ cannot
be retained as the savior of sinners. In other words, Luther contends against the
antinomians, not finally for the sake of the law but for the sake of Christ and the
gospel.
2)While antinomianism at its most basic level calls for the abolition of the
law (Decalogue) from the churches on the assumption that it has already been
fulfilled and abolished by Christ, it is also marked by other characteristic
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doctrinal distortions. Its chief error is rooted in its failure to understand the
scriptural doctrine of sin, which manifests itself in a one-sided anthropology (the
loss of the simul in the simul iustus et peccator) as well as a defective eschatology
(the loss of the "not yet"). The result is a false perfectionism where Christians are
already regarded as altogether sancti (and the ecclesia as sancta) not just imputative
but even formaliter.
3)The antinomian heresy rejects the law only to turn the gospel into a new
law (nova lex). This is clearly evident in Agricola's doctrine of repentance based
as it is on the gospel rather than the law, or, to use his language, on the violatio
flu rather than on the violatio legis. Luther, on the other hand, holds that
whatever exposes sin and preaches wrath is law, even if the words are those of
the gospel.
4)It is thoroughly consistent with the above when Agricola defends early
Luther against late Luther, thus showing himself to be the heir of Augustine, for
whom the gospel was the evangelical law (lex spiritualis).
5)To read the later tertius usus legis back into the Luther of the antinomian
disputations (or to claim that it is implicit in these texts) contradicts Luther's basic
understanding of the duplex usus legis. A third use of the law for Christians qua
saints fails to do justice to Luther's understanding of the usus legis in the Christian
life because a) he consistently holds that Christians need the law only insofar as
they are still sinners [in quantum peccatil; and b) it stems from a failure to
distinguish between law and gospel after justification. Furthermore, Luther's
evangelical use of apostolic parenesis is predicated on the fact that faith receives
the law as gift. Therefore, faith's use of the law, or the evangelical use of the law,
would be a better way of expressing this, terminologically, than tertius usus legis.

CHAPTER TWO
THE BACKGROUND OF THE FIRST
ANTINOMTAN CONTROVERSY

Three major antinomian controversies took place in Wittenberg in the sixteenth century, one during Luther's lifetime and two after his death.1 The first
controversy, which is the subject of our study, had its beginnings in 1527 in an
argument between Johann Agricola and Philipp Melanchthon. The occasion for
this was the visitation of the churches in electoral Saxony and the major issue was
the role of the law in repentance. The main phase of the first controversy however was the dispute between Agricola and Luther between 1537 and 1540. The
issue was basically the same. The second and third antinomian controversy,
which broke out after Luther's death, were between the Philippists and the
Gnesio-Lutherans.2 The issue at stake this time was the question of the third use
1Some scholars number them differently and as a result end up

speaking of three antinomians controversies. Thus, Gustav Hammann, Nomismus
and Antinomismus innerhalb der Wittenberger Theologie von 1524-1530 (Dissertation
Bonn, 1952), VIII (Vorwort), instead of taking the dispute of 1527 as the initial
phase [Vorspiel] of the first controversy that broke out a decade later, regards the
early dispute as the First Antinomian Controversy and the following one as the
Second (or Great) Antinomian Controversy. According to this reckoning, the
controversy that flared up again after Luther death would have to be the third.
We will follow the more common nomenclature because the issues at the center
of the controversy in 1537 are basically the same as those discussed a decade
earlier.
2Some further comments will be made about this controversy at the end
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of the law. The matter was finally settled by the Formula of Concord.3
This chapter, in which we will occupy ourselves with the background to
the antinomian controversy of 1537-40, is divided into two parts, one dealing
with history, the other with theology. Although these have been divided, they
are of course inseparable as the presentation itself will show. Even when we are
tracing the historical development of the controversy we will be discussing theology. We begin with a study of the historical background, focusing especially
on the preliminary dispute between Agricola and Melanchthon in the second half
of the 1520s, and then the unfolding of the controversy proper between Luther
and Agricola a decade later. Although this controversy spans the years 1537-40,
our research will concentrate on the years 1537-38 because it is during these two
years that the three famous disputations, which are the subject of the next chapter, took place. Although there was one final opportunity in 1540 which Luther
seized on to refute the antinomian error, namely, the licentiate examination of
Johannes Kirlin, which has traditionally been numbered among the antinomian
disputations, this time Luther himself only played a comparatively minor role
and the arguments were not really new. Since that disputation is not analyzed in
the next chapter, the circumstances surrounding it will not be discussed in detail.
For the sake of completeness however we will at least outline the history of the
controversy up till 1540.
of this section.
3FC SD VI, Vom dritten Brauch des Gesetzes Gottes (BSLK, 962-69). The
preceding article, V, Vom Gesetz and Evangelium, picks up the main points of the
earlier controversy between Luther and Agricola (BSLK, 951-61). While each of
the controversies has its distinctive emphasis, these are not mutually exclusive so
that it should not surprize us to discover (as we will see in our analysis of the
disputations) that Luther makes many remarks that have a bearing on the problem of the tertius usus legis. This matter will also be taken up again in ch. 4.
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The second part of this chapter will concentrate on the theology of the
antinomians and of Agricola, their chief leader. This will take us into an analysis
of the positions antinomicae, the "official" doctrinal statement of the antinomians,
which Luther published together with his own counter-theses. This will be supplemented by material from Agricola's own writings in order to build up as
comprehensive a picture of antinomian theology as possible.
The Rise of Antinomianism in Wittenberg
We begin with a brief sketch of the early life of John Agricola,4 the key
figure in the First Antinomian controversy, and his relationship with Luther.5 He
4Agricola is a Latinization of Schneider and Schnitter (WA TR 4, 270, 21-

24). He was also called Eisleben or (Eis-)Islebius, after his place of birth, to distinguish him from others of the same name. Hence, Luther nicknamed him
"Grickel."
5The standard work on the relationship between Luther and Agricola is
Joachim Rogge, Johann Agricolas Lutherverstiindnis unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung
des Antinomismus (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1960). Although our work
concentrates on the period 1537-38, yet the early history of the relationship
between these two men and their theological divergence is very important for the
light it sheds on the antinomian controversy that erupts in the second half of the
1530s. Rogge's work is not intended as a biography, but it is probably the best
detailed treatment of the relationship between Agricola and Luther, athough his
too eager attempt to rehabilitate Agricola sometimes prevents us from agreeing
with his interpretation. However, the basic biographical work still remains
Gustav Kawerau's Johann Agricola von Eisleben (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz,
1881), even though it needs correction in places in the light of more recent
scholarship.
Two more specialized works deserve special mention: the Bonn dissertation
by Gustav Hammann (mentioned above) and the monograph by Steffen
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse: Theologiegeschichtliche Studien
zum Verhaltnis zwischen dem jungen Johann Agricola (Eisleben) und Martin Luther
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983). On a smaller scale but no less incisive is the essay by
Ernst Koch of Leipzig, written in commemoration of the five hundredth anniversary of the birthday of Martin Luther: Ernst Koch, "Johann Agricola neben
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was born (most probably in 1494) in Eisleben. We do not have much information
about his childhood and youth. He entered the university in Leipzig in 1509/10
but did not finish his doctorate. Instead, he took up school teaching (probably in
Brunswick). Hence, he did not become a theologian right away. His early
relationship with Luther was close and cordial. Both were troubled in their
younger years with the fear and anxiety born of a troubled conscience—Agricola
also experienced a "Turmerlebnis" like Luther6—and both knew first hand the
freedom and comfort brought by the gospel. It is difficult to date the beginning
of Luther's theological influence on Agricola. It is usually thought that Agricola
first met Luther in Wittenberg on 6 January 1516 after being profoundly moved
by his Epiphany Day sermon, but that is no longer certain.? Luther made such a
deep impression on Agricola that he always continued to look upon him as his
spiritual father, even during the years of controversy.8 Agricola was decisively
shaped by Luther over the next five years and developed a very close friendship
Luther: Schillerschaft and theologische Eigenart," in Lutheriana: Archiv zur
Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers, vol. 5, ed. Gerhard Hammer and KarlHeinz zur Miihlen (Cologne and Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 1984), 131-50. These are
the key secondary sources that will guide our discussion in this section. The
standard reference works (e. g. TRE, RE, RGG) do not contain anything new, in
fact often the author of the article "Agricola" or "antinomianism" will often be a
person who has one of the above books.
6 Koch,

Johann Agricola, 150.

?The basis for this was Agricola's remark: "ex eo tempore factum est, vt me
ad omnia sua offitia perpetuo accerseret Lutherus" (E. Thiele, Denkwiirdigkeiten aus dem
Leben des Johann Agricola von Eisleben, von ihm selbst aufgezeichnet, in ThStKr 80
[1907]: 253 n. 2).
C. E. Forstemann, Neues Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der evangelischen Kirchen-Reformation (Hamburg: n.p., 1842), 319 b: "Es ist Luther, den ich alweg
alss meyn vater an Gottes stadt gehalten habe, durch welchen ich auch ein Christe vnd
Gottes kind worden bin."
8See
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with him.9 He helped Luther post the Ninety-Five Theses to the door of the
Castle Church in Wittenberg, he served as secretary at the Leipzig Disputation,
edited Luther's sermons on the Lord's Prayer,10 in 1519 became magister in bibliis,
in 1521 set himself up publicly as Luther's defender, and in 1523 became
av Oyu) crrnc in the divine service.11 Although it was with Luther in particular
that he was to develop such close ties (which included their families also), he and
Melanchthon were also very close friends,12 and undoubtedly he was influenced
9The question of the young Luther's theological influence on the young

Agricola is a topic for itself. See Koch, Johann Agricola, 133-40, 146; he shows that
three periods in Luther's early life are decisive for Agricola: The Romerbriefvorlesung (1515/16), the Auslegung der sieben Buflpsalmen (1517), and the Operationes in psalmos (1519/21). Luther's Romans lectures were probably the first
occasion Agricola had to hear the young doctor lecture. Here he would have
heard him developing his humilitas theology and the idea that God's actions are
always sub contraria specie (cf. Rom. 57 I, 193, 1-18; 56, 375, 14-378, 17). According
to his comments on Rom. 8: 7 and 8: 15, true repentance does not arise out of fear
but out of love: "Non enim timendo, Sed amando fugitur ira Dei et miseria atque horror
Iudicii et per conformitatem voluntatis Dei quietatur conscientia" (WA 56, 365, 16-20).
A comparison of Agricola's treatment of the Zacchaeus pericope (Luke 19: 1-10),
which had great influence on him, with Luther's exposition shows both lines of
continuity and peculiar emphases (Koch, 138-39).
10See Koch, Johann Agricola, 134, n. 21, for the change he makes to

Luther's understanding of the passion of Jesus in his edition of Luther's
Vaterunserauslegung (1519).
11RE I (3d. ed.), 250; ThStKr (1907): 255; ThLZ (1887): 61. We have no

date for Melanchthon's statement that Agricola ist a xarnxritric in Wittenberg
(ZHT [1872]: 360). Hammann, in note 13 to § 2 shows that Kawerau's statement
(Johann Agricola, 31) as well as RE I (3d. ed.), 250, that already in 1521 Luther had
appointed Agricola to teach biblical studies to the parish youth, can no longer be
supported since the publication of Agricola's autobiographical notes by E. Thiele,
Denkwiirdigkeiten, 246-70).
12It was Melanchthon who taught him philosophy in the Arts Faculty

before both of them went on and studied theology, graduating in the same year
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by his early theology.13 After a few years of vocational indecision, he followed
Luther's advice and in 1523 began teaching exegesis in the theology department
of the university where he was highly valued as an interpreter of scripture.14
What is difficult to account for is why in 1525 he suddenly left his circle of friends
in Wittenberg and accepted the offer of appointment (made by the Count of
Mansfeld) as director of the newly established Latin school in Eisleben. In
addition to his school responsibilities he assumed the duty of preacher, although,
like Melanchthon, was never ordained to the holy ministry. His hopes of
obtaining a professorship at Wittenberg suffered a set back when in 1526
Melanchthon was appointed to a newly founded chair in the theological faculty.
This also seems to have caused a serious rift in their friendship. He would have
to wait another ten years before Luther, at the instigation of the elector, summoned him to Wittenberg to take part in a conference on the Smalcald Articles,
with a view to securing his appointment to a chair.15 Meanwhile, during his time
in Eisleben he prepared exegetical lectures which then later formed the basis for
his commentary on the Gospel of Luke.
Sandwiched between Agricola's first and second Wittenberg periods is the
(1519). Both of them married the following year and their friendship continued to
be very close until Agricola left Wittenberg.
Koch, Johann Agricola, 146. We will discuss this further when we
consider Agricola's theology.
13Ernst

14Thiele, Denkwiirdiglceiten, 253-55, noted by Hammann, Nomismus und
Antinomismus § 2 n. 15. Agricola was often later criticized for being ambitious
and seeking admiration in his formative years.
15E.

L. Enders, Dr. Martin Luther's Briefwechsel, vol. 11 (Calw & Stuttgart:
Verlag der Vereinsbuchhandlung, 1907), 143-45 (Kurfurst Johann Friedrich von
Sachsen an Luther und die ubrigen Theologen, 11 December 1536), and 147-48 (Joh.
Agricola an Luther, 18 December 1536).
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dispute between himself and Melanchthon over the law and repentance, which as
well as having a second episode ten years later, also has a prelude in a dispute in
1524 over the method of preaching employed by Dominicus Beyer in Tetschen
(Bohemia).16 He stressed that the preaching of the law reveals sins and thus prepares for the preaching of faith. On the other hand, there were some (obviously
of an antinomian persuasion), chief among whom was Martin Becker, who
objected to this. They claimed that Christ has given command to preach the gospel not the law. This was reported to Luther in a letter by Wolf von Saalhausen
with a request for his considered opinion. Luther's answer is very instructive)-7
He says that Christians, real Christians, do not live their life under the law, that
is, under external compulsion; just as little however do they live in a gospel
which, after it has been separated from the law, is understood now as principally
freedom in worldly things, but Christians live rather in faith, that is, in an "extra,"
unseen by us, of servanthood and freedom. Through the word of God and the
presence of Christ, Christians are new people who exercise and preserve their
16Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus, 1-9, whose analysis of this
controversy we will follow, calls this 1524 dispute a Vorspiel because, just as a
prelude already contains all the themes of the following work, so too this dispute
is a minature of the main controversy three years later (which Hammann calls the
First Antinomian Controversy). In each case, two voices are sounded in opposition to each other, to which Luther's voice is then added as a third and independent voice. Retaining the musical metaphor, in our terminology, the First
Antinomian Controversy has a prelude (1524) and two movements: in the first
(1527) we hear the two principal voices of Agricola and Melanchthon, which are
sounded in counterpoint; in the second and main movement the principal voices
are Luther and Agricola, and although the same themes reappear, this time they
are expanded and arranged in a complex variety of variations.
17WA 15, 228-29 (Ein Sendbrief des Herrn Wolfen von Saalhausen an
D. Martin Luther, 27 June 1524).

32
faith precisely by serving the neighbor in the orders and laws of this world. But
since real Christians can never be separated empirically from sham Christians,
but are known only by God, law and gospel must be preached side by side. In
that way the wicked are urged to external goodness and uprightness through the
preaching of the law (and the worldly sword).
Thus Luther confirms Beyer's preaching about the abiding office of the law
in the worldly things. In fact he even goes a step further when he says that
basically it is more necessary to preach God's law than the gospel, because there
are many wicked people who must be restrained through the compulsion of the
law. To some this sounds as if Luther has changed from his earlier evangelical
position. But this represents no change of view. Rather, it is simply evidence of
the fact that Luther finds it necessary, in view of the special situation confronting
him, to emphasis one side of Christian preaching more strongly than he needed
to previously.
In answer to the second question put to him, whether the law had first to
be satisfied before faith could be given to us, he showed how far removed he was
from Beyer. While the latter had demanded the fulfillment of the law at all costs
(either by us ourselves, or indirectly, by Christ's substitutionary fulfillment for
us, Luther holds that the fulfillment of the law by us is virtually impossible. And
while Beyer moreover had said that man has to fulfill the law or at least confess
that he has not, Luther makes it much clearer that God uses the law to compel us
to confess our sins and to seek his help, so that there is no room for any human
achievement prior to faith. Hammann suggests that in this second question
Luther stands apart from Beyer when he rules out not only antinomianism but
nomism as well. For faith these opposites are not only removed but combined
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because the Christian fulfills the law precisely because he stands in the freedom
of the gospel. Beyer had said just the opposite: Only that person who fulfills the
law or who acquires its fulfillment through the confession of sins and the prayer
for forgiveness can come to the gospel, to faith, and become a Christian. Luther,
on the other hand, says that the Christian, the new being, also does good works
precisely because he already has faith and is already a new being.18
Clearly this letter did not put an end the dispute for later in the same year
(1524) Beyer and Becker, at the suggestion of their patron, traveled to Wittenberg
to speak to the acknowledged authorities of evangelical theology in order to have
this matter resolved. Their agreement [Vertrag] on the doctrine of the law
reached by Luther, Melanchthon and Bugenhagen stressed the following: 1) The
law is to be preached to show and punish sin; 2) it must be preached so that the
godless and uneducated people live disciplined lives for the sake of the common
peace; 3) works are not meritorious for grace remains God's free gift. This teaching of the double function of the law agrees with Luther's original views. For as
yet we hear nothing of the tertius usus legis introduced into theology later by Melanchthon. In fact it says nothing about the place of the law in an ordo salutis.19
There is no mention of the fact that sinners cannot receive God's grace before they
have first experienced the terror of the law, but it simply says that the gospel
does not give people the comfort of the forgiveness of sin who do not know or
18WA 7, 61, 35-38 (Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen, 1520): Ita

necesse est, primum personam ipsam hominis esse bonam vel malam, antequam faciat
bonum vel malum opus, et opera sua non faciunt eum malum aut bonum, sed ipse facit
opera sua aut mala aut bona.
19Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus, 7, is right in accusing

Kawerau of eisegesis when he says the "Bedeutung des Gesetzes fur Heilsordnung"
is stressed in the Gutachten of the Wittenbergers.
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acknowledge their Sin.20 Nevertheless, there is a difference between Luther's
letter and the Gutachten of the Wittenbergers which must not be overlooked: 1)
The Gutachen is more doctrinal in that it separates the locus de lege from its context within the rest of theology and treats its in isolation; 2) comfort is put under
the gifts of the gospel, whereas Luther in his letter spoke of grace;21 3) above all,
the Gutachten is silent about the fact that it is God who compels and urges us
through the law to acknowledge our sin and seek his grace: Here it is rather the
law itself that shows and punishes sin.22
The merit of the Saalhausen'sche Vorspiel, to use the musical metaphor, is
that it introduces us to the major themes to be heard in the first of the two movements comprising the First Antinomian Controversy. In Becker we meet the proponent of an evangelical theology that approves a one-sided preaching of grace
(completely separated from the law), which already bears a distinctive antinomian stamp. Over against the libertinistic currents that could have spread as a consequence of it, Beyer seeks rather to preach reformation theology in all its fullness. He gives great emphasis to the validity of the law for the worldly order,
but at the same time begins to make faith independent of the law and works and
thus lapses into a nomism that at first is scarcely noticeable. Luther adopts a
position midway between these two men, yet with his strong emphasis on the
20WA 15, 229,19-20 (Antwort Doctor Martini Luthers, 3 August 1527).
21WA 15, 229,19; 228, 26.
22WA 15, 229,15-16. These three points are highlighted by Hammann,
Nomismus and Antinomismus, 7. He maintains that while these differences may
only seem slight, the events of later years would show that the problematical
features of Melanchthon's theology had their beginnings in just such statements.
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preaching of the law he seems to have come closer to nomism than Beyer.23 But
what Luther says here applies only to the validity of the law in the world. How
exactly Luther will speak about the law and faith is not yet fully clear.
It comes as no surprise to learn that the main themes from the Vorspiel are
repeated in the dispute between Agricola and Melanchthon in 1527 for Agricola's
ideas have not changed. His characteristic emphasis, that repentance is not produced by the law but results from preaching of the gospel, put him on a collision
course with Melanchthon, who after discovering with Luther during the visitation of the churches that repentance had been abandoned altogether and that
Christian liberty had given way to carnal license, came to the conviction that the
law had to be preached more emphatically, for the law was necessary for repentance.24 Melanchthon set out his basic theological convictions for the visitors in
his Visitation Articles (1527),25 which, after minor alterations, were later included
23Thus Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 8.

24Hammann, Nomism und Antinomism, 116, condudes that the nomistic
stamp of Melanchthon's doctrine of repentance is not simply the result of the
appalling conditions of the church and the moral laxity of the people discovered
by the visitors. Rather, he holds that the nomism that manifests itself here is
constitutive of Melanchthon's theology and as such informs all its different areas.
25 Articuli de quibus egerunt per Visitatores (CR 26, 7ff). These articles

were printed without the knowledge of Melanchthon and against his will (WA
26,182), in both German and Latin (CR 26, 7ff). The document contains
seventeen articles, among others: Von der Lehre; Von den zehn Geboten; Von der
rechten christlichen Bulk; Von der rechten christlichen Genugtuung far die Siinden.
However, the order in the shorter Latin form is quite different: The article Vom
Kreuz comes second, and that Vom Gesetz only right at the end. With the collapse
of the old church structures new norms needed to be established to govern
personal conduct and ecclesiastical practises. This probably is the reason that the
Articles of Visitation give a stronger emphasis to the role of the Decalogue (including obedience to the authorities) and the need for repentance than to the doct-
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in the well-known Instructions for the Visitors of Parish Pastors in Electoral Saxony
(1528) along with a preface by Luther.26 In spite of some minor improvements,
the doctrine of repentance of the Instructions remained exactly what it had been
previously in the Visitation Articles. Again repentance is understood as remorse
and suffering of the heart over sin, terror and fear of God's wrath, punishment
and judgment, and only occasionally the mortification of the flesh. From this it is
clear that Melanchthon's preferred terms are remorse and suffering. But above
all we find here once again that faith is viewed as independent of the foregoing
repentance. Just as in the Visitation Articles here also God is the active subject of
repentance, on the one hand, and man, when he is admonished and encouraged
to repent, on the other. Furthermore, we miss here, as before, a separate article
rine of justification (although of course it was presupposed). Even making allowances for the fact that the theological emphases were conditioned by the situation, we agree with Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: Zweiter Band: Ordung und
Abgrenzung der Reformation, 1521-1532 (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1986), 263, that it
is regretable that the gospel does not come out more clearly. Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 113, on the other hand, reminds us that Luther never regarded the document as a theological treatise but saw it as a practical document
to show pastors how they must teach, and one which he hoped they would willingly use for the sake of the gospel. He valued it because it summarized the
chief articles of the Christian faith in a simple way that could be easily understood. He did not see the Articles of Visitation as an end in itself but as a means of
establishing orderly conditions in the Saxon Church. For an analysis of the
Articles, see Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 61-71.
26The Visitation Articles, with a few modifications and a preface by
Luther, also appear in the works of Luther under the title Unterricht der
Visitatoren an die Pfarrherrn im Kwfiirstentum zu Sachsen (WA 26, 195), for in the
final analysis the theology is his, although the formulations are Melanchthon's.
The preface had the effect of sloping the document in a more evangelical
direction and making it sound less like a papal bull. When Luther reissued it in
1538 he made some noteworthy evangelical alterations. For details on the
historicak background, see the introduction by Thiele and Brenner (WA 26, 17582).
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on Christ, the Word of God, faith and justification.27
The main issue in this controversy was the place of faith and justification
in the context of salvation. Agricola continued to uphold what he had heard
preached so emphatically by Luther at the beginning of the Reformation: Christ is
the end of the law (Rom. 10: 4). The person who is righteous ex fide is no longer
under the wrath of God.28 In addition, the Lukaskommentar shows that repentance for Agricola is not connected to the law, nor is it even temporally antecedent to justification, but it is located in various other places.29 From his point of
view then Melanchthon's stress on the law and repentance and the necessity of
terrifying the conscience before preaching the gospel all smacked of that papistic
legalism from which Luther had delivered the church through the preaching of
the gospel. However, Agricola's protest against Melanchthon's doctrine of repentance in the Visitation Articles went unheeded.30 The theological discussions
27Hammann, Nomism und Antinomism, 115.
28Luther, at the beginning of his mid-career, set out his view of the law

in great detail in Confutatio rationis Latomianae (WA 8, 43-128).
29See Joachim Rogge, "hmerlutherische Streitigkeiten um Gesetz und

Evangelium, Rechtfertigung und Heiligung," ed. Helmar Junghans, in Leben und
Werk Martin Luthers von 1526 bis 1546. Festgabe zu seinem 500. Geburtstag, vol. 1 of
2 vols. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 187-204. Rogge's analysis of
this early dispute between Agricola and Melanchthon is very instructive. His approach is in many ways is very congenial to Gustav Hammann's work, Nomismus
und Antinomismus, which traverses the same territory, but in much greater detail,
yet for some strange reason he fails to mention him. See below for a summary of
Hammann's analysis of the Lukaskommentar.
30He and others attacked Melanchthon harshly, "er krtiche wieder ruck-

warts" (see H. Hermelink and W. Maurer, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 3d.
ed. [Tubingen, 19311, 139). Agricola also objected to Melanchthon's insistence
that the Decalogue had to be diligently expounded by pastors. In the Hundert
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during the first phase of the First Antinomian Controversy had no noticeable
effect on the way in which Melanchthon formulated the visitation document.
The crucial doctrine of repentance remained unaltered. Agricola responded by
writing what amounted to a censura.31
und Dreiflig gemeiner Fragestiicice fib- die jungen Kinder (1527)—in 1528 this is
expanded to 156 and later to 321 questions (Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 73)--he
claimed that the law no longer has any place in Christian preaching but is useful
only for the maintenance of order among the crude masses. Repentance is not
produced by the law nor by the threat of judgment. This can only follow as a
fruit of faith after the preaching of grace. It is the sight of God's love in the
sacrificial death of Christ that brings about repentance and faith (cf. CR 1, 915: ab
amore iustitiae). The law is not a precursor of the gospel but a "verfehlter Versuch
Gottes" to rescue mankind. Repentance does not have its origins in the fear of
punishment, but in the love of God. This comes out especially in Fragen 75-78;
see Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 142-43.
31WA Br 4, 323, 44 47 (Agricola an Luther; 3 January 1528). The

question of the relationship between Melanchthon and Agricola merits far greater
attention than we can give here. Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, has
made an valuable contribution to the discussion (see esp. pp. 143-54). He
maintains that Melanchthon was never able to make a clean break with his preWittenberg humanism. The difference that 1518 made for him is that his
humanism now no longer has a philosophical but a theological foundation. His
position is really a synthesis between his earlier humanism and Luther's
theology. Agricola, on the other hand, comes to Wittenberg without any
philosophical baggage and was decisively shaped theologically by Luther (albeit
it the early Luther!). In the preliminary antinomian controversy, Hammann
argues, Melanchthon harks back to his earlier position, whereas Agricola fails in
his attempt to represent Reformation theology in its essential form. Hammann
posits that with Luther and Melanchthon we have two different forms of
theology, even though Melanchthon himself declared that he wished to do
nothing but repeat Luther's teaching (CR 1, 898 and 903). In line with his
rationalistic, pedagogical interests, he attempted to make the homo novus visible,
tangible, and teachable! Through him there gradually arose a new theological
anthropology, an intrinsic interest in the nature of the homo novus. The Visitation
Articles are an important marker along this way (149). Agricola, on the other
hand, strove much more than Melanchthon for the heart of Luther's theology, but
precisely because he missed it at its center, he missed it completely, and ended
up creating his own tpye of Reformation theology (137-38).
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At the elector's request, a consultation was held at Torgau Castle on 26 to
29 November 1527 to settle the dispute over the visitation. Three questions were
put on the table for discussion, each of them having been left unresolved by the
controversy. First, the exegesis of Galatians 3: 19. When Melanchthon appealed
to this text in his Visitation Articles to support the usus politicus aegis, he must have
realized that he was at variance with Luther's own exegesis of the passage in
which it was interpreted along the lines of the usus theologicus.32 Agricola drew
attention to this contradiction in his censura. However, although they disagreed
on the exegesis of the passage, Melanchthon and Luther still agreed on the
doctrine.
The second question discussed was the definition (or better: division) of
repentance (partitio poenitentiae). The whole medieval tripartite schema of the
sacrament of penance (contritio cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio operum) collapsed
under the weight of Luther's radical assertion that repentance was the ground of
the Christian's whole life. Melanchthon, with his penchant for tradition, brought
the threefold schema back (minus the content) in his definition in the Articles and
substituted the passio Christi for the satisfactio operum. Luther too can speak of the
partes poenitentiae (contritio, confessio, satisfactio, absolutio; in his first Thesenreihe he
will use a different definition), but he abolished the casual-redemptive relationship between the parts, purged away the Pelagianism, and reinstated God as the
32CR 26, 28: Primum igitur docenda est et urgenda [scil. lexJ, ut coherceantur
rudes homines; this is the later so-called political use, which he supported with
Gal. 3: 19: Iuxta illud: Lex est posita propter transgressiones, scilicet cavendas. Of
course Melanchthon also knew that the law was to be preached: ut terreat
conscientias. His interpretation here however reflects his preference for a
practical-ethical exegesis.

40
sole author of repentance in all its parts.33
The third question for discussion, the origin and nature of contritio, goes to
the center of the argument between Melanchthon and Agricola after the appearance of the censura. In the Articles of Visitation Melanchthon made contritio the
praecipua pars poenitentiae and the presupposition for faith. In fact he goes so far
as to single out one special part of contritio, the timor Dei, which he equates with
the whole of repentance. Regrettably however he does not relate it to faith but
sees it as the terror before God's judgment produced by the law34 Agricola, on
the other hand, bases his doctrine of repentance exclusively on a christological
foundation, and then sanctions it by appealing to Luther.35 As we have already
33Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus, 93-94; he suggests several
reasons why Melanchthon thought his definition superior; most important: he
considered it more comprehensible than Luther's definition (mortificatio carnis,
abnegatio sui, and cognitio peccatI) which was hardly understood by the people and
not even by the theologians.
34Even the distinction between timor servilis (without faith) and timor

filialis (with faith) makes no difference, for in Melanchthon the timor filialis is still
fear of God's judgment, as well as being both temporally and materially
separated from faith. This timor Dei is not only the beginning of repentance, it is
dependent on it as its first part, for without metus divini iudicii there can be no
faith. It is precisely this emphasis that Agricola reacts against by grounding
repentance in the gospel, in Christ, without contritio.
35Luther in fact had never taught that there could be true repentance
through a gospel separated from the law or through a gratia separated from timor
(WA 7, 63, 34; 64, 7-12; 63, 38-64, 4; Tractatus de libertate christiana, 1520). Luther
had rather spoken of repentance from grace and of repentance from the law at
the same time, and he can speak like this because repentance was not a precondition for salvation but God's gracious action. For him it was not a question of
either law or gospel, but only a question of preaching Christ. However, for him
two things belong to this preaching, law and gospel, and indeed not as a temporal and material succession, but in an identity (cf. WA 39 I, 571, 10-575, 2; 3
AD, Arg. 36/9; WA 39 I, 484,12-14; 2 AD, Arg. 29). Agricola attempted to again
argue for the sequence gospel-law by adducing the argument of Jonah (3: 5):
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seen, for Agricola it is not the injury of God's law (violatio legis) but the injury of
God's Son (violatio filii) which is the authoritative basis for preaching repentance.
But, as we will see later, a doctrine of repentance based solely on the gospel (ex
amore iustitiae) cannot be defended and Luther will offer it no support. However,
Melanchthon admits that Master Eisleben's use of the Augustinian term amor
iustitiae, ambivalent as it is, does go back to Luther 36
Hammann points out that there are two unevangelical aspects of Melanchthon's doctrine of repentance which are not in keeping with Reformation teaching. The first lies in the fact that the remorse of the heart occurs without any
reference to Christ. Sin is no longer understood first and foremost as unbelief
and defiance against God, but as the transgression of an objective, external norm,
which is also inside the human heart, where it engenders either fear or trust. The
second problem with Melanchthon's doctrine of contritio is the fact that the movements within the soul, which are produced by the word of the law, have now
been made into a necessary presupposition for saving faith.37
They believed and then repented. The locus classicus is Luke 24: 47.
36Rogge, Streitiglceiten, 192, observes that Luther himself had learned
about this a decade earlier from conversations with the superior of his order,
John von Staupitz, who taught him that the love for righteousness and for God
was the beginning of repentance and not its goal. Only after these conversations
with Staupitz did that word poenitentia, which at first was utterly bitter for him,
become sweet. Again we see how Agricola's theology is not only based in but is
a continuation of Luther's early Augustinian way of thinking. For a comparison
between Luther's and Agricola's use of the term amor iustitiae, see KjeldgaardPedersen, Gesetz, Evanglium und Busse, 244-49.
37Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 99-100. Proof of this is the

characteristic phrase in which Melanchthon, following Luther's usage, describes
faith first of all as vivificatio, but which he then reinterprets in his own way when
he describes it as: "seu consolatio" (CR 1, 905). Luther could never say that the
faith which springs from fear is comfort! Again: "in animis ante vivificationem . . .
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It became clear in the course of the discussions that both Agricola and
Melanchthon had diverged from Luther, but each in a different direction. Each
represented one side of Luther's theology so that neither retained the antithesis
between law and gospel, which is the distinguishing mark of his theology.
Melanchthon thought that his position had been vindicated, and Agricola
conceded that his advocacy of the younger Luther in favor of the older Luther
found no support in the present phase of the discussions. Agricola accepted the
idea of a fides minarum as a compromise, that is, he acknowledged that the divine
threats are important for the sorrow that marks the beginning of repentance.
Contrition presupposes terror in the face of God's threatening judgment.
In Luther's judgment, only that which comforts and justifies is to be called
faith; the fides minarum or fides generalis, which is still bound to the divine minae
producing terror, would be more aptly described by the word "poenitentia." The
result was that Agricola's attempt at a solution by mixing together the terms fides
and minae was effectively rejected. The consensus was that the forgiveness of
sins and repentance belong together. It is impossible to preach the gospel without also preaching repentance. One, the one hand, the people (especially the uneducated) need to be warned, yet the pastor must never forget that the chief part
of repentance is faith. This seems to have been said for Melanchthon's benefit.
oportere pavorem et terrores et confusionem conscientiae existere" (CR 1, 905). Melanchthon is saying that faith is possible only where these motus of the soul are
present! Vivificatio can arise only in those souls where the law has first done its
preparatory work; only where pavor, terror, and confusio are first produced by the
law can consolatio be given afterwards. Melanchthon of course knows that it is
God who works all these motus in us. But, as Hammann concludes, the fact that
Melanchthon simply equates these effects of divine action, these works of contritio, with specific immanental events within the human soul, and the fact that he
focus his whole attention on these motus, which are in the first instance human
effects, means that in the end he makes faith dependent on human action.
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On the other hand, Agricola's concern was also taken up. Nothing should be
preached before faith, but it must be noted that "busse" follows "aus und nach dem
glauben." Agricola could be satisfied that repentance was to be taught from faith

and that repentance and law were now to be regarded as part of "gemeinen
glauben" (fides generalis). Certainly, for the "gemeinen groben man" this article of

faith is better presented using the terms "busse, gebot, gesetz, forcht."38 However, it
became apparent after the conference that the two opponents were far from being
38See WA 26, 202,1-203, 4; esp. 8-9, 21, 27-28, 33, 35, 37-38 (Unterricht der

Visitatoren an die Pfarrherrn im Kuifiirstentum zu Sachsen). Rogge, Streitigkeiten,
193-94. After the conclusion of the official negotiations, there was an additional
debate over dinner on the topic of what was later called the tertius usus legis.
Agricola told Melanchthon that there was one thing he could never do: follow
only the one order of preaching the Decalogue (i. e., preaching the law before the
gospel). Christians are free from the law (cf. Fragestiick 130). The Decalogue is
not to be taught, only the commands [parenesis] in Paul: "non esse Decalogum
exigendum: sed praecepta, quae sunt in Paulo" (Kawerau, Johannes Agricola, 149).
Melanchthon replied: The Decalogue cannot be given up especially since Christ
taught it himself. Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 106, makes a very
insightful observation here, and one which we will need to keep in mind as we
study the disputations. Agricola, he says, does not simply reject the law, but
preaches parenesis to Christians instead of nomos. His decision, "paulinische
Pariinese statt Gesetz," can only properly be understood from the fact that the law
(Gesetz), which summoned the vita christiana of itself, was fundamentally
overcome by the Pauline parenesis (Gebot) because this summons people to new
life by the gospel or by faith. Hence, Hammann concludes, we have no right to
dismiss Agricola as an antinomian in the libertinistic sense. He fully concedes
the need for the vita christiana to be put under the praecepta; only, in contrast to
Melanchthon, he seeks to ground these commandments in the gospel and not
outside it in an independent law divorced from Christ. At the same time it is
clear that Agricola separates the Pauline parenesis from the lex. He seems to
have rather placed it alongside the law and the gospel as a tertium quid; cf.
Althaus' proposal for a schema: Gebot-Gesetz-Evangelium to replace the traditional
Gesetz-Evangelium; see Paul Althaus, "Gebot und Gesetz: Zum Thema Gesetz und
Evangelium," in Beitrage zur Forderung christlicher Theologie, vol. 46, ed. Paul
Althaus and Joachim jeremias (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952, 7-8. We
will need to return to this discussion in the final chapter after we have analyzed
the theses and disputations.
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united on their view of the law and the role it plays for faith. The new question
that was emerging on the horizon concerned the role and place of the Decalogue
in evangelical doctrine. While in 1527 the dispute was chiefly between Melanchthon and Agricola, in less than a decade Luther and Agricola will come to blows
over just this very problem.39 However, in 1527 Luther was still singularly unconcerned about the whole affair, and thought that it was nothing more than a
pugna verborum which he refused to take seriously and hoped had now finally
been settled so that the important work of the visitation could proceed. 40
This first movement of the First Antinomian Controversy has much to
teach us. At least one thing has become clear. The way to correct an error or
imbalance is not by emphasizing the extreme opposite. That is an inherently
legalistic approach which will never arrive at the truth but only succeed in
creating the same error in the opposite way. Both Melanchthon and Agricola are
each guilty of basically the same error. In a word, as Hammann has convincingly shown, Agricola attempted to overthrow Melanchthon's nomian
doctrine of repentance by means of his antinomian counter-doctrine, and not in
the first instance by means of scriptural exegesis. And it is just the genius of
Luther to have diagnosed the problem and to have proposed a solution which
grounded repentance in the proper distinction between law and gospe1.41
The onset of the second movement of the First Antinomian controversy
39This is perceptively observed by Rogge,

Streitigkeiten, 194.

'IOWA Br 4, 295, 23-30 (Luther an Justus Jonas in Nordhausen; 10 Decem-

ber 1527).
41Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus, 96.
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proper, a decade later, was preceded by the Cordatus controversy in 1536.42
Conrad Cordatus, who was a pastor in a village in the vicinity of Wittenberg,
charged that Caspar Cruciger was teaching that human repentance is a necessary
prerequisite of justification. When Cruciger defended himself by claiming he
was doing no more than following his teacher Melanchthon, this threatened to
draw attention to what appeared to be a serious difference between Melanchthon
and Luther. Luther taught that repentance and contrition are not human actions
but entirely God's doing which he accomplishes through the word. Therefore, it
is improper to call them a necessary factor [causa sine qua non] of justification.
Melanchthon, on the other hand, understood repentance psychologically and so
viewed it as a human act, thus betraying a certain Erasmian influence. The
matter came up indirectly for discussion in the graduation disputation of Jacob
Schenk43 and Philipp Motz on 10 October 1536.44 Cruciger, who presided at the
disputation, stated that the new obedience was a partial cause of justification, and
thus differed from Luther who held that obedience was a consequence and
evidence of justification but not its cause.45 The Wittenberg theologians tried to
42For details, see Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: Dritter Band: Die

Erhaltung der Kirche 1532-1546 (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1987), 150-54, which
forms the basis of the following remarks. For the primary documents, see WA Br
7, 541-45.
43The self-confident and independent theologian Jacob Schenk, who

was a thorn in Luther's side, was the means whereby one of Melanchthon's
doctrinal deviations came to light during 1537. Luther attributed Schenk's ability
to ingratiate himself with people to his antinomian teaching. For details, see
Brecht, Luther 3, 154-58.
44The theses prepared by Luther on Rom. 3: 28 do not deal with the

matter directly; see WA 39 I, 82-86.
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settle the matter and prevent any further estrangement between Luther and
Melanchthon. Their efforts resulted in a consensus: Justification is solely on
account of God's mercy, not our works. Hence, works cannot be called a partial
cause of justification but are rather the result of justification.46 Furthermore, the
commandments are fulfilled through faith.47 Cruciger was happy that Luther
had at least conceded that good works were a necessary result of justification,
although he did not agree with him that such a philosophical term as "necessary"
should be abandoned all together. Brecht is of the opinion that Melanchthon saw
no essential difference between their positions and moreover regarded his own
simply as a development and clarification of the Augustinian doctrine of
justification. He concludes that while Luther may have achieved a temporary
peace in the Cordatus dispute, the fact that he did not succeed in convincing his
colleagues reveals the limits of his authority.48
Agricola's opportunity to return to Wittenberg to rejoin Luther and his
colleagues comes in December 1536, although due to a misunderstanding there
was neither a position nor place for him to live. However, he and his wife Else
and their nine children find a warm reception in Luther and Katy's home (the
45See WA 39 I, 93, 18-96, 23 (Arg. 6) and 102, 2-105,9 (Arg. 10).
46The matter of justification comes up again in the antinomian disputations, this time not in connection with works (but see WA 39 II, 307, 6-16; MF, Arg.
27) but with reference to the law. Thus, the antinomians argue that the law
(hence, works) is necessary for justification (39 I, 381, 12-17; 1 AD, Arg. 14); that
the law, as one of the causes of justification, cannot be useless (39 I, 469, 6-12; 2
AD, Arg. 17); or that the law justifies as the efficient cause of justification (39 I,
470, 15-18; 2 AD, Arg. 18).
47For Luther's written statement, which was the basis of the consensus,

see WA Br 7, 580,1-581, 36.
48Brecht, Luther 3, 154.
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Black Cloister). In spite of some turbulent undercurrents,49 at first there is no
visible sign of any problems and for three months Agricola even acts as Luther's
proxy both in the university and in the pulpit while Luther is away attending the
meeting of the league in Schmalkalden.50 The first inkling of trouble comes in
May 1537 when Agricola, as court preacher, teaches his own peculiar views of the
law in a sermon delivered to the evangelical princes of the league assembled in
Zeitz. He criticizes the preaching of the law and teaches that the gospel (that is,
Christ's passion and death) contains the revelation of God's wrath.51 Luther
gradually becomes convinced of the antinomian nature of Agricola's views after
reading the anonymous positiones antinomicae, which were circulating secretly in
Wittenberg52 as well as Agricola's Drey Sermon and Predigen.53 Bugenhagen,
°Owing to Agricola's involvement in the earlier episode of the
antinomian controversy, his arrival in Wittenberg was not greeted by all as a time
of great rejoicing, for several influencial people had already formed set opinions
about him, which were not favorable. In Agricola's judgment Justus Jonas was
one of the greatest of the "falsi testes," whom already during his time in Eisleben
he had deemed as "inflammantes contra me D. Lutherum" (Thiele, Denkwurdigkeiten,
257).
50As

the year went on however the resentment against Agricola grew on
the part of those closest to Luther. Cruciger called him eJmetevro" spermolovgo"
(CR 3, 386; Cruciger an Vitum Theodorum, 10 July 1537) and blamed him as the
one most responsible for the confusion [suvgcusi"] at that time. He is even
ridiculed as having the spiritum Muntzerianum (Thiele, Denlcwiirdiglceiten, 257).
51See

Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 173.

52These theses are the "manifest" of the antinomians. Luther never says
that Agricola wrote them but he no doubt realized that they represented his
theology. In WA 39 I, 395, 5 (1 AD, Arg. 21) he mentiones the "author" of the
propositiones, presumably refering to the positiones antinomicae, but does not
mention the name of Agricola. He later prints them together with his set of
countertheses, as a basis for discussion at the disputation of 18 December 1537.
They will be discussed later in our analysis of Agricola's theology. Luther's
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Jonas, and Cruciger reject him, and Bugenhagen no longer allows him to
deputize for him in the pulpit during his absence,54 although Luther does not
withdraw the privilege entirely, yet at the same time remains cautious.
In the summer of 1537 Luther spoke out publicly against the antinomians
for the first time. In a sermon on Luke 5: 1-11 in July, in which he polemicizes
against "unsere Antinomer,"55 he addresses the question of the proper distinction
sermon of 1 July 1537 may have been preached with the positiones in mind. That
the theses were known is clear from a letter of Cruciger to Veit Dietrich on 27
June 1537 wher he says: "tamen sparsae sunt, sed inter paucos, quaedam propositiones,
quas to tibi mitti petis" (CR 3, 386). Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und
Busse, 256 n. 33, suggests that these propositiones or positiones may also form the
basis of Luther's remarks in his Tischrede of 21 March 1537. We read there: "Post
illud colloquium Magister Jobst demonstravit ei positiones legem non debere praedicari in
ecclesia, quia non iustificaret" (WA TR 3, 405, 4-5 [no. 3554]). What Luther says fits
well with the positiones antinomicae which rejects the law precisely because it
plays no role in justification. If 21 March 1537 is the correct date (see WA TR 3,
405, n. 1), there would be much to support the view that Luther knew the
anonymous theses earlier than had previously been assumed. Cf. Kawerau,
Johannis Agricola, 174 and Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 139. Clemen, WA Br 8, 121
follows Kawerau in this matter without discussion.
53These sermons provided the impetus for the final break with the
Wittenberg theologians; Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 173-75.
54CR 3, 386 (Cruciger an Vitum Theodorum; 10 July 1537). Agricola for
his part felt himself unjustly attacked from the outset (Thiele, Denkwurdigkeiten,
258).
55WA 22, 74-92 (Evang. am 5. Sonntag nach Trinitatis; Crucigers
Sommerpostille). The term "unsere Antinomer" (which also comes up in the
disputations) signals that this is an internecine dispute and the the antinomians
belong to the evangelical wing of the church. For reasons of content it seems best
to date the sermon 1 July 1537 (see note below). This dating is supported by
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse, 256-62. However, it has been
recently challenged by Brecht, Luther 3, 399, n. 4, for several reasons: 1) it is not in
Rorer's list; 2) on that day Luther preached in the afternoon on a different text,
which would apparently be very unusual; 3) Cruciger said on 10 July that
Luther's attitude toward Agricola was not yet entirely dear. Be that as it may, for
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between law and gospel, and under this rubric tackles also the issue of the proclamation of Christ's passion and death as BuJ3predigt. He rejects the antinomian
opinion that Romans 2: 4 provides the scriptural warrant for their inversion of
law and gospel and for preaching repentance through the gospel (or the violatio
filii, as they call it) instead of through the law. In opposition to their claim that
one must first preach grace and comfort [revelatio gratiae] and only afterwards
terrify with wrath [revelatio irae], Luther exclaims that they understand neither
wrath nor grace, neither repentance nor the comfort of the conscience.56 With a
clarity that is hardly surpassed by any other statement in the following years
Luther then formulates his own position in the following way: "Everything that
preaches our sins and God's wrath is the preaching of the law, however and
wherever this happens. Conversely, the gospel is a sermon which shows and
gives nothing else but grace and forgiveness in Christ."57 Luther does not
mention Agricola by name in the sermon but it is clear that it is Agricola whom
our purposes the content is more important than the date.
56WA 22, 86, 27-87, 2. The duplex revelatio of

the gospel and the
proclamation of the violatio filii to the exclusion of the violatio legis are two central
features of antinomian theology. Luther refers to the idea of the "violatio filii"
already in a Tischrede from 21 March 1537 and says that it is characteristic of
Agricola: "Valeat, qui dicit transgressores non peccare contra legem, sed violare Filium
Dei" (WA TR 3, 405,14-15 [no, 3554]). It is also mentioned as characteristically
Agricolian by Wendelin Faber in his Letter to Caspar Giittel in April 1540 in
which he sums up Agricola's teaching in three theses (Forstemann, Neues
Urkundenbuch, 332). Of course the term also appears in the first of the antinomian
positiones (see sect. 2).
57WA 22, 87, 3-6: Es ist alles des Gesetzes Predigt, was da von unsern

siinden und Gottes zorn predigt, es geschehe, wie oder wenn es wolle.
Widerumb ist das Euangelium solche Predigt, die nichts denn Gnade und
vergebung in Christ() zeigt und gibt. Cf. FC SD V, 12 (BSLK, 955).
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he has in mind.58 The polemic in the sermon indicates that Luther was probably
familiar with his Drey Sermon und Predigen which he published in June 1537.59
Tension between the two principal protagonists continues to escalate. This
is evident from a letter that Agricola sent to Luther in early September.60 It is the
first of two important letters from Agricola to Luther in the fall of 1537. Its chief
purpose is to lodge a complaint at Luther's refusal to allow him to publish the
Evangeliensummarien, which he had earlier approved.61 Agricola affirms that it
58Luther's earliest recorded reference to Agricola as an antinomian is to
be found in Tischrede of 21 March 1537 (WA TR 3, 405-6). On the role of the
sermon in the course of events that led to the open conflict between Luther and
Agricola, see Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 168-76, and Rogge, Lutherversttindnis, 13642.
59For a summary of Agricola's

Drey Sermon und Predigen, see Rogge,
Lutherverstiindnis, 140-41. It is here that he states that the law has been set aside
with the coming of Christ. While Luther stresses that the gravest sin is lack of
trust in God, Agricola rejects the idea of guilt before God. Remissio peccatorum
means to have a good conscience and peace and joy in the heart. At no point in
the documents is justification understood as imputatio, as actus Deo, or even as
removal of sin and guilt before God. Koch, Johann Agricola, 147-49, notes that
Agricola interpretation of Mathew 15: 21-28 (one of the sermons) contains the
most important themes of his theology and piety. The ductus of the argument
shows surprising agreement with a sermon by Tauler on the same text, which is
not surprising in view of the influencial nature of mysticism in Wittenburg
between 1516 and 1520 (Ibid., 148, n. 125). There is no record of Luther's having
preached on this pericope till 1523.
6°WA Br

8, 122-23 (Agricola an Luther; 2 September 1537). This letter is
the first of a number of attempts to show that his teaching is in conformity with
holy scripture, the apostles and Luther himself.
61Although it

could possibly refer to the Drey Sermon vnd Predigen (thus,
Kawerau [ZKG 4 (1881): 303 n. 1] and Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis,142, n. 33), we
follow Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse, 215, in taking it as a
reference to the Evangeliensummarien. See Clemens introduction to the letter
(cited above). In any case, the question is not of decisive importance. For a
discussion of the contents of Agricola's Summarien, see Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis,
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teaches the same as all his works: that the preaching of the death of Christ (=
preaching repentance) terrifies the conscience, while the preaching of the resurrection of Christ (= preaching forgiveness) raises it up again. He points out that
this is the teaching of all the apostles, especially of Paul and Barnabas, and that it
is Luther's teaching too. He also includes a catalog of his previous teaching in
order to demonstrate his orthodoxy.62 The problem however is that because
Agricola attempts to justify himself in this letter, he avoids controversial ideas
and formulations and thereby sweeps the real issues under the carpet.63
In a sermon on 30 September (text: Matthew 22: 34-40) Luther sets out
clearly his teaching on the law. The law will always prick the conscience for we
do not love God as we ought. Christ did not dissolve the law but came to fulfill
it. Yet it is not enough that Christ fulfilled the law, it must also be fulfilled in me.
Luther stresses, no doubt with Agricola in mind, the indissolubility of law and
gospel."
156-65.
62Kawerau, "Briefe und LIrkunden zur Geschichte des antinomistischen

Streits," ZKG 4 (1881): 304-305; cf. 299-324, 437-62.
63This is also the case with his Lehrbekenntnis written

in September,
which begins with the assertion: Lex debet habere summam autoritatem in iustitia
carnis (Kawerau, ZKG 4 [1881]: 304). The fact that the law is binding for the
publica pax et tranquilitas was never at issue. Agricola's prime concern in this
document is that the conscience must not be injured. He counsels that if the
"conciones Legis" torments the conscience too much and drives it to despair, then
the "mens" should rise up and say to the law what Christ says to Peter: "Vade post
me Sathana."
64WA 45, 145-157 (Predigt am 18. Sonntag nach Trinitatis). In a passage
clearly aimed at the antinomians he says:
Darumb ists unrecht and nicht zu leiden, so man wolt also predigen (wie
etliche vorzeiten gethan haben, und auch noch etliche tolle geister thun): 013 du
schon nicht die Gebot heltest, Gott und den Nehesten liebest, ja, ob du gleich ein
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By the second half of October things seemed to have improved. Agricola
could report to the elector that there was substantial agreement between Luther
and himself and that all the problems had been due to a misunderstanding.65
John Frederick, anxious for doctrinal unity, advised him not only to teach the
substance of what Luther teaches but to use his words as wel1.66 As an added
precaution Chancellor Bruck was asked to check if Luther had approved the
publication of Agricola's Evangeliensummarien, which at that time were in the
process of being printed.67 When Luther found out about this he ordered the
printing stopped and confiscated the manuscript and the copies already printed.
He kept one for himself on which he later wrote down critical comments about
Ebrecher bist, das schadet nicht, so du allein glewbst, so wirstu selig. Nein, lieber
man, da wird nichts aus, Du wirst das himel Reich nicht besitzen, es mus dazu
komen, das du die Gebot haltest und jnn der Liebe seiest gegen Gott und dem
Nehesten, Denn da stehets kurtz beschlossen: "Wiltu zum leben ein gehen, so
halte die Gebot" (146, 38-147,14).
Here he decisively rejects the relativization of sin, which is a hallmark of
antinomian doctrine; cf. WA 39 I, 344, 26-29 (Positiones: Item alii).
65Agricola felt that this gave him the authority to proceed with the

printing of the Evangeliensummarien, even though Luther had earlier withdrawn
permission (see Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 180-81).
66Forstemann, Neues LIrkundenbuch, 312 (Johann Friedrich an Agricola,
30 October 1537): "Weil Ir dan mit Doctori Marthino der lehre in der substanz ainigk
seit," you should also pay attention "vff die worth", that Agricola's doctrine
"Doctoris Marthini in den worten auch gleich sey."
67Kawerau, "Briefe und Urkunden," 205-206; Forstemarui, Neues
Urkundenbuch, 313 (Johann Friederich an Briick; 30 October 1537). Cruciger sums
up their gist as follows: "De postillis ita est, ut audisti; nam cum animadversum esset,
eum statim initio asperisse sua illa de revelatione iustitiae, praecedente revelationem irae,
item quod in novo Testamento non sit docenda violatio legis, sed violatio fidei, praeter
alias nugas, d. doctor inhibuit, ne porro excuderetur liber" (CR 3, 454; Cruciger ad
Vitum Theodorum, 27 November 1537 [see also the note in WA 39 I, 334].
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Agricola's view of the law.68 His action showed that despite all Agricola's protestation to the contrary, the difference between them was not just one of words
but of substance.
Agricola's reaction was not long in coming. He wrote to Luther at the end
of November69 (the second important letter mentioned above) pointing out to
him that in his books he teaches repentance and forgiveness in two ways, one
through the law and faith [legem et euangelium], the other solely through the
gospel [sine lege per euangelium tantum].7° The latter kind of teaching is now
68The Evangeliensummarien was the occasion for a battle that lasted

nearly three years and which resulted in the end of a close friendship between
Luther and Agricola. It was probably the Summarien that Luther had most in
mind when at the end of April 1540, in the closing stages of the controversy, he
handed the elector his defense against the charges brought by Agricola. In support of his counter-accusations Luther enclosed his anotated copy of the
Evangeliensummarien. He reminded the elector that Agricola had sent the manuscript off to the printers without first having had it vetted: " . . . Gibt ynn den druck
seine postillen hinder [ohne] wissen vnd willen des Rectors [der Universitet] wider meins
gtz herrn [des Kurfersten] gebott, das man nichts drucken sol, der Rector sols zuuor
besehen" (WA 51, 431,14-16; Wider den Eisleben, 1540). Luther accused him of acting in a deceitful way and using the printing of the Postil to fire the first volley of
shots against the doctrine of the Witttenberg theologians (WA 51, 431, 16-432, 5).
He was annoyed that Agricola, in spite of his ambition, jealousy, and desire to
lord it over others, always pretended to be friendly, laughed and ate with his
Wittenberg friends and yet "verretherlich seine feindschafft wider vns verborgen" (WA
51, 432,12-13).
69WA Br 8, 279; cf. WA Br 13, 265. The problem of the dating is
discussed below. Brecht, Luther 3, 410, n. 11, suggests that this is the letter
Melanchthon refers to on 25 November (CR 3, 452-54 = MBW 2, no. 1968).
70WA Br 8, 279, 4-5: In libris vestris existunt duo modi docendae poenitentiae

et remissionis peccatorum, hoc est, docendae iustificationis. For Agricola then
poenitentia + remissio peccatorum = iustificatio. Although this does not go beyond
anything he has already said, it is important if only because he hardly ever
mentions the doctrine of justification.
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defined in the same way as the double sermon mentioned in the other letter. In
connection with this Agricola refers to Luther's 1519 Ein Sermon von der Betrachtung des heiligen Leidens Christi and points out that the double sermon expresses
the fact that Christ is to be both sacramentum and exemplum at the same time.71
The important thing here is that Agricola claims that Luther's doctrine of repentance is inconsistent, that it contains two irreconcilable lines of thought. The
letter could be seen as a request for an answer to the question: which of the two
ways of teaching repentance agrees with apostolic doctrine, so that a certa forma
doctrine can be handed down to the next generation.72
This letter proved highly provocative and set off such a reaction that he
said later in retrospect that it set the Rhine on fire.73 Up till this time Luther had
71WA Br 8, 279, 5-9: Alter modus est per legem et euangelium, sine lege per
euangelium tantum alter, adeo ut docenda sit ecclesia de morte et resurrectione Christi, id
quod est cernere maxime in sermone vom Leiden Christi, item Quod sit Christus
sacramentum et exemplum. This is a central aspect of his basic theological position.
To preach Christ as sacramentum et exemplum = to preach mors et resurrectio Christi
= to preach euangelium sine lege. Not until we have completed our analysis of the
disputations will it be clear how Agricola's understanding of repentance along
with sacramentum et exemplum differs from that of Luther's.
72Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 168-69, stresses that Agricola's intentions in

the letter are positive not negative, conciliatory not polemical, and that rather
than being argumentative he genuinely wants to reach a consensus on one of the
cardinal points of Reformation theology (cf. Haec simplici animo sentio et scribo;
WA Br 8, 279, 17). Luther, on the other hand, found in the letter a further
confirmation of Agricola's theological idiosyncrasy and his persistent unwillingness to bring his teaching into line with that of the Wittenberg theologians.
73Therefore, it was no exaggeration when Agricola says in a gloss:
"Dieser Brief, den ich aufs einfdltigst geschrieben, hat den Rhein entbrannt" (WA Br 8,
279, 20). The dating of this letter is problematical. The date given by the WA
editor is August 1538. However, Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 165, points out that
the chief argument against such a dating is the gloss that the letter set the Rhine
on fire, for there is no known event that it could refer to. A more likely
explanation is that the letter was written in December 1537 in which case the
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refrained from publishing the positiones antinomicae, although he came close to it
after Agricola had gone ahead and published the Summarien. However, the letter
was the last straw. He now sent them to the printers, probably between 4 and 6
December, and published them together with his own countertheses in order to
make it absolutely clear that he dissociated himself from them entirely.74
Luther's action had enormous repercussions on the Wittenberg theological
gloss would refer to the publication of the Positiones antinomicae. The Weimarer
editor however defends the August 1538 dating by taking the gloss as a reference
to Luther's Thesen der fiinften Reihe contra antinomos, which were written either at
the end of August or at the beginning of September 1538. However, it seems that
a far more compelling reason for adopting the earlier dating ( Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 280, n. 20) is the verbal correspondence between Agricola's letter to
Luther and Cruciger's letter to Veit Dietrich (7 December 1537). In the crucial
sentences Cruciger confirms that it was Agricola's letter with his cardinal
objections to Luther's doctrine that really started the ball rolling: ". . quia ipse
duplici modo uteretur docendi poenitentiam, alias ex Evangelio tantum, alias ex lege et
Evangelio. Hoc idem nuper semel atque iterum doctori scripsit, et is hoc ipso magis
offensus est, quod videretur nostrum doctrinam incertam reddere." Given the close
similarity of this passage to the corresponding one in Agricola's letter (cf. the text
of WA Br 8, 279, 4-9 above), one can only conclude that Agricola's letter was
written just prior to Cruciger's. Heinrich Ebeling, Der Streitpunkt zwischen Luther
und Agricola. Zur Datierung eines Agricola-Briefes und noch einige andere
Datierungen, ZKG 56 (1937): 364-66, thinks that he can prove from Agricola's letter
that it was Luther's publication of 6 December 1537 of the anonymous theses,
which until then had been circulating in secret, that set the Rhine on fire. Ebeling
proposes an early date (between 24 November and 7 December) based on the fact
that in the second Thesenreihe and its associated disputation (12 January 1538)
Luther goes into precisely the question of the sacramentum-exemplum christology
and its relation to repentance and the law (ibid., 362).
74Luther is never one to enter into public controversy too quickly. That
is amply demonstrated by the history of the Reformation and the way in which
he renounced the use of force to implement evangelical doctrine. The antinomian
controversy is no exception. This is proven already by Luther's refusal to become
involved in the preliminary dispute between Agricola and Melanchthon. It was
only at the request of the elector tht he intervened to bring about a settlement.
When he does enter the debate finally in 1537 it is only because he is forced to do
so for the sake of the gospel.
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circle, especially on Agricola. Even though his colleagues encouraged him to try
to reach agreement through discussion he would no longer let himself be dissuaded from coming out against Agricola publicly. Agricola for his part still
clung tenaciously to the view that there was no serious theological difference
between himself and Luther but simply personal ill-will and misunderstanding.75
Although Luther did not allow his personal feelings to get in the way, he openly
acknowledged the anguish of losing a dear friend.76
75This is clear from an autobiographical statement (Thiele, Denkwiirdig-

keiten, 258, noted by Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 170). Moreover, Cruciger, in the
same letter cited above, reports that Agricola in his lectures was obviously trying
to formulate his doctrine of the law in such a way as to satisfy Luther but that the
result was only confusion. Thus he writes (following on from the citation in the
preceeding note): "Heri in praelectione audivi [Cruciger] eum [Agricola] hoc
ponentem, quod Evangelium utatur ministerio legis ad arguendum peccatum. (CR 3,
461). This is a very significant passage because it reflects just how far Agricola's
understanding of law and gospel differs from that of Luther's, even though he
was attempting to go as far as he could to accommodate Luther's doctrine. The
problem is that the doctrine he was trying to accommodate was Luther's early
pre-Reformation view of law and gospel, which was still firmly grounded in the
Augustinian tradition. On the one hand, he can say that the ministerium legis no
longer has anything to do with the lex Mosaica, which Luther would readily agree
to (although we will see later that the antinomians in fact consistently reference
the law to Moses and thus argue that it has been abolished), but on the other
hand, he says nothing about the fundamental task of the law as lex accusans but
instead makes the equation Evangelium = nova lex. This, as we will see later, is a
basic tenet of antinomian theology.
76This is reflected in Luther's Tischrede: "Amicissimi mei [Rogge, Luther-

verstandnis , 280, n. 25, thinks the plural may include others who do not agree
with the action he has taken against Agricola] me pedibus calcare volunt et
euangelium turbare. Ideo instituam disputationes ad provocandos antagonistas" (WA
TR 3, 480, 37-481, 2 [no. 3650a]; Tischrede vor dem 18. 12. 1537). He was
determined to uncover any falsehood because as far as he was concerned this
business was no joking matter ["es gielt nicht also schertzens"]. He tells his table
guests, with deep emotion, that it is no small thing to lose a friend, whom one has
loved most dearly [" quern summo amore
Cf. the title of the chapter on
Agricola in H. G. Haile, Luther: An Experiment in Biography (Princeton, New
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Soon after the antinomian positiones were published, Luther formulated
and published his own thirty-nine theses, which formed the basis of the First
Disputation held on 18 December 1537 in the presence of a large audience. Since
Agricola did not take part in the disputation,77 even though it was his theology
that was being debated, it took the form of a regular Schuldisputation in which
Luther, as well as presiding, represented one side, while other members of the
faculty took turns at representing the antinomian side. The only participants
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 223-37: "Loss of a Friend." In this same
Tischrede Luther says that he ate and laughed with him, and yet at the same time
he opposed him behind his back. He cannot bear it any longer, "nam crassissimus
est error reicere legem. Wan doch andere errores und scandala gingen, esset tolerabilius.
Sed legem reicere, sine qua neque ecclesia neque politica neque oeconomia aut quisque
hominum potest esse, daft heist dem faft den boden ausgestoflen." The time to enter the
fray has come: "Da ist tzeit wehrens. Ich kan noch mags nicht leiden" (481, 4-12).
Later Luther spoke further about Agricola. He again blamed much of the trouble
on Agricola's pride and ambition: "Ach, die schUndliche hoffart und vermessenheit,
was richtet sie an? Sie ist ein Mutter tiller Ketzerei." He then reflects on the years
since the beginning of the Reformation. He had hoped that after all the turmoil
of the 1520s he would finally have peace and quiet and be able to sing Te Deum
laudamus and thank God for all that had been accomplished, but it turns out that
was not the case: "so wird ein Zeit des Zankens und Kiffelns draus." Death would be
better, he says, than this suffering. "Es heifit ein martyrium interpretativum, geistlich
Leiden, das ohne Blut zugehet, darinnen sich einer bratet und iingstet. Das mull ich auch
leiden in solchen Aergernissen und Vermessenheit meiner flinger und Schiller, daft ich
viel Heber den Tod leiden wollte und meinem Blut beschliefien!" (481, 32-482, 2).
77WA TR 3, 483,17-20 [3650b]: "Contra antinomos. Anno 37. 18. Decembris

Doctor Martinus habuit disputationem contra antinomos et Mo.) an twanyac magna
cum frequentia auditorum, provocans etiam nomine athletam [Agricola] in arenam, sed
hic nullus prodire voluit." Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis , 173, says that we can conclude
from this that there was no one in the audience prepared to step forward in the
place of Agricola and defend his teaching. In the absence of hard evidence we
can only guess at the reason for Agricola's absence. There is nothing to suggest
that he was inferior to Luther in dialectics and rhetoric (he participated in the
Zirkulardisputation de veste nuptiali on 15 June 1537; see WA 39 I, 322, Arg. 45).
Perhaps he wanted to avoid upsetting Luther further by having to disagree with
him publicly and at the same time was afraid of being embarrassed or humiliated
himself.
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whose names are in the record are Justus Jonas and Conrad Cordatus.
Melanchthon, ever eager to work for peace and harmony, persuaded
Agricola to write to Luther on 26 December to seek a reconciliation.78 In this
letter he declares his willingness to submit to Luther's authority, admits his error,
and refers to an the agreement that he and Luther had reached earlier in the
church sacristy. In addition to the letter, he also used the services of Frau Katy,
Melanchthon, and even Jonas to intercede for him.79 Nevertheless, in spite of all
78WA Br 8, 343 (26 December 1538?). It is puzzling why the editor, 0.
Clemen, allows the letter to remain in its present place even when he himself is
reluctant to accept the 1538 dating. Following ZKG 56 (1937): 365, n. 28, and
Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 281 nn. 43 and 44, who date the letter 26 December
1537, the WA, in its Nachtriige und Berichtigungen to WA Br 8 (WA Br 13, 267) now
recommends that the letter be repositioned behind no. 3203 to bring it into correct
chronological sequence. It appears to follow Agricola's letter to Luther on 7
December 1537. In lines 7-8 Agricola repeats the assurance given there that he
will submit to Luther's authority: Alioquin quad ad genus doctrinae attinet, sancte
confirmo me futurum esse in vestra potestate. Even the superscription over his
signature is the same: V. P. dd. [Vestrae Paternitati deditissimus]; only filius is
missing. However, perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence comes from
Thiele's Denkwiirdigkeiten, 258-9, especially the following:

Nam conciliatus mihi Lutherus . . . Iterum coepit mutare animum . . . Et ecce
agitatum est, vt etiam lectione privarer. Admonitus autem per Philippum M.
scripsi me futurum in eius potestate [vide supra]. Conuenit me in templo [on
that, see 1. 6 of the letter in question] et dedit manus societatis. Ego promisi illi
meum offitium. und soli alles hingelegt sein. Et tamen iterum Coepit eius
animus contra me recrudescere . . . Iterum scribo Hortatu Philippi [that would
then be the letter in question]. Die brieffe wil er nicht lesen sed aspematur . . .
Tandem legit mane nondum vino Calefactus, priusquam iret Torgam ipso die
Innocentium [28 December 1537]. Et dixit se velle, vt sim in offitio . . . Postremo
scripsit mihi Lutherus altera Epiphaniae, vt abstinerem in vniuersum a sacra
lectione.
79Agricola knew the influence that Kate wielded over Luther: "Do hat die

Domina Ketha rectrix Coeli et terrae, Iuno Coniunx et soror Zonis." So he asked her to
use her good offices to put in "eyn mal eyn Butt wort" on his behalf (Thiele,
Denkwiirdigkeiten, 259).
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these conciliatory efforts Luther, as dean of the faculty, informed him by letter on
the Day of Epiphany 1538 that he had revoked his permission to lecture in
theology at the university and that subsequently he would need to apply to the
senate for permission if he wanted to continue to teach.80 Melanchthon,
recognizing the gravity of the situation now that Agricola's means of livelihood
had been cut off, advised his friend to send Frau Else to Luther (whom he
regarded quite highly) to plead on his behalf. The mission proved successful,81
but before restoring his facultas legendi at the university Luther demanded that
Agricola fulfill two requirements. First, he had to cease using his strange new
terminology. Secondly, he had to participate in a public disputation with Luther
the following Saturday.
Luther formulated the second Thesenreihe contra antinomos before the end
of December 1537, followed by the third and fourth at the beginning of January.82
The disputation on the second set of theses was to be held on 12 January 1538.
According to the agreement made earlier, this time Agricola was to be present.83
80WA Br 8, 186, 2-9 (Luther an Agricola, 6 Jan. 1538). Luther gave no
specific reason for his action but perhaps he hoped that the revocation of the
venia legendi would force Agricola to stop hiding behind his anonymity and argue
with him face to face: "Deinde si que contra nos in angulis loqueris, non equidem
impediam, Sed to vide, vt tibi parcas."
81Thiele, Denkwiirdigkeiten, 259. Agricola says of her: "Venit, rogauit et
Impetrauit." It was agreed that he should use "pro reuelatione irae . . . Vocabulum
Legis."
82WA Br 8, 188, 3-18; WA 39 I, 347-54 (cf. the editor's introduction, p.

335). See also our translations along with the introduction to the respective
disputations in ch. 3.
83This time when Luther, who once again presided and acted as chief

respondent, summoned him with the words: "Numquid adest dominus Magister
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Nonetheless, we still do not hear from him in person until argumentum 14, and
even then he only presents two argumenta.84 At the conclusion of the responsio to
argumentum 15 Luther made a short speech coram publico in which he acknowledged the suspicion that he had harbored earlier toward Agricola and announced
that he was now satisfied with what he had heard and that therefore he and
Agricola were no longer in disagreement but were once again friends. Luther
concluded by making a heartfelt plea to the audience for unanimity and sincerity
in order to give no ground to the "explorates" sent by his enemies, who would be
happy to see them start fighting again.85 He was obviously relieved that the
painful controversy had been resolved even if privately he may have doubted
whether the matter had really been settled.% Consequently, there was no need to
hold another disputation to debate the third and fourth Thesenreihen which
Luther had already published. He could only hope that no more disputations
contra antinomos would be necessary. Agricola for his part seems to have taken
Isleben?" he knew he would not be calling in vain; see WA 39 I, 457, 6 (2 AD, Arg.
14).
84The two arguments put forward byAgricola correspond to Arg. 14

(WA 39 I, 458, 17-26) and Ag. 15 (WA 39 I, 461, 20-462,13). This agrees with an
independent report of the proceedings ex literis Vencelai Arpinatis ad Vitum
[Dietericum] dated 14 January 1538 (CR 3, 482-3) cited by the editor below Arg. 14
(WA 39 I, 457, n. 2) as well as with an autobiographical fragment from Agricola's
handwritten notes in his Hebrew Bible preserved in Wernigerode (cf. ThStKr 80
(1907): 259-60).
85See WA 39 I, 466, 23-468, 2. This Aussohnungsrede is attested by two
sources besides the MSS containing the entire disputation: one is a handwritten
account from the Agricola Bible (see above note), and is printed in 466, 23-467, 17
(right col.); the second is also noted by the Weimarer editor (see 466, n. 3). A
comparison shows that there is no essential difference between the accounts.
86Thiele, Denkzvardigkeiten, 261-62; WA TR 3, 570, 11-571, 14 (no. 3729),

1538.
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the reconciliation as a vindication and proof of his innocence.87
The reconciliation did not last long. Luther soon found it necessary to
criticize Agricola again for his presumption, error and intrigues. An uneasy
peace prevailed between the two camps,88 but there was no longer any real
intimacy between Luther and Agricola like there had been before the onset of the
controversy.89 On 23 April 1538 (the third Osterfeiertag) at the behest of the
elector,90 Agricola was to preach publicly before the congregation in order to
87Thus Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 182. He bases this on Agricola's

remarks in Thiele, Denwiirdigkeiten, 261. On the other hand, Rogge notes that in
Spalatin's judgment (which he cites from Spalatini Annales, 312) Agricola's admission of error was insincere as before and that at heart his opinion never
changed. Opinions on the reconciliation were divided. In contrast to Spalatin,
Bugenhagen and Jonas, Cruciger was convinced of the honesty of both parties for
he reports on the outcome of the disputation two days later without any criticism
at all (CR 3, 482-3; Cruciger an Vitum Theodorum, and Venecelai Arpinatis an
denselben, 14 January 1538).
88The electoral court greeted the news of the reconciliation with joy but

Chancellor Bruck and Spalatin remained skeptical. It was an uneasy "truce" and
the Wittenberg theologians viewed it negatively and doubted it would last.
According to Agricola's own report (Thiele, Denlaviirdigkeiten, 263) on the 25
August 1538 (Dominica post Bartholomei), when Bruck, Jonas and Melanchthon
were gathered at Luther's home, Melanchthon himself fell under suspicion
because he "fideliter" stood up for him.
89Kawerau, Johann Agricola, 195. Luther pulled back even further from

Agricola after a confidential talk with Armsdorf, three weeks after the disputation, for the latter was convinced that Agricola could not be trusted and that
it would be an error of judgment to give up all suspicion against him. Luther
complained that the antinomian controversy had almost been the death of him.
Weaknesses in people he can forgive, but "malitia ex propositio" is unbearable,
especially in theologians, for arrogrance in theology is the source of all evils (WA
TR 3, 571, 38-573,10 [no. 3729]; 3 February 1538).
90Luther asked Dr. Bruck to reinstate Agricola in his office as teacher

and preacher (Thiele, Denlaviirdigkeiten, 261). It seems that Bruck informed
Luther that while Agricola's public teaching was in agreement with his, privately
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show that in puncto Bufle and Gesetz he was in full agreement with Luther and the
Wittenberg theologians and that he repudiated the contrary doctrine. We do not
know exactly what happened except that Luther was not satisfied and became
increasingly angered by the situation. In September he decided to proceed with a
third disputation against the antinomians. This does not seem to have been
triggered by any one thing in particular, but a growing number of little things
that kept fueling Luther's disgruntlement, not least of which was the claim made
by the Mansfeld castle preacher, Michael Coelius, that Agricola was only waiting
for Luther to die so that then he could teach whatever he pleased.91 The Third
he was spreading his old antinomian opinions. Luther disbelieved this (publicly
at least) and called it slander. However, Agricola was unable to resume
preaching in St. Mary's because Bugenhagen had not yet lifted the interdict
which barred him from preaching, despite all Luther's efforts to persuade him to
change his mind. The elector however thought it was time for Agricola to preach
in order to give proof of his sound doctrine (Thiele, Denlcwiirdigkeiten, 262), and
so at his behest he delivered two sermons on 23 April. Although Cruciger
reports that Agricola set forth his corrected doctrine of the law (CR 3, 513;
Cruciger an Vitum Theodorum; 23 April 1538), it cut no ice with Luther. In spite
of the amendments to his doctrine Agricola still fell back on his old formulations.
Thus the sermon was permeated with his old thesis: "Cur Christus diceret
poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum docendam esse in suo nomine." On top of that
he could not shake off the habit of using the word "oportet" (cf. Jonas' letter to
Luther on 18 August 1538 alerting him to Agricola's propensity to use Muss; WA
TR 4, 39, 22-28 [no. 3966]).
91When

Luther decided to take action against Agricola in the light of the
new accusations, Melanchthon and Jonas were instructed to speak to him.
"While Melanchthon sought to resolve the issue, Jonas was interested in exacerbating it" (Brecht, Luther 3, 166). On 3 September Luther demanded a public
retraction from Agricola even though he continued to reaffirm his willingness to
submit to him (WA TR 4, 205, 22-32 [no. 4307]; WA 50, 469, 26-29; Wider die
Antinomer, 1539). Eventually Agricola did draft a retraction which Melanchthon
then reworked, presumably to make it more acceptable. He had been specifically
requested to state precisely in what respect he had changed his doctrine of the
law. Above all, he was called on to affirm what he had previously denied, that
the preaching of the law is: ad conterendos pios homines (Thiele, Denkwiirdigkeiten,
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Disputation took place within the framework of Cyriacus Gericke's licentiate
examination on 6 September 1538,92 although the length of the debate, which
extended into the afternoon, makes it more like a Zirkulardisputation than a
Promotionsdisputation.93 Although there were still two sets of theses which had
not been debated as a result of the reconciliation, Luther wrote a fifth Thesenreihe,
perhaps because he was looking for a new point of departure.94 Predictably,
263). However, what Agricola finally presented—Luther calls it a "palinode"—
only confirms Luther's impression of "Grickel's" superficiality. He was hoping
Luther would help him frame the retraction as mildly as possible WA TR 4, 88,142 [no. 4030]; 30 September 1538), or as Brecht says (Luther 3, 167), meet him halfway, theologically.
92The exact date on which the disputation was held has been a bone of

contention among the experts. Since the question of dating is not so important
for our purposes, we will accept the decision of Hermelink (WA 39 I, 486-87)
without discussion. He can see no other date possible than 6 September 1538,
which of course coincides with the Promotionsdisputation of Cyriacus Gericke.
93WA 39 I, 496, 25-584, 5 (Promotionsdisputation des Cyriacus Gerichius).
Normally in the the opening address of a licentiate disputation the candidate
would be mentioned by name, but in this case Gericke's name does not occur
once in this unusually long praefatio (see 489, 1-496, 24). Luther once again acted
as president as well as chief respondent before a large audience, and once again
the man at the center of the storm, Magister Johann Agricola, was conspicuously
absent. In a Tischrede Luther says that he proceeded to hold forth "aufs Gewaltigste
wider die neuen Lehrer" in a five hour discussion of doctrine. ". . 'Die das Gesetz
durchs Euangelium verwurfen und das Gesetz wollten aufheben und den Leuten, die
sonst allzu sicher waren, heuchlen zum Men, denselben . wollte er [Luther]
widerstehen bis an sein Ende, sate er auch driiber sterben. Man sollts ihm auch
nachsagen nach seinem Tode"' (WA TR 4, 211, 13-14, 15-18 [no. 4310];13 September
1538). It is here too for the first time that Luther lumps the antinomians together
with the Arians of the ancient church because of the grave danger both pose to
the whole church (211, 24-34).
94For an analysis of the content of the theses, see our discussion of the

Third Disputation in ch. 3. Normally the theses were posted prior to the disputation but in this case they were not sent out until 15 September (Thiele,
Denkwurdigkeiten, 263). This is another fact that makes this disputation different
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Agricola (even though he was not present at the disputation) later claimed that
peace had once more been achieved. Luther, on the other hand, continued to
denounce the antinomian heresy both publicly and privately, even though
Agricola continued to affirm his allegiance to him.95
In December 1538 Agricola approached Luther once more for a reconciliation, motivated partly no doubt by the prospect that if he remained at odds
with him the elector might cut off his stipend. To avoid any possibility of this
backfiring he sought Melanchthon's help in drafting the text of a recantation.
However, this proved to be too irenic so that he drafted an outline of his own
which he then asked Melanchthon to rework. He then went to Luther and instead of showing it to him asked him how he should best formulate a retraction.
Luther however considered him a hypocrite and wanted nothing more to do with
him. He did in fact respond to Agricola's request but in a way that he had never
expected. It took the form of an open letter to Caspar Giittel, one of Agricola's
arch-enemies in Eisleben. The letter, published in January 1539 bearing the title
Wider die Antinomer, is full of satire and polemic directed against Agricola. In it
Luther inserted one sentence, which no doubt amounted to the promised
retraction.96 His purpose in writing this, apart from wanting to humble Agricola,
from a regular Promotionsdisputation.
95Cf. WA TR 4, 67,16-68, 2 (no. 4002); 10 September 1538. See Brecht,
Luther 3, 400, n. 29 for other references. WA Br 8, 292; CR 3, 587-8=MBW 2, no.
2093. Cf. WA 43, 34,10-17; 46, 15-49, 14 (Vorlesungen fiber 1. Mose von 1535-45).
Forstemann, Neues lirkundenbuch, 314. In a Tischrede on 7 October 1538 Luther
reports that Agricola still tries to preach God's wrath while denying the law; that,
says Luther, is about as silly as if I were to say: Vom tode sol man nicht predigen,
vom [=sondern von] sterben mag man predigen. Over against this he affirms the
fundamental inseparability of the law and wrath (WA TR 4, 97,10; 98, 4-12 [no.
4043]).
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was to make it perfectly clear that he categorically rejected antinomianism lest
anybody should come along after his death and conclude from what Agricola
had written that he supported it. To those who believed that Luther shared the
views of the antinomians, based on his earlier writings (this of course is what
Agricola said), he points to his later writings, his sermons, and his hymns based
on the Commandments.97 Also in January Luther requested Agricola to prepare
a set of theses for debate within the arts faculty on 1 February. However, Luther
was critical of them because they did not address the real issues that were at
stake and offered no clear proof that Agricola had abandoned his false view.98
He regretted having dealt so gently with him in Wider die Antinomer.99 Although
a final break was avoided, the writing was on the wall.100
96[Nemlich also,] "das Er Magister Johannes Eisleben wil widderrufft
haben, was er wider das gesetz oder zehen gebot geleret oder geschrieben hat,
und mit uns (wie wir hie zu Wittemberg), wie audi zu Augspurg fur dem Keiser
die Confessio und Apologia vermag, halten, Und ob er anders wurde hernach
halten oder leren, sol es nichts und verdampt sein" (WA 50, 470,1-5).
97There are several important points which Luther makes in this letter

which echo what he has already argued in the antinomian disputations. He
stresses especially the inextricable connection between sin and Christ as well as
the impossibility of eliminating the law entirely because we need the law in order
to know what Christ has done for us.
98The theses were drafted in two sets: the first, theses 1-9, which Luther

objected to the most, represented Agricola's attempt to justify his actions by using
an allegory based on 1 Sam. 14: 24-27). The second set, 10-17, corresponded
basically to Luther's teaching, except for a few theses which are typically
Agricolian. See Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 198, for details.
"WA Br 12, 276-79 (Luther, Stellungnahme zu Thesen Agricolas, 31 January
1539); WA TR 6, no. 6880; WA Br 8, 362, 21-25 (Luther an Melanchthon in
Weimar); Thiele, Denkwfirdigkeiten, 265-66.
Lutherverstandnis, 191-92, is not interested in justifying
Luther's stance but in discovering its basis. An undated Tischrede from 1539 (WA
100Rogge,
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This publication marked a sudden turning-point in the relationship
between Luther and Agricola. Not only did Agricola and his followers take
exception to it, but the theologians around Luther also thought that he failed to
strike the right balance in his choice of words.101 Moreover, Agricola's colleagues at the university showed their support for him by promising to elect him
dean of the arts faculty. Only Luther's vehement objections halted the process.102
As the conflict escalated, Agricola appealed first to the rector of the university
TR 4, 512, 5-513, 8 [no. 4790; an original parallel to no. 4724], possibly from the
second half of February) yields useful information on Luther's view of the nature
and dangers of antinomianism. He lumps the antinomians together with the
papists insofar as both attack the gospel: "Et Christum a dextris vexant [antinomi]
sicut papistae a sinistris. Nam illi docendo Christum Christum impugnant" (10-12).
Likewise, Karlstadt, Miintzer and Eisleben are normally lumped together by
Luther, and yet Agricola stands out in Luther's estimate as the one who has
deceived him the most (WA TR 4, 433, 26-27; 3 July 1539). In either case nothing
less than Christ is at stake. Luther is concerned that if antinomianism was
allowed to spread it could seriously endanger the church. Melanchthon reports
on the struggle against antinomianism at the conference of Frankfurt. Luther's
fear is that if the antinomians succeeded in removing the law from the church
then the government would say: "Nos etiam sumus christiani; lex non ad nos
pertinet" (4, 468,10-17 [no. 4756]; par. to the above from Collection B); see also
101, 25-26 (10 or 11 October 1538); 97, 28 (7 October 1538); 452, 8-17. Indeed, even
the hangman will then appeal to the fact that he is a Christian in order to throw
off the law. Luther fears that the result would be nothing but sweet grace or unbounded libertinism: ". . so wirdt eitel silf3 gnadt, id est, infinita licentia folgen" (512,
26-27). This is exactly how Mi.intzer argued in 1525 and it had dire consequences.
101Nevertheless, Jonas, Bugenhagen, Amsdorf and Melanchthon wanted

to make it clear to the elector in their Gutachten of April 1540 that Luther spoke as
harshly as he did not just on account of Eisleben but for the sake of doctrine
(Forstemann, Neues LIrkundenbuch, 320-21, 325-27).
102Luther threatened to preach publicly against the members of the
faculty if they did not abide by his decision. In his opinion, Agricola's
appointment would have only caused dissensions in church and school. Luther's
reasons for blocking him are twofold: a) doctrinal differences; b) Agricola's
insincerity (WA TR 4, 361,1-19 [no. 4521]).
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and then, on 31 March 1540, to the elector for an impartial investigation of the
matter. This infuriated Luther and provoked him to write a personal attack
against Agricola in which he incorporated the evidence collected against him and
handed it to Chancellor Briick as proof that Agricola was an enemy of Wittenberg
because his teaching was incompatible with the sound evangelical doctrine of its
theologians.103
The elector finally initiated an inquiry and ordered Agricola confined to
the city until the dispute was settled. However, in mid-August he fled Wittenberg and went to Berlin where he took up the position of court preacher to the
Elector Joachim II of Brandenburg. Luther did not let this pass without comment.
He used the doctoral examination of Joachim Marlin on 10 September 1540 as a
final opportunity to denounce the antinomians as instruments of the devil. This
time Luther himself played only a relatively minor part in the disputation. Some
weeks later Agricola was prompted by his new prince to make peace with
Luther. On 1 October, Melanchthon, acting as an mediator (this role was taken
over by Bugenhagen when he had to attend the colloquy in Worms), advised
Joachim II that Luther was not prepared to make any concessions and that there
could be no peace unless Agricola made a full retraction of his criticism of Wider
die Antinomer and withdrew his complaints against Luther. Agricola complied
with the request and also asked Elector John Frederick to forgive him for
breaking his promise and leaving Wittenberg.104 The first draft of the revocation
had to be sent back because it would not have satisfied Luther, after which
103Wider den Eisleben (WA 51, 429-44).
104Kawerau, "Briefe and Urkunden," 442-45, 445-48=MBW 3, nos. 2520-21;
Forstemann, Neues Urkundenbuch, 347-48, 351-54.
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Joachim II saw to it that the draft was improved. By mid-December the printed
recantation was in his hands ready to send to Wittenberg.lo Unlike his colleagues however Luther was never able to let go of his old distrust. He continued to see Agricola as man driven by the quest for power and glory. Even at
the risk of insulting Joachim II Luther refused to receive Agricola when he visited
Wittenberg in 1545, although he was glad to see his wife Else. What he heard
from Berlin confirmed his opinion that Agricola had not changed and was still an
unrepentant hypocrite. He was supported in his stance by his prince.106
The question that must finally be answered is whether Luther's assessment
of Agricola was correct and the harsh condemnation of his teaching warranted?
Luther would claim of course that his action was always motivated by doctrine
and not personality. That may well be true in general, but given the former close
friendship between these two men, Agricola's obvious ambition, Luther's perception of himself as the chief theologian in Wittenberg, and the teacher-student
loin his "Confession vnd Bekenntnis vom Gesetz Gottes," which basically
follows Melanchthon's outline, Agricola puts the blame for his antinomian
teaching on the nomistic preaching of George Witzel, the preacher in Eisleben
who returned to papal obedience. It is instructive to observe the difference in
reaction between Luther and Agricola to Catholic legalism. See Vogt,
Bugenhagens Briefwechsel, nos. 90, 92. Rirstemann, Neues LIrkundenbuch, 349-51.
Kawerau, "Briefe and Urkunden," 453-54, 457-60.
106WA Br 10, 388, 4-389,15 (Luther an Georg Buchholzer in Berlin, c. 1
Sept. 1543 [no. 39091); WA 40 III, 727, 6-20 (Enarratio 53. capitis Esaiae [15441
1550; WA 49, 526,1-2 (Predigt am 8. Sonntag nach Trinitatis); WA Br. 11, 81-83;
84, 10-85, 16; 86, 5-15; 95-100 (Luther an Kurfiirst Joachim II von Brandenburg, 2
May 1545 [no. 40981). Shortly before his death Luther warned the Wittenberg
theologians a final time against the errors of "Eisleben" whom he claimed was
possessed by the devil; see WA 51, 443,17-23 (Wider den Eisleben, 1540): . . .
Sondern aber hiitet euch fur dem Eisleben, denn er wirt nicht allein vom Teuffel geritten,
Sonder der Teuffel wont selbs in jm; on Agricola's reaction to Luther's death, see
Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 233-35.
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relationship that stamped their friendship from the beginning, it would be a bold
person who would conclude that the human element played no part in Luther's
reaction to Agricola's teaching. Brecht concludes that while Agricola remained
faithful in large part to the Wittenberg doctrine, he failed to understand Luther's
theology at its very center, the situation of human beings coram Deo in judgment
and grace.107 And precisely because he misunderstood the heart of Luther's
theology he misunderstood it completely. It is conceivable that had he not stood
outside the doctrinal consensus of the Wittenberg theologians by turning the gospel into a new law, he may have become one of the most capable and articulate
exponents of the evangelical faith.108
The antinomian controversy did not stop in 1540, although this marks the
end of one important phase: the dispute between Agricola and Luther. It breaks
out again in a new form after Luther's death in the form of the Second and the
Third Antinomian Controversy. The later antinomians, who included men such
as Poach, Otho, Michael, Neander, and Musculus, were mainly embroiled in
controversy with the Philippists and the Gnesio-Lutherans over the question of
the third use of the law.109 It is important to note however that there is no
1o7Brecht,

Luther 3, 172.

1o8For

an illuminating comparison Agricola and Melanchthon, see the
Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, esp. 137-43.
109The

best summary of this later controversy is presented by Wilfred
Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit: Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die
neutestamentliche Parainese, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968),
45-55, in an excursus. For a thorough study of the Second Antinomian
Controversy, see Matthias Richter, Gesetz und Heil: eine Lintersuchung zur
Vorgeschichte und zum Verlauf des sogenannten Zweiten Antinomistischen Streits
(Leipzig Diss., 1994).
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unbroken line of continuity between the earlier and later antinomian controversies.11o The later antinomians all insisted that the law plays a vital role in the
Christian life, albeit not a "third-use" role.

The Theology of the Antinomians
This section will be divided into two parts. First, we will consider the
theology of the antinomians on the basis of our chief source, the anonymous
theses [propositiones antinomicae] which were circulating in Wittenberg in 1537.
While Agricola himself was probably not the actual author, the theology is his,111
and to that extent he is at least the intellectual author. Since Luther published
them together with his own set of theses, which was to be the basis of the first
disputation, we need to examine them in order to develop a picture of antinomian theology. After our analysis of the positiones antinomicae, we will examine the
major themes of Agricola's own theology as they relate to the topic of our study.
The method we will follow is first to offer a translation of each of the
positiones antinomicae and then our comments. These will be comparatively brief

because the theology of the theses will be discussed further in our next chapter.
Although the intention here is to outline antinomian doctrinal teaching, we will
110Johannes Seehawer, Zur Lehre vom Brauch des Gesetzes and zur
Geschichte des spateren Antinomismus (Rostock Diss., 1887) shows (supported by

Joest) that the later antinomians, who were united by their common rejection of
the tertius usus legis, all strove to distance themselves from Agricola. The later
antinomians, unlike Agricola, maintained that it is the law that drives people to
repentance, and thus prepares for the gospel. It is clear that they taught the usus
elenchticus, partly in reaction to Agricola.
111Some comments will be made on the question of the authorship of

the theses as we discuss them below. See also the letter WA BR 8, 159, 3-5
(Johannes Agricola an Luther, before 7 December 1537).
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also attempt comparisons (however limited) with Luther's theology wherever
possible. In publishing the antinomian theses, Luther makes it clear in a brief
preface that he is taking this action in order publicly to dissociate himself from
them lest his silence be taken as approval.112 He promises to explain the reason
for his stance against the antinomians at the disputation which would follow in a
few weeks.
The Antinomian Theses Circulated among
the Brethren by an Unknown Author113
1.Repentance is to be taught, neither from the Decalogue, nor from any
law of Moses, but on the basis of the injury done to the Son through the
gospel.
2.For Christ says in the last chapter of Luke: Thus it was necessary for
the Christ to die, and in this way to enter into his glory that repentance and
the forgiveness of sins be preached in his name [Luke 24: 46-471.
3.And Christ in John says: The Spirit convicts the world of sin, not the
law [John 16: 8].
4.The last words of Christ teach the same: Go, preach the gospel to
every creature [Mark 16: 15].
5.Paul, when he speaks to the Philippians (Have this mind in you,
which is also in Christ Jesus, that you might work out your salvation with
fear and trembling) [Phil. 2: 5, 12], states very clearly that repentance (which
he calls fear and trembling) is to be taught from remembering Christ, not
from the law.
6.From the sermons of Paul and Barnabas [Acts 13-14] it is clear
enough that there is no need for the law in any part of justification.
The first proposition presents what is central to antinomian theology, if
112For

the argument that Luther may have known of the anonymous
theses earlier than has been traditionally assumed (following Kawerau), see
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium and Busse, 256, n. 33.
113WA 39 I, 342, 1-345, 13: Positiones antinomicae incerto autore inter fratres
sparsae. These theses, which were circulating in secret, were published by Luther
in December 1537 as part of his response [Ad incerti cuiusdam autoris positiones D.
Martini Lutheri Responsio] to the growing antinomian controversy.
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not its chief doctrine: poenitentia is to be taught, non ex Decalogo, aut ulla lege Mosi,
sed ex violatione filii per Evangelium. This is a recurrent theme in the theology of
Agricola and also comes up three times in the First Disputation.114 The doctrine
is then substantiated and elaborated in propositiones 2-7. In other words, unlike
Luther, he does not teach that repentance has its origin in the violatio legis but in
the violatio fiTii.115 The two keys texts used to support this teaching are Luke 24:
4647118 and John 16: 8,117 each of which is taken up in the disputation by both
Luther and the antinomians.118 Mark 16: 15, on the other hand, does not come
up in the disputations at all, probably because Jesus' commission here does not
contain the crucial word µET& oi a [poenitentia] even though the text itself is a
further confirmation of the fact that Jesus mandated the disciples to preach the
114
WA 39 I, 384, 4-6 (Arg. 15), 399, 8-9 (Arg. 22), 400, 2-3 (Arg. 23).
On the prior use of the term violatio filii, see our note above on the same in
connection with Luther's sermon on 1 July 1537. On the meaning of ex violatione
filii, see the lengthy note in W2 20, 1624, n. 2.
115Cf. also WA 39 I, 343, 33-34, where the

positiones list this under the
"purr as taught by Luther, and 345, 5-6, where Luther in turn lists it in his
responsio as a characteristically antinomian teaching.
116Ernst Koch, Johannes Agricola neben Luther, (141) points out that
Agricola finds in Luke 24: 47 the classical proof for his view that the action of
regeneration = the action of renewal, and this action leads, via repentance, to the
forgiveness of sins. Koch sees this as further proof that Agricola is operating
under the influence of Melanchthon's early theology.
117Although John 16: 8 does not contain the term metavnoia either, the

idea of repentance is implied by the words: tult iheolv ihgyteci irapciicXttroZ TOv
icciagov ICE0 allaptiac
1180n Luke 24: see WA 39 I, 392,17-20 (1 AD, Arg. 19); 414, 2-5 (1 AD,

Arg. 35); 416, 1-3 (1 AD, Arg. 36); 485, 9-15 (2 AD, concl.); 572, 3-7 (3 AD, Arg. 9).
On John 16: 403, 9-10 (1 AD, Arg. 16); 414, 13-14 (1 AD, Arg. 35).
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gospel and not the law. Agricola does not consider the fact that the term "gospel"
may be used here, not in the proper sense of the promise of the forgiveness of
sins, but in the more general sense of God's word, containing both law and
gospel. Philippians 2:13 is used only once in the disputations, and then not in
connection with repentance but good works, the emphasis being on the bonum
proponere and our inability to do that ex se sibi. While it is true that Paul's
exhortation salutem vestram operari (which is related to the idea of riatic St'
ecycirric ivepyowtivri in Gal. 5: 6, according to the interpretation evident here) is
based on the exemplum (our word) of Christ as the model of humility and selfsacrifice (Phil. 2: 5-11), nevertheless, verse thirteen makes it clear that this is
possible only because God himself is working in and through usv[flate . . . gece
(1)613ov xo3 Tp01101) Tip/ Eavrav acotripio:v
ivepyav iv

Kdl TO egitelV K(11

KatepyisiCecreiTi

ez6c yap Ewily 6

ivepriv ineep Trig Elio° iciat]. Therefore, this

weakens the antinomian claim that repentance (which in our opinion is not the
issue here anyway) is to be taught ex memoria Christi, non ex lege (Th. 5).119 The
antinomians also appeal to the sermons of Paul and Bamabas as proof of their
thesis that repentance is ex evangelio and not ex lege. The main passage in
question here seems to be Paul's sermon at Pisidian Antioch (Acts 13:16-41).12o
Now certainly almost the whole sermon there is a recounting of what the Lord
119Rogge,

Lutherverstiindnis, 148, notes that the phrase ex memoria Christi,
while it agrees factually with Agricola's teaching, is virtually never used by him
(another indicator that he may not be the primary author). It is more common for
him to use the term beneficia Christi, which he took over from Melanchthon.
120Since

Acts gives us no record of any sermons preached by Barnabas,
we can only assume that the author means the sermons preached by Paul on his
first missionary journey with Barnabas. And the only such sermon recorded is
the one in Acts 13: 16-41.
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did for his people and is supported by several Old Testament passages. In
Agricola's language, this would constitute the beneficia Dei or alternatively the
violatio Christi. Yet the sermon does end on a note of warning [pAinetz cilv] (13:
40) which could certainly be taken as a call to repentance based on the law in the
form of the scriptural testimony of Habakkuk 1: 5. Therefore, although the
greater part of the sermon recounts God's dealings with his people Israel and
finally the redemptive work of his Son, it still contains law even if it follows
gospel. Moreover, we will see when we come to the disputations that Luther will
argue that the gospel statements which condemn sin do not in fact function as
gospel but as law.
7. Without any [prior] thing whatever, the Holy Spirit is given and people
are justified; it is not necessary that the law be taught, either for the beginning,
the middle, or the end of justification.
8. Moreover, the Holy Spirit was given once and is continually given, and
people are justified without the law, alone through the gospel of Christ.
9. Therefore, it is not necessary for the law of Moses to be taught, either for
the beginning, the middle, or the end of justification.121
If the first six points presented a thesis (#1) followed by its scriptural proof
(#2-6), the next three represent the familiar syllogism of the school disputation
with a major premise (#7), minor premise (#8) and conclusion (#9). The theme is
justification, which, as we have seen, was already at the center of a controversy
between Cruciger (a disciple of Melanchthon) and Cordatus in 1536. As far as we
know, Agricola does not use the term iustificatio thetically since for him the
content of justification is bound up with all that is conveyed by the terms
poenitentia and remissio peccatorum.122 He asserts in the propositio major that the
121See

the Disputation De iustificatione (1536), WA 39 I, 78-126.

122Thus

Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 148. It seems that this may be further
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law [ea res] is not to be applied to either the beginning, middle or end of
justification.123 The propositio minor asserts that people are justified sine lege, per
solum Evangelium de Christo. The conclusio finally eliminates the lex Mosi all together because it is not necessary for it to be taught at any stage of justification.
Luther, for his part, rejects completely the scholastic division of justification into
partes and contends that the antinomians who employ this division do not themselves understand what they mean by such high-flown terms as principium,
medium, and finis.124 Furthermore, although he holds that the law is not
"necessary" for justification in a material sense, he maintains that it still plays a
preparatory role and hence cannot be eliminated from the context of
justification.125
10.The major premise is certain based on what we know from the work of
Paul and Barnabas [Acts 13: 38-39].
11.You will conclude the same from the minor premise, for the Holy Spirit
fell in visible form on the Gentiles [Acts 10: 44-45].
proof that Agricola was not the primary author of the positiones antinomicae.
123Luther takes this up in Thesis 15 of his Fourth Thesenreihe:

Argumentatio ista: Quicquid non est necessarium ad iustificationem neque in principio,
neque in medio, neque in fine, id non est docendum etc., nihil est (WA 39 I, 352, 36-38).
He exposes the absurdity of such an argument by showing that in the final analysis nothing would be taught. On the other hand (Th. 21): Si syllogismus vult,
haec non esse docenda ad iustificationem necessaria, quid novi affertur? (353, 13-14).
124In the fourth Thesenreihe he says: Primum si interroges, quid istae

verborum ampullae principium, medium, finis sibi velint, invenias nec ipsos intelligere
(WA 39 I, 353,1-2).
125Again, Luther makes this clear: Ex hoc non sequitur, legem esse
tollendam aut non docendam, etiam si nihil prosit ad iustificationem (WA 39 I, 353, 1516; ATh, IV, Th. 22). He also stresses the givenness of the law as a fact of life: Lex
enim nulla nostra necessitate, sed de facto iam invitis nobis adest, ante et in principio,
medio, fine et post iustificationem (353, 37-38; ATh, IV, Th. 33).
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Luther refutes the minor premise (Th. 8) in his fourth Thesenreihe where he
argues that there can be no justification without the law because it is the task of
the law to show that we are sinners and in need of justification.126 He denies that
the "experientia" of Paul and Barnabas would have been such that the Holy Spirit
fell on the heathen without the preaching of the law.127 In fact, although he does
not say it in so many words, the same applies to Peter's sermon in the home of
Cornelius. Agricola would have us believe that the Spirit came without the
preaching of the law at all. However, even a cursory look at what Peter said
126WA 39 I, 353, 17-18 (ATh, IV, Th. 23): Falso allegatur in minore

experientia a Paulo et Barnaba, per quorum ministerium sine lege, gentes sunt
iustificatae. Moreover, in Th. 26 he agrees with Augustine that "without the law"
means "without the help of the law:"Sine lege" ubique in Paulo intellegi debet, ut
Augustinus recte exponit, lege adiuvante id quod semper secuti sumus (353, 23-24).
127This is an exegetical more than a theological conclusion. Admittedly,

the account of Paul's sermon at Pisidian Antioch does not contain an overt
proclamation of the law such as we find in Peter's Pentecost sermons in Acts 2
where he reminds them twice that they crucified Jesus but God raised him up
(vv. 23-24; 36), although it is implicit in 13: 38-39 where there is an indissoluble
connection between the Cak mg atuapnio-v Karayybatetat and the axe, Eavraw
01!)1( itruv TienTE iv vOug Moyiiaicoc oucaudeilv at. In other words, the fact that
justification bestows what cannot be obtained ex lege Mosi presupposes the prior
claim of the law. This fact is compeletely overlooked by the "proof" offered for
the propositio major of the antinomian positiones. Furthermore, it is inadmissible to
arbitrarily confine one's attention to the missionary kerygma of Paul and
Barnabas. When one looks at the other sermons in Acts, the preaching of the law
is not just implicit but explicit. In Acts 2 Peter concludes by stressing that God
has made him both Lord and Christ, TOVTOVTOV `Acrotiv Ov
iattrUpuiCraTE
(v. 36), and in the following verse we are told the reaction of his hearers:
'Alcoliaavrecr & Katevliynaav rrty xapOiav . . . . That this was more than mere
contrition is evident from the fact that they were baptized. In Acts 13 the
outcome is different, but they too were eager to hear again the hciyog Toi5 xupiou
the following sabbath.
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shows that he preached the law (Acts 10: 42) as well as gospel (v. 43).128
12.Why then do certain persons, without the word, indeed contrary to
the word of Christ, and contrary to the example of the apostles, make the law
the first part, and indeed a necessary part, of the doctrine of justification?
13.Therefore, in order to preserve the purity of the doctrine, we must
oppose those who teach that the gospel is not to be preached unless souls
have first been shaken and made contrite by the law.
14.Those who improperly add this preachment to the words of Christ
and teach that first the law, then the gospel, is to be taught, are distorters of
Christ's words, for they do stand firm on the simplicity of his words.
15.For just as we must to stand firm on the simple sense of those words:
This is my body, so we will have to stand firm on the simplicity of those
words: Go, preach the gospel, baptizing etc [Matt. 28: 19; Mark 16: 15-16].
16.All the law does is convict sins, and indeed without the Holy Spirit,
therefore it convicts to damnation.
17.However, we need a doctrine that not only condemns with great
effect but also saves at the same time. That however is the gospel, which
teaches repentance and the forgiveness of sins conjointly.
18.For the gospel of Christ teaches the wrath of God from heaven, and at
the same time the righteousness of God (Rom. 1 j: 17,18]). It is a preaching of
repentance, conjoined with a promise, which reason cannot grasp naturally,
but through divine revelation.
If the quidam in Thesis 12 is an oblique reference to Luther (and it is hard
to see how it could be anything else), then the author is either ignorant of
Luther's teaching on justification or he is deliberately attributing falsehood to him
128A parenthetical comment about the "Gentile Pentecost" in Acts 10: 4445. The fact that the Spirit fell on Cornelius and his household while Peter was
still preaching, and before they were baptized, is of special heilsgeschichtlich
importance and indeed contrary to the normal order of things in Acts. It is proof
to the reluctant Jews that it is God's will that the Gentiles are also to be received
into the church. This is the conclusion that the Jews themselves finally come to
when Peter reports the event to the leaders of the church in Jerusalem (Acts 11:
15-18). This narrative is descriptive of the way in which the Spirit leads and
guides the mission in Acts, especially at certain crucial points, such as when the
gospel crosses over the boundaries of Judaism and is preached on Gentile soil. It
does not represent the normal way in which the Spirit is given, even in Acts, and
should not be used prescriptively as is often the case in Pentecostal circles.
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for scurrilous purposes.129 Luther certainly does speak of the partes of
repentance, as we see from his own theses,13° but he would never say that the
teaching of the law is the prima pars of justification.131 Furthermore, he has also
made it plain that the term necessaria should not be used in theology, and
especially not in the article of justification.132
Thesis 13, with its criticism of those who teach that the gospel should not
be preached nisi animis prius quassatis et contritis per legem, seems to be aimed
especially at Melanchthon and may hark back to the controversy of 1527.133
Thesis 14 declares that those who teach this way, insisting that the law
must be preached before the gospel, are only verborum Christi contortores, for they
are superimposing their own system on the clear words of Christ which he spoke
when he commanded that the gospel be preached in all the world. The important
thing for the incertus autor is the simplicitas verborum Christi, which could be lost if
one does not stay strictly with his commission, Ite, praedicate Evangelium. The
author supports his position by comparing these words with the verba Domini
129We agree with Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 147, that this is yet another
indicator that Agricola himself was probably not the author of the theses.

for instance, WA 39 I, 345, 22-23 (ATh, I, Th. 4): Poenitentiae prior
pars, scilicet dolor, est ex lege tantum. Altera pars, scilicet propositum bonum, non
potest ex lege esse.
130See,

131This is already clear from the Theses on Rom. 3: 28 and Disputation
of 1536 de iustificatione (WA 39 I, 82-126).

for instance, his Responsio to Argumentum 13 in the Promotionsdisputation von Palladius and Tilemann (1 June 1537), WA 39 I, 224, 22-226,17.
132See,

133Rogge,

Lutherverstandnis, 147, n. 52, notes that Luther writes in the
margin of his copy: Da ist die giffi heraus," see Forstemann, Neues Urkundenbuch,
314. For more, see above our comments on the controversy.
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spoken at the institution of the Lord's Supper: Hoc est corpus meum. However, the
antinomians, by insisting that the word "gospel" can only have one sense, came to
the text with just as preconceived a notion as to what it means as did the Sacramentarians who, for purely rational or philosophical reasons, ruled out the literal
sense of corpus and proceeded to interpret it symbolically. Already the fact that
the dominical mandate in Matthew 28: 20 does not use TO El)ayyiXiov, but rather
charges the disciples to teach all people to keep iroirra Oaa ivereaagnv
should make one wary about too quickly identifying To ve.)ayyiAio v in Mark 16:
15 with eral)ecric apiarmay. This will be discussed further in the course of our
analysis of the disputations.
Thesis 16 expresses one of the chief objections that Agricola has to the
preaching of the law. He agrees with Luther, lex semper accusat, or lex arguit
peccata, but he makes a significant addition: he adds the word "tantum." Thus,
Agricola teaches: Lex tantum arguit peccata—and qualifies that further by adding: et
quidem sine Spiritu sancto, and concludes: ergo arguit ad damnationem. We will see
later that Luther, in one of his responses, refers specifically to this thesis and
rejects it as nonsense saying that it is impossible for the law to reveal sin without
the Holy Spirit, but that the Spirit who works through the law is not doing the
same as the Spirit who works through the gospel.134 The other point we will see
Luther making is that the true purpose of the law finally is not to drive to
damnation—hence the law does not only [tantum] condemn--but to be our
paidagwgov" in leading us to Christ.
Theses 17 and 18 express the heart of Agricola's theology. In place of the
two antithetical words of God, law and gospel, which for Luther must always be
134See WA 39 I, 370, 3-371,16 (1 AD, Arg. 4).
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distinguished but never separated, Agricola wants to speak only of one word.
That in turn means that instead of having the law to condemn and the gospel to
forgive, he wants the gospel, as the one word, to do double duty and thus to
forgive as well as to condemn. Hence, he maintains that gospel coniunctim docet
poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum (Th. 18), which is why he can use Jesus'
words in Luke 24: 46-47 as a mandate to preach solely the gospel. Underlying this
is the assumption, central to Agricola's theology, of a duplex revelatio, where the
gospel reveals not only God's wrath but also his righteousness: Evangelium Christi
docet iram Dei et coelo, et simul iustitiam Dei (Th. 18). As we will see in the next
chapter, Luther demonstrates that this central tenet of antinomian theology rests
on a false exegesis of Romans 1: 18135 (and they make a similar error in their
interpretation of the account of Paul's conversion136). The antinomians claim that
they can still teach God's wrath even without teaching the law. First they preach
grace and then the revelation of wrath. In fact they have made this into a new
method of preaching which they then claim to find everywhere in scripture.
Luther rejects this new method as well as the claim that one can preach wrath
without preaching the law. He insists that it is impossible to separate them
because the law brings wrath (Rom. 4: 15).137
Although not mentioned in positiones antinomicae, a correlative to the
135See

WA 39 I, 423, 3- 424, 3 (2 AD, Arg. 1).

136See

WA 39 I, 405, 7-11 (1 AD, Arg. 27); 406, 19-407, 15 (1 AD, Arg. 28);
566, 12-567, 14 (3 AD, Arg. 33/6). A third text to be used by the antinomians in
support of their teaching that the gospel bestows forgiveness and salvation and at
the same time reveals sin, is Ps. 19: 2.
137See WA 39 I, 348, 27-30 (ATh II, Th. 19, 20); WA 50, 474, 9-27 (Wider
die Antinomer, 1539).
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notion of the duplex revelatio of the gospel is the Begriffspaar sacramentumexemplum. When we encounter this in this disputations, we will see that while
Luther distinguishes here between law and gospel, Agricola uses this modus
loquendi in Luther to corroborate his teaching that the law is in the gospel and
that therefore the lex Mosaica has been abolished to make way for the gospel as
the nova lex.138
Finally, we observe that this idea of a duplex revelatio is also the
presupposition for the first thesis which asserts that repentance does not arise ex
lege but ex violatione filii per Evangelium. The antinomians find additional support
for their thesis in Paul's statement in Romans 2: 4 that the benignitas Dei is meant
to lead us to repentance.139
The positiones antinomicae now begin a new section. The next two sets of
articles provide a sampling of several important Reformation sources that have
been categorized as either "purr (sound) or "impuri" (unsound), judged from an
antinomian point of view. After the a brief introduction, the first of these two
sets of articles offers with approval five passages from the writings of Luther and
one from Melanchthon under the heading: Puri sunt ex multis pauci isti. It is
worth noting that the majority of the so-called "puri articuli" belong to the period
of the young Luther. In each case we will first cite the passage in translation and
then comment on it.
The commentaries of the earlier men are in scant agreement with us, for
1380n

sacramentum-exemplum, see WA 39 I, 461, 20-466, 21 (2 AD, Arg.

15).
139This is also taken up in WA 39 I, 536, 3-537,13 (3 AD, Arg. 18); 580, 416 (3 AD, Arg. 42/15).
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the manner of justification is taught purely in some places and impurely in
others.

From the Many These Few are Sound140
1.Luther in the Preface to Romans where he says: "God's wrath from
heaven over all mankind is revealed through the gospel, because of their
godlessness and wickedness."
When Luther wrote this in his Epistelvorreden to the Septemberbibel in
1522,141 he was innocent of any latent antinominism, and as we saw above, later
rejected the notion that the gospel is the revelation of God's wrath. As we said
above, this idea figures prominently in Agricola's theology and will be further
discussed in the next chapter.
2. Luther in his Preface to James: "He wants to do with the law what
the apostles do with the appeal to love." In this name it is condemned, even
if the epistle of James is apostolic.
This passage also comes from Luther's Preface in the "September Bible."
The antinomian author, for obvious reasons, shares Luther's dislike for the
Epistle of James. However, Luther's criticism of James is not antinomian in
outlook. He does not polemicize against James simply because of its
predominately nomistic character (we today would call it parenesis as opposed to
nomos), but because it lacks the clear proclamation of Christ, since for Luther the
chief criterion of canonicity is finally christological [was Christum treibet].
3.In his Epistle to the Romans Philipp is always stressing that in the
New Testament it is the offence against the Son which is to be emphasized,
140WA 39 I, 343, 27-344, 13.
141WA DB 7,13, 34-35, 27-34.
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not the breaking of the law.
This passage is strictly not a citation but rather an attempt to give the gist
of Melanchthon's work.142 However, there is no doubt that he would never have
written: In novo testamento esse urgendam violationem filii, non violationem legis.
There are certainly plenty of passages which could be construed in that way,
especially if they were taken out of context.143 But there are also many other
passages which would not support an antinomian reading of Melanchthon's
work.144 To cite Melanchthon in support of a position which he himself fiercely
opposed only a decade earlier does nothing to advance the antinomian cause.
4. Luther in summaries of the Psalter says on the psalm [19]: The
heavens proclaim: And with that he sets aside at the same time the old law,
which etc.145 And in his notes on the psalm he compares the glory of the
law with that of the gospel, considering carefully why the heavens reveal
the honor of God. And among other things he says: "Because the doctrine of
142The Weimarer editor (Hermelink) notes that the first edition of
Melanchthon's Roman's commentary, Commentarii in epist. Pauli ad Romanos,
recens scripti a Philippo Melan. anno 1532, does not appear in CR.

143R0gg
---e, Lutherverstiindnis, 148, gives examples: "Euangelium praedicat
poenitentiam (see Rogge, 277 n. 58) , et arguit peccata, et offert remissionem peccatorum
et iustificationem." Again: "Reuelatur ira Dei de coelo, hoc est praedicatur in Euangelio
super omnem impietatem . ." Agricola no doubt felt vindicated when
Melanchthon, in expounding Rom. 1: 18, elucidated it by drawing on his key
passage, Luke 24: 46-47: ". summam suae doctrinae aptissime complexus est Christus
ipse, cum inquit, Lucae vltimo. Ite praedicantes poenitentiam in nomine meo et
remissionem peccatorum."
'44Again, Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 149, offers examples. "Lex est
doctrina requires a nobis perfectam obedientiam erga Deum . . . condemnans hos, qui non
sunt tales, quales ipsa esse praecipit." Again: "Et tamen interim non sola fides, sed etiam
obedientia erga legem adesse debet."
145See WA 38, 24, 20-21 (Summarien fiber die Psalmen and Ursachen des

Dolmetschens; 1531-1533).
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the law rather leads to the honor of men and the dishonor of God, while
through the works of the law either they are proud or those in despair hate
God, this is a proclamation of the heavens.146
The antinomians say that it is impossible to proclaim the honor [gloria] of
God without at the same time telling of the dishonor of mankind. Does Luther's
exegesis (in his Operationes) lead him to conclude that both the salvation and sin
of mankind are revealed through the one gospel, as in Agricola?147 It seems not.
When Luther says with Psalm 19:2 (Eng., v. 1) that the honor of God [gloria] cannot be proclaimed unless the dishonor of man is proclaimed at the same time, he
is not saying that the gospel reveals sin. What he says is that where the gospel
prevails the law also has exercised its function. Kjeldgaard-Pedersen has shown
in his analysis of Luther's interpretation of Psalm 19 that Luther, unlike Agricola,
does not relate the gospel to the revelation of sin. To proclaim the honor of God
means to proclaim his mercy (which means ultimately Jesus), which is the only
basis for the glory of man, and through which God himself is glorified. When
Luther speaks of the proclamation of the glory, there is nothing to suggest that
the gospel is also the means of the revelation of sin.
Since the positiones antinomicae refer to Psalm 19 in Luther's Psalmensummarien, we should also comment on that. While Luther's exegesis of the psalm
might at first sight lend support to the antinomian idea that the gospel is really
the lex nova, a careful look at his other writings will reveal that that is not the way
he speaks once he has extricated himself from Augustine and learned to dis146WA 5, 543, 23-26 (Operationes in Psalmos; 1519-1521).

147This is the question that Kjelgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium and
Busse, 278-79, attempts to answer. For a comparative exegesis of Ps. 19 to
establish the theological divergence between Luther and Agricola, see pp. 226-43.
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tinguish properly between law and gospe1.148 Another passage from the same
Summarien also appears to validate antinomian teaching: "Eben so solle auch das
newe gesetz des Euangelij leuchten, alles [alle Welt] allerley leren, erleuchten, trosten,
reinigen etc. Und damit hebt er zu gleich auff das alte gesetz, welchs nicht so rein, helle,
lieblich und unvergenglich war etc."149 However, the fact that this passage, in spite
of its late dating, is more reminiscent of the early Luther than of late Luther, does
explain why it could be misinterpreted in an antinomian direction.
This may be a good point to make some observations about Luther's early
theology, since most of the Luthertexte cited in support of antinomian doctrine
(the "purr) come from the earlier part of his career. We may date Luther's
decisive Durchbruch around 1518/19.15° By this time he has already parted
1480n Luther and Augustine, see Leif Grane, "Divus Paulus et S.
Augustinus, Interpres eius fidelissimus: iiber Luthers Verhaltnis zu Augustin," in Festschrift fur Ernst Fuchs, ed. G. Ebeling, E, Jiingel, and G. Schunack (Tubingen:
Mohr, 1973), 133-46. Grane makes the point that Luther was not interested in
Augustine's theology per se but only insofar as it assisted him in his
interpretation of Paul to grasp the modus loquendi Apostoli. He concludes with a
very telling a passage from Luther's Tischreden, cited according to Clement's ed.,
Cl. 8, 45, 34ff. (No. 347 in Veit Dietrichs Sammlung): "Sind [seit] ich Paulus
verstanden hab, so hab ich keinen Doctor konnen achten. Sie sind mir gar gering
worden. Principio Augustinum vorabam, non legebam, sed da mir in Paulo die thur
auffgieng, das ich wuste, was iustificatio fidei ward, da ward es aus mit yhm." See also
Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light Upon Luther's Way from
Medieval Catholicism to Evangelical faith (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1951), esp. 9-18.

149WA 38, 24, 19-23 (Summarien fiber die Psalmen und Ursachen des
Dolmetschens; 1531-1533). This psalm was important to Agricola and it also
played a role in his refutation of Miintzer's commentary. Therefore, thesis #4 no
doubt goes back to Agricola.
speaking, we accept the position of Ernst Bizer, Fides ex
Auditu: Eine Untersuchung iiber Entdeckung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin
Luther (Neukirchen: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins
150Generally
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company with scholastic theology, is beginning to distinguish between law and
gospel, and is gradually weaning himself off Augustine.151 Furthermore, we
work with the assumption that there is a radical difference between the theology
of the young Luther and the mature Luther. Even if the same term is used later,
it will be now used in a different way.
The contrast between the old law and the new law, instead of between law
and gospel, is typical of the young Luther for whom the gospel is really the new,
spiritual law.152 Hence, the equation evangelium = nova lex or lex spiritualis. This
Neukirchen Kreis Moers, 1958). A similar position is adopted by Saarnivaara,
Luther Discovers the Gospel, and Brecht in his three-volume biography, Martin
Luther. Bizer's position has been seriously challenged. For instance, see
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium and Busse, esp. 332-52. Leif Grane,
Modus loguendi theologicus. Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (15151518) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), does not see Luther's breakthrough occurring at a
particular date but understands it rather as a new way of thinking and speaking
theologically, a transformation of language, as Luther gradually comes to reject
medieval scholasticism.
151In a nutshell, the core difference between Augustine and the mature
Luther is that Augustine understands the gospel as the nova lex or lex spiritualis
and therefore distinguishes between two laws instead of between law and gospel.
This has profound theological implications. It means that for Augustine
justification is understood as renewal or gradual transformation of the believer
into the image of God, while for Luther it is the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of righteousness propter Christum per fidem. Broadly speaking, Luther puts
the emphasis on the externum verbum and the Christus pro nobis, while Augustine
speaks of the inner word and the Christus in nobis. For Luther sanctification
(though he does not use the term as such) is the fruit of justification, for Augustine justification is sanctification.
152Both the young Luther and Agricola use Ps. 19: 11 (Eng., v. 10) to il-

lustrate the meaning of the lex spiritualis. However, in his Operations Luther
makes a distinction here. The knowledge of the law in its character as spiritualis
is not the same as knowing the lex domini spiritualiter (WA 5, 556,15-16). To
know the law spiritually (which is akin to Jesus taking the law into his own
hands) means understanding it as the demand that we can in no way fulfill and
which in turn leads to the fact that we feel tormented in our conscience. But that
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equation is consistent with the Augustinian and scholastic terminology, according to which lex was an Oberbegriff for law and gospel. Consequently, whereas in
the mature Luther the contrast is lex-evangelium; lex-promissio, in the young Luther
(following Augustine) it is rather lex vetus-lex nova; lex literalis-lex spiritualis.
Hence, the early Luther operates with two laws (lex litterae and lex spiritualis), the
older Luther speaks rather of two uses of the one law.153
The above passage from Luther's Operationes is quoted in Agricola's
Evangeliensummarien,154 which is probably the best source for the theology of the

is still to understand that law as litera. To understand the law spiritualiter as lex
domini is to understand it as the law fulfilled in Christ. Agricola reserves the term
lex spiritualis for the law fulfilled in love. However, he has no understanding of
the spiritual function of the law (revealing sin and wrath) even though he says
that we only come to the knowledge of the real character of the law in the light of
grace. Therefore, Agricola cannot say that the law in its theological function
leads directly to its goal (Christ) when it is understood spiritualiter, since for him
the law (as lex arguens) and the Spirit work in opposite directions. Where the
Spirit is present the law cannot function "spiritually." In Agricola then the gospel
also, and not only the law, leads to a knowledge of sin in the Christian. For an
instructive comparison of Luther and Agricola in their exegesis of Psalm 19
(although we cannot accept all his conclusions), see Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz,
Evangelium und Busse, 226-243. It is useful to note how comparatively seldom
Luther uses the term lex spiritualis in his later years, and even when he does, he
speaks like Paul in Rom. 7: 14: Lex est spiritualis, id est, requirit spiritualia (WA 39
II, 138, 15; Arg. 25, Marlin); cf. 39 I, 460,1-2 (2 AD, Arg. 14). These are the only
two times that the two words lex and spiritualis occur in a sentence (which is not
the same as the term lex spiritualis) in the Antinomian Disputations, and in fact in
the later disputations as a whole. A glance at the Registerband of the WA (Latin
works) will also confirm the relatively infrequent occurrence of this concept in
the mature Luther.
153This point is also observed by Martin Schloemann, Natiirliches und
gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1961), 20.
154Forstemann, Neues Urkundenbuch, 299. It is quoted in somewhat
more detail and in German translation. Cf. WA 5, 543, 21-26: Haec fides et scientia

domini facit nos amare, gloriari et glorificare. Hanc gloriam Moses et prophetae etsi
cognoverunt, non tamen enarraverunt, sed enarrandam aliquando praedixerunt, cum
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later Agricola.155 Now what makes this passage as cited in the Summarien (in
contrast to the way it stands in the positiones antinomicae) so important for the
light that it sheds on both Agricola and Luther is the fact that Luther has
underlined it and made marginal notes on two sentences: on Agricola's addition
and on the words "Sonst hat das Gesetz Gottes vnehre gewirckt."156 Luther is
probably not even aware that these are his own words from the Operationes that
he is commenting on157 and that from Agricola's point of view he is even
contradicting himself when he remarks: "Das leugestu, quia Tram operatur lex, non
blasphemiam."158 Then with regard to the words that Agricola adds at the end of
the paragraph: "an welchen Gott kein ehr kan (in the sense that the law can never
serve the honor of God) Luther comments: "Ecce Satanam, Contritorum enim Deus
est."159 It is dear from this that Luther does not hold that the law causes security
doctrina legis potius gloriam hominum et ignomiam dei operaretur, dum per opera legis
aut superbi praesumerent aut desperati deum odirent homines.
155This is

not intended to suggest that there is a decisive shift in
thinking between the young and the old Agricola. In fact in our opinion (and
that is all that it is, an opinion, because this question lies outside the scope of our
research) Agricola's theology is fairly well settled by 1525. On the Evangeliensummarien, see Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 156-65. For an analysis of his teaching
up to 1527, see Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium and Busse, esp. 37-212.
156It

was pointed out in the historical section that when Luther learned
that Agricola was having the Evangeliensurnmarien printed without his approval,
he ordered the presses stopped and confiscated the copies already printed,
keeping one for himself.
157Agricola does not acknowledge the words as being Luther's but
simply embeds them in his own writing so that the reader assumes they are his.
158Forstemann, Neues Urkundenbuch, 299, n. 2; cf. WA 50, 674, 1-2
(Luthers Randbemerkungen zu den Summarien des Agricola).
159Forstemann, Neues

Urkundenbuch, 299, n. 3; cf. WA 50, 674, 3-4
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and blasphemy, nor does he see it as the chief purpose of the law to bring about
the honor of God, but teaches that the law works wrath (Rom. 4: 15). The
question raised here of course is whether Luther really does contradict himself
with his marginalia or whether the original context of this passage in the
Operationes supports such an understanding. It will becomes clear as our analysis
unfolds why we believe that Luther's Randbemerkungen do in fact constitute a real
contradiction and that furthermore this is indicative of a decisive change in the
understanding of the law that distinguishes the mature Luther from the young
Luther.160
5. Isaiah 40: The law must be a pedagogue of the body. But those who
seek righteousness through it make of it a pedagogue of the conscience. But
as far as the heavens are removed from the earth, so far must we separate the
law from the conscience.
The law must be bound161 to the body and external members in order
that it may govern external actions. This is the true and proper use of the law.
However, those who use it for justification abuse the law to their damnation.
Luther, in passage cited here by the antinomians and which they agree
with, is at great pains to stress that the law belongs to the domain of the body,
not in the conscience [lex esse paedagogus corporisl. This theme comes out very
strongly in Luther's 1531/1535 Galatians commentary, where he stresses that the
law is to rule the body but not the conscience.162 To say that the law must not be
(Luthers Randbemerkungen zu den Summarien des Agricola).
160Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse, 226-243, take the

opposite view.
161WA 25, 250, 1 reads "ablegenda" instead of "alliganda" as in the
Positiones antinomicae.
162See WA 40 I, 213, 28-214, 24 (Galatervorlesung, 1531/35). Although
Luther expresses it in different ways, one of the most common is the phrase
conscientia in evangelio--caro in lege. See Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, 101-109.
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permitted to rule the conscience is the same as saying that the law, and hence
works, must be excluded from the article of justification. In other words, Luther
like Paul insists that justification is sola fide, without the works of the law. To use
the law for justification is to abuse the law. The statement that the law is the
paedagogus corporis is simply another way of stating the usus legis politicus, which
is the only use of the law that the antinomians will countenance.163 Because
Luther says nothing about the usus theologicus here but rather affirms the need to
expel the law from the conscience whenever it is used as a way of salvation (or as
a paedagogus conscientiae), the antinomians claim these passages in support of
their own position.

These are Impure164
1. In Visitatio Saxonica: Christ gave command that we should proclaim
repentance and the forgiveness of sins in his name, therefore the Decalogue is
to be taught.165
This statement begins the second set of articles which are intended to draw
attention to Luther's errors (the first certainly reflects Luther's theology even if
the document is not his), understood from the antinomian point of view. Hence
the title: Impuri sunt. Conversely, one could say that these statements, from
1630h the problem of the Melanchthonian equation of the usus politicus
and the usus paedagogicus, where paedagogia is understood as disciplina in a
Calvinistic sense, see our discussion of conclusion to the Second Disputation (WA
39 I, 485, 9-24). However, this idea does not occur in Agricola.
164WA
165 Die

1, p.152.

39 I, 344, 15-23.
Evang. Kirchenordnungen des XVI Jahrhunderts, ed. Em. Sehling,
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Luther's standpoint, highlight certain errors in antinomian theology.
The first of the impuri articuli begins with a polemic against the visitation
articles and the Visitationsordnung that arose from it. For Agricola the
introduction to the order of visitation, "Von der Lere,"166 meant a contradictio in
adiecto when, for instance, it is taught there: "Christus mandat nobis praedicandam
esse poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum in suo nomine, ergo docendus est
Decalogus." For him the "ergo" was unacceptable, and it was precisely this kind of
thinking that he wanted to eradicate through his peculiar exegesis of Luke 24: 4647, which is a recurring theme of his theology.167
2. Again concerning the fact that the cross is to be borne: Thus the gospel
teaches that the law has been given to humble us in order that we may seek
Christ etc.
This statement at first sounds as though it has been misplaced and should
rather be listed under the purl articuli since it sounds more antinomian in tenor
than Lutheran. However, appearances can deceive and we will see in our
analyses that in fact it is thoroughly Lutheran.168 Consider again the way the
166Here especially WA 26, 202, 6-7 (Unterricht der Visitatoren an die
Pfarrherren, 1528). Later in the article "Von der Lere" Luther makes the point,
contra antinomos, that repentance and law belong to the "gemeinen glauben" for one
must first believe that God is the one who threatens, commands, and frightens
etc. He holds that it is best for the sake of the unschooled, common people, to
retain the terms repentance, command, commandment, law, fear [busse, gebot,
gesetz, forcht] etc. to describe that way of speaking, in order that there be no
confusion between that and the justifying faith that makes righteous and takes
away sin—something that the faith that arises from commandments and
repentance can never do (202, 32-203, 4).
167For references to where this passage comes up in the disputations,
see our discussion above of the first set of theses of the Positiones antinomicae.

168R0gg
--e, Lutherverstdndnis, thinks that the formulation is too unsual for
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statement is formulated: Sic igitur Evangelium docet, legem datam esse, ut humiliet
nos, ut quaeramus Christum etc. The decisive word is docere. It does not say:
Evangelium humiliat nos . . ., but: Evangelium docet, legem datam ese, ut humiliet nos
. . . The gospel itself does not do the humbling but it teaches us that the law does
that.169 Agricola, on the other hand, teaches that it is precisely the gospel that
humbles us and brings us to repentance.170
3. In Galatians Luther says that it is indeed the office of the law to harass
the conscience and terrify it in order that it might the more readily know
Christ.171 Many such passages are to be found in the same commentary,
which we reject as errors that the purity of doctrine may be preserved.
The final article in this set is an allusion, if not a direct quotation, from
Luther's 1531/1535 Galatians Commentary. His earlier 1519 commentary was
still a favorite with the antinomians as it provided a fund of proof-passages for a
whole host of points which his latter exegesis of Galatians regarded as suspect:
"Tales loci multi sunt in eodem commentario, quos ut erroneos improbamus,172 ut
Agricola and that it probably is the work of a student who could not quite bring
himself to deny all that he learned from Luther. Its independent formulation (it
is the only article that cannot be sourced) is another reason why Rogge is of the
opinion that it does not come from Agricola.
169There is an echo of this also in the Formula of Concord: cf. FC SD V,
18: Es ist aber gleichwohl dies auch water, daft das Gesetze mit seiner Lehre durchs
Evangelium illustriert und erklart wird, und bleibet dennoch des Gesetzes eigentlich
Ampt, die Siinde strafen und von guten Werken lehren (BSLK, 957).

170, above, Positiones antinomicae, Th. 17 and 18.
171WA

40 I, 257, 29 (Galatervorlesung, 1531/35), et passim.

172Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 278, n. 77, again thinks that the plural
points to a plurality of authors. He notes that Agricola never speaks in the third
person in any passage. The observation that Luther's 1519 Galatians Commentary was a veritable gefundenes Fressen for the antinomians further confirms our
thesis that by and large they continue themes that are found in Luther's pre-
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puritas doctrinae conservari possit." The passage cited, which is typical of so much
of his later lectures on Galatians, clearly asserts that the officium aegis is to harass
and terrify consciences, indeed to expose and condemn sin, but not for its own
sake, as the antinomians claimed, but to clear the way for the penitent to Christ.
Likewise Others173
With this heading we come to the final section of the positiones, which
comprises two subsets of theses (A and B) totaling eleven in al1.174 However,
neither subset probably belongs to the positiones antinomicae but they were most
likely added by Luther (or his disciples) as a warning against antinomian
doctrine, and in a sense constitute his own preliminary refutation.175
Al. The law is not worthy to be called the word of God.
It is conceivable that Luther, as the final redactor, made this thesis serve
Reformation theology before he discovered how to properly distinguish between
law and gospel.
173WA 39 I, 344, 25-345,13.
174The heading is misleading in two ways: First, the "Item alii" obviously

refers back to the preceding articles from Luther, yet at least one of the first
subset is clearly Agricola's (as we will see); secondly, Luther himself claims that
the eight theses from the second subset can be traced back to Agricola. Forstemann, 314: "Ista duas [Theses 2 and 3] potest negare fortasse, tamen nescio. Nec sunt
Islebio imputati, sed aliis vt suis discipulis, vt titulus indicat. Omnes alie sunt M.
Grickls, vt aliis probatur."
17Again the problem of authorship arises. Hermelink (WA 39 I, 335)

thinks that they are conclusions drawn by Luther from statements of Agricola
which he either heard or read. Rogge, Lutherverstandnis, 152, on the other hand,
thinks that it is more likely the joint work of Luther's disciples (possibly Jonas,
Cruciger and Melanchthon). He includes Melanchthon because theses 2 and 3 of
the first subset could very well hark back to a letter once addressed to him.
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both as heading and summary of all that follows.176
A2.If you are a harlot, rogue, adulterer, or some other sort of sinner, ask
if you are in the path of blessedness.
A3.If you are in the midst of sin, up to your ears in it, and you are,
believe, then you are in the midst of blessedness.
Luther says that he added these theses himself and did not want people
attributing them to Agricola, although he confirms that all the rest are his.in
Nevertheless, even if they do not come from Agricola himself, the statements
confirm the judgment often made that the antinomian movement associated with
Agricola was marked by not only doctrinal error but also moral laxity and libertinism. The truth of this will become even more patent when we examine the
disputations and hear Luther's own testimony.178 Alternatively, could it be that
176Thus, Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 153. He conjectures that the
statement itself probably comes from the hand of Agricol's disciples and that,
although the master himself had never dared say this in so many words, it is
quite consistent with all that he did say.
177See

Forstemann, Neues Llrkundenbuch, 314, which we cited above.
This statement of his to that effect also seems to provide the key to understanding
the puzzle of the dual numbering system used in this last section, which we have
been referring to as two subsets. See Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 154.
178Luther

himself makes somewhat similar assertions, apparently based
on reliable sources, in a sermon of 1537: " . . . ob du gleich ein Ebrecher bist, das
schadet nicht, so du allein glewbest, so wirstu selig" (WA 45, 146, 40-147,1; Predigt am
18. Sonntag nach Trinitatis). Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 76, makes the helpful
suggestion that Agricola, although he denied ever having said: "Bistu ein hure,
bube, ehebrecher, oder sonst ein sunder, gleubstu, so bistu im wege der seligkeit" (Th. #2
above), apparently wanted to counteract the well-known Catholic danger of
putting too much store by the peccata actualia. It is not individual sins that
separate us from God so much as the lack of trust in God as a result of the fall.
Obviously, this emphasis was taken too far and Luther's sharp polemic was in
place.
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Luther here is mocking the loose way that Agricola, in antinomian fashion, talks
about faith? Or is Agricola perhaps quoting early Luther here?
B1.The Decalogue belongs in the town hall, not in the pulpit.
Strangely enough, this thesis, which for many is the classical catchword of
antinomianism, is not to be found in any of the writings of Agricola.179 Yet it
accurately describes one of the central doctrines of antinomian theology: that
only the civil law [usus politicus] is binding on Christians and that the Decalogue
or moral law [usus theologicus] is not to be taught in the church for it has already
been fulfilled by Christ.180
B2.All who follow Moses will surely to go to the devil. To the gallows
with Moses!
This follows directly from the previous thesis and provides further proof
that the antinomians see no place for the lex condemnatrix or the law of Moses in
the Christian life.181 As we will see later, they hold that the law belonged to the
first "dispensation," before Christ (here they understand the law in the heilsgeschichtlich way), and ever since his birth has been terminated.
179Thus Rogge, Lutherverstiindnis, 154-55. This fact does not conflict
with Luther claim (mentioned above) that "omnes alie [theses]" are to be attributed
to Master Eisleben.
180Cf.

#1 and #3 above of the " impuri articuli."

this thesis also, according to Rogge, Lutherverstandnis,155,
does not come from Agricola but from the pen of Jakob Schenk from Freiberg i.
Sa. who later was always lumped together with Agricola. He used this thesis in a
sermon to demonstrate his support for a group of antinomians in Wittenberg. A
similar saying is cited by Luther in hi Responsio to 3 AD, Arg. 23 (39 I, 545,14): ut
ipsi loquuntur, ad corvos relegai (see editor's notes), only here he agrees with the
saying insofar as the law is not necesssary for justification, neither is it useful or
possible.
181Again,
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B3.It is not our task to prepare people for the gospel through the
preaching of the law; God has to do that, it is his work.
The substance of this thesis has already been covered above in the
positiones antinomicae (Th. 14 and 15) where it was posited by the anonymous
author that those who preach the law first and then the gospel are distorting
Christ's words. As we will see again and again as we progress, Luther rejects all
attempts to collapse the law into the gospel because in the final analysis the
gospel is then destroyed and transformed into a new law. Here something else
has to be said as well. Luther would never say, as the above thesis suggests, that
by our preaching of the law first we prepare people for the gospel. He too would
say that only God does that, and that he does indeed do it through the law.
B4.The offense against the law must not be dealt with in the gospel, but
the offense against the Son.
This thesis also has been stated earlier as one of the "puri articuli" (Th. 3).
The fact that Luther saw fit to repeat it no doubt reflects the central role it plays
in antinomian doctrine and the serious threat that he sees the substitution of the
violatii filii for the violatio legis poses for the gospel, as we have just observed in
connection with the previous thesis.
B5.To hear the word and to live according to it, that is the way of the
law.
It is difficult to see how this statement applies to Agricola, since he himself does not teach the law (audire verbum here will mean audire lex). Perhaps,
however, that is precisely the point. Since he does not teach the law, this thesis is
not a description of antinomian doctrine but an oblique criticism of it. Hearing
the word (which would include doctrine) was as far as Agricola would go. When
it came to living the word [vivere], Agricola could set aside all the instructions
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and admonitions of scripture as a consequentia legis and thus use this (antinomianism) as a pretext to cloak his libertinism.182
B6.Hear the word and perceive it in your heart--that is the order of
things unique to the gospel.
This thesis forms the antithesis to the preceding, but it is not a true lawgospel antithesis. Because Agricola does not teach the law, neither can he teach
the gospel. If he rejects the audire verbum et ita vivere as a statement of law, which
no longer applies to Christians, then it is not surprising that the audire verbum et
sentire in corde as a statement of gospel, is for that very reason vague and weak
and finally no gospel at all. Luther too can talk about the "sentire in corde," but in
connection with the law not the gospel. Since however for Agricola, as we will
see later, the gospel ends up doing the work of the law, he must posit this sentire
in corde as an effect of the gospel. Furthermore, he calls this the proprium Evangelii
in methodo, which we translate as the order of things unique to the gospel. In
other words, for Agricola, the proprium of the gospel is the reverse of the lawgospel sequence. First the gospel is heard as gospel and then experienced as law.
And because the Christian as sinner is no longer bound by the law, this sentire in
corde has no way of confronting libertinism with the judgment of God.
B7.Peter did not know Christian freedom, [hence] his words: Making
your calling certain through good works does not hold.
Taking no doubt as his point of departure the fact that Peter was to
preach the gospel to the Jews while Paul was to go to the Gentiles, and that their
dash at Antioch showed that Peter and his party were not 43 peoroboValv npbc
Lily Catieciav rov ei)ayyeA.iov (Gal. 2: 14), Agricola concludes that Peter did not
182Thus Rogg
----,
e Lutherverstiindnis,155. We also follow his line of
interpretation in the next thesis but enlarge on it.
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know freedom, that is, that he was still living ?coma v6p.ov, and that therefore his
counsel: Certam facientes vocationem vestram per bona opera, is not to be followed (cf.
2 Peter 1:10).183 The truth is however that Agricola himself is still living Kat&
witiov because his monistic understanding of the gospel fails to allow the gospel
to be the gospel and hence forces it to function as law.
8. As soon as you think, such and such ought to happen in the church,
people should be good, upright, virtuous, holy, chaste, you have already lost
the gospel (Luke 6).
This final thesis, which is a crowning argument for Luther, is a literal
quotation from Agricola's Lukaskommentar.184 Here the complete divorce of
doctrine and life becomes clealy apparent, which we will have occasion to obfiej3ctiav
inav
KX1fatv xch
noiefaOca, is here cited with Luther's elaboration
(or interpretation) where the certam facere is answered by per bona opera.
183The text, 2 Peter 1: 10: Sul) µ(XXXov, do5eX01, anovocia arc

184Agricola, In Euangelium Lucae annotationes . . I 5; noted by Rogge,
Lutherversteindnis, 156, although he points out that the passage has been cited out
of context and as a result almost stood on its head (which leads him to suspect
that the Agricolatext was found by students and not by Luther himself), for just
after this passage Agricola writes: " . . . dann got braucht darumb solchs kampfstuck,
das eyner heute ein engel sey, morgen ein teufel." He points to the example of Matt
16: First Peter is blessed (v. 17) and a little later he is called Satan (v. 23), who
does not understand Jesus. One could be holy today and unholy tomorrow, one
moment in heaven, and afterwards in hell. It should be noted that this is the
characteristic way in which Agricola talks about sin. Instead of saying that a
Christian is simul iustus et peccator, he rather says that he is an angel one day and
a devil the next. Back to the quotation: Rogge makes the point that since this
passage in quoted in isolation, it betrays a marked tendency toward libertinism,
whereas the actual intent of the passage (in light of the context) is quite the
opposite: Agricola wants to use just this thesis against securitas. We agree with
Rogge that the passage is quoted out of context, but in our opinion it is inconsequential because this is not the only passage that presents the antinomians as
having libertinistic tendencies. As we work through the disputations we will see
that Luther warns them on many occasions that by condoning immoral behavior
they are opening a window to Satan who will come in and destroy the church.

99
serve several times in the disputations. Clearly, for Agricola the law is the enemy
of the gospel so that any admonition to holiness of life is seen already as a denial
of the gospel. Agricola wants to take his stand on the gospel as an evangelical
theologian. Yet paradoxically, we argue that it is precisely through his denial of
the law that he lost the gospel. The great enemy to the gospel is that securitas,
which is so deluded by Satan, that like the false prophets of the Old Testament, it
calls out: peace! peace! when in fact there is only war and destruction. Luther has
to often to warn his hearers during the disputations to be alert and to watch at all
times in order not to be deceived by Satan. In the conclusion to his preface to the
third disputation he reminds them that we are daily harassed by sin, the devil
and the law and that we can expect no peace here on earth because we are called
to serve in the Lord's army (the Lord of Sebaoth). Therefore the church in this life
is called militans and not triumphans.185 In Luther's judgment, the antinomians
are making people an easy prey for Satan by lulling them into a false security
[securitas], encouraging them to be self-indulgent, licentious and libertinistic. In
the final analysis, Luther contends, the antinomians must be opposed because
they are opening a window to every kind of security, and where the law is
removed, the gospel is removed also.186 This point is made in various ways in
the course of the disputations, as we will see in the next chapter, and goes to the
heart of our thesis--which is nothing other than Luther's thesis: Christ will be of
185See WA 39 I, 496,12-18. Luther also warns in his open letter, Wider
die Antinomer (1539) that the devil devotes himself to making people secure,
teaching them to heed neither the law nor sin, so that if at some time they should
suddenly be overtaken by death or a bad conscience they sink helplessly into hell
because they have grown accustomed to nothing but susse sicherheit (WA 50, 471,
31-37).
186WA TR 3, 483, 30-31 [no. 3650cl (21 December 1537).
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no benefit to people who are secure in themselves and lack all knowledge of their
sin. For only sinners can receive his gifts since it is for sinners that he came.187
Agricola's Theology of the Law
Having looked at the theology of the antinomians on the basis of their own
positiones antinomicae, we now wish to conclude by considering Agricola's
theology, and particularly his understanding of the law. We will basically confine ourselves to his 1525 Lukaskommentar because it presents the clearest summary we have of his view of the law. Gustav Hammann has carefully analyzed
this work to gain a picture of his early theology,188 which has its roots and center
in Luther's theology and does not undergo any fundamental change during the
period we are considering.189 First of all a summary of the main points he makes
in his preface, which is a more general outline of his theology.19°
187Luther

develops this argument especially in 3 AD, Arg. 23 (39 I, 545,
8-548, 23) where he also speaks very sternly about the antinomians, calling them
proud, insolent, treacherous and wicked, but he does this, not in the first instance
to reprove them for their failure to live an ethical life, but to warn them that they
are in danger of losing Christ through their security and presumption because
Christ has nothing to give those who are sufficient in themselves, but only those
who look to him for life and every blessing.
188Gustav

Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 12-48. A
comparison and discussion of the various treatments of Agricola's work,
particularly his Lukaskommentar, lies beyond the scope of our research. While
Rogge's work remains the standard, the more recent study of the young Agricola
done by Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium, und Busse, is certainly
superior and far more comprehensive in the areas that it treats. For K.-Pedersen's
treatment of the Lukaskommentar, see pp. 71-106.
1891'his

is the general consensus. Rogge, Lutherverstdndnis, 254; Steffen
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse, 281; Koch, Johann Agricola,
132.
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1.This thought follows a heilsgeschichtlich pattern. After the vetus homo,
whom the law had left helpless in peccatum originale, comes Christ (according to a
former promise) who makes it possible for us to believe (faith here being understood as unio with himself) and to be reborn to eternal life. In other words, the
struggle between the remnant of sin and grace does not play any significant role
for Agricola. Before the incarnation of the Son of God the caro was subject to sin,
but since then grace reigns.
2.Agricola describes the unio of the soul with Christ as the center of his
whole theological project. For it means liberation from the old nature of Adam
and participation in the new nature of Christ. Agricola therefore stands closer to
Luther here than most of this other pupils, both then and later.
3.At the same time however it must be said that the vital connection
between this center and the other articles is endangered in several respects: Sin,
viewed as a natural habitus, has become a sickness, indeed the natura of man and
190Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 12-26, compares the preface
to Agricola's Lukaskommentar with Luther's tractatus de libertate Christiana because
both were written about the same time and seem to have a common purpose.
However, the goal of the preface to the tractatus is somewhat different: While
Luther wants to present the "vera fides Christiana as the vita in salute," Agricola
rather speaks of the "verus usus Christi in sacra scriptura as the via ad salutem" (15).
Consequently, we might expect Agricola to go beyond speaking about the
"predisposing work of the law in the hearts of sinners" (Kawerau, Johann Agricola,
135) leading them to the gospel, and to talk about the role of the law in the
Christian life. Agricola however appears to know practically nothing about the
preaching of the law today. Whatever he does say about the law is only
peripheral (Hammann, 31). We look in vain for a statement such as we find in
Luther: "Non enim alterum tantum sed utrunque verbum dei praedicandum est, nova et
vetera proferenda de thesauro, tam vox legis quam verbum gratiae" (WA 7, 63, 34-35; cf.
52, 24-5 and 53, 3: Luther stresses that both words are to be preached, because
scripture itself consists of praecepta und promissa, of two different words. The
following points basically represent Hammann's summary of his comparison of
the preface to the Lukaskommentar and the tractus de libertate Christiana.
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thus has lost its character as guilt before the holy God. Conversely, through a
similar natural, material conception, grace takes on a metaphysical aspect.
Because it is thought of as working almost irresistibly, it can even be said that the
beneficia Christi have already been given to us "in" the historical Jesus. Here then
we see an evident historicizing tendency in this theology: Christ along with his
gifts is pushed into the remoteness of the years 1-30; hence, faith is conveyed to
us today essentially through direct tactus de coelo, without the mediation of the
preached word. That however means that in repentance, seen from a human
perspective: we gain faith "non tam lectione quam meditatione harum rerum."191
4. Therefore the center of Agricola's view is even further removed from
Luther's understanding of faith than it might at first appear. For faith is finally
above all fruitio Christi; crux, inanitio and opera of the Christian in the world all but
fade into the background, indeed are almost absent. Certain mysticial features
are clearly apparent: The unio of the soul with Christ no longer arises from the
verbum externum, but from an inner immediacy. However both this mysticism in
the center and that rational, natural-material and historicizing element in the
other aspects of his theology are mutually exclusive.192
191Meditation

plays an important role in Agricola's thought. According
to Oswald Bayer, Promissio. Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende in Luther's
Theologie (Gottingen: n.p., 1971), 37, Luther's sieben Buf3psalmen of 1517 represents
"das authentische Kompendium seiner frilhen Theologie." Koch, Johann Agricola, 145,
observes that Agricola's theology is a theology of spiritual experience, which has
as its basis the meditatio passionis Christi. Luther's theme of the the contemplatio or
meditatio carnis Christi was influencial on Agricola for it was the path by which he
came to the usus Christi (Agricola's term for the method of bridging the hermeneutical gap between then and now) and to repentance.
192Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus, 25, n. 51, notes that this

juxtaposition of unio mystica and ratio also occurs in later high orthodoxy. One of
the essential differences certainly is that in Agricola the unio is still a lived reality,
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We will now concentrate more closely on Agricola's view of the law as he
expresses it in his 1525 Lukaskommentar, before he is forced, under the pressure of
counter-arguments, to harden his position by emphasing certain aspects of his
theology. A fuller and more coherent picture of Agricola's view of the law will
provide valuable background for our attempt to understand the position which
Luther is opposing in the disputations of 1537-38. This background is all the
more necessary since the only primary source of information about antinomian
(and hence Agricola's) theology in the disputations themselves comes in the form
of the propositions or syllogisms. The rest must be inferred. In the following
analysis, we are once again guided by the valuable work of Gustav Hammann
who is particularly interested in discovering whether the beginnings of Agricola's
later antinomianism (1527-1530) can be recognized already in 1525.193
The first thing that can be said is that Agricola focuses more strongly on
the incarnation of Christ than on the cross, a point confirmed in his Colossians
Commentary, where he even says that the devil was the author of Christ's
crucifixion. While he can make traditional statements about Christ's death being
necessary to fulfill the law and turn away God's wrath, these do not predominate.
The cross becomes the great demonstration of salvation lying beyond the cross
and hidden in the deus absconditus; it is not the decisive event of salvation.
Agricola has not seen with the same clarity as Luther that it is the will of God that
Christ go to the cross and that God precisely in this opus alienum accomplished
while Orthodoxy made of it a locus de doctrina (cf. Werner Elert, Morphologie des
Luthertums, vol. 1, 3d ed. [Munich: n.p., 1965], 135, n. 1).
193Nomismus and Antinomismus, 27-48. Since it is a summary of
Hammann's analysis we will not provide the references to Agricola's
Lukaskommentar.
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his opus proprium. Agricola says God carried out his opus proprium only after the
law as the opus alienum. In Luther Christ is the work of God. For this reason he
does not see that even today God does nothing else in his children than accomplish in them the same paradoxe opus. For Luther therefore Christ was the opus
dei, because in him and his cross the two actions of God took place together in the

same deed. For Agricola, on the other hand, Christ is only one opus dei, which
God carries out in opposition—and in heilsgeschichtlich succession—to his other
opus, the law. It was not clear to him that Christ was the tevlo" of the law in a

double sense. In other words, he knows only a simplex finis legis whereas Luther
speaks of a duplex finis legis.194
Agricola hardly says anything about the law even in connection with
repentance in his Lukaskommentar.195 For him there is no preaching of the law
today. Christ is the end of the law. Since the year one, God acts only through
Christ, through beneficia and gratia, when he wants to draw people to himself.
194Ibid.,

28-30. For Luther's view, see WA 40 I, 550, 20-29 (Galatervorlesung, 1531/35): Tempus autem legis dupliciter finitur: Primum per adventum
Christi in carnem . . . Deinde ille idem Christus . . . quotidie et singularis horis ad nos in
spiritu venit . . . et indies magis magisque absolvit tempus praefinitum a patre (cf. 523,

11). Luther too knows of a temporal succession: first the law, then Christ;
however, unlike Agricola, Luther maintains that this one advent of Christ keeps
happening again and again.
195Ibid.,

33-34. He looks at Agricola's exegesis of Luke 24: 47, which for
him is a key text. Several times he describes the preaching of the gospel as
praedicatio poenitentiae et remissionis peccatorum. This may not trouble us too much
if we did not already know that this preaching excludes the law. Agricola further
tells us that the two officio of the gospel are 1) "damnare quicquid est excelsum,
sublime, sanctum, breuiter demoliri omnem altitudinem" and 2) "nunciare remissionem
peccatorum per Christum"; and that Christ himself "utrunque habet, et uim terrendi,
augendi peccata . . . et uim condonandi delictum"; and that the gospel, before the "uis
resurrectionis," also has the "uis ruinae"; and that the "uerbum Euangelii vocale
iudicabit omnem carnem."
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Hence, the judging, punishing and condemning function of the law, which in
Luther belongs to repentance, in Agricola passes over to the gospel. He knows
only a repentance arising from the gospe1.196 The new era of the Son follows the
old era of the law because the law utterly drives people to despair. Agricola
asserts that God's way of bringing people to himself through the law turned out
to be a failure; hence he had to find a new way. Again we meet the temporal
separation (unknown to Luther) in God's actions: the way he once acted in the
law is different from the way he now acts in Christ. Except for a very few special
instructions of Christ, Agricola lumps the whole Old Testament under the category of law and conversely sees the New Testament as grace. Nothing is said
here any longer about the fact that the law works daily in the vetus homo (perhaps
even materialiter through the gospel itself197). To put it pointedly, Agricola says
that God changed his mind and found a new way to overcome human obstinacy
solely through his beneficia.198 This new order of things, where he wins people
196Hammann asks what makes Agricola cut repentance, the mortificatio
of the vetus homo, adrift from the law and tie it solely to the gospel. It seems that
in the final analysis he doubts the law's capacity to overcome human obstinancy
and bring us to God, for the law (not the abusus legis) only makes hypocrites.
Rather, it is Christ alone, through his gifts to us, who can bring us to the decisive
turn, for the revelation of God's goodness ought and can lead us to repentance
(Rom. 2: 4). Agricola holds that when repentance is preached based ex lege the
result is hypocrisy, a disparity between the outer (appearance) and the inner
(being).
197That happens even if "gospel" texts can become law in concreto in
their effect; cf. WA 39 I, 348 (ATh II, Th. 18); 351 (ATh IV, Th. 17 and 18; 535, 15536, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 18): Peccatum autem ostendit praedicatio legis . . . Et hoc posset
etiam fieri ostensis beneficiis Christi.
198Humans in their obstinacy insisted on using (misusing!) the law as a
means of salvation (lex Dei as a lex ad vitam.). Hammann, Nomismus and Antinomismus, 32. Luther however says that we cannot be free of the opinio in operibus

106
for himself, has taken effect since the incarnation. Therefore, we find nothing in
Agricola either about the lex naturae or about the preaching of the law. Just as
with Christ the cross recedes behind the incarnation, so for the Christian almost
any preaching of the law is superfluous, for the novitas vitae is now given to them
through God's beneficia (cf. Rom. 2: 4).
The disregard for the law in Agricola is accompanied by dangerous consequences. For it is surely a mixing of law and gospel when after the law has
been removed from the sphere of God's salvific action, it is brought back again by
transferring its function to the gospel. And it is just this mixture after prior separation that leads to a patent uncertainty in Agricola's statements.199 It is dear
that with his understanding of the gospel, which basically expands the functions
of the law (previously removed) and to that extent mixes the law and the gospel,
(that woks justify) until fides vastatrix eius veniat et regnet in corde; 70, 14-15: Non
enim liberi sumus per fidem Christi ab operibus, sed ab opinionibus operum, idest a stulta
praesumptione iustificationis per opera quaesitae WA 7, 63, 22- 24 (Tractatus de libertate christiana, 1520).
199Hamann,

Nomismus and Antinomismus, 35-36, illustates this from
passages in his commentary where he clearly teaches repentance from the gospel
before the forgiveness of sins. It emerges very clearly when he says: "Haec est...
Evangelii forma, Poenitentia primum praedicanda est in nomine Christi, deinde remissio
peccatorum, haec duo pariter ire debent. Poenitentia homines ab errore reuocat in uiam,
prohibens peccandi licentiam Remissio peccatorum in uiam reuocatos, id est, were
poenitentes consolatur ." Hammann rightly argues that the fact that Agricola comes
close to the Lutheran simul when he says "haec duo pariter ire debent," does not constitute any objection to his thesis, for here this "pariter"—although it can also mean
"at the same time"—has to mean "in the same way, to same extent," because the
remissio comforts only the "in uiam reuocatos" (35, n. 26). Another passage cited by
Hammann, 39, also shows that Agricola understands the simul only in terms of
temporal simultaneity; both law and gospel are to be preached, but in clear contrast to Luther, they are no longer directed to the same person. The simul has no
reference to the Christian but the connection is broken by virtue of the fact that
the law is to be preached (urgendo) alone to the heathen (gentes), the gospel only
to Christians (consolando).
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Agricola paradoxically comes close to just that schema which he was shortly to
attack in Melanchthon, where the events of salvation were understood in terms of
a temporal succession (that is, an ordo salutis). First comes repentance from the
gospel, then the forgiveness of sins, which here begins to comfort the inner man!
Making repentance temporally prior to forgiveness has profound theological
consequences: It means now that repentance is made into a spiritual achievement
which comes before the forgiveness and which is on the point of becoming a condition for God's action.
On the other hand, as a result of the mixing of the gospel with the functions of the law, Agricola's uncertainty is also to be seen from the fact that he can
just as easily put the poenitentia, which has absorbed into the gospel, behind the
remissio by interpreting it in terms of the sanctification of the Christian. In fact in
many places he makes poenitentia the mark of the new life of the Christian (in the
world!).200 Through his confusion of law and gospel, he arrives at the same point
in his subdivision of the law into a second and third use as another more famous
person was to reach through the separation of law and gospel. While of course
Melanchthon later separated the law from the gospel in such a way that he still
retained it in the proclamation of the church as a valid, independent word of God
today, separate from the gospel, Agricola removed the law from the gospel in
such a way that he had to have it abrogated in the year one once and for all only
at the same time to assign its functions to the gospel and in this way to mix them
both. To that extent we would have to say that Agricola has a second and third
usus legis in Euangelio (over against a second and third usus legis in Melanchthon),
200See ibid., 36, n. 28 for passages that reflect the novae creaturae

vocabulum.

108
or even more concisely, a "second and third usus Euangelii legalis."201
We conclude this summary of Agricola's theology with a short discussion
of his anthropology. This has already been touched on above. Hammann points
to passages in Agricola which indicate that the regnum Dei and the verbum Dei are
repeatedly referred to the to the inner person so that faith for him looks inwards
rather than outwards.202 Koch observes that spiritual experience is an important
factor in Agricola's theology. Spiritual experience, according to Agricola, is the
constant process of moving from Anfechtung through repentance to regeneration
and new life.203 This process is an event in which inner prayer wrought by the
Spirit plays a decisive role.204 The significance of the inner spiritual reality of the
Holy Spirit in the process of Anfechtung, repentance and rebirth gives Agricola's
theology a strong spiritualizing tendency. Finally, Koch notes that Agricola's
interest in this inner process means that his theology is marked by a special con=Ibid., 36.
202ibid, 42-43. In Hammann's opinion, one of Agricola's greatest
problems was his failure to understand that the Christian as opus Dei per verbum.
Instead, he thought that becoming a Christian meant coming to faith directly by
oneself, and to a unio with Christ which, since it bypasses the verbum externum,
has more in common with mysticism than with Luther. From this perspective, he
had come to the point of assigning the homo novus above all to the inner realm for
he saw in the new man first and foremost the homo spiritualis; on the other hand,
the homo externus receded significantly into the background.
203Koch, Johann Agricola, 145-46.
204See Koch, Johann Agricola, 146, n. 112. Koch, 136, notes that Rom. 8:

26 especially played an important part in Agricola's thinking; cf. WA Br 4, 562-65,
esp. 564, 80-82 (Agricola an Luther Mitte September 1528); and Regin Prenter,
Spiritus creator. Studien zu Luthers Theologie (Munich: n.p., 1954), 34, observes that
Rom. 8: 26 is the orientation point for the young Luther's thinking about the Holy
Spirit.
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cern for the human affects.
As we have already seen Agricola's view of the simul iustus et peccator
tends to be interpreted dualistically insofar as he regards Christians now in
heaven, now in hell. Rather than applying the simul to the whole person he
applies the iustus to the new nature and the peccator to the old nature in temporal
sequence so that at one moment they are wholly sinners and at the next wholly
saints. This also results in lack of certainty.205 Compared to Luther's statements
in any case we see Agricola on the verge of giving up the paradox of the unity of
the two persons in the one Christian. Certainly, it must be said in Agricola's
defense that he does not speak of two different persons but of the one Christian,
and that he too wants to hold to the unity of the old and new man in Christ, to
the unity of Adam and Christ in the believer. However, in Hammann's judgment
he fails, even though the separation that he made in other areas (between Old
and New Testament, between the believer as heathen and Christian) is not made
here with the same emphasis. Nevertheless, it can easily serve as a point of entry
for antinomianism, indeed libertinism, into theology 206
205Koch, Johann Agricola, 145, notes that Agricola's theology retains the
characteristic Zwischensituation of Luther's early theology, which alternated
between certainty and uncertainty. Oswald Bayer, Promissio, 40-41, observes that
Luther himself overcame this uncertainty in 1521. But Agricola, even in 1537 and
later, still has recourse to Luther's statement of 1516 that the saints are continually in fieri. Thus in his Drey Sermon, we read: :"Inns factum esse bringen sie es
nimer mehr." On Luther, 1516: WA 56, 441, 23-442, 26 (on Rom. 12: 2).
Nachschrift: WA 57 I, 216,16-20. Note how Gen. 1: 2 is mentioned in both texts:
The Spirit does not rest but hovers over the waters! On the work of the holy
Spirit in the process of renewal in Agricola, see Koch, 142-44. He also shows that
one of the interpretative combinations that characterizes Agricola's exegesis is his
use of Gen. 1: 2 as an allegory for justification in conjunction with Rom. 8: 26 (TO
rveihia inrepewruyxcivEi CFTEV otygoic Cotaitifrotc).
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On the basis of his analysis of the Lukaskommentar, Hammann concludes
that the roots of Agricola's antinomianism (although in 1525 we can still only talk
of tendencies) are to be found in the way he takes over statements from Luther's
theology without understanding how in them Luther distinguished between law
and gospel207 This total dependence on Luther (and to some extent Melanchthon) instead of on the scriptures is already an unreformational element of his
theology.208 Furthermore, if in Luther the scriptures in all their fullness had been
unlocked by a new encounter with their center, with Christ, that is only because
through the scriptures Luther was dragged to the Christus extra nos, the Christ
who is alone and altogether our. savior, not dependent on anything referenced to
us. Hammann makes a very perceptive observation when he concludes then that
Luther's protest against Rome and the Roman preaching of the law could never
be the principium, but only a secondary consequence of his theology.209
For Luther the law was abolished only "in Christ," that is, for faith, and
even then only insofar as the pius is homo novus, a "vere" christianus. Insofar as this
206Thid., 39-42.
207Gustav Hammann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 140, argues that

although Agricola did not properly understand the Luther he was attempting to
defend, nevertheless his problem in the early stage of his career was not antinomianism. Thus, "sicher ist, daft wir den fruhen Agricola noch nicht als einen
Antinomisten im prinzipiellen Sinne bezeichnen konnen." Hammann is convinced
that the term "antinomian" can only properly be applied to Agricola following the
outcome of the controversy of 1527.
208When Agricola chose certain scriptural statements from the
multitude that had been opened up by Luther's exegesis, already this selection
paved the way for a definite rationalizing tendency in his theology, which is
particularly evident in the question of the law.
209Hamann, Nomismus und Antinomismus, 44.
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person at the same time still remains a homo vetus, the law also remains in force
(also according to the young Luther!). The Reformation struggle for the freedom
of the gospel was the freedom from the law which accuses and condemns the
sinner. The battle was for the freedom of the gospel which Roman had made
into law. Agricola however failed to understand that and therefore immediately
applied the thesis about the end of God's law in Christ in its inner-worldly sense.
In attempting to make his explanation accessible to reason, he asserted that the
abrogation of the law for all time "in Christ" refers to the birth of the historical
Jesus. As a result, Luther's "the end of the law in Christo extra no?' became in
Agricola "the end of the law in Christo ante nos and in his birth" together with all
its consequences.
It is Hammann's contention that if the taking over of theses from others
(primarily from Luther) forms more the formal basis for the rise of antinomian
tendencies in the young Agricola, then the material roots of all shifts are to be
found in the center of his theology. In Luther word and Christ always flow into
each other. And this verbum is really only then the word of Christ and only so
long as it is at the same time the word of the cross, the message of the Crucified.
In Agricola, on the other hand, this unity of external word (as law and gospel),
Christ, and the cross has been lost, which means that it was never central for him
in the first place. And where this center of Reformation theology, the unity of
verbum externum, Christus, and crux is no long firmly held to and believed, everything falls apart.210 Hammann has demonstrated that this is the root of
Agricola's antinomianism, which is implicit already there in his Lukaskommentar
of 1525, and which becomes explicit in the first phase of the first antinomian
210Ibid.,

46-48.
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controversy in 1527.
Irrespective of whether Hammann's interpretation is always correct, his
work has brought to our attention specific ideas, terms, and emphases which are
typical of Agricola's way of doing theology in contrast to Luther's. Whether these
same motifs that we have mentioned above carry over to the 1537-1538 disputations would need to be investigated. We however will not pursue this question
ourselves. At any rate, this chapter on the historical background to antinomianism has not only provided a discussion of the positions antinomicae, which is the
primary background document for the disputations which we are about to turn
to, but it has also afforded a glimpse at some of the key themes in Agricola's own
writings. An appreciation of these two theological vistas, as well as of the main
developments in the history of the early stages of the controversy, which we have
outlined, should provide us with a vantage point as we consider Luther's
responses to the antinomian arguments.

CHAPTER 3
LUTHER'S ANTINOMIAN THESES AND DISPUTATIONS
Introduction
All told Luther formulated six Thesenreihen with the intention of
debating these with Agricola in six separate disputations. However, for
various reasons only four eventuated, and even then only the first and
second, which were held on 18 December 1537 and the on 12 January 1538
respectively, were set up specifically for the purpose of debating the given
theses with Agricola. As it turns out these two disputations, which were
based on the first and second Thesenreihe, ended up being held in Agricola's
absence, except for a part of the second disputation. Owing to the apparent
reconciliation between Agricola and Luther, the disputations that were to
have dealt with the third and fourth sets of theses lapsed. The next public disputation against the antinomians, on 6 September 1538 (after it was plain that
Agricola had acted insincerely), was actually the Doctoral Disputation of
Cyriacus Gerichius, which took up the theses of the fifth Thesenreihe. And
again the final disputation, on 10 September 1540, was the occasion of another
doctoral disputation, this time that of Joachim Morlin, where the theses from
the sixth Thesenreihe were debated. However, this disputation of 1540 will
not be analyzed.
This inordinately long chapter is divided into three parts, each of
which deals with one of the three disputations against the antinomians of
113
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1537-1538 held in Wittenberg. The analysis of each disputation will be preceded by a translation, structural outline, and summary of the respective
Thesenreihe. A summary of Luther's preface to each disputation will also be
included.
PART 1
The First Disputation against the Antinomians
18 December 1537
Introduction
It is quite clear from the Disputationsnachschriften that Luther held a
public disputation against the antinomians on 18 December 1537 at which he
not only presided but was also the sole respondent. The names of the opponents are mentioned in two instances: Jonas in argumentum 27 and Cordatus
in argument= 35. Luther had wanted to debate the theses with Agricola and
was annoyed that he absented himself.1 Hermelink is convinced that the
unnamed opponents at the disputation, who stood in for Agricola, were not
his followers. Therefore, instead of being a proper antinomian debate
between Luther and Agricola it became the occasion for a genuine academic
disputation on the topic lex et evangelium.2 This however was not a lost
cause for, as Luther mentions in his preface, one of his chief aims was to reinforce in his students the sana doctrina scripturae and to provide them with a
sure method for teaching others. Hermelink opines that in the disputations,
in contrast to the Tischreden, Luther remains purely objective and refrains
1CR 3, 482.
2WA 39 I, 359 (editor's introduction). From here on all references
will omit the letters WA.
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from personal attack. That of course does not prevent him from being
passionate. The theses for the debate are set out below in translation and this
is followed by a structural analysis and summary.
Theses3
Translation
1.Repentance, by the testimony of all, is indeed sorrow for sin in
conjunction with an intention to lead a better life.
2. This sorrow is properly nothing else, nor can it be, than a feeling or
sensation of the law in the heart or conscience.
3. For many indeed hear the law, but since they do not feel its
sensation or power, they do not suffer pain at all and do not repent.
4. Only the first part of repentance, namely, sorrow, arises from the
law. The second part, namely, the good intention, cannot arise from the law.
5. For people who are terrified at the sight of sin cannot purpose to do
good by their own powers, since not even those who are secure and at peace
can do that.
6. But troubled and overwhelmed by the power of sin, they fall into
despair and hatred of God, or they descend into hell, as scripture says.
7. Therefore, the promise or the gospel must be added to the law to
pacify and raise up the terrified conscience that it may purpose to do good.
8. Repentance arising only from the law is half or the beginning of
repentance, or repentance by synecdoche, because it lacks a good intention.
9. And if it persists, it becomes the repentance of Cain, Saul, Judas, and
of all who lack trust in God's mercy and despair of it, that is, those who are
perishing.

339 I, 345-347:

nomos.

Disputatio D. Mart. Lutheri. Contra quosdam Anti-
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10. The sophists taught the definition of repentance, that is, sorrow
and intention etc., which they had gotten from the fathers.
11.But they did not understand, nor could they teach, the parts of the
definition: sorrow, sin, intention.
12.They imagined that sorrow is the act elicited by the power of the
free will to detest sin as often as one wishes.
13. Because this sorrow is suffering or affliction, whether the
conscience wants it or not, it is forced to suffer when it is struck and
tormented by the law.
14.They thought sin is that which is contrary to human traditions,
more seldom, what is contrary to the moral law.
15.In fact, originally, they thought that after baptism there is no sin at
all, especially not against the First Table.
16.Compared with these straws, the hammer of God's law (as
Jeremiah [23: 29] says) that smashes rocks, shuts all people up under sin [Rom.
11: 32].
17.They used to think that a good intention is a resolve made by
human powers in connection with sin to be avoided in the future.
18.Although according to the gospel there is an impulse of the Holy
Spirit that heartly detests one sin after another, they however boldly permit
the sin in the flesh to rebel.
19.This ignorance of theirs should not surprise us, for with scripture
not being very highly esteemed, it was impossible for them to know neither
what the law is nor what the gospel is.
20. That is to say, having been so thoroughly immersed in human precepts and commandments, they judged holy and divine things as nonsense.
21.Contrary to these useless teachers of despair, the gospel begins to
teach that repentance should not only be despair.
22. But penitent people ought to begin to hope, and thus prompted by
a God's love to hate sin; that truly is a good intention.

117
23.Some, not considering our reasons for saying this, or the mater,
thought that this was speaking against the law of God.
24.And they wickedly teach that the law of God must simply be
removed from the church; that is blasphemy and sacrilege.
25.For the whole of scripture teaches that repentance is to be begun by
the law; this is also shown by experience and the order of things itself.
26.Let all who forget God (he says) turn back to hell; and: Put a ruler
over them, Lord, that they may know that they are but mere men etc. [Ps. 19:
18, 21].
27. Fill their faces with shame and they will seek your name, Lord [Ps.
83: 17]. And: the sinner is caught in the work of his own hands [Ps. 9: 17].
28. The order of things is such that death and sin are in nature before
life and righteousness.
29. For we are not righteous or alive, to be given over to sin or death,
but we are already sinners, and dead through Adam, and must be justified
and vivified by Christ.
30.Therefore, Adam (that is, sin and death) is to be taught first; he is
the form of the future Christ, who is to be taught after this.
31.Indeed, sin and death must be revealed, not through the word of
grace and comfort, but through the law.
32.We know from experience that Adam is first exposed as a
transgressor of the law, afterwards he is raised up by the promised seed of the
woman [Gen. 3: 17, 15].
33.And David is first killed by the law through Nathan, who says: You
are the man etc., afterwards he is saved by the gospel: You will not die etc.
34.Paul is first prostrated by the law as he hears: Why are you
persecuting me? Afterwards, he is enlivened through the gospel: Rise etc
[Acts 9: 4-6].
35. And Christ himself says in Mark 1: Repent and believe the gospel,
for the kingdom of God has drawn near.
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36. Again, repentance and the forgiveness of sins was to be preached in
his name [Luke 24: 47].
37. Thus, the Spirit also first convicts the world of sin that he may
teach faith in Christ, that is, the forgiveness of sins [John 16: 8].
38. Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, follows this pattern: first, he
teaches all are sinners and need to be justified through Christ [Rom. 3: 9-24].
39. Luke testifies to the same in Acts: Paul taught both Jews and Gentiles that no one can be justified except through Christ. And those things
follow [Acts 13: 38; 15: 11; 16: 31 etc.].
Structure
Theme: True and False Repentance
A. True Repentance (1-9)
I. Definition: repentance consists of two parts (1)
1. sorrow for sin
2. the intention to lead a better life
H. Explanation of definition (2-3)
1. sorrow is tactus or sensus legis (2)
2. repentance presupposes an awareness (sensus) of the
power of the law (3)
ILL Repentance springs from law and gospel (4-8)
1. law (4-6)
a) gives rise to sorrow (the first part) alone (4)
b) does not produce the good intention (second part)
aa) the good intention cannot arise in a heart terrified
by the law because of sin (5)
bb) those troubled by sin are driven by the law to
despair and to hate God (6)
2. gospel (7)
the gospel or promise must be added to the law to
produce true repentance: sorrow and a good intention
3. conclusion (8-9)
a) repentance arises from law and gospel (8)
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aa) without a good intention repentance is only half or
inchoate or it is by synecdoche
bb) partial repentance, if allowed to persist, will cause
people to despair of God's mercy and perish (9)
B. False Repentance (10-24)
I. The sophists (10-22)
1. the sophists' definition of repentance (10-11)
a) the definition is correct because it comes from the
fathers (10)
b) but they do not understand or teach correctly the parts:
sorrow, sin, intention (11)
2. the error of the sophists (12-18)
a) sorrow (12-13)
aa) sorrow, as suffering or pain, is an act grounded in
the free will (12)
bb) but: when the conscience is struck by the law it has
no choice but to suffer (13)
b) sin (14-15)
aa) sin is primarily the transgression of human
traditions (14)
bb) it was originally taught: no sin after baptism,
especially against the First Table (15)
cc) but: scripture teaches that the law is like God's
hammer, and shuts all people up under sin (16)
c) good intention (17-18)
aa) the good intention is a human resolve to avoid sin
in the future (17)
bb) although the Spirit removes sin from the heart, it
is permitted to flourish in the flesh (18)
3. the reason for and the result of the sophists' error (19-20)
a) reason: the neglect of scripture, and ignorance of law
and gospel (19)
b) result: human precepts are exalted and divine things
are trivialized (20)
4. contra the sophists (21-22)
a) the gospel teaches repentance is not only despair (21)
b) the good intention is to hate sin out of love for God (22)
II. The antinomians (23-24)
1. Luther's emphasis on the gospel in repentance was
misunderstood as being a denigration of the law (23)
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2. the antinomians (therefore) teach that the law has no
place in the church and must be removed (24)
C. The Scriptural Pattern of Teaching Repentance (25-39)
I. The order of repentance (25-31)
1. repentance is begun by the law (25)
a) examples (26-27)
b) the order of things: sin and death in nature precede life
and righteousness (28)
c) illustrations (29-30)
d) summary: sin and death is to be shown through the
law, not through the gospel (31)
H.

The experience of repentance (32-39)
1.Adam is first exposed as a transgressor of the law, then he
is raised up by the promise (32)
2. further examples (33-37)
3.summary: Paul teaches that all are sinners and need to be
justified through Christ (38-39)

Summary
The fact that this first set of theses deals with the theme of repentance is
not without significance. This was one of the key issues at stake in the
controversy between Luther and the antinomians. The first thesis of the
positiones, which also deals with repentance, already shows the fundamental
difference between them. For the antinomians repentance arises ex
violatione fclii per Evangelium,4 whereas for Luther5 the first part of repentance, defined as dolor or as tactus seu sensus legis (Th. 2) or as vis legis (Th. 3)
in the heart or conscience, can only arise ex lege (Th. 4). The second part, the
439 I, 342, 9-10 (Pos, Th. 1).
5The

above.

following summary is drawn from the first Thesenreihe
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propositum bonum, on the other hand, cannot arise ex lege (Th. 4) for a
homo territus a facie peccati cannot bonum proponere, that is, produce a
propositum bonum (Th. 5). In other words, true repentance, consisting as it
does of sorrow and the intention to amend one's life, is effected by both law
and gospel (Th. 7) for poenitentia solum ex lege is merely dimidium vel
initium poenitentiae because it lacks the bonum propositum (Th. 8), and if
allowed to persist will inevitably lead one to despair of God's mercy (Th. 9).
In his struggle for the correct understanding of repentance Luther also
engaged the sophists or scholastics who, while they had the right definition of
repentance (Th. 10), were yet unable correctly to understand or teach it (Th.
11). Because they neglected the scripture and were ignorant of law and gospel
(Th. 19) they trivilized sin (Th. 14 and 15), domesticated the law (cf. Th. 16),6
and put unwarranted confidence in the power of the free will to exercise
contrition (Th. 12). Because the Roman Church did not understand law and
gospel and based penitence on the law, the sophists viewed the propositum
bonum as nothing more than a human resolve to refrain from sinning (Th.
17). The result was that they knew nothing of the impetus Spiritus sancti,
born of the gospel, who removes sin from the heart, and so they gave sin full
reign in the flesh (Th. 18). When Luther began to preach the gospel over
against these teachers of despair (aptly named, because their teaching drove
people to despair of God), he stressed that repentance should not only be
despair (Th. 21) but also hope ex amore Dei so that people hate sin, which is a
6By way of comparison Luther cites Jer. 23: 29, where God's law is
likened to the malleus Dei that breaks the rocks into pieces, and Rom. 11: 32,
where Paul says that the law shuts all people up under sin.
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good intention(Th. 22). In other words, Luther preached the gospel where
previously only the law had been preached. However, this was misconstrued
by the antinomians7 and taken as an indication that Luther had come out
against the law pure and simple. This was a serious error of judgment based
on a lack of consideration being given to the causas dicendi seu materiam

subiectam (Th. 23). The immediate consequence of this was the pernicious
doctrine which has come to be one of the chief hallmarks of antinomianism:

legem Dei simpliciter tollendam esse ab Ecclesia (Th. 24).
In the last part of the Thesenreihe Luther provides the scriptural proof
(Th. 26 and 27) that repentance begins with the preaching of the law (Th. 25).
Since the ordo rei ipsius is such that mors et peccatum est in natura ante

vitam et iustitiam (Th. 28), it follows that sin must be made manifest per
legem and not per verbum gratiae et solatii (Th. 31). Likewise, experientia
shows that the law is to be preached before the gospel, for Adam is first
exposed as a transgressor legis, and only afterwards is he raised up [erigitur] by
the promissio of the semen mulieris (Th. 32). In summary, Paul teaches that
no person can be justified except per Christum (Th. 39).
Luther's Preface
Luther reminds his audience that Satan will do all in his power to destroy the doctrine of justification so that it is all the more urgent that it be
soundly taught and faithfully transmitted to future generations. There is no

7Although the text just has aliqui there can be no doubt as to its

referent, as is clear already from the heading: Contra quosdam Antinomos
(see above).
8WA 39 I, 360-364.
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better way of teaching and preserving pure doctrine, he suggests, than the
method they follow, that is, to divide Christian doctrine into two parts, law
and gospel, just as there are two things set before us in God's word, namely,
wrath and grace, sin and righteousness, death and life. The former, that is,
sin, death and God's wrath, is born in us and inherited from our first parents.
The latter, namely, grace, forgiveness of sins, righteousness and life has
indeed been begun in us through Christ's beneficium but has not yet been
brought to completion, nor will it be until the day of resurrection.
Luther emphasizes that if we adhere to these two things we cannot go
astray. The former is taught through the law, the knowledge of which is
especially necessary for the human race, for not only were we conceived and
born in sin and live in it, but also our human nature is so corrupt and blind
that it neither sees nor feels the magnitude of sin. Admittedly, all people
have some knowledge of the law by nature, but it is very weak and veiled.
But since human nature has been so corrupted and blinded by the venom of
the devil in paradise that we cannot understand the magnitude nor feel and
dread the punishment of sin, God's wrath, and eternal death, the doctrine
that reveals and manifests these evils must be preserved in the church. That
is the law. On the other hand, Luther points out, another doctrine must also
be preserved in the church for these same evils, once they have been revealed
and shown to us through the law, in order that we do not despair. This
doctrine teaches comfort in the face of the accusation and terrors of the law,
grace in the face of God's wrath, forgiveness of sins and righteousness over
against sin, and life in the face of death. That is the doctrine of the gospel,
which teaches that God through his word has confined all people under sin in
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order that he may have mercy on all, for he most certainly desires to forgive
all people their sins, to free them from death, and to give righteousness and
life to those who know their sin. And he wants to do all this freely, without
any merit on our part, so that for Christ's sake these benefits might flow to
believers.
Luther draws attention to the fact that Paul himself used this method
in all his letters, especially Romans. In the first three chapters he does
nothing else than inculcate the fact that all human beings are godless and
unrighteous, and that not only the Gentiles but also the Jews are under sin.
When he has inculcated this, he then sets forth the other part of Christian
doctrine, namely, that we are justified freely by God's grace through the
redemption in Christ.
Moreover, not only do we find this method in Paul but Christ himself,
John the Baptist, the apostles and prophets all retained the same method. For
Christ says in Matthew 5: I have not come to abolish the law but to fulfill it,
which shows that my office is not to abrogate the law but to fulfill it--and to
fulfill it in such a way that those who believe that they have been redeemed
from the curse of the law through my fulfillment of the law may also know
that here they must fulfill the law themselves, especially since they have now
received the first fruits of the Holy Spirit. Thus, Paul says in Romans 3: We
do not overthrow the law through faith but uphold it, and in chapter 8: What
was impossible for the law etc., in order that the justification of the law
[iustificatio legis] might be fulfilled in us. Therefore, the law cannot be

abolished. Prior to Christ it remains unfulfilled, and after Christ it must be
fulfilled, though in this life that never happens perfectly even among the
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justified, for it demands that we love God with our whole heart and our
neighbor like ourselves. However, this will happen perfectly in the future
life.
Since therefore the prophets, Christ, and the apostles adhered to this
pattern, Luther recommends that we too should follow them and admonish
all people, especially the untaught and impenitent, in order that they may
learn to know the magnitude of their sin for which they deserve God's wrath
and eternal death. But when this is done through the law, we have a divine
mandate to console the timid again through the gospel, to lift up and
encourage those terrified by the law and to support them. Thus, the true and
proper office of the law is to accuse and to kill, while that of the gospel is to
give life.
Luther concludes by addressing his students: He tells them that these
disputations have been set up for them that they may be confirmed in sound
doctrine and hold to the sure way of teaching it to others, which will not let
them go astray or be deceived. This doctrine teaches true repentance, which
endures throughout our whole life.
Disputation
Translation and Analysis Arguments
Introduction
The arguments of the antinomians brought forward for discussion
mainly center on the nature of repentance and attempt to show that the law is
unable to produce repentance and hence ought not be taught. Of the thirty
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seven arguments in the first disputation twenty four fall into this category.9
Apart from two arguments which really belong to the locus on justification,10
the remaining eleven deal directly with the law and attempt to show that it
has already been abolished in Christ or, for various reasons, should be.11
These are the two major groups of arguments. Of the twenty four arguments
challenging Luther's doctrine of repentance, six are specifically aimed against
Thesis 4 (dolor is ex lege, but not the bonum propositum);12 similarly of the
eleven arguments concerned directly with the law, six are aimed specifically
against Thesis 24 (to teach that legem Dei tollendam esse ab ecclesia is blasphemum et sacrilegum).13 Nine of the remaining eighteen arguments in the
first group are unspecified14 and nine are directed against specific theses.15 On
9Args. 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 15-32, 35. All references are to Relation A unless

otherwise indicated.
10Args. 5, 14.
11Args. 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 33, 34, 36, 37.
12Args. 3, 6, 16, 17, 21, 32.
13.Args. 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 33.
14Args. 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 35. Arg. 14 on justification also

belong here.
15Args. 4 (contra 25), 8 (contra 1), 11 (contra 22), 25 (contra 21), 26
(contra 1 and 2), 27 (contra solutionem), 29 (contra 16), 30 (contra scopum), 31
(contra solutionem).
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the other hand, three arguments in the second group are unspecificed16 and
two are specifically targeted.17
The order of the arguments will be the order in which they appear in
the Weimarer Ausgabe. First, we present our translation of the Latin text,18
and then follow this with an analysis of Luther's argumentation in response
to the antinomian.19 Our objective at this stage is not to engage in lengthy
discussion with the secondary literature, but to understand the logic of his
counterarguments within the immediate context of the argument advanced
by the antinomians, as well as within the broader framework of his own
Thesenreihen and the antinomian positiones.20 The secondary literature will
be used here only to elucidate the text.
16Args.

34, 36, 37.

17Arg.

1: contra totam disputationem, and Arg. 13: contra scopum

disputationis.
18As

at the time of writing, no translation of the Antinomian Disputations exists either in English or German.
19While most of the time Luther's response [responsio or solutio]
will take the form of a refutation and defense of his own position as
enunciated in the Thesenreihen, there are some arguments that he can agree
with or almost agree with, though usually with qualification. Where
Luther's responsio is preceeded by another briefer one, we take it to be that of
a student's, for as we pointed out earlier, the disputation is in effect a
Schuldisputation.

Thesenreihen will be presented in translation at the
beginning of each section dealing with the respective disputation. Those sets
of theses for which there is no corresponding disputation will be presented
separately.
20Luther's
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Argument 121
Against the Whole Disputation
We are not obligated to do the impossible. The law is impossible.
Therefore, we are not obligated to it.
Response: It is improper, that is, wrong and infelicitous, to say that
through the law we are obligated to do the impossible. When Adam was
first created, not only was the law possible for him, but it was also
delightful. He performed this obedience, which the law required, with a
perfect will and a cheerful heart, and indeed perfectly. But the fact that
now after the fall it is impossible, is not its, that is, the law's fault, but our
fault; it is not the fault of the obligee, but of the sinner. Therefore, the
assertion that the law urges us to do the impossible, needs to be understood properly, because if you want to keep strictly to the sense of the
words, it sounds as if God himself is being blamed for burdening us with
an impossible law. But it is rather sin and Satan who who turned the
law from something possible and delightful into something impossible
and terrifying. Nevertheless, because Christ willingly submitted himself
to his own law and endured all its curses, through it he obtained the
Spirit for all who believe in him. Impelled by him, they begin to fulfill
the law also in this life, and in the future life their obedience of the law
will be supremely delightful and perfect, that is, they will do it with body
and soul, as the angels do now.
This argument, in which the antinomians argue for the abolition of the
law in general rather than against any particular thesis of Luther's, is based on
the idea that because the demands of the law are impossible we are exonerated
from having to fulfill them.22 Underlying this thinking is the classical
philosophical axiom that if something ought to be done [debere] it can be done
[posse].23 The inference they drew from this is that if something is impossible
2139 I, 364, 7-365, 6.
22In 1 AD, Arg. 7 we will consider how Luther approaches the question of whether the law has been abrogated. He does not deal with that matter
specifically here, but concentrates on an antecedent argument: Lex est
impossibilis.

other words, Sollen presupposes Konnen. This is also the basis
of Kant's categorical imperative: you can because you must. Elsewhere, 39 I,
23In
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it cannot be (made) obligatory. Luther rejects their argument as improprie,
that is to say, it is non recte et incommode to assert that per legem ad
impossibilia obligamur (364, 9-10).24 To argue in such a way is to run the risk
of implying that God is unjust because he commands impossible things.
Hence, according to that way of thinking, God is to blame for sin not we.
However, precisely this refusal to accept responsibility for one's guilt coram
Deo belongs to the very nature of sin as we see already from our first parents
in Eden. He therefore stresses that before sin entered the world the law was
not only possibilis for Adam, but also iucunda. He obeyed God summa
voluntate ac laetitia animi (364, 10-12), but he did not do it to please God; he
was already pleasing to God and so keeping the law came naturally.25 Hence,
178, 23; 180,9-10 (De horn., Fragm.) Luther argues: A debere ad posse non valet
consequentia. As we will see later, in 2 AD, Arg. 23 he rejects the assertion:
Lex impossibilis est frustra condita, as an argumentum iuridicum, because it
speaks only de legibus politice, while Luther is speaking de lege iustificatione
nos (476, 17-19). Hence for him the classical axiom is a juridical or philosophical argument which has no theological validity. Consequently, he rejects
Jerome's statement, cited by Gratian (MPL 23, 546): Anathema sit, quisquis
dixerit, Deum impossibilia praecepisse, as Pelagianism (39 I, 419, 7-420, 11, esp.
420, 3-8; 2 AD Praef.). Re Rom. 1: 21ff., Luther argues that the heathen ought
to know and worship God, but they cannot and therefore remain unbelievers
(39 II, 267, 21-23; FR, Arg. 1).
24A11 in-text references will be confined to page and line numbers
only. Unless otherwise stated, WA 39 I is assumed.
25The joy that Adam had in the law (even better, God's word) in his
pre-fall condition is partially mirrored in the new creation of the vita
christiana. Cf. 39 I, 372, 9-11 (1 AD, Arg. 5): Christus, qui venit legem implere,
is dat voluntatem, ut legem facias; imperfecte tamen in hac vita propter
reliquias peccati in came haerentis, illic autem perfecte; 373, 1-6 (1 AD, Arg. 6):
Deinde affert Spiritum sanctum credentibus in se, ut voluptatem
habeant in lege domini, iuxta psalmum primum, atque ita recreantur per eam
animae ipsorum, datque voluntatem, ut faciant earn, hic spiritus. In futura
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Luther warns that we need to be very careful if we are going to say: Lex urget
nos ad impossibilia, so as not to be misunderstood.26 For the author of sin is
not God, the creator, but sin and Satan. It is Satan who makes the legem
possibilem et iucundissimam into something impossible and terrifying (364,
15-365, 2). But Christ has reversed this by willingly submitting to the law and
suffering its curse. Through the impulse of the Spirit, whom he obtained for
believers, they begin to fulfill the law already here and now [emeruit (scil.
Christus) credentibus in se Spiritum, quo impellente incipiunt, etiam in hac
vita legem implere] and in the future life will do so perfectly, corpore et
animo, as the angels do now (364, 2-6).27
Argument 228
Contra 24
The law has been abolished. Therefore, it is not to be taught.
Response: This is one of the chief arguments which can also
influence sensible people. When Christ says, the law and the prophets
autem vita habebunt voluntatem faciendi legem non tantum in spiritu, sed
etiam in came, quae, dum hic vivit, adversatur huic delectationi.
The fact that Adam fulfilled the law perfectly and joyfully, and that
we will do so too in the life to come, reminds us that the earthly paradise is
already an anticipation of the heavenly paradise.
26See also 39 I, 515, 14-517, 11 (3 AD, Arg. 7) where Luther will

elaborate further on the danger of saying that the law commands us to do the
impossible. Cf. 39 I, 449, 14-17 (2 AD, Arg. 9) where he notes that in spite of
God's beneficence, no one gives thanks, and people end up going from bad to
worse. Quae causa est? Certe non Deus, sed nos, qui aversi sumus a Deo, et
peccatum, in quod per inobedientiam Adae incidimus, ita ut sapientia et
bonitas in nobis sit inefficax (449, 15-18).
Insuper [Christus] dat
Spiritum sanctum, ut incipiamus hic implere. In futura vita erimus similes
impletori Christo. Cf. 468, 14-469, 3 (2 AD, Arg. 16).
27See also 39 I, 380, 5-6 (1 AD, Arg. 12):

2839 I, 365, 9-368, 2.
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are until John [Matt. 11: 13] 29 these words sound as if the law is no longer to be taught after the advent of Christ.30 But the meaning of these
words is: nobody can do what the law demands and the prophets promise until John, the pointer to the Lamb, comes. This is the real meaning of this passage. The law demanded righteousness, it required perfect
obedience. Moreover, the prophets proclaimed that fulfillment, but as
something in the future, and through this confirmed the law and its
demands; them- prophets could not do what the law required, much less
the law itself, but the coming John could. If you want to see, he said, and
have what the law requires and the prophets promise, behold here the
Lamb of God [John 1: 29]. Whoever does not receive this revealer of the
Lamb and believe that Christ has come as the end of the law, will perish
like the Jews, for whom John has still not come today and who remain
under the law. Admittedly, they could not keep it until John came, and
even he was not able to keep or satisfy the law. And yet he said: Listen,
the law, which previously demanded of us the impossible, now no
longer has the right to demand anything from us, because now we have
Christ present and for all to see, the Lamb of God, who takes away the
sins of the world; he more than fulfilled the requirements of the law.
Moreover, since sin has been removed, the law has no right to accuse us
as he is now the end of the law for righteousness to all who believe
[Rom. 10: 4]. Therefore, it is impossible for people to do what the law
demands and the prophets proclaim regarding the future fulfillment of
the law unless they have and grasp Christ by faith etc. But believers have
what the law demands and the prophets promise. Therefore, it is no
longer necessary for the law to demand its own fulfillment and for the
prophets to prophesy about Christ, the future fulfiller of the law, because
he appeared at his own right time, having been made a curse for us, that
we might be freed from the curse of the law [Gal. 3: 13]. He also gave us
the gift of Holy Spirit in order that the just requirements of the law
might be fulfilled in us [Rom. 8: 4].
However, the demanding law remains for the ungodly, and indeed
it even accuses and terrifies the godly, but it cannot drive them to despair
29StA 5, 252, n. 297, notes that V inserts the following sentence:
(that is) nobody can do what the law requires and the prophets promise until
John comes and points them to the Lamb.
30StA

5, 252, 14, does not include the next sentence as found in

31StA

5, 253, n. 301, does not have the rest of this sentence.

FrHRW.
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and condemn them. Therefore, the law and the prophets ceased at the
time of John because Christ appeared. The same thing also happens
privately with any given individual. As long as a person does not
believe the finger and voice of John, who bears witness that Christ, the
Lamb of God, has fulfilled the law, he lives as a slave under the sovereignty and tyranny of the law. To such a person the law says: Pay what
you owe. God has given the law for you to keep, but you have not kept
it, therefore you have a wrathful God and a stern judge. However, the
law does not say how or through whom he can fulfill it. It cannot reveal
him who will fulfill it until the gospel comes along and says that Christ
has done this.
The argumentum proposes that the law should not be taught because it
has been abolished. Luther recognizes that this is a very weighty argument
[unum ex praecipuis] and one that is entirely plausible [etiam potest movere
hominem sensatum] (366, 1-2). Moreover, the antinomians have scripture
on their side for Christ says that the law and the prophets are until John
(Matt. 11: 13). Luther maintains that the real meaning of this passage is that
nobody can do what the law demands and the prophets proclaim until the
coming of John, because he points to Christ, the fulfiller of the law and the
prophets.32 John's purpose, as the monstrator agni, is to bear witness to Lamb
of God, who takes away the sins of the world (John 1: 29) (366, 4-12).33 The law
which previously demanded of us impossibilia34 has now been deprived of its
32Cf. 39 I, 454, 15-455, 8 (2 AD, Arg. 13), where Luther says that these

words are comforting because they mean that the terror and exaction of the
law will not last forever: Nam ubi habuero Christum per fidem, habeo id,
quod lex requirit et exigit a me (455, 7-8).
33See 39 I, 579, 10-12 (3 AD, Arg. 42/14) where John again appears as
the monstrator, but with the emphasis that those who receive the Christ to
whom he points are rid of the lex damnans ac accusans (579, 10-11).
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right to demand anything from us [iam non habet amplius ius exigendi
aliquid a nobis], for Christ as agnus Dei has more than [abunde] fulfilled the
requirements of the law. The fact that Christ does not merely fulfill the law
measure for measure but with such superfluity that he does more than the
law could ever demand is an important emphasis and one which will recur
several times. It is important because it makes it clear that Christ is not
beholden to the law as its servant but remains its Lord so that in fulfilling the
law he at the same time abolishes it. He is the finis legis and gives the righteousness demanded by the law to all who believe in him.35 Therefore, nobody can fulfill the law nisi habeant et fide apprehendant Christ= (367, 4-7).
In his characteristic way Luther says not only that Christ, factus pro nobis
maledictum, has freed us from the curse of the law,36 but also that he has
34For the argument that the law is impossible, or that God demands
the impossible, see 39 I, 476, 3-477, 2 (2 AD, Arg. 23) and 39 I, 515, 14-517, 11 (3
AD, Arg. 7).
35This seems to be the way Luther understands Rom 10: 4: TiAog yap
vcip.oi) Xpiatbc dig oncalocrlivfl rayn. T6 7latElSOVT1. In other words, Christ is

the end of the law because the law can now no longer accuse those in Christ
for they have by faith the righteousness which the law demands. See 39 I, 479,
4-6 (2 AD, Arg. 25): Christus est finis legis. Ita apud pins cessat exactio legis et
accusatio, quia quid exigeret, cum adsit Christus, qui dicit: Ecce me, qui facio
pro illis, quod exigis, desine. However, we will see later that Luther speaks of
a duplex finis legis to combat the false antinomian notion of a simplex finis
legis.
36Luther often uses the Pauline phrase Xpi avbc fulac itny6pocaev ix
xatapa (Gal. 3: 13, which in
Trig xarcipac 'rob- vdµov yev6p.evog

turn echoes Deut. 21: 23) in connection with justification and a description of
Christ's salvific work. Through his fulfillment of the law Christ robbed it of
its curse. See e. g. 39 I, 363, 5-6 (1 AD, Praef.); 381, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 13); 384, 16-17;
385, 7-8; 386, 14 (1 AD, Arg. 15); 388, 18-19 (1 AD, Arg. 16); 465, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 15).
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given us the Holy Spirit ut iustificatio legis in nobis impleretur (367, 9-11).37
However, this does not apply automatically to everybody across the board, but
only to those who have faith. For the impii the lex requirens remains, and
indeed even the pii can be accused and frightened, insofar as they still have
the flesh, but now it can no longer drive them to despair.38 This difference is
further reinforced when Luther changes the focus of his argument by
paralleling what Christ did once when he came to fulfill the law and the
prophets and what he does today, individually, when people believe in him.
Thus, he applies the words of Matthew 11: 13 to the individual: Sic privatim
fit cum quolibet homine. As long as people do not believe the digitus ac vox
Ioannis, who bears witness to the agnus Dei, they remain enslaved to the
37As

we have already seen, Luther is not content to emphasize only
Christ's fulfillment of the law pro nobis and justification by faith, but he also
stresses the fulfillment of the law (=iustificatio legis) in us by the power of the
Holy Spirit. See also 381, 7-9 (1 AD, Arg. 13). A discussion of the significance
of this will have to wait until ch. 4.
38It is instructive to note how Luther describes the different effect
the law has on the pii compared with the impii. Cf. on the one hand, 367, 3-4:
Ablato autem peccato non habet lex ius accusandi nos ita ut ipse [scil.
Christus] nunc finis sit legis ad iustitiam omni credenti; on the other hand,
367, 12-13: Impiis tamen manet lex requirens et pios quidem etiam accusat et
terret, sed non potest in desperationem adigere et damnare. The context
makes clear that Luther here uses "accusare" and "condemnare"
interchangeably. Also for Luther, as for Melanchthon, lex semper accusat (see
39 I, 412, 2 [1 AD, Arg, 32]) applies also to the Christian qua sinner, but at the
same time he knows with Paul that there is no condemnation for those in
Christ Jesus (Rom. 8: 1). On Rom. 8: 1, see among others 39 II, 225, 8-12 (Marb.,
Arg. 42): Paulus non inquit: Nihil peccati est in sanctis, sed nihil damnationis.
Caute igitur est distinguendum. Peccatum est peccatum, hoc non est dubium.
Sed duae species sunt faciendae. Sanctorum peccatum remissum est, quod
non nocet, sed impoenitentum non remissum dicitur, quod nocet. Cf. 39 I,
223, 1-4 (PT, Arg. 11). What it means that the peccatum of the saints is
remiss= will be discussed in ch. 4.
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imperium and tyrannis legis. To such people the law thunders mercilessly:
Redde, quod debes.39 The law works strictly according to the letter, and its
bookkeeping is impeccable. It dispenses justice with utter impartiality: Deus
legem tulit, ut eam facias, non fecisti autem, ergo habes Deum iratum et
severum iudicem (367, 14-18; our emphasis). Finally, the law can only
demand its own fulfillment; it is wholly incapable of telling us how or
through whom we can fulfill it until the gospel comes and announces:
Christum hoc fecisse (367, 18-368, 2).
In this argument Luther accepts the premise with qualification, and
therefore cannot accept the conclusion without qualification.40 He can say
with Paul (or with Jesus in Matt. 11: 13) that the law has been abolished, but in
so doing he does not mean the same as Agricola does, for the apostle knows
that the law has been abolished only for the credentes, and then only insofar
as they have died to the law and the law is dead to them, not insofar as they
still have the flesh. It is on account of this qualification that Luther is unable
to say that the law has been abolished completely for everyone, irrespective of
whether they are saints or sinners. Hence, he says in his responsio that the
39These

are the words of the unmerciful servant of Jesus parable
(Matt. 18: 28), who, after having been forgiven an enormous debt, promptly
goes out and calls in a loan from a fellow servant with these words, pay what
you owe, despite the fact that the latter pleads for mercy. Such a merciless
extraction of our debitum is the very nature of the lex as semper requirens.
Also apropos here is Jesus' warning to settle with your accuser on the way to
the magistrate, lest you end up being thrown into prison. "And I tell you," he
says, "you will never get out till you have paid the very last penny" (Luke 12:
58-59).
40This

is clear from Luther's argumentation, though he does not
spell it out in so many words. There are other arguments also where Luther
has to reject the conclusion because of equivocation. See 2 AD, Args. 5, 7, 8.
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lex requirens still remains in force for the impii and also for the Christian
quoad camem (367, 11-14). Agricola could not live with that tension.
In this argument Luther does not dwell on the differences between
himself and the antinomians but rather affirms on the basis of Matthew 11: 13
that the law has indeed been abolished. The major difference between them
comes out in the application of the text. For the antinomians the law has
been abolished all together without qualification, whereas for Luther, it has
been abolished for faith in Christ but not for the impii, which includes
Christians insofar as they still have the flesh.
Argument 341
Contra 4
Repentance is worked in us solely by the grace of God. Therefore,
no part of repentance is to be ascribed to the law.
Proof: Jer. 31 [: 8]: Return to me and I will return etc., and Ps. 51 1: 121:
Create in me a clean heart, God.
Response: We do not deny that God works repentance in us; in fact
our theses confess this quite openly. But it is improper to say that the
grace of God produces repentance in us. For grace, properly speaking, is
the fulfillment of the law, the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, and life
in Christ. That God works repentance in us is certainly attested by the
fact that many hear the law, but are moved neither by its threats nor its
terrors, because they do not feel the power of the law. Therefore, I do not
convert any one by virtue of my preaching unless God is present and
cooperates with his Spirit. Does that mean then that the law is not to be
preached because God moves and converts the heart by mercy alone?
This conclusion is foolish; by the same reasoning I could say that the
gospel should not be preached because few people hear it and even fewer
believe. But God wills that we teach the law. When we have done this,
he himself will see to it who will be converted by it. He certainly uses it
to turn to repentance whom he wills, when he wills. Hence, we should
preach the gospel because it is a doctrine for all, but not all believe. In the
same way the law applies to all, but not everyone repents. But those who
do, do so through the ministry of the law. However, the prophet is
4139 I, 368, 5-369, 16.
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speaking about true repentance, which endures for the whole of life. It is
as if he were saying: Humble me and lead me to true repentance that I
may abhor perverse and ungodly doctrine, notwithstanding its most holy
appearance among the hypocrites, who do not understand the law, much
less are able to teach it properly to others, but are swollen with pride in
the righteousness of the law and their own wisdom. Moreover, a disciple will never become better than his teacher [Matt. 10: 24]. For that
reason, they themselves42 convert their disciples, but to idolatry and perdition.43 The gospel is for all, but not all believe. The law is for all, but
not everyone feels the power and sensation of the law. I therefore repent
when God strikes me with the law and brings home to me the gospel.
We cannot say anything about the time and the hour. He himself knows
when he wills to convert me. He speaks about the whole of life.
Luther makes an important distinction here between the work of God
and the grace of God in repentance. The antinomians argue that the gratia
Dei facit poenitentiam, whereas Luther maintains that this is incorrect
because the gratia Dei is, strictly, the impletio legis, remissio peccatorum,
iustitia et vita in Christo. We note in passing that Luther does not view gratia
as a attribute of God from which one then draws conclusions, after the
fashion of the scholastics. Grace is rather God's gracious action toward us in
Christ, with all that that entails.
Notice too that repentance is not something that we achieve by
ourselves on the basis of the law, it is not an internal psychological state, but
God's work in us: Deus operatur in nobis poenitentiam (368, 9-13). Here,
strictly speaking, Luther is talking about the first part of repentance, although
he does not make that clear. While the overarching thrust of what he is
saying here is plain, there are a few places in the middle of the argument
42The operative word here is "themselves." The Latin reads: Ideo
convertunt et ipsi quidem suos discipulos . . . .
43StA

5, 255, n. 337, stops here; what follows is FrR.
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where he is not as precise as he might be in distinguishing between the first
part of repentance and repentance as a whole. Since he is defending Thesis 4
against the antinomian argument that repentance in toto arises from grace, it
would have been helpful if he had stressed that while grace does indeed give
rise to the second part of repentance, the bonum propositum, it falls to the
law to bring about dolor de peccato, which, as we saw from the first Thesen-

reihe, corresponds to the first part of repentance.
After the initial distinction between what Deum in nobis operari, and
what gratiam Dei facere in nobis, Luther goes on to affirm that the preaching
of the law does not convert people, nisi Deus adsit et suo Spiritu cooperetur,
because Deus sola misericordia movet et convertit cor (368, 14-17). The law
cannot produce repentance by itself, it is only preparatory, the all-important
ingredient is God's grace and mercy. But just because God moves the heart by
mercy alone does not imply that there is no need to preach the law. We
preach it because God wills that we preach it, and he uses it in his own divine
freedom to convert whomever and whenever he wills [certe convertit per

earn ad poenitentiam, quae et quando vult].44 God is at work through both
law and gospel, yet in neither case is the outcome mathematically certain or
able to be determined by us for he will bring to repentance quos et quando
only the message of the gospel, but also the sensus legis
stands under the "ubi et quando visum est Deo" to borrow the phrase used in
CA V (BSLK 58, 7-8). Cf. 345, 20-21 (ATh, I, Th. 3); 370, 5-6 (1 AD, Arg. 4):
44Not

Ostendenda est diligenter magnitudo peccati et irae Dei per legem, et Deo
postea committenda res, is corda movebit, quae vult. However, the sensus
legis is not exclusively bound to the verbum praedicaturn like the gospel,
because the law is inscribed on the hearts of all people. The matter of the lex
insculpta will come up in 1 AD, Args. 25 and 34.
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vult (369, 2-3).45 Not all who hear the law are moved by the threats of the law
because not all sentiunt vim legis (368, 14). The law applies to all, but not all
repent [lex ad omnes pertinent, sed non omnium est poenitentia] (369, 4_5).46
Likewise, the gospel should be preached, quod est doctrina communis
omnium, sed fides non est omnium (369, 3-4). In both cases God works when
and where he pleases. However, Luther's main point is that whenever
repentance47 arises, it is ex ministerio legis (369, 5).
In a final polemic aimed at unmasking the hypocritical repentance of
the antinomians, he applies the words of Jeremiah 31: 8 to them and in
sermonic fashion points out that false doctrine is incompatible with true
repentance.48 Although Luther at times, as we will see, can reproach them for
45Cf. 369, 22-24 (B): Deus est efficax, Deus operatur per verbum legis
et Evangelii, quod nos praedicamus, sed operatur, ubi et quando vult.
Although God works through both law and gospel he works in different ways
so that what is said about the law cannot also be said about the gospel. This
the antinomians failed to understand.

it would have been more precise if Luther had said dolor instead of poenitentia, inasmuch as the latter is a product of both law and
gospel.
46Here

47Strictly

speaking, contrition. Luther is not as precise here as in
Th. 4 where he says only the first part of repentance arises from the law (tanturn occupies an emphatic position), the second—and as he will see later, more
important—part, namely, the good intention, springs from grace (alternatively, from the promise or gospel, as in Th. 7).
48This is one of two proof-texts adduced by the antinomians to
support their claim that repentance is worked solely by the grace of God.
However, in terms of law and gospel the "converte to ad me" of Jer. 31: 8
refers to the contrition and the turning away from sin produced by the law,
while the "ego convertar" is God's gospel promise which effects repentance so
that people not only turn away from sin, but turn back to God. The latter
corresponds to the second part of repentance, namely, faith and the good
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their moral laxity and ethical indifference, here he makes it perfectly clear that
the chief sin of the antinomians is that of false doctrine, since unbelief (the
sin against the first commandment) is for him always the root sin. In a piece
of sarcastic realism he uses Jeremiah 31: 18 against them and charges that they
themselves, and not God, convert their disciples/49 but to idolatry and perdition.50 In summary, we see from Luther's refutation that the antinomian
understanding of repentance is finally a confusion of law and gospel.
Argument 451
Contra 25
What the law was unable to effect, the Holy Spirit had to be sent to
do. The law was not enough to strike terror into the heart. Therefore,
the Holy Spirit had to be sent for this.
intention. (Indeed, according to 39 I, 472, 9-10 [2 AD, Arg. 191: fides est
principale bonum propositum.) In the other text, Ps. 51: 12, the prayer of the
psalmist, cor mundum crea in me, Deus, can only be prayed by one who
knows his heart is unclean through the revelation of the law. Neither text
supports the antinomian thesis: "Sala gratia Dei operatur in nobis poenitentiam" (368, 5).
49The Latin is quite emphatic: Ideo convertunt et ipsi quidem suos
discipulos. The barb is scarcely concealed: here Luther mocks them with the
text that they themselves use (Jer. 31: 18) to prove that conversion is
accomplished by God (or by grace), and turns it back on them to prove that
their converts are indeed just that, their converts and not God's, and if their
converts, then they are no more than idolaters bound for hell, for the disciple
can never be better than the teacher (Matt. 10: 24). See following note.
50Luther

may have in mind Jesus' words from his own diatribe
against the Pharisees in Matt. 23, esp. v. 15, where he reproaches them for
traversing sea and land to make a single convert, whom they then end up
making twice as much a child of hell as themselves. Luther's conjunction of
idolatry and perdition not only underscores the fact that for him false doctrine
is always idolatry, but it is also a reminder of how seriously he takes
heterodoxy and why he fights against it so strenuously.
5139 I, 369, 19-371, 16.
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Response:52 That argument has already been dealt with. It is false to
conclude that because the law does not do its work without interior
movement, therefore it should be abolished. The magnitude of sin and
of God's wrath must be carefully revealed through the law, and then the
matter commended to God; he will move the heart as he wills. But here
we should note Thesis 16 of the antinomians: The law only exposes sins,
and indeed without the Holy Spirit, therefore it exposes sins only to condemn them. That is godless nonsense, because it is impossible for the
law to expose sin and move the heart without the Holy Spirit who is
God, the creator of all things, who wrote the law with his own finger on
tablets of stone, as it says in Exodus [31: 18]. Therefore, we make a distinction with regard to the Holy Spirit just as we do with regard to God
when we distinguish between God in his divine nature and substance,
on the one hand, and as he has been given to us, on the other. God in
his nature and majesty is our adversary, he enforces the law and
threatens transgressors with death. But when he involves himself in
our weakness, and assumes our nature, sins and evils, there he is not
our adversary, as Isaiah 9 [: 6] testifies: A child is born to us and a Son is
given to us, the true God is given to us as a present, he becomes our
priest and savior. Thus, the Holy Spirit, when he writes the law with his
finger on Moses' stone tablets, is in his majesty and assuredly exposes
sins and terrifies the heart. But when he is involved with tongues and
spiritual gifts [Acts 2], then he is called gift, and sanctifies and vivifies.
The law exposes sin without this Holy Spirit, who is gift, because the law
is not gift, but the word of the eternal and omnipotent God who is fire in
the conscience. But the law does not expose sin without the Holy Spirit
because God is the lawgiver. Therefore, it should not be said that the law
exposes sins without the Holy Spirit. However, insofar as they say that
the law exposes and condemns sins, they are correct. But then to infer
from this that on account of this effect the law is to be abolished is
nothing but godless blasphemy. I would buy golden shoes for the prophet who can show with certainty from the scriptures that the law is to
be abolished because it exposes and condemns sins. For if they abolish
the law they also abolish death and hell. For if there is no accusing and
condemning law, what need do I have of Christ who gave himself up for
my sins? But when death comes you will certainly feel that sin accuses
and condemns you so terribly that you would despair if you were not
lifted up by the promise of Christ. Satan hates the teaching of godliness.
Therefore, through such spirits he wants to abolish the law. On the
other hand, for the very reason that they abolish the law, it is to be
52We omit the student's response (ibid., 370, 1-2) which follows G.
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established and retained, because it exposes and reveals true sin, and by
this revelation reduces people to nothing, condemns them, and drives
them to seek help from Christ (Gal. 3 [: 191).
The argument53 attempts to play the law off against the Spirit54 by proposing that what the law was unable to do the Holy Spirit had to be sent to do.
Luther in his responsio rejects the conclusion of his opponents and goes on to
develop the important distinction between the Holy Spirit in his divine
nature as author of the law, and the sanctifying, vivifying Holy Spirit as he is
given to us through the gospel. But before he clarifies the relation between
the law and the Spirit he wants first to emphasize the indissoluble connection
between them, since the Thesis 1655 of the antinomian positiones implies that
53While the antinomian argument= is contra 25 of the first

Thesenreihe (39 I, 369, 18): Llniversa enim scriptura tradit poenitentiam a lege
esse inchoandam, id quod rei ipsius ordo et experientia quoque monstrat,
Luther's counterargument is a refutation of Th. 16 of the positiones (see
earlier note).
54Clearly the antinomians argued: Lex sine motu interiore non

operatur suum officium, ergo est tollenda (370, 4-5). The reference seems to
be to the proclamation of the law, for Luther says that the magnitudo peccati
et irae Dei is to be shown per legem, and the matter then commended to God
(370, 5-6). It follows then that the antinomians reject the law because it is
incapable of moving the heart to contrition without the aid of the Holy Spirit.
Further evidence for the fact that the antinomians played the law off against
the Spirit can be found in the Pos, Th. 3: Et Christus aped Ioannem ait,
Spiritum arguere mundum de peccato, non legem; and Th. 4: Idem docet
ultima concio Christi: Ite, praedicate Evangelium omni creaturae.
55Cf. Pos, Th. 16: Lex tantum arguit peccata, et quidem sine Spiritu

sancto, ergo arguit ad damnationem (39 I, 343). Note the position of the tanturn; it is not "tantum lex," because clearly antinomian doctrine does not
teach that only the law condemns, since for them the gospel also condemns
(see Th. 17), but rather "lex tantum," meaning that the law only accuses and,
because it only accuses, indeed without the Spirit, ergo ultimately it can do
nothing but condemn. This then is why they reject the law in favor of the
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Luther taught that the law exposes sins without the Holy Spirit.56 Furthermore, the antinomians assume that when they teach that it is the Holy Spirit
who exposes sin, they have scripture on their side (John 16: 8). Consequently,
Luther must show that when he teaches that the law exposes and condemns
sin, he is not excluding the Spirit. That would be impossible because the Holy
Spirit, as Deus creator omnium,57 is also the auctor legis; he wrote the law
with his own finger on the stone tablets of Moses (370, 6-12). Without the
Spiritus Sanctus there would be no experience of the law. However, and this
is the crucial point, the Spirit who exposes sins and moves the heart through
the law is not the same as the Spirit who works faith through the gospel. The
Holy Spirit works in a different way through the law than he does through
the gospel. This insight is consonant with Luther's distinction between opus
gospel, because it can do both at once. Martin Schloemann, Natiirliches and
gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther (Berlin: Verlag Alfred TOpelmann, 1961), makes
the case for understanding the unity of the natural experience of the law [lex
naturae] and the church's preaching of the law [lex praedicata] in terms of
both usus and effectus. He argues that in Luther the content of the preached
law is no different from that of the natural law, even though in preaching its
Strafamt may be significantly intensified. This is an important point and it
will have to be developed more fully as we progress. Re Pos., Th. 16 and 17,
Schloemann says that the antinomians correctly understand the unity of
Luther's teaching on the law and therefore seek a proclamation in which the
possibility of the damnatio through the preached word is excluded (108).
56As

we can see, Th. 16 (see preceeding note) has two thrust: the
main one, which Luther takes up later, is that the law only exposes sin and
therefore condemns; the other, which is more parenthetical, is that the law
exposes sin even without the Holy Spirit. This thesis represents an
antinomian critique of Luther's theology.
here is simply applying the old trinitarian axiom: opera
trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa; cf. Werner Elert, Der Christliche Glaube:
Grundlinien der lutherischen Dogmatik, 5th. ed., rev. and enl., ed. Ernst
Kinder (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1960), 225-6.
57Luther
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Dei proprium, referring to the gospel, and opus Dei alienum, referring to the

law, even though he does not employ that terminology here. He says plainly:
Deus in natura et maiestate sua est adversarius noster, exigit legem et
minatur transgressoribus mortem. On the other hand, Luther says of God in

his incarnation:58 Sed quando associat se infirmitati nostrae, suscipit
naturam, peccata et mala nostra,59 and thus becomes pontifex et salvator
noster (370, 12-18).60 Therefore, the Holy Spirit as auctor legis is synonymous
58Cf.

the contrast between verbum increatum and verbum
incarnatum (as the Logos of John 1: 14) which Luther employs in 1 AD, Arg.
17.
59Cf. Luther's remarks on the topic of the revealed and hidden God
in De servo arbitrio (WA 6, 568, 3-29=StA 3, 253, 13-254, 18) as well as his
interpretation of the words in Gen. 1: 2: "Et spiritus domini ferebatur super
aquas," in his Genesisvorlesung (42, 8, 15-13, 10), which is much closer to the
time of our disputation.
60Re1. B (370, 27-371, 23) gives a further contrast between the different

modes of the Spirit by citing Hilary's instructive comment: Eternity in the
Father, appearance in the image, application in the office [Aeternitas in patre,
species in imagine, usus in munere]. See Hilary, De trinitate, bk. 11, 1 (MPL 2,
51); cited according to Peter Lomb., Sent., bk. 1, dist. 31 C. This statement of
Hilary's is explicated in Arg. 9 of the Promotionsdisputation of Palladius and
Tilemann (39 I, 216, 21-218, 3). Here Luther in his responsio says that since in
our corrupt nature it is impossible to see and bear God as he is, it pleased him
involvere in itas externas apparitiones et sacramenta, ut possemus eum apprehendere (217, 9-17). Thus the Holy Spirit leads us per illa externa, by which
he allures and invites [lactat et invitat] us ad aeterna, coelestia et invisibilia

(217, 17-19). Then he uses the analogy of the fisherman, who deceives the fish
with his bait to draw them in, to describe the work of the Holy Spirit in
drawing us to eternity [ad aeterna perducimur]. He uses that visible bait by
which he entices[inescat] us to himself and allures [allicit] us to eternal life
(217, 19-23). Thus God works with us as we do with children who are sick and
feeble, whom we gently coax and allure, taking them by the arm and deceiving them into going where we want them to go, but only until they grow up.
Unless God acted like that with us we would perish at the first sight of his
majesty (217, 23-218, 3).
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with the Deus nudus or with Deus in natura et maiestate, and as such exposes
sins and terrifies the heart. Therefore, the Spirit who moves the heart
through the law and produces the natural experience of wrath and desperatio
is not the Spirit of Christ, but the Spirit of the Deus nudus, the consuming
majesty.61 However, when he is present in the preached word and so there
with his dona spiritualia,62 he is present as donum, gift and gift-bestower,
sanctifier and vivifier. Hence, Luther concludes that the law exposes sins
without this [iste] gift-Holy Spirit because lex non est donum, sed Dei aeterni
et omnipotentis verbum, qui est ignis conscientiis,63 but by the same token,
61Luther makes a similar distinction in 39 I, 389, 2-391, 20 (1 AD,
Arg. 17), and 484, 5-22 (2 AD, Arg. 29). Cf. also 39 I, 243, 13-246, 11 (PT, Arg. 24).
62We take Luther's words, Quando vero involvitur linguis et donis
spiritualibus, to be a reference to the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of
Pentecost (Acts 2) and hence understand the lingua here quite specifically to
mean the apostolic preaching of the gospel, and not the charismatic gifts of
speaking in tongues which Paul talks about in 1 Corinthians 12. The context
supports this interpretation: a few lines earlier (370, 16-17) Luther refers to Is.
9: 6 and the divine incarnation where God becomes our savior. Then he
immediately refers to the lingua and dona spiritualia to further contrast how
he works in grace compared with the law. Surely the common thread
running through these references is that they are both statements about
salvation. If that is the case, we are justified in translating lingua with
"preached word." Moreover, the dona spiritualia, which stands in apposition
with lingua, are not the charismatic gifts but, as the context shows, the Spiritgiven gifts of sanctification and new life which are bestowed in justification.
63It is important to note that Luther does not say that the law is a
gift. Only faith can say that the law is donum, for faith knows that God uses
the lex accusans in his fatherly goodness to bring us to repentance. So too
Luther can praise God for the gift of his law, which faith delights in and
praises like the author of Ps. 119 does; see 39 I, 372, 19-373, 12 (1 AD, Arg. 6). At
the conclusion of his exposition of the Ten Commandments in the Large
Catechism, Luther says that we should prize and value them above all
teachings as the greatest treasure God has given us [Dariimb soil man sie je
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the law never exposes sins without the Holy Spirit because Deus is legislator
(370, 18-371, 3).
Having dealt with the relation between the law and the Holy Spirit,
Luther now returns to Thesis 16, mentioned above, and considers its main
thrust. He agrees with the substance of its criticism, namely, that he teaches
legem arguere peccata ad condemnationem.64 However, he categorically rejects the implication that for this reason the law is to be abolished. In order to
show the untenability of such a conclusion Luther pushes it to the utmost: if
you abolish the law you also abolish death and hell, and if you abolish death
and hell, why do you need Christ, who died your death for you? (371, 8-10).65
fur alien andern Lehren teur and wert halten als den hohisten Schatz, von
Gott gegeben] (BSLK, 645, 41-43). That is the way faith speaks about the law.
64As can be see from Th. 16 (see n. 51), this is not intended to be a
literal quotation. At first sight, when we read what Luther says (371, 3-4),
namely, that the antinomians are right in saying that the law exposes and
condemns sins [Quod autem dicunt, legem arguere peccata ad
condemnationem, recte dicunt], we might be led to think that this represents
their teaching in a positive sense; however, both Pos, Th. 17: Opus est autem
doctrina, quae magna efficacia non tantum damnat, sed et salvat simul
(obviously a reference to the gospel), and Luther's own words in the next
sentence: Sed postea inferunt, propter hunc effectum eam esse tollendam, hoc
impium est et blasphemum (371, 4-6) leave us in no doubt that this is not the
case. In other words, they do not teach the condemning law (nor that the law
condemns), better, they do not teach the law at all, precisely because it only (!)
condemns.
65We

have taken the liberty of reformulating Luther's argument in
order to make its progression clearer. His method of argument resembles that
of Paul's in 1 Cor. 15: 12-19 where the apostle confutes the skeptics of the
resurrection by using a rhetorical device consisting of a series of questions
until he reaches the nadir in v. 19 ("If for this life only we have believed in
Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied"), before the great volte-face in v.
20 ("But in fact Christ has been raised from the dead). While the rhetorical
form of Luther's argument may have something in common with that of
Paul's in the above text, its theological underpinning is provided by the
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Clearly, this is one of those dicta heroica which Luther utters from time to
time in order to drive home a point. No mortal can literally abolish death
and hell simply by rejecting the law. However, when the law is not taught it
is as though death and hell were abolished for their effect is lost and with it
the need for a savior is also lost. This nexus between the Christ and the law is
very important to Luther's argument against the antinomians, as will become
apparent later. They of course would not accept this "logical" causal nexus of
their own argument. Luther now speaks existentially, ad limen mortis, and
reminds his opponents that in the final analysis the proof will be in the
pudding, so to speak: "But when at length you meet death face to face, you
will see for yourself that sin's accusation and condemnation will be so
devastating that, were it not for the gracious promise of Christ, you would
end up in despair" (371, 10-12).66 Consequently, the law stands and the
antinomians are wrong.
By rejecting the law, the antinomians (perhaps unknowingly) are
playing into Satan's hands whose own goal is the abolition of the law. So
long as the doctrina pietatis67 remains intact, which includes the orthodox
apostle's well-known words at the end of the same chapter: "The sting of
death is sin, and the power of sin is the law" (1Cor. 15: 56). Luther simply
takes this causal chain and reverses it: where there is no law there is no sin
(or at least sin is not reckoned as sin; cf. Rom. 5: 13), and where there is no sin
there is no death). For a similar line of argumentation, see 39 I, 546, 14-19 (3
AD, Arg. 23), where he urges that without the law and sin Christ cannot be
retained.
66These

words remind us of the well-known beginning of Luther's
famous Invocavit sermons of March, 1522 where he says that each of us must
face death alone. Everyone must prepare his own weapons and amor to fight
his own battle with death and the devil by himself alone (10 DLL 1, 7-2, 3).
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teaching of the law, Satan is cheated of his power and his ultimate weapon,
death (which Paul in 1 Cor. 15; 26 calls the last enemy), is really nothing but a
toothless tiger, for it has been defanged by Christ's own death and resurrection.68 The reason the devil wants to use the antinomians as his instruments [per tales spiritus] (371, 12-13) to destroy the law is because the law,
inasmuch as it leads to repentance, keeps us in the forgiveness of sins and
hence out of the reach of Satan. As forgiven sinners, sprinkled with the blood
of Christ, we can approach death with intrepid hearts, because in Christ, death
itself has died and Satan has been defeated.
Luther closes his responsio with a strong affirmation of the need for
law, contra antinomos, just because it exposes and reveals verum peccatum,
first glance it may seem as though Luther uses doctrina pietatis
in the sense of the scriptural teaching of sanctification, which we know was
completely perverted by the antinomians. The problem with that however is
that it does not fit so well into the ductus of the argument. It is better then to
take it as a reference to orthodox doctrine, the teaching of the faith, which at
this point means especially the scriptural doctrine of the law.
67At

68Cf.

Paul's mockery of death in his triumphant Easter hymn of 1
Cor. 15: 54-55. Luther does not make the connection between law, doctrina
pietatis, death and Satan explicit, but it is all implicit in what he says. The
reason Satan hates the doctrina pietatis, which on our reading here means
specifically the teaching of the law, is because, as we saw above from Paul's
concatenation of death, sin, and law (1 Cor. 15: 56), to which Luther
sometimes adds Satan to form a quadrilateral of demonic powers, is because
the law exposes sin, unmasks Satan, and leads the penitent to Christ in whom
death has met its match. G. Ebeling, in commenting on De hom., Th. 21-22 in
Lutherstudien, vol. II/1: Disputatio de homine (Tubingen: n.p., 1977), 19-20,
shows that there Luther takes "Sande and Tod" in apposition to "Macht des
Teufels," which is why then he speaks of only two evil powers instead of
three. Cf. 39 I, 239, 2-4, 6-9, 18-19 (PT, Arg. 20) where Luther notes that Sir. 14:
15 says that the first man was created righteous, innocent, and pure.
Therefore, ante lapsum, he was indeed sui viris, but now we are mall, impuri,
corrupti and no longer have a liberum arbitrium.
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and through this revelation, redigit in nihilum hominem et condemnat et
impellit quaerere auxilium apud Christum (371, 13-16). This last sentence
speaks of the role of the law in repentance and is in keeping with Luther's
stress on the primacy of the theological understanding of the law in its duplex
usus. How he speaks about the law in the vita christiana will become clear as
we progress.
Argument 569
Contra 5
Moses says in Deuteronomy: Behold, I set before you a blessing and
a curse, choose which you will [Deut. 11: 26]. Therefore, human beings
can obey God by their own strength.
Response: This argument, whether we can fulfill the law, properly
belongs to the doctrine of justification. Paul's answer is no.
Contra: The scripture says in various places: If you repent, if you
keep my commandments [Deut. 11: 27 etc.], I will be your God and you
will be my people [Lev. 26: 12]. Therefore, it attributes the fulfillment of
the law to human powers. Otherwise, why does it inculcate these words
so frequently.
Response: The law indeed demands and shows what is to be
done, but where is that will which obeys and does what the law requires?
Who will give it? Christ, who came to fulfill the law, he gives the will to
do the law, imperfectly, of course, in this life, on account of the remnants
of sin that cling to the flesh, but perfectly in the life to come.
This argument= strictly belongs to the locus on justification. Contra
the objection of the opponents, Luther asserts that only Christ, the fulfiller of
the law, can give the voluntas to keep the law. By attributing the fulfillment
of the law to human powers the antinomians are not thinking of the law in
its usus theologicus, which for Luther is always its primary use, but in its civil
use, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the only use that the
antinomians recognize. For the them the condemning law has already come
6939 I, 371, 19-372, 11.
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to an end with Christ. For Luther, it has been fulfilled perfectly by Christ, who
now gives his own the will to do it too, even in this life it is only imperfectly
on account of the reliquiae peccati which adheres to the flesh (372, 10-1470
Argument 671
Contra 4
You are wrong in saying that the law is a source of sorrow. Therefore, your position is false.
Proof: The prophet says in Ps. 119 [: 165]: Much peace comes to those
who love your name or your law, Lord; and Ps. 19 1: 81: The law of the
Lord is perfect, converting the heart. Therefore, it brings peace and
security to the conscience, not sorrow.
Response: The entire psalm speaks about Christ and his kingdom
and the gospel. But Christ is the fulfillment of the law; when he is
present the law loses its power, it cannot bring about wrath for Christ has
freed us from it. Moreover, he gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe
in him that they may take pleasure in the law of the Lord, according to
Psalm 1 1: 21, and that thus their hearts may be restored through it, and
this Spirit gives them the will to do it. In the future life however they
will have the will to do the law, not only in the spirit, but also in the
flesh, which, while it lives here, opposes this delight. Therefore, the
apostles and their successors announce that it is the office of Christ, the
fulfiller of the law, whose glory and the works of his hands are the
heavens and the firmament, to make the law delightful and perfect.
Therefore, to the extent that the Spirit is in us, we too delight in the law.
However, to the extent that we are of the flesh, the law also remains, yet
in such a way that it cannot drive us to despair, just as sin and death
remain, yet without being able to harm or condemn us.
The antinomian argumentum asserts that sorrow is not ex lege because
scripture (especially the psalter) teaches that the law delights and renews the
heart.72 However, rather than accepting the anthropocentric exegesis of his
70See

our discussion of 1 AD, Arg. 1 on the matter of our inchoate
fulfillment of the law already in this life through the power of the Spirit.
7139

I, 372, 14-373, 12.
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opponents, Luther refers the whole psalm to Christ, his kingdom, and the
gospel ( 372, 19-20) on the basis of his hermeneutical axiom that Christ is the
center of scripture.73 The antinomian interpretation of Psalm 19, which is not
discussed but assumed, sees the whole psalm as extolling the gospel in the
sense of the nova lex which comes from heaven.74 Luther also sees the psalm
talking about the gospel, or more specifically Christ, but it is precisely because
Christ is the fulfiller of the law that wherever he is present the law loses its
power over us, non potest exercere iram quia Christus ab ea liberavit (373, 1).
Afterwards [deinde]75 he gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe in him
72ps. 19 was Agricola's favorite "proof-text" when it came to explaining what he understood by lex spiritualis. It is specifically v. 8 which is
cited here, Lex domini immaculata convertens animas, whereas under the
Puri sunt ex multis pauci isti of the antinomian positiones, the author refers
to Luther's exposition of Ps. 19: 2 in his summaria Psalmorum and cites with
approval his comment: Coeli enarrant: Lind damit hebt er zu gleich auff das
alte Gesetz, welches etc. (38, 24, 20-21). See our discussion in ch. 2.
730n

Luther's christocentric exegesis of the OT, see Paul Althaus,
The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1966), 79-102; Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther and das alte Testament (Tubingen: Mohr, 1948), 104, 224. The expression Christus dominus ac
rex scripturae is found in Luther's Galaterbriefvorlesung of 1531/35 (WA 40 I,
458, 11, 20, 34).
74See

ch. 2 for comments on Agricola's exegesis of the psalm.
Again, the positiones (39 I, 344, 2-4) quote Luther's early exposition of the
psalm approvingly where he explains why the law had to be replaced by the
gospel: "Cum doctrina legis potius gloriam hominum et ignominiam Dei
operetur, dumque per opera legis aut superbiant, aut desperati Deum oderunt,
coelorum haec est enarratio" (5, 543, 23-26).
75This is the first of several places where Luther speaks of the twofold impletio legis: first (here the word primum is not mentioned), per
remissionem peccatorum et imputationem divinam, secondly, (here deinde,
elsewhere insuper) through the gift of the Holy Spirit. The first happens extra
nos, propter Christum per fidem and takes place in justification. The other
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that they may have pleasure [voluptas] in the Torah of the Lord (cf. Ps. 1: 2).76
And it is the Spirit who gives them the will to keep it (373, 1-4). Here in this
life, however, the unremitting battle between the flesh and the spirit spoils
our delight in the law and opposes it [adversatur huic delectationi]. Luther
therefore says that it is the officium Christi, as the fulfiller of the law, reddere
legem iucundam, immaculatam (373, 6-7). The reddere points us back to the
earthly paradise where our first parents knew the lex iucunda in all its fullness. The heavens proclaim Christ precisely because, as impletor legis, he has
once again made the law a delight.77 However, because we still have sin and
death to contend with, our joy in the law is not yet complete but is overcast by
the sorrows of life and the burden of the flesh. Luther therefore qualifes the
lex iucunda in this life with with the words, quantum spiritus est in nobis. It
is not yet the untrammeled joy of the heavenly paradise, but for faith it is a
real joy nevertheless, for Christ has given us the law's fulfillment as a gift.
occurs per Christum et Spiritus sanctum in nobis and thus corresponds to
sanctification. These are two separate things and although the second
presupposes the first they should not be turned into a temporal sequence.
Luther's use of deinde in fact underscores the inseparability of justification
and sanctification. On this matter see Rudolf Hermann, Zum Streit um die
Uberwindung des Gesetzes. Erorterungen zu Luthers Antinomerthesen
(Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolge, 1958). For a discussion of the
meaning of primum - deinde, see 39 I, 431, 1-435, 13 (2 AD, Arg. 3). See also
ch. 4 in connection with justification and sanctification.
credentes
find delight in the law. See also our discussion in connection with the tertius
usus legis in ch. 4.
76See Arg. 1 for other passages where Luther says that the

77Clearly for Luther the gloria Dei of Ps. 19: 2 is Christ, more
precisely, Christ in his office as savior. However, in this particular argument
he wants to especially stress the aspect of Christ as impletor legis, because by
fulfilling the law he has robbed it of its condemning power.
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Furthermore, even though the lex condemnatrix remains quantum carnis, it
has been shorn of its power for it can no longer drive us to despair (393, 9-12).
Christ is now our refuge from the stormy blast of the law.
In summary, Luther agrees with the antinomian assertion that the law
can be a source of delight for Christians, but adds the important qualification
qua saints or quantum spiritus.78
Argument 779
Contra 24
Whatever has been abrogated is not effective. The law has been
abrogated. Therefore, it should not to be taught. That it has been abrogated is attested by Paul in Romans 6 [: 14]: You are not under the law, but
under grace. The speeches of Peter, Paul, Barnabas, and others in Acts
likewise attest the same thing.
Response: Circumcision and other ceremonies had their specific
people and time, which, having been fulfilled, have ceased. But in fact
the Decalogue still inheres in the conscience. For even if God had never
promulgated the law through Moses, the human mind would still have
this knowledge by natural means: that God is to be worshipped and the
neighbor loved. The Decalogue too has its own prescribed time; that is to
78We will see later that because the antinomians operate with an
unscriptural anthropology they fall into the error of a false perfectionism.
Furthermore, we will also see that, although Luther never loses sight of the
fact that Christians can praise the law in the spirit of Psalm 19 (and Ps. 119 as
well), he knows that this joy is overshadowed by the fact that the law never
ceases to be the enemy to the extent that we never cease being sinners. But for
Christians it remains a defeated enemy. Since however it is only for those in
Christ that the law is a source of joy, it is not really the law as such that they
rejoice in, but the fulfilled law. For we will see that the lex impleta is no
longer really lex in the proper sense of the word, which for Luther is always
lex accusans et condemnans, but it is now the law as it has been taken over by
Christ and used in his service. Therefore, we can confess with the psalmist
that the law of the Lord is indeed perfect, reviving the soul, making wise the
simple, rejoicing the heart, enlightening the eyes, enduring for ever (Ps. 19: 710).
7939 I, 373, 15-375, 12.
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say, when Christ appeared in the flesh and subjected himself to the law,
he deprived it of its right and curbed its purpose, lest it be able to drive to
despair us and condemn us. However, in the future life it will be abolished completely; there it will not be necessary to admonish us to love
God. But then we will do truly and perfectly what Christ has done here.
Then you will not say: I ought to love the Father, but I love the Father,
and the very thing I have been commanded is what I do. Under Christ
therefore the law is on the way to being done, it is not yet done. Here,
believers need to be admonished by the law, there, there will be no debt
or exaction, but the perfect work of the law and supreme love. Thus, for
those outside Christ, the exaction of the law is sorrowful, odious, and impossible. On the other hand, for those under Christ, it begins to become
delightful, and possible in part, but not as a whole. Therefore, it should
be taught among Christians, yet not on account of faith, which has the
spirit subject to the law, but on account of the flesh, which resists the
spirit in the saints (Gal. 5 [: 17]). Insofar as the flesh lives, the law has not
been abrogated, yet it does not rule but is compelled to be subject to the
spirit and to serve it. The law therefore is necessary, first, on account of
the stubborn and untaught, that they may be coerced, secondly, on account of the faithful, who still have remnants of sin. For just as sin and
death never rest but repeatedly perturb and sadden the godly for as long
as they live here, so the law repeatedly returns and terrifies the consciences of the godly. But when we are raised, it will simply be abolished;
it will not teach us nor will it demand anything from us. Thus, it is
Christ's office to restore the human race, also in this life, to that lost innocence and joyful obedience to the law, which in paradise was in the
positive [degree]. He did this when he died for us and endured the curses
and punishments of the law, and gave us his innocence and righteousness as a gift. The law is done in us in this way, the joyful obedience in
another way, which there we shall do in the superlative [degree]. Since,
therefore, the greater part [of the human race] is hard and impenitent,
and the saints in this life have not entirely put off the old self and feel
the law in their members at war with the law of their minds, taking it
captive [Rom. 7: 23], the law is not to be removed from the church, but
retained and faithfully taught.
The argument against the law in this case is based on the premise: Lex
est abrogata (and hence is not efficax), for which support is found in Paul's
words in Romans 6: 14: Non estis sub lege, sed sub gratia. Luther will not
accept the minor premise as such because it is too general. In his responsio
therefore he distinguishes between circumcisio et aliae ceremoniae and the
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decalogus. The former had its certum populum et tempus and has now finished;80 the latter also has its praefinitum tempus, and its terminus ad quem
was when Christ appeared in came and submitted to the law in order to redeem those under the law (374, 1-8).81 Therefore, the ceremonial law belongs
to the law of Moses, not the Decalogue.82 However, while the former has
already ceased, the latter has not yet been completely removed: In futura
autem vita prorsus tolletur [scil. lex], illic non opus erit monere, ut Deum
diligamus. Sed tum vere et perfecte id faciemus, id quod Christus hic fecit
(374, 8-10). In the futura vita we will not need to be exhorted to love God and
the neighbor, for we will do it spontaneously.83 However, here in our life sub
Christo the law is on the way to being kept but it is not yet fully kept: lex est in
80Cf. Luther's GK (BSLK 580-1, 82) where he says that, like many

other OT ordinances, the Sabbath is connected to a particular time, place, and
people. The ceremonial law was not universal but limited by time and
history.
81Agricola taught that the law was abolished from the year one of

the Christian era. See ch. 2 on Agricola's theology for references.
82Luther virtually equates the law of nature with the Decalogue so
that this becomes a major plank in his argument contra antinomos that the
law cannot be abolished because it belongs by nature to the structure of
creation and is inscribed on the mind of every person. He often identifies the
Decalogue in terms of content with the double commandment to love God
and the neighbor, as well as with the Golden Rule in all three orders and
Stiinde, e.g., see 29, 525ff. (Pred. 1529 on Luke 10: 23-24, Wirer). See Werner
Elert, Morphologie des Luthertums, Band II: Soziallehren and
Sozialwirkungen des Luthertums, 3d. ed. (Munich, 1965), 52, 54-55. On the
difference between the Decalogue and the law of Moses, see 39 I, 478, 16-18 (2
AD, Arg. 25).

illic non erit debitum aut ulla exactio, sed opus legis
perfectum et summa dilectio.
83Cf. 374: 13-14:
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fieri esse, non in facto esse (374, 11-12).84 That means that the law, or more

specifically, the Decalogue, is not yet abolished.85 The reason that it is still
necessary is twofold: primum propter praefractos et insensatos, ut illi
coerceantur, secundo propter fideles, qui habent adhuc reliquias peccati (374,

20-22).86 However, Luther makes it clear that although the law needs to be
taught apud christianos,87 the reason for this is not propter fidem, quae habet
84The passive construction is a reminder that we are not the ones
who keep the law but the law is kept for us, not only by the Christus extra nos
but also by the Christus in nobis.
85374, 18-19: Quatenus illa [scil. carol vivit, eatenus non est abrogata
1ex—then Paul adds the qualification--non tamen regnat, sed servituti spiritus
subiecta esse cogitur. For the other factor in the equation of the vita christiana, namely, the Christian quoad sanctus, see 1 AD, Arg. 2 and the passages
cited there from other disputations. The distinction between the peccatum
regnans of the impii and the peccatum regnatum of the pii is completely in

accord what Paul's admonition in Rom. 6: 12: Let not sin reign [fS a a0.E.uitco] in
your mortal bodies to make you heed their passions, for Christians are led
[ayzaeat] by the Spirit (Gal. 5: 18).
86Cf. 375, 9-12: The law is to be retained and taught because the
maior pars is dura et impoenitens, and the sancti in hac vita non penitus
exuant veterem hominem and are still drawn into the battle between the
flesh and the spirit. See 39 I, 381, 9-10 (1 AD, Arg. 13): although the law must
still remain for the credentes for the mortification of the flesh, it is no longer
an onus seu iugum because it is suave et leve.
87When Luther says in 375, 2-3 that the law will be completely
abolished and will not need to be taught in the future life [Sed cum

resuscitabimur, abolebitur simpliciter, non docebit nos nec quicquam a nobis
exiget] he implies that it does need to be taught to the pii in this life. What

exactly that means will be discussed in ch. 4. Here however we observe that
docere is used in conjunction with exigere, and that Luther says that the law
keeps returning to the pii on account of the caro and terrifies their
consciences. Here at least the docere occurs in connection with repentance
(implied) and not good works.
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spiritum legi subiectum,88 but rather propter carnem, quae resistit spiritui in
sanctis. Nevertheless, even though Christians qua sinners need the law,

insofar as they are sub Christo the law even now begins to become iucunda,89
yet even so they can still only do it in part and not yet fully [in primitiis . . .
non decimis].90 It is for this reason that Luther can say that the officium
Christi is to restore to the genus humanum, also in this life, that amissam
innocentiam et obedientiam legis iucundam, which was a mark of life in

paradise (375, 4-6).91 But even in Eden the the obedientia legis iucunda was
88How

exactly is this clause to be understood where fides is
characterized as that which has the spiritum legi subiectum? It sounds at first
as if it is contrary Paul who says that if you are by the Spirit you are not under
the law (Gal. 5: 18). On the other hand, he can say that the mind that is set on
the flesh is hostile to God, and cannot submit to God's law (Rom. 8: 7).
89Cf. 39 I, 388, 5-6 (1 AD, Arg. 16): The Christian accipit Spiritum
sanctum, qui legem alioqui carni odiosam et molestam iucundam et suavem
facit.
90Cf. 375, 8-9: Conversely, for those who are extra Christurn, the
exactio legis is tristis, odiosa, impossibilis (374, 14-15). The expression in
primitiis . . . non decimis can be applied to different subjects. Here the

referent is the law. In its two other occurrences in the later disputations
generally, only the first member(primitiae) is used; in the first case the
referent is the Holy Spirit: 39 I, 235, 19-21 (PT, Arg. 17) (A III): Imo sumus
tantum primitiae creationis, accepimus tantum primitias Spiritus; in the
other the referent is the imputed iustitia: 494, 1-2 (3 AD, Praef.): Secundo
sumus etiam formaliter iusti, ut quando per istas primitias et Spiritum sanctum mihi datum de coelo per fidem incipio luctare et pugnare cum peccato et
blasphemia. The relationship between iustitia imputative and iustitia
formaliter, or justification and sanctification, which is the issue here, will be

discussed in ch. 4; see also our comments in connection with 1 AD, Arg. 14
and 2 AD, Arg. 3.
91See 39 I, 373, 6-7 (1 AD, Arg. 6): Ergo reddere legem iucundam,
immaculatam est officium Christi, impletoris legis . . . .
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only in the positive degree [in positivo] compared with heaven where it will
be in the superlative degree [in superlativo]. Luther's use of these terms from
grammar highlights the incomparable joys of heaven, where any talk of
obedientia legis is out of place (as he will later point out) and in comparison
with which even the pristine lex iucunda, which was a mark of the earthly
paradise, pales into insignificance.
The most significant advance that Luther makes here in his argument
against the antinomians is that the Decalogue is not to be equated with the lex
Mosi, which eo ipso is historically and temporally delimited, but rather with
the lex naturalis, which by contrast is universa1.92 This is the assumption
underlying Luther's assertion: Decalogus vero haeret adhuc in conscientia
(374, 2-3), and that even if it had never been propagated through Moses, the
human mind would still know naturaliter the two tables of the law, that is,
that Deum esse colendum, proximum diligendum (374, 3-5).93 Hence, in one
fell swoop Luther delivers a tour de force which demolishes the antinomian
argument that the lex which Paul says is abrogata includes the Decalogue.
Luther however consistently refuses to equate the decalogus with the lex
Mosaica but instead identifies it with the lex naturae (in terms of content) and
thus establishes its universality. It only remains to be seen what weighting to
give this argument within the overall framework of Luther's responsio to
antinomianism and the role that it plays. To put the question as sharply as
92For a fuller discussion of the relation between the lex naturalis or
lex insculpta and the lex Mosi or lex scripta (which is identical with the lex
praedicata), see 39 I, 454, 4-16 (2 AD, Arg. 13) and ch. 4.
93See too 39 I, 539, 4-541, 5 (3 AD, Arg. 19).
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possible: Is the assertion of the universality of the law intended to be no more
than an irrefutable challenge to the fundamental tenet of antinomianism, or
is it also intended to be Luther's primary theological argument? If the latter is
the case, we would then have to ask how this is related to his christology and
soteriology. In other words, is his chief argument for the retention of the law
based on the nature of the law itself, or is it based on his christology? We will
only be able to answer that question after we have heard all his arguments.
Argument 894
Contra 1
Opposites cannot be parts of the same thing. Fear and faith, sorrow
and the intention to lead a better life, are opposites. Therefore, they
cannot be parts of the same thing, namely, repentance.
Proof of major premise: It is clear that opposites cannot be in the
same subject at one and the same time.
Response: As a physical argument it is not to be condemned.
Opposites are not in the same subject to the same degree. Extreme heat
does not coexist with the first, second, or third degrees of coldness.
Again, doctors say that maximum health cannot coexist with weakness.
So here, if sorrow is extreme, it does not permit faith but despairs. When
health is perfect, sickness is excluded. But with faith we are not yet
perfectly healthy, but are to be healed. The Samaritan begins to heal the
man who fell among robbers [Luke 10: 33-351. Therefore, our disease is
not yet fully healed, but repeatedly troubles us. Thus both sin and
righteousness are in us, yet not to the same degree, but to different
degrees. Faith fights against sin, against the suggestions of the devil, and
the like, although it rules in the highest degree. For both coldness and
heat can coexist to a certain degree. Sin fights against faith, but does not
conquer it; therefore it is present to a lesser degree. Thus opposites can
easily exist in the same subject to varying degrees.95 Both sorrow and
faith can exist at the same time in milder degrees. If they are opposites
they are mutually exclusive. If sorrow is uppermost it drives nature to96
9439

I, 375, 15-376, 17.

95StA

5, 262, 14 ends here.
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despair. Likewise, if faith prevails it excludes terrors and does not yield
to them.
The argument, based on the principle of Aristotelian logic, contraria
non posse simul et semel esse in eodem subiecto (375, 18-19), is directed
against Luther's first thesis that repentance comprises both dolor de peccato
and propositio melioris vitae. We note here the "logical" cast of mind which
is characteristic of the antinomians and which accounts for their being unable
to abides paradoxes. This will come out often as we proceed.
Luther accepts the argument= as a physicum and offers various illustrations of it. However, this applies only to opposites which are present in the
same subject in eodem gradu or in eodem gradu. Thus, to take a medical
example, summa sanitas cannot coexist with infirmitas; in other words,
sanitas perfecta excludes morbus (376, 4-6). On the other hand, opposites can
coexist in the same thing in diversis gradibus. Here Luther uses the parable of
the half-healed Samaritan to illustrate how, as Christians, with faith we are
not yet perfectly healthy, but are still waiting to be healed [fide nondum
perfecte sumus sani, sed sanandi]. Meanwhile, we keep suffering relapses
[Ideoque morbus nondum est plane sanatus, sed subinde molestat nos].
Because faith is not yet perfected in us, sin and righteousness coexist in us, but
not in eodem gradu, sed diverso.97 Even though faith rules in summo gradu,
it still fights against sin,98 for in this life our perfection is per Christum, not in
text (39 I, 376, 16) has "naturam et desperationem adigit"
which seems to be a mistake.
96The

97The question of how to understand the "total aspect" and the
"partial aspect" of the simul iustus et peccator (to use Joest's term), will be
discussed in the next chapter. Further light may be shed on the problem
when we discuss 3AD, Args. 21, 29/2 and 30/3.
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ourselves (376, 7-11). Therefore, Luther concludes that since dolor and propositio melioris vitae (or faith) are not present to an exclusive degree, they can
coexist in remissioribus gradibus in the same person. However, the final
outcome depends on which holds sway: dolor summa leads to desperatio,
whereas fides summa excludes terrores (376, 13-17).99
Argument 9100
Contra 24
Whatever that does not proceed from faith is sin [Rom. 14: 23]. The
law does not proceed from faith (Gal. 3 [: 12]). Therefore, the law is sin
and consequently must be destroyed and removed.
Response: That is a sophistical argument. There is an ambiguity in
the word "law." Whatever does not proceed from faith, that is, whatever
we do not do believing, but doubting, is sin. The apostle is speaking here
about our works. In Galatians he says: The law does not proceed from
faith, that is, the law does not give faith or does not belong to the matter
of faith. The office of the law is one thing, the office of the gospel
another. The one teaches the promise, the other the law and works.
Luther calls this argument a sophisticum argument= (377, 1) because
the antinomians use the word lex equivocally: in the minor premise it occurs
in a statement of soteriology where, Paul argues in Galatians 3: 11 that 6 6
vatioc c6K g0T1V EK

riatewc. On the other hand, in the conclusion the lex is

98376, 9-10: Fides pugnat contra peccatum, contra suggestiones
diaboli, atque ita, quamquam in summo gradu dominatur. Here clearly
Luther is speaking of faith as fides qua creditur. He often talks in this way to
oppose the antinomian notion of Christian perfection already in this life. See
also 39 I, 394, 17-19 (1 AD, Arg. 21): Ibi pugnat fides contra diffidentiam et
desperationem, item contra libidinem, Tram, superbiam, vindictam etc.
99This is another way of saying what Paul says in 2 Cor. 7: 10 with

his comparison between a godly grief and a worldly grief. The Minn icctroc
0adv leads to pzravot a and thus to CROtnpi a, whereas the Minn TO;i5 Kiziagov
leads only to 0 civ at og.
10039 I, 376, 20-377, 6.
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based on the Pauline axiom in the major premise: 7CECV SE 6 6.6x ix riatew
gaptia icrriv (Rom. 14: 23), which is a statement of Christian ethics, as the
context makes clear. In other words, the conclusion: lex est peccatum, is based
on a wrong exegesis of the Galatians passage, which in turns leads to a
confusion of law and gospel. The law does not, and should not, be ex fide. It
is iustitia which is ex fide, something that the law demands but cannot give.
As Luther says, the officium legis is one thing and the officium evangelii
another. These must not be confused. The one teaches the promissio, the
other the lex and opera (377, 5-6).
Argument 10101
Contra 24
Whatever increases sin is not to be required. The law increases sin
(Rom. 5 [: 20]). Therefore, it is not to be required.
Response: We need to make a distinction in the major premise.
The law came in to increase the trespass (Romans [5: 20]), and, as
Galatians [3: 19] says: it was added on account of transgression. Therefore,
it increases sin. If the inference here is that the law for that reason is not
to be required but removed, the premise is false. For the law is to be
praised and especially taught for this reason, that it increases sin and
humbles people. For the stubborn and wicked cannot be converted and
mortified unless they are terrified by the rods and horns of Moses [cf. Ex.
34: 29-35]. But if you understand this phrase, the law increases, to mean
that it causes sin, then it is not to be demanded. But the law does not
increase sin in the sense of causing it, but only in the sense that it reveals
it (Romans 7 [: 7]). To cause sin is one thing, to reveal it is another. The
law is not the cause of sin, we are.
Luther in his responsio demands: Maior est distinguenda. The major
premise: Quicquid auget peccatum, non est requirendum, is open to
misunderstanding. The problem is that the particula: Lex auget peccatum (377,
17) can be read in two ways: either, lex auget = facit peccatum, in which case
10139 I, 377, 9-378, 2.

163
Luther agrees, tunc non est requirenda (377, 18), or, lex auget = ostendat
peccatum (378, 1), as Paul says in Romans 7: 7. In making this distinction:
Aliud est autem facere, aliud ostendere peccatum, Luther shows his superior
dialectical skill and deprives the antinomians of this text.102 Clearly, he wants
to guard against giving any impression that the law is to blame for sin. Thus,
he ends by saying: Lex non facit peccatum, sed nos (378, 2).103
102Luther

similarly distinguishes between the effectiva causa peccati
and the causa ostensiva (= monstrativa) peccati in 39 I, 556, 6-557, 3 (3 AD, Arg.
25/1); see also 529, 3-6 (3 AD, Arg. 16).
103Luther

here simply distinguishes between facere and ostendere
peccatum. However, Paul knows too that the law [ivtoX rf] provokes and
incites sin and that it is precisely by magnifying sin in this way that it becomes
ica0( incept3oXhv aliaptco ACK (Rom. 7: 13). On the other hand, he can also say
that it is our sin that incites us [lc atipyaCe 00 at] to even greater acts of
rebellion whenever the law is applied (Rom. 7: 8). It is just because the law
has this multiplier effect on sin and humbles people that Luther says it is
laudanda et maxime docenda. For the praefracti et malitiosi cannot be
converted and terrified unless they are frightened by the rods and horns of
Moses [radiis et cornibus Mosis]. (We note in passing that the reference to the
"horns" of Moses goes back to a mis-translation of the Vulgate from the
Hebrew, where in Ex. 34: 29 the word "was radiant" is related to the word for
"horn.") Luther's point here is that the law by nature is good, yet on account
of human sin the sensus legis is the experience of wrath (Cf. 39 I, 444, 6-11 (2
AD, Arg. 7); 518, 5-12 (3 AD, Arg. 9); and esp. 556, 6-560, 12 (3 AD, Arg. 28/1).
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Argument 11104
Philip Melanchthon contra 22105
God works in us to will and to complete (Phil. 2 [: 13]). Therefore,
human beings cannot purpose good by themselves.
Response: This argument concludes: If the Holy Spirit acts, we do
not act. It is true that we cannot purpose good, but the Spirit, who is
given to believers, does that. All that we purpose, outside of Christ and
the Holy Spirit, is to murmur against God, speak evil of God and other
people, rage, kill etc.
Melanchthon's argument calls into question Luther's teaching of
repentance in Thesis 22 where he states that poenitentes ought ex amore Dei
peccatum odisse, which for him is the mark of vere propositum bonum.106
The antinomian assumption, on the other hand, is that repentance in toto
arises from the gospel and that the propositum bonum is possible only ex Deo
or ex Spiritu sancto, and therefore excludes any human effort of the will.
Thus, the antinomians make no distinction between the different ways in
which God works through law and gospel in repentance. Luther, contra
antinomos, says plainly in Thesis 4: Altera pars, scilicet propositum bonum,
10439

I, 378, 5-11.

105It

is difficult to be certain of what role Melanchthon is playing
here. Is he just taking the part of the antagonists in the academic disputation
or is this is own argumentum? Three things are clear however from our last
chapter. First, Melanchthon and Agricola are on opposite sides, theologically,
when it comes to the doctrine of the law. Secondly, the Cordatus controversy
in 1536 shows that Melanchthon and Luther appear to be at odds over the
relationship between repentance and justification. Melanchthon claims that
repentance, which he sees as a human work effected by the law, is a necessary
prerequisite for justification, while Luther sees it as God's work and therefore
not necessary. Thirdly, Melanchthon does play a mediating role between 1537
and 1540 in trying to bring Luther and Agricola together.
106See

39 I, 346 (ATh, I).

165
non potest ex lege esse.107 Indeed, even Thesis 22 says that peccatum odisse (=
propositztm bonum) is ex amore Dei, in other words, ex evangelio. Therefore,
Luther agrees with the argument= that only God can create the propositum
bonum, but he does this when the gospel is proclaimed to those who have
been rendered contrite in spirit by the law.
Argument 12108
Contra 24
Question: Is the New Testament called new as distinct from the
Old?
Answer: Yes.
Now the Argument Contra: The Old Testament has been abolished
and the New has taken its place. The law is the Old Testament.109
Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Proof of Conclusion: The law is the teaching of the Old Testament.
But since that has been abolished, the law is also set aside.
Response: We have spoken above about the abrogation of the law.
The law and the prophets run until Christ; when he is present they cease,
because he fulfills the law. And then, because the law condemned him,
an innocent person, he robbed the law of all its power, which is to
demand, to accuse and to terrify. This exaction ceased in Christ, but
really through the forgiveness of sins and divine imputation, for God
wills to consider the law fulfilled, so long as we believe in the fulfiller of
the law. Moreover, he gives the Holy Spirit that we may begin to fulfill
it here. In the future life we will be like the fulfiller, Christ. Therefore,
insofar as the law has been fulfilled, it has been abolished. In Christ it
has been perfectly fulfilled, not in us, because we do not believe him
with a firm faith.
Already in his response to argumenturn 2 Luther affirmed that: Lex et
prophetae (who confirm the law) currunt usque ad Christum, and with his
10739 I, 345 (ATh I).
10839 I, 379, 9-380, 8.
109Lex

StA 5, 265, 2-3.

est vetus testamentum is added only by G; hence omitted by
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advent cease because he fulfills the law (379, 1-2). This is the biblical way of
speaking about the abrogatio legis. Furthermore, since the law condemned
him in his innocence, he overcame it and robed it of its universam vim,
namely, exigere, accusare et perterrefacere (380, 1-2). When we believe in
impletorem legis, the exactio legis ceases, for God considers the law pro
impleta lege through imputation.110 Moreover [insuper],in he gives us the
Holy Spirit, that we may begin to fulfill it here [ut incipiamus hic implere]
(380, 5-6).112
The new and important point that Luther makes here is that the
exactio legis has ceased per remissionem peccatorum et imputationem
divinam. Christ's fulfillment has been imputed to us as credentes and his
forgiveness covers our own sin and failure to fulfill God's law, but this is
received only in fide and not yet in re, for Christians still carry around with
them the sinful flesh. This then is Luther's way of answering the question of
110In the disputations Luther understands justification primarily by

way of imputation, either the imputation of Christ's righteousness or his fulfilment of the law. See also 39 I, 388, 4-5 (1 AD, Arg. 16): Quicumque igitur
hoc beneficium Christi fide apprehendit, ille imputative legem implevit; 412,
19-20 (1 AD, Arg. 33): Nos reputamur hic iusti propter Christum; at other
times he will stress rather the non-imputation of our sins: 492, 2 (3 AD,
Praef.): Deus non imputat peccatum. Finally, there are many occasions when
Luther will talk about justification (or liberation from the accusing law) both
in terms of imputation (or non-imputation) and expurgation: e.g. 434, 4-8 (2
AD, Arg. 3). This latter matter, which involves the relation between justification and sanctification, is very important and will be discussed in
connection with 2 AD, Arg. 3 and also in ch. 4.
1110n insuper, see above n. 75.

112See 39 I, 365, 4 (1 AD, Arg. 1): incipiunt [scil. credentes] etiam in
hac vita legem implere, and the parallel texts noted in the discussion.

167
whether the law has been abrogated: Quatenus ergo lex impleta est, eatenus
sublata (380, 6-7). That is, the law has not yet been abrogated in all that it does,
which is the antinomian claim, but only for faith.113 In Christo est [scil. lex]
impleta perfecte (380, 7), and insofar as we are in Christo, per fidem, it has
been abrogated for us also, but, and this is the other side of the equation that
the antinomians need to be reminded of, insofar as we are still a d p t, or to use
Luther's words here, quia hoc [scil. in Christo lex est impleta perfecte] firma
fide non credimus, the law has not yet been abrogated and thus still remains
to discipline the flesh.
The answer that Luther gives here is developed on the basis of the
imputatio Christi, and not on the basis of the distinction between the Old and
the New Testament as proposed in the argumentum. We have already seen
in argumentum 7 that Luther does not equate the decalogus with the lex
Mosi, nor does he equate the law with the Old Testament, as the antinomians
do. At the beginning of the present argumentum he concedes that the New
Testament is new vis-à-vis the Old (without saying how), but he never talks
about the abolition of the Old Testament per se. In later arguments Luther
will show that since the law is not simply to be identified with the law of
Moses given on Sinai, that is, with the ceremonial and judicial law, which
has been abolished in Christ, but is rather identical to the natural law written
113For a parallel to the quatenus-eatenus way of speaking, see 39 I,
356, 15-16 (ATh, V, Th. 40); 392, 5-8, 14-15 (1 AD, Arg. 18); for a more detailed
discussion, see 431, 8-12 (2 AD, Arg. 3). For a similar idea, but expressed with
the terms partim-partim, see 542, 5-6, 17-19 (3 AD, Arg. 21); 561, 10-11; 562, 10563, 1 (3 AD, Arg. 29/2).
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on the hearts of all people, which in content is the same as the Decalogue, it
has not therefore been abolished absolutely, but only for faith.
Argument 13114
Contra the Scope of the Disputation
The law was given to the Jews, not to the Gentiles. But we indeed
are not Jews. Therefore, the law was not given to us, neither should it be
imposed on us. Consequently, those who burden us with the yoke of the
law act in an ungodly way.
Response: Although the law was given to the Jews, it does not
therefore follow that they are bound to serve under it for as long as they
are called Jews, otherwise the apostles and all the believers from among
the Jews would have been most miserable. But Paul says: Through the
law I have died to the law [Gal. 2: 19]. And yet the unbelieving Jews
always want to remain under the law and by no means concede that it
ought to be abrogated. But in regard to the thesis, Peter explains in Acts
15 [: 7-21] how it is to be understood: neither the ceremonial law, which is
the chief concern there, nor the moral law, is to be put on the necks of
the brethren, because Christ came to fulfill the law, which neither the
fathers nor their posterity were able to bear [Acts 15: 10, 28, 29], and to free
all who believe in him from the curse of the law [Gal. 3: 13]. Since therefore its office is to terrify and condemn, its yoke is to be removed from
the necks of believers, Gentiles as well as Jews, and replaced with the
yoke of Christ that they may live under him in peace, who fulfilled the
obedience owed and required by the law, which he gives to those who
believe in him. And yet it is to be fulfilled by the godly that they may
mortify the deeds of the body by the Spirit [Rom. 8: 13], and clean out the
old leaven [1 Cor. 5: 7]. Therefore, the law remains, but its burden or
yoke does not press on the necks of those on whom Christ's burden has
been placed, because it is sweet and light [Math 11: 29-30].
The antinomian argument= tries to base the removal of the law
from the church on the fact that it was given to the Jews (sic) and not to the
Gentiles. In his refutation Luther appeals to the decision of the apostolic
council in Jerusalem (Acts 15) to exempt the Gentiles from the requirements
of the ceremonial law.115 In other words, he points to the fact that the early
11439 I, 380, 11-381, 10.
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church already made a distinction within the lex Mosaica between the
Decalogue, on the one hand, and the ceremonial and judicial law, on the
other, which they believed had been fulfilled and abolished in Christ.116
Therefore, the credentes in Christum were exempt from its prescriptions.
However, this applied not only to the Gentiles. Believing Jews held that the
law had been abrogated for them as well. Luther now goes a step further and
says that not only must the Gentiles not be burdened by the ceremonial law
(which is the issue in Acts 15), but also nec moralem legem imponendam
cervicibus fratrum, because Christ came to fulfill the law and to free all
believers from the maledictio legis.117 He then describes the unfulfilled law
as quam neque patres neque eorum posteri potuerunt portare (380, 19-381, 2),
and that is exactly what it remains for unbelievers, since the officium legis is
terrere et condemnare. However, the iugum legis, which is nothing but the
lex condemnatrix, is to be removed for believers and replaced by the iugum
Christi that they may live in peace under him who fulfilled the obedientiam
debitam et requisitam a lege,118 which he gives them as a gift (381, 4-7).
Consistent with his usual way of speaking about the law in two ways, as the
law that has been fulfilled by Christ [lex impleta] and the law that is to be ful115Luther deals with this same argumentum based on Acts 15: 10 in
two other places in the disputations: WA 39 I, 480, 12-481, 19 (2 AD, Arg. 26),
and 499, 5-503, 3 (3 AD, Arg. 2).
116Cf. WA 39 I, 539, 4-541, 7 (3 AD, Arg. 19), where Luther responds

to a similar argument, but there he will take as his point of departure the
distinction between the Decalogue and the natural law.
1170n the maledictio legis, see above n. 36.
118Luther here equates impletio legis with obedientia (Christi). See

also 39 I, 388, 15-20 (1 AD, Arg. 16); 52, 26-34 (De lege, Th. 78-81).
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filled by us flex implenda] through the Spirit (to kill the old Adam), Luther
adds: Et tamen piis praestandum est, ut spiritu facta carnis mortificent, utqui
vetus fermentum expurgent. Therefore, insofar as the law must still be
fulfilled by the godly, on account of the flesh, the lex remains, but the onus
seu iugum legis is no longer burdensome for believers since it has been
removed from their shoulders and replaced by the onus Christi, which is
suave et leve because in effect it is no burden at all (381, 7-10).119 The law is
only burdensome for us when it is unfulfilled, and indeed in that form it is
lex semper accusans et condemnans because it is never anything other than a
lex impossibilis. But when Christ gives us the lex impleta as a gift, the iugum
or onus legis no longer burdens us but is suave et leve, and delightful because
119cf. Matt. 11: 30: o ya p ..,rvyk gov xpqark xth TO (1)optiov p.oi)
iXaOpciv i0T1V. Luther does not explicate this text, but it seems to us that the
following exegesis would be in agreement with what he has been saying:
those whom Jesus invites to rest are of icoiric;ivrec icca who frn givoi (cf. Matt.
23: 4 where the Pharisees are criticized for binding 4optia j3apga which are
hard to bear). Those laboring under the burden of the law as a lex implenda
or those who experience the full power and terror of the law (the sensus
legis), find it unbearable because it drives a person to despair if not tempered
with the gospel. The latter in this context is the ay dray mg, the refreshment
and comfort which Jesus offers the person burdened by the law. In Pauline
terms the av cincruatc would be the forgiveness of sins and acquittal from the
condemnation of the law. Finally, and paradoxically, the rest that Jesus offers
his disciples is his 0)yeoc and Opriov (we, like Luther, take these as
synonymns), which in contrast to the burden of the lex implenda, is xp n (ITO
and iX0p6v (11: 30) because it is really no burden at all. In other words, the
yoke he invites us to put on is not the yoke of the law, but the yoke of the lex
impleta. But, as Luther often says, not only is Christ the fulfiller of the law for
us, he also gives us the Spirit that we may begin to fulfill the law ourselves in
our own lives. For a further discussion on how this is to be understood see
our comments in connection with 39 I, 474, 8-11 (2 AD, Arg. 21).
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we live sub eo [scil. Christus] in pace (381, 6).120 Furthermore, it now becomes
a lex possibilis for faith, because although it is not yet kept perfectly by us, it
has been kept perfectly by him, and hence our failures are forgiven and our
salvation is assured propter Christum. And now by the power of the Holy
Spirit this lex impleta has begun to be fulfilled in us in re, in the sense that we
begin purging out the vetus fermentum and putting to death the facta carnis
as we live a life of repentance in service to others.
Argument 14121
Question: Is the law necessary for justification?
Answer: Yes, because it is written: He has shut all people up under
sin that he may have mercy on all [Rom. 11: 32].
Now this is my argument: If the law is necessary for justification,
then Christ died for nothing [Gal. 2: 21].122 Therefore, Christ and Paul
were wrong in teaching [justification] "apart from works."
Response:123 In the theses to follow124 you will hear that the law is
by no means necessary for justification, and that this topic, whether the
law is necessary for justification, belongs to the disputation on justification. The law is not necessary for justification, but useless and impossible
because it does not remove sins, but reveals them; it does not justify us,
but establishes us as sinners; it does not give life, but mortifies and kills.
120It

is only to those who in repentance know themselves to be
pock mil TansivOc that Jesus promises rest. To those who are burdened by
the guilt of continually failing to fulfill the law Jesus offers the yoke of his
own obedience and perfect fulfillment. Hence, for faith Jesus' yoke, as we
said, turns out to be no yoke at all, no burden, but a sheer delight because he
himself has fulfilled the law for us and hence muzzled its accusation and
condemnation.
12139 I, 381, 12-384, 2.
122StA

does not print the next sentence (see 5, 267, n. 609).

123The

paragraph division follows that of StA 5, 267, 12.

124 He

347-350.

means the zweite Thesenreihe gegen die Antinomer: 39 I,
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Since these effects belong to the law, it is clear that it is not necessary for justification. But you say: Even though its proper effect is that it
holds people accountable, humbles them, and reveals the wrath of God,
that is still a necessary use. Response: However, not for justification.
But justification happens to nobody without this contrition. Therefore, is it necessary for justification?, and consequently, the law, which
effects this contrition? Response: No. The contrite person is so far from
the law that he comes to grace to leave it behind even further. If Peter
had remained in that contrition produced by the law any longer, and if
the Lord had not looked back at him [Luke 22: 61], the same thing would
have happened to him as happened to Judas [Matt. 27: 3-5], that is, despair and death. Therefore, these words: "All have sinned" [Rom. 3: 23];
likewise: "That every mouth may be closed and the whole world held
accountable to God" [Rom. 3: 19], and others like them, are thunder claps
to those who feel the power of the law, testimonies that the law is simply
impossible for justification. For the more a person feels the power of the
law, the more he turns away from God and hates him. Therefore, let
those who feel these terrors take hold of the word of grace, namely, "the
righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ" [Rom. 3: 22]; also:
"They are justified by the grace of God as a gift" (Rom. 3 [: 24]). Hence
justification indeed follows contrition, not as the result of contrition but
of grace; that is, the efficient cause of justification is grace not contrition.
Therefore, we must be diligent in inculcating that God is angry with sin
and punishes it most severely. [But] no less are we to teach the free
forgiveness of sins through God's grace, through the redemption which
is in Christ Jesus [Rom. 3: 24].
Moreover, Paul attests very clearly that the law is impossible for
justification when he says in Romans 8 [: 3]: "It was impossible for the
law," and adds the reason, through, that is, on account of, the flesh.125 If
the law is impossible for justification where am I to find a remedy and
help against sin and death, for the righteousness and life that is to
follow? Here Paul answers: our God has had compassion and sent his
own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and condemned sin in the flesh
through sin in order that the just requirements of the law might be
fulfilled in us [Rom. 8: 3].
Therefore, since we cannot fulfill the law on account of the sin
reigning in our flesh and taking it captive, Christ came and killed that
sin through sin, that is, through the sacrifice that was made for sin, in
order that in this way the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in
125StA does not print the last part of the sentence beginning "and
adds" (5, 269, 9).
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us, first through imputation, then also in substance, but not by us, but by
the grace of God, who sends his Son in the flesh. To those who believe
this he gives the Spirit that they may begin to hate sin sincerely, to
recognize this immense, incomprehensible, and ineffable gift, to give
thanks to God for it, to love, worship and call on him and expect
everything from him. For if he gave up his Son, and indeed for sins, he
will surely also give [us] all things with him [Rom. 8: 32]. And yet it is
very useful to urge the doctrine of the law, not that it is of use for justification, since, as we have said, the more it is in it, the more it draws us
away from it and hinders it, because it accuses and condemns the
conscience and mortifies the person. But this office of the law is not
perpetual, yet it is necessary for the time being, until the gospel
concerning Christ is proclaimed: You will not die but live [Ps. 118 (117):
7]. Christ came not to save the righteous but the sinners [Matt 9: 13]; he
does not break the bruised reed [Is. 42: 3], nor does he frighten the sad, but
sweetly addresses them: Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened
[Matt 11: 28]. The law therefore kills through its impossibility, but the
gospel gives life through this word of grace or one like it: Take heart, my
son, your sins are forgiven you [Math 9: 2]. Christ is the Lamb of God on
whose shoulders were laid the sins of the whole world [cf. John 1: 29],
and the Holy Spirit is efficacious and breathes and works where he wills
[cf. John 3: 8]. Therefore, both the doctrine of the law and of the gospel
are to be retained in the church. After one has been terrified and
humbled by the law, God has mercy, not on account of those terrors,
because when people feel them they hate God and conclude that he is
unjust, but out of his sheer mercy, which he has shown in Christ.
In his responsio Luther notes that the question of whether the law is
necessary for justification strictly speaking belongs to the locus on
justification. He answers it all the same and says that the law is inutilis et
impossibilis and then gives three compound reasons for this: 1) quia non
aufert peccata, sed ostendit ea, 2)non iustificat, sed nos peccatores constituit, 3)
non vivificat, sed mortificat et occidit (382, 2-4). Therefore, words like those
in Romans 3: 19, 23 are like thunder claps to those who feel the vis legis, testimonies that the law is impossible for justification (382, 15-17). The
impossibilis legis is confirmed by Romans 8: 3, where Paul makes it plain that
the real reason for this is propter carnem (282, 25-283, 1). A further reason
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why the law cannot justify is that far from bringing people close to God, it
actually drives them further away until, if allowed to go unchecked, it will
drive people to hate God: Quo magis enim homo vim legis sentit, eo plus
aversatur et odit Deum (382, 17-18).126 It is in this context that Luther cites the
example of Peter and compares his contrition with that of Judas. If the Lord
had not promised Peter forgiveness, he would have ended up like Judas:127 in
desperatio et mors (382, 12-14). Clearly then when our Lord looked back at
him it had the same effect as the preaching of the gospel, for a contritio legis,
unaccompanied by the gospel, leads to death. Luther insists that law and
gospel must both be taught, each in its own way. On the one hand, we must
preach that Deum peccato irasci ac severissime punire; on the other hand,
that remissio peccatorum gratuita per gratiam Dei (382, 22-24).128 God sends
Christ in similitudine carnis peccati to condemn sin in came the in order that
126Luther knows the inevitable nexus between the terrores legis and
the odium Dei, see 384, 1: quia homo istos [scil. terrores1 sentiens odit Deum et
iniustum iudicat. On the hatred of God as an effect of the law see 39 I, 345,
(ATh I, Th. 6); 505, 3-6 (3 AD, Arg. 3); 555, 15-556, 2; 557, 11-18; 559, 12-14 (3 AD,
Arg. 28/1); cf. 39 I, 52 (De lege, Th. 83).
127The repentance of Peter in contrast to the mere contrition of

Judas, or of Cain, Saul, and Judas as in 39 I, 346 (ATh I, Th. 9), is a common
theme. See 411, 3-6 (1 AD, Arg. 31); also 210, 6-12 (PT, Arg. 4); 215, 15-20 (PT,
Arg. 8); 277, 5-8 (VN, Arg. 4/5).
128383, 22-24: Lex occidit per impossibilitatem suam, sed Evangelium vivificat per hoc verbum gratiae aut simile: Confide filii, remittuntur tibi
peccata tua. Cf. 39 I, 363, 19-20 (1 AD, Praef.): Sic verum et proprium officium
legis est accusare et occidere, Evangelii vivificare. The proprius effectus of the
law is: ut reos faciat et humiliet homines ac iram Dei ostendat (382, 6-7). But
after the law has terrified and humbled, God has mercy, yet the reason for his
mercy is never in us, but only in him: ex mera sua misericordia in Christo
exhibita (384, 1-2).
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the iustificatio legis might be fulfilled in us. In other words, since we cannot
fulfill the law propter peccatum in came nostra regnans ac earn captivans,
Christ comes and kills sin by sin, that is, through the victima which he made
for sin, in order that the iustitia legis may be fulfilled in us.129 Luther's
description of soteriology is instructive: Christ killed sin by becoming sin
(concretely, a sinner) for us (cf. 2 Cor. 5: 21), or as he says elsewhere, he robbed
the law of its curse by becoming a curse130 (concretely, a cursed person) for us,
in oder that the iustitia legis may be fulfilled in us. This surely points beyond
a mere imputation of Christ's iustitia legis to a real and substantial
fulfillment of the law in us. Hence, Luther consistently speaks of this
fulfillment as having two parts: primum imputative, deinde etiam
formaliter. We need now to look at this in a little more detail in order not to
misunderstand what Luther means by this distinction.
The terms imputative and formaliter refer to justification and
sanctification respectively.131 Although they are distinguished by a primum
and a deinde (elsewhere insuper), this does not imply a temporal sequence, or
the suggestion that the second (in an Augustinian fashion) is higher and
greater than the first. Admittedly sanctification presupposes justification (and
129It seems Luther understands the phrase iustitia legis (383, 8-9) to
mean the same as the iustificatio legis (383, 5) of Rom. 8: 3. In both cases then
we may assume that it refers to the righteous demands of the law which are
fulfilled in us.
13039 I, 385, 7 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
131The pair of terms imputative—formaliter occurs frequently in the
disputations and is very important for Luther's understanding of justification
and sanctification. On this, see ch. 4 as well as our comments in connection
with 2 AD, Arg. 3.
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in that sense is deinde) but the two cannot be pulled apart because there is no
justification without sanctification as its immediate concomitant. It seems
that Luther understands the first to be Christ's work for us, extra nos, which is
then bestowed on us by imputation through faith, while the second is the
Spirit's application of this to us substantiver. Here specifically Luther says it is
non tamen ex nobis, sed ex gratia Dei mittentis filium in carnem. Thus,
God's grace, the Holy Spirit, and the Christus in nobis, are all at work in us
formaliter in sanctification. This entails a continual struggle of the Spirit
against the flesh which, according to Luther, can be recognized in the
credentes by certain characteristic fruit: ut ex animo incipiant odisse peccatum,
agnoscere hoc immensum, incomprehensibile et ineffabile donum ac pro eo
gratias agere, diligere, colere, invocare Deum, expectare ab eo omnia (383, 514).132 Since therefore the law must also be fulfilled in us propter carnem, the
doctrina legis, even though useless for justification, must continue to be
urged.
spiritum in 383, 11 to be
a reference to the Holy Spirit even though it is not capitalized) is not linked
syntactically with the formal or effective fulfillment of the law in this passage
(383, 9), it is nevertheless connected theologically in 383, 10-13 where Luther
makes it clear that it is (only) through the gift of the Holy Spirit that believers
can begin to hate sin etc., which surely has everything to do with sanctification. See also 39 I, 395, 22-24 (1 AD, Arg. 21): Deinde concipimus per fidem
Spiritum sanctum, qui novos motus parit et voluntatem imbuit, ut vere
incipiat Deum amare et peccatum detestari in came reliquum; similarly 436,
9-11 (2 AD, Arg. 4). In the latter passage the Spirit's work is closely linked
with peccatum detestari, odisse, and expurgare. In 443, 20 444, 18 (2 AD, Arg.
7) (B), the beginning of the formal impletio legis is attributed to the Spirit
either directly or indirectly. Cf. also 526, 4-7 (3 AD, Arg. 13) and 365, 2-6 (1 AD,
Arg. 1).
132Although the work of the Spirit (we take
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In discussing the problem of the law and justification Luther always
comes back to the principle definition of the law as lex accusans et condemnans and the Pauline doctrine of justification propter Christum per fidem.
This rules out the necessity of the law for justification in that it is not the
causa efficiens. The law however has its God-ordained place in the scheme of
salvation. God uses it to bring people to a knowledge of their sin and to break
down their pride in order that they might receive his righteousness as a gift.
Hence, justification follows contrition, but as a result of grace. In other words,
the causa efficiens of justification is gratia not contritio. The way that this
works out in practise is that both law and gospel are to be preached: God's
judgment on sin and his bestowal of forgiveness for Christ's sake per fidem.
The error in the antinomian argumenturn is the assumption that the law is
necessary for justification. The antinomians proceed to use this criterion
against Paul (and even Christ) to reject the doctrine of justification absque
operibus. This evinces a failure to distinguish properly between the causa
efficiens and the causa materialis of justification.133 Although the law is not
necessary for justification Luther says that it is nevertheless necessary in the
interim [sed hoc officium legis non est perpetuum, necessarium tamen
interim] until the gospel of Christ is preached (383, 18-19).
The opponents base their argumenturn for the necessity of the law on
Romans 11: 32: God has shut all people up under sin in order that he may
have mercy on them. Clearly the purpose of the law is to bring people to the
point of receptivity where they will allow themselves to be given to by God.
133This

distinction is further elaborated in WA 39 I, 446, 8-448, 7 (2
AD, Arg. 8) and in 469, 6-470, 12 (2 AD, Arg. 17).
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However, the law cannot complete this task by itself for, as Luther says
elsewhere, the law in and of itself only drives people away from God. The
law can produce contrition (sorrow, remorse) but nothing more. At that
point the gospel must intervene and take over, otherwise the law may well
sweep the penitent out into the deep water of despair and leave him there to
drown in his sorrows.
Argument 15134
Peter taught repentance based on the offence against the Son [Acts 2:
36-38]. Peter was a speaker. Therefore, preachers ought to teach repentance based on the offence against the Son, not on the basis of the law of
Moses.
Response: I grant that we should especially stress the offence against
the Son, as the first thesis of the antinomians has it, that is, unbelief in
the Son. I realize it must be stressed for since the fulfillment of the law
through the Son has now been offered and given to us, not to embrace
and believe that fact with open arms is a terribly great sin. That certainly
ought to be diligently inculcated. But I ask you, what kind of a conclusion is this: The offence against the Son must be stressed, therefore the
law in its entirety is to be rejected and removed from the church? The
law, as I have often said, always urges and demands perfect fear, love and
trust in God. But no one does this. What does God do? He sends his
Son, he assumes our flesh, submits himself to the law and allows
himself to be condemned by it that through this we might be freed from
the curse of the law [Gal. 3: 13], and God commands us to receive this
fulfiller of the law. What happens? Unbelievers and the world as a
whole do not receive him, do not embrace him with joy, do not worship
that victor over the law, but instead persecute, blaspheme, and kill him
with all his gifts, and crucify him most ignominiously between two
robbers. Thus the law is not diminished or abrogated through that
offence against the Son, but it increases and is strengthened all the more
because it is written: Whoever does not believe is already judged [John 3:
18], for there the law remains continually demanding perfect obedience,
[but] the unbeliever cannot do it, nor does he apply Christ's fulfillment
to himself through faith. Therefore, unbelievers sin in a twofold way:
first, they are disobedient to the law by themselves, secondly, they do not
want to receive him who was made a curse for them to free them from
13439 I, 384, 4-386,16.
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the curse of the law [Gal. 3:13]. Therefore, when unbelief in the Son is
urged, the law is urged in a twofold way. First, obedience to the law is
enjoined per se, secondly, the Son is sent, to whom all things have been
handed over by the Father, to be a sacrifice for the sins of the world,
where we are mandated to listen to him and believe in him [Matt. 11: 27;
17: 5]. That does not happen. But, according to Psalm 2 [: 2-3], the great
majority of people do not accept his authority.
Therefore, these conclusions of the antinomians are not only very
feeble, but foolish and ungodly as well. I admonish you especially, who
in due time are going to be teachers of others, to teach dialectics135 as
your first priority with the great diligence, that is, how to divide and
define correctly, in order that you can properly understand the subject
matter [res] and the words. For unless you clearly define the words and
determine their force, you will be a miserable craftsman when it comes
to composing syllogisms, as is the case with these antinomians who do
not see that the manifestation of sin through the law and the revelation
of wrath are the same.
But let us come back to the main point. The offence against the Son,
that is, unbelief in the Son, not only does not fulfill the First Table, but it
transgresses it in a twofold way, it does not remove the exaction of the
law, but actually establishes and sharpens it. In the Old Testament it is
especially the fulfillment of the First Table that is required. In the New
Testament it is especially belief in the Son that is required. Therefore,
those who do not believe in the Son sin in a twofold way, first against
the God who requires perfect obedience to the law. And since no saint
was ever able to fulfill it, God sent his own Son to fulfill that law for
them [Rom. 8: 3-4]. Those who do not receive this ineffable gift sin
against him terribly who offers the remedy for the terrors of the law, sin,
and death, crucifying again for themselves the Son of God (Heb. 6 [: 6]).
Our folly and blindness is greater than any mind can conceive. In
paradise our first parents, although they were without sin, did not
perform the obedience demanded of them by God. Then in the Old
Testament their posterity performed it even less, although it was
demanded by the law that had been given for this purpose. For their
corrupt nature did not allow it. In the New [Testament], where Christ is
given to heal this disease, that is, to seek what is lost [Luke 19: 10], and to
restore our corrupt nature to its original soundness, we too are slackers,
in fact persecutors of this sweetest fulfiller of the law. Who then will
135Cf.

Wilhelm Ockham: Summa logicae, pars. I, in Opera philosophica 1, 7-238. Here the terms universalia and praedicamenta as well as
their application to res are discussed in detail and differentiated.
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supply this help? Satan in hell? Therefore, either let us receive Christ
with joy and thankfulness, who was made a curse for us to free us from
the curse of the law, and through him begin to fulfill the law, or know
that we will suffer eternal and indeed condign punishment together
with the devil and his angels in hell.
This is the first time that Luther responds to the antinomian thesis that
repentance ought to be taught ex violatione filii, non ex lege Mosis.136 He
agrees that the violatio filii, understood in the sense of incredulitas in filium,
must be taught [urgendam esse] because the irnpletio legis has been offered
and given to us per filium, and not to believe that it has in fact been done and
is given and faith rejoices in it [non credere earn factam] is a great sin.
However, Luther strongly rejects the conclusion that the antinomians draw
from that, namely, lex in universum est reiicienda et ex Ecclesia removenda
(384, 7-13). In other words, the real sin is unbelief toward the fact of the Son's
having fulfilled the law, not the failure to keep the law, which demands
perfectum timorem, dilectionem, fiduciam Dei. The violatio filii however
does not mean the abrogation or diminution of the law, but its augmentation
and confirmation,137 for according to John 3: 18 the unbeliever stands under
judgment, but this is not the judgment of Christ, for Christ's mission was to
save the world not to be its judge. Rather, the unbeliever stands under the
judgment of the law, for the law continues to demand perfect obedience
39 I, 342, 9-10 (Pos., Th. 1): Poenitentia docenda est non ex
Decalogo, aut ulla lege Mosi, sed ex violatione filii per Evangelium. On the
meaning of the violati filii, see W2 20, 1624, n. 2.
136See

137385,

1-2: Sic lex non imminuitur aut abrogatur per illam violationem filii, sed plus augetur et corroboratur; cf. 385, 21-23: Violatio filii, hoc est,
incredulitas in filium . . . non tollit legis exactionem, sed etiam stabilit et
exasperat.
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which he is unable to do, and at the same time he refuses to appropriate to
himself the impletio Christi through faith (385, 1-5). It follows from this that
the unbeliever sins in two ways [dupliciter]: primum per seipsos sunt
inobedientes legi, deinde nolunt suscipere eum, qui pro ipsis maledictum
factus est, ut a maledictione legis eos liberaret (385, 6-8; our emphasis).138 The
first way corresponds to the sin of disobedience to the law, specifically the First
Commandment, the fountainhead of all the commandments, the second to
the sin of unbelief in the Son.139 However, these finally are one and the
same, for the First Commandment of the law demands only that we believe
the gospe1.140 Therefore, to preach the violatio filii (or, what amounts to the
same thing, the incredulitas in filium), is not to preach the gospel (as the
antinomians maintained) but the law. Again, this is done in two ways:
[dupliciter lex urgetur]: first, the law demands obedience to itself, secondly, we
have the divine mandate to listen to and believe in the Son, who came to
fulfill the law and offer himself as a sacrifice for the sins of the world,141 but
138Christ

robbed the law of its curse by becoming a curse for us. For
Luther the fact that Christ maledictum factus est (385, 7) means that he
became hostia pro peccatis mundi; cf. 39 II, 109, 8-9 (DHC, Arg. 13) where he
says Christ factus hostia, victima pro nobis. For other passages on Christ as
maledictum, see our discussion of this in Arg. 2.
139The

sin of unbelief is the primary and root sin, cf. 399, 10-14 (A),
21-34 (B); 400, 4-13 (1 AD, Arg. 22 and 23); 403, 14-404, 9 esp. 404, 5-6 (1 AD, Arg.
26). Unbelief is first and foremost a sin against the First Commandment, 385,
28-31 (B); cf. 385, 5-8 (A). See too 39 I, 84 (Rom. 3: 28, IV, Th. 11).
of that, we hope to show in ch. 4 that the law itself is a
unity, so that the sin against the First Commandment and unbelief in Christ
are really one and the same sin.
1400n top
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the great majority do not accept that he is their king [imperium] (385, 8-13).142
In the Old Testament the fulfillment of the First Table (faith in Yahweh) was
the most important thing; in the New Testament it is faith in the Son.
However, as we said above, these come together in Jesus who is one with
Yahweh. Therefore, we can conclude that God urges faith in his Son, the
fulfiller of the law, both through the Decalogue (which still applies to
Christians qua sinners) and through the gospel. If that is the case, then even
the incredulitas in filium is finally not simply a sin against the Son, but
against the law.143 Conversely, all sin against the law is ultimately
incredulitas in Christum, and not to believe in Christ is to sin horribiliter

(386, 2-3). The antinomian argument has therefore been overturned: the
preaching of repentance ex violatione filii is not really a preaching of the
gospel at all, but of the law.
Luther's digressio in his responsio is worth repeating here as a
parenthesis. He urges his students, who themselves are aspiring to be
doctores, to teach dialectics as their first priority, which Luther defines as

knowing how bene dividere et definire in order to be able to understand
141Luther says both: 385, 11: Christ is hostia pro peccatis mundi; 386,
1: misit Deus filium suum, ut is legem impleret pro ipsis [scil. sancti]. Clearly,
these may not be separated.

142385, 9-13: Primum enim legis obedientia praecipitur per se,
deinde mittitur filius, cui amnia tradita sunt a patre, ut sit hostia pro peccatis
mundi, ubi mandatur, ut hunc audiamus et credamus in eum. Id non fit.
Sed maior et potior pars hominum non patitur eius imperium iuxta 2.
Psalmum.
143See

385, 21-23: Violatio filii, hoc est, incredulitas in filium non

solum non praestat primam tabulam, sed dupliciter transgreditur, non tollit
legis exactionem, sed etiam stabilit et exasperat. For a very concise version of

the same argument, see 1 AD, Arg. 22.
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properly the res et vocabula (385, 14-17). His adhortatio is prompted by the
antinomian syllogism which derives repentance ex violatione filii. To Luther
this is a classic proof that the antinomians are infelices artifices in
componendis syllogismis. For if they knew how to define words clearly and
determine their force, they would have known that the manifestation of sin
through the law and the revelation of wrath are one and the same [idem esse
ostensionem peccati per legem et revelationem irae] (385, 17-20).
Argument 16144
Contra 4
The gospel exposes sins. Therefore, there is no need for the
ministry of the law in the New Testament to expose sins.145
Proof: Rom. 1 [: 18]: God's wrath is revealed from heaven through
the gospel; and John 16 [: 8-9]: the Holy Spirit will convict the world of
sin.
Response: Whoever does not correctly divide here confuses'law and
gospel. The gospel, properly defined, is the promise concerning Christ
that frees from the terror of the law, from sin and death, and offers grace,
forgiveness of sins, righteousness and eternal life. Christ is the teacher
and giver of those heavenly and eternal blessings. But he is just as much
an interpreter of the law, not as a legislator or as some Moses, but in
order that we might understand what kind of work or fulfillment it is
that the law demands of us, something that Christ cannot show unless
he expressly interprets the law. But in Matthew 5 he interprets it as a
doctrine which is not satisfied by some external observance, but which
requires a clean heart, and demands perfect obedience, perfect fear and
love of God. For thus Christ says in Matthew 5 [: 20]: Unless your
righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees etc. That is, not
only ought you not be murderers outwardly, but you ought also to have
a heart free from all wrath and envy; likewise, not only ought you to
abstain from lust in the body, but you ought to have that chastity which
the angels have even now and which after the resurrection from the
dead all the blessed will have too. Therefore, Christ is not a lawgiver.
14439

I, 386, 19-388, 20.

145Hermelink

notes, 39 I, 386, n. 1, that Agricola said in a lecture
that the gospel uses the ministry of the law to expose sin (CR 3, 461).
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However, he reveals the work of the law, and at the same time shows
what he himself has done in order that this work of the law, which is
required of everyone, may be fulfilled; indeed, he shows that he has
accomplished this by doing the will of God and by satisfying his law:
Sacrifice and offering you did not desire, but you have opened my ears
etc. "Then I said: 'Behold, I come. In the chapter of the book it is written
of me: I do your will, 0 God,' and: 'Your law is in the my heart' (Ps. 40 [:
7-9]). Therefore, that righteousness which the law requires does not
happen through the law, which reveals sin and brings about wrath, but
through Christ, who alone did the will of God and fulfilled his law and
received the Holy Spirit. Therefore, whoever apprehends this gift of
Christ by faith has fulfilled the law through imputation and receives the
Spirit who makes the law, which is otherwise hateful and burdensome
to the flesh, delightful and sweet. So also in Romans, Paul does not
teach the law, but shows that what is required of us, namely, the perfect
obedience and righteousness which we lack because we are all sinners
and stand accused before God (Rom. 3 [: 23]), is attained through faith in
Christ. Therefore, he is speaking there about its fulfillment, which he
was unable to do in any other way that people would understand except
by saying that it is the supreme and perfect obedience, fear, faith etc.
toward God. That is not, properly speaking, to preach the law but to
show people the power and work of the law. Therefore, the gospel,
properly speaking, does not, expose sin, but shows that it is the law that
exposes sins. Christ did not come to demand from us that obedience
which the law requires, but he came to give it to us since we cannot do it.
However, at the same time, he shows us what he has done, namely, that
by doing the will of God and obeying the law even beyond what it
required, he has redeemed us from the condemnation of the law and
through this has given us the righteousness which is better than that of
the Pharisees.
The argumentum Luther refutes here is as central to antinomian
theology as the two passages adduced in the probatio (Romans 1: 18 and John
16: 8-9) are foundational.146 Both are mentioned in the antinomian
146Rom.

1: 18 is referred to twice throughout the disputations, here
and in 39 I, 423, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 1). In both cases it is adduced by the antinomians as a proof-text for the argument that sin is exposed through the
gospel. John 16: 8 (v. 9 simply explicates v. 8) occurs in two other places, also
in the First Disputation: 39 I, 403 (Arg. 26) and 414 (Arg. 35). The latter is the
only place where Luther himself refers to it. The other two are cited as proof
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positiones.147 Luther's point of departure in his responsio is the proper
distinction between law and gospel. Here he defines the gospel as promissio
de Christo, which frees from the power of the law etc. and gives grace and
forgiveness etc. (387, 1-4). Christ is not only doctor and donator of these
heavenly bona, yet he also interprets the law, not however as a legislator like
Moses,148 but in order that we might understand what kind of work or fulfillment it is that the law demands of us. This he cannot show unless he
expressly interprets the law [id quod Christus non potest ostendere, nisi legem
diserte definiat] (387, 5-8). In the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5: 17-48) Jesus
is not content with mere external obedience but demands TiAel oc, that is, total
submission to the will of God (387, 11-16). However, he alone can give what
he demands.149 Significantly then, by means of his christological exegesis,
of the antinomian premise that the gospel exposes sin, or in 39 I, 403, more
specifically, that only the gospel can expose and convict unbelief and
ignorance of Christ. Luther does not take up Rom. 1: 18 in this argument but
will discuss that at length in 2 AD, Arg. 1. Here he seems to be guided more
by the texts which he himself introduces (Matt. 5; Ps. 40) than those in the
probatio. Although his thinking reflects John 16: 8 he makes no reference to
it. See ch. 2 for the role that Rom. 1: 18 and John 16: 8 play in antinomian
theology.
16: 8: 39 I, 342, 14-15 (Th. 3): Et Christus apud Ioannem ait,
Spiritum arguere mundum de peccato, non legem. Rom. 1: 17, 18: 39 I, 343,
21-23 (Th. 18): Nam Evangelium Christi docet iram Dei et coelo, et simul
iustitiam Dei, Rom. 1. Est enim praedicatio poenitentiae, coniuncta promissioni, quam ratio non tenet naturaliter, sed per revelationem divinam.
147John

Luther also knows that when Christ, in his opus
alienum, takes the law into his own hands and interprets it spiritually, he is a
veritable Mosis mosissimus. Thus, Luther understands Moses as both
interpres and as legislator, depending on what work is being done at any
given time.
148However,
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Luther sees this Sermon, as well as Paul's treatise in Romans, as setting forth
God's demand, not to be fulfilled by us, but the demand that Christ has
fulfilled in our stead. If there is any talk of an opus legis, it is precisely in the
sense of a fulfilled opus legis. This becomes clear from Psalm 40: 7-9, which
Luther again interprets christologically. Here Christ takes on his own lips the
words of the psalmist, and in doing so claims the psalm as his own and sees
his perfect obedience as the fulfillment of scripture: Tunc dixi: Ecce ego venio,
in capite libri scriptum est de me, ut faciam voluntatem tuam, Deus, et lex tua
sit in medio cordis mei (387, 20-388, 1). This perfect obedience or fulfillment is
now ours through faith as a gift [beneficium] for we have been given the law's
fulfillment imputative and at the same time receive the gift of the Spirit, who
makes the otherwise loathsome law iucundam et suavem (388, 4-6).150 Christ
did not come to demand from us the obedience of the law that we cannot
render, but he came to give it to us. Yet, at the same time, he shows us what
he did [tamen simul ostendit, quid ipse facit]: because his obedience does not
merely fulfill the law, but far transcends its requirements [abunde praestando
149Cf.

387, 28-31(B), where Luther has Christ say in connection with
Matt. 5: 20: Hoc opus et officium meum est, ego debeo facere et implere legem,
ego debeo praestare totam illam obedientiam, quam lex requirit, videlicet non
occidere, non irasci, non moechari aut concupiscere etc. In understanding
that Christ gives us in the gospel what God demands of us in the law, Luther
at least understands the gospel of the Sermon on the Mount, even if he does
not specifically refer to the gospel framework of the sermon given in the
Beatitudes.
150Cf.

39 I, 373, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 6) where Luther says, on the basis of Ps.
19 that the Spirit is given to believers ut voluptatem habeant in lege domini.
See 1 AD, Arg. 1 for other passages.
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obedientiam, quam lex requirebat] he redeems us from the condemnation of
the law and gives us the very righteousness that it demands.151
The antinomian argument asserts that the gospel exposes sins [arguit
peccata].152 Luther rejects this as a confusion of law and gospel, and instead
argues that the gospel, properly speaking, does not preach the law, hence does
not expose sins, but rather shows the power and work of the law. In other
words, Luther asserts that the gospel, strictly speaking, does not expose sin, but
shows that it is the law that exposes sins [Itaque Evangelium non arguit
proprie peccatum, sed ostendit legem peccata arguentern] (388, 13-15).153
151Luther often speaks about Christ's fulfillment of the law, but he
never suggests that there is a one to one correspondence between the law's
demand and Christ's fulfillment. Such a notion would bring Christ into
captivity to the law and suggest that it is finally the law and not Christ who is
dominus. Christ however is Lord of the law, even though he voluntarily
submits to its demands for our sake. In the end he trumps the law in that he
not only "pays the law out," but does far in excess of what the law could ever
demand. In our opinion, the Barthian understanding of Christ as fulfiller of
the law ends up exalting the law above Christ, so that the gospel ends up
fulfilling and thus serving the law. We, on the other hand, are convinced
that for Luther law and gospel are incommensurate, and that the law is not
the measure of the gospel; that is, Christ's fulfillment of the law is not to be
understood in quantitative terms, for the measure of the law does not
determine the extent of Christ's fulfillment. This is the significance of the
abunde.
152There are also many other arguments where we will find the
basic antinomian thesis represented, that is, attributing to the gospel what is
really the work of the law: to expose sin and thus show the need for salvation.
See 1 AD, Args. 16, 17, 22-24, 26-28, 32, 35-37; 2 AD Args. 1, 14, 15, 28; and 3 AD
Args. 18, 33/6, 34/7, 35/8, 36/9, 40/13, 43/15.
153Cf. 388, 27-31(B): What the law demands is revealed in the gospel.
The gospel itself does not demand but shows that it is the law that demands.
Ergo dicimus, etiam in Evangelio legem ostendi, seu, quid requirat lex. Quare
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Christ, in his office as fulfiller of the law, stands on the side of the gospel
contra the law. However, in order for us to understand what Christ has done
as impletor legis, he needs to expound and interpret the law.
Although under the pressure of antinomian exegesis Luther is pushed
to define the gospel differently than simply the bestowal of the forgiveness of
sins, yet he still ends up in complete antithesis to the antinomian position,
which holds that the gospel exposes sins. What is significant about his
argumentation here is that it is a step in the direction of the profound insight
that the gospel can also be understood as showing, by implication, the work of
the law. However, it would appear that Luther has still not satisfactorily
explained exactly how the Spirit convicts the world concerning sin (John 16:
8).154 One way of proceeding would be to interchange Spirit and Christ on the
basis of the inseparability of their opera ad extra. Restated christologically, the
text would then read: Jesus convicts the world of sin, and if we now substitute
gospel for Jesus we end up with the antinomian thesis: The gospel convicts
the world of sin. However, Luther cannot accept such a thesis because it
represents a confusion between law and gospel. The mere mention of Jesus is
not in and of itself synonymous with the gospel. His officium can be either
one of law or gospel, even though his proprium is the officium evangelii. By
Evangelium proprie non arguit peccatum, sed ostendit legem, quid requirat
lex, ut Christi officium intelligi possit.
154See also 39 I, 347, 19-20 (Am, I, Th. 37): Sic et Spiritus primo
arguit mundum de peccato, ut fidem doceat in Christum, id est, remissionem
peccatorum. Luther here still does not explain theologically how the Spirit
convicts us of sin, although he does hint at it when he interprets the text in
terms of law and gospel by saying that the Spirit convicts the world of sin that
he may teach faith in Christ. This connection should become clearer in the
next argument.
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understanding the gospel as Christ's fulfillment of the law pro nobis, Luther
stresses that the gospel shows us the power and work of the law by explaining
how it is fulfilled in Christ. Thus, we come full circle: the gospel does not
expose sins, but shows that it is the law that exposes sins. The gospel does not
do the work of the law, but it describes the work of the law and proclaims it
fulfilled pro nobis in Christ. In a later argument Luther will say that without
the law we would never know what exactly Christ did for us in fulfilling the
law.
In the next argument Luther will again address the problem of the relation between the Spirit and the law, but this time he will tackle it from the
standpoint of pneumatology rather than christology.
Argument 17155
Contra 4
Contrition is the work of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is not
given through the law. Therefore, contrition cannot be given through
the law.
Proof: The natural person does not grasp the things that are of God
[1 Cor. 2: 14].
Response: No one understands the law unless his heart is moved by
its sensation and power. But that feeling or sensation of the law is
divine. Therefore, the law does not expose sins without the Holy Spirit,
although when we say that we are not speaking about the Holy Spirit in
the proper sense. For when we talk about the Holy Spirit we generally
mean him whom Christ sent to us from the Father as a gift, to be our
vivifier and sanctifier etc. Therefore, we do not ascribe contrition to him
as gift, consoler, and Spirit of truth, but to God, the author of the law,
who wrote it on tablets of stone. The analogy which I cited earlier
concerning the uncreated word and the incarnate word is helpful here. It
is dangerous to want to search out and grasp the naked God by means of
human reason, without Christ the mediator, as the sophists and monks
have done and have taught others to do. scripture says: No one will see
me and live [Exod. 33: 20], and in order that we may avoid this danger the
15539

I, 388, 23-391, 20.
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incarnate word has been given to us--laid in a crib and suspended on the
tree of the cross. This word is the Wisdom and Son of the Father and has
told us what the Father's will is toward us. Those who abandon that Son
and follow their own ideas and speculations are overwhelmed by the
majesty of God and despair.
Dionysius with his mystical theology and others who followed him
have indulged in these speculations about the majesty of the naked God.
They wrote many things about spiritual marriages where they imagined
God himself as the bridegroom and the soul as the bride, and thus taught
that humans, in this mortal and corrupt flesh, can converse and have
dealings with the inscrutable and eternal majesty of God without the
mediator. There is no doubt that this teaching of theirs has been
received as supreme and divine wisdom. I too occupied myself with it
for some time, but not without its doing me great harm. I advise you to
avoid this "mystical theology" of Dionysius like the plague, and also
similar books containing stuff like that. I am afraid that in time the
fanatics will come and reintroduce such things into the church and in
this way obscure and utterly destroy sound doctrine.156 Delusions come
from Satan, who so fascinates the mind of human beings that they
embrace such lies instead of the sure truth and supreme wisdom, or
think they are getting some sort of taste of the future life and blessedness.
Mtintzer and the Anabaptists spread the same foolishness among the
common people. Having got rid of Christ, they would boast of having
revelations as well as dealing and speaking with the naked God. Marcus,
who was the originator of this error, used to say that he was full of the
divinity.
The Jews saw and heard God speaking in his majesty at the foot of
Sinai, but they were so fearful and afraid, because of the frightening
storm, the black clouds, and the terrifying sound of the thunder, that
they ran back and said to Moses: Do not let the Lord speak with us lest we
die; you speak to us [Exod. 20: 19]. Also: I will not listen to the voice of
my Lord beyond or see this great fire any more lest I die. They are right
in all that they have spoken, says the Lord. I will raise up for them a
prophet like you etc (Deut. 18 [: 16-181), because it is said: That prophet,
namely Christ, will reveal to them my will, and he will be the mediator
between me and them.
156Hermelink (39 I, 390, n. 2) notes that the passage from Ad has
speculationes (389, 18) to prorsus obruent (390, 7) was already cited by Val.
Ernst Loscher from a manuscript inVollstiindiger Timotheus Verinus I
(Wittenberg, 1718), 31.
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Therefore, where the naked God speaks in his majesty he only
frightens and kills. When you want to have dealings with God then,
begin in this way: Listen to the voice of Christ whom the Father has
made teacher of the whole world when he says: This is my beloved Son
in whom I am well pleased; listen to him [Matt. 17: 5]. He alone knows
the Father and reveals him to whom he wills [Matt. 11: 27]. Conversely,
the Jews, Turks and all the self-righteous, who ignore this rule and deal
with the naked God, end up falling into despair. But the world does not
listen, it forsakes Christ and his word and instead follows and highly
prizes illuminations and revelations, which are splendid and divine in
form, but are really the work of Satan. Turks, so I hear, have priests and
religious men who undergo Eicatamv for days at a time: they are seized
and lie prostrate for some time without any sensation at all, and when
they return to themselves, they speak of things sublime and wonderful.
The common people are captivated by this, and even people of rank who
see this think that it is a feat of extraordinary holiness. But God the
Father has commanded us not to listen to such raptured people, but to
the Son in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom [Col. 2: 3].
In summary, when the Holy Spirit is God in his nature, he is the
author of the law, without whom the law does not expose sins; but when
he is gift through Christ he is our vivifier and sanctifier.
This argumentum is closely related to the preceeding. There the
antinomian premise was that the gospel exposes sins, here it is that contrition
is the work of the Holy Spirit. Both reject the law for essentially the same
reason.157 Luther begins his responsio with a reminder that the law is a
power whose sensation is felt in the heart.158 But that feeling or sensation of
the law comes from God [Is autem tactus seu sensus legis est divinus] (389, 23). Therefore, he says, the law does not expose [arguit] sins without the Holy
157The

probatio adduces 1 Cor. 2: 14 as proof. The things of God,
here contrition, cannot be grasped by the animalis homo. The assumption is
that contrition is not a product of human reason, but comes from the Holy
Spirit.
158See 39 I, 345 (Am, I, Th. 3): Multi enim audiunt quidem legem,
sed quia sensum seu vim legis non sentiunt, nihil dolent neque poenitent.
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Spirit. This is an important conclusion for the antinomian presumption
seems to be that there is a fundamental antithesis between the law and the
Spirit. Luther now offers a profound insight which would have been of great
help in the preceeding argument. He points out that we need to distinguish
between the Holy Spirit, in the proper sense, sent by the Father as gift, to be
our vivificator and sanctificator etc., and, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit as
God, the author of the law written on the tablets of stone (389, 5-9). The same
Spirit can work in two different ways.159 Although Luther does not use these
terms here, we could say that when the Spirit works through the gospel as
donum, consolator and spiritus veritatis, he is doing his opus proprium, his
gospel work. On the other hand, when the Spirit works through the law as
Deus autor legis in order to bring about contritio, he is engaged in his opus
alienum, his law work.
Luther at this point harks back to a similitudo which he used earlier to
explain the difference between these aspects of the Spirit's work. He draws an
analogy between the verbum increatum and the verbum incarnatum and
warns against the danger of seeking out the nuda divinitas (= verbum
increatum) by means of human ratio without Christus mediator (389, 942).160
All such attempts to want scrutari et apprehendere the nudam divinitatem
sine Christo mediatore are bound to fail because they are contrary to God's
1590n the difference between the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Christ

and the Spirit of God in his divine nature and majesty, see 370, 12-371, 2 (1
AD, Arg. 4) and our discussion there where other Luther-texts are also cited.
160 For verbum incarnatum, see Ebeling,

Lutherstudien, 11, pt. 2, 413,
and pt. 3, 600. For a discussion of this similitudo and the contrast between the
deus nudus and the deus revelatus, see our analysis of 1 AD, Arg. 4.
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own intentions (cf. Ex. 33: 20). On the other hand, God has stepped out of his
inscrutable and eternal majesty and has shown himself in his Son, the
verbum incarnatum, paradoxically, in the crib of Bethlehem and on the cross
of Calvary (389, 13-15).161 Luther's warning against trying to deal with the
deus nudus directly, whether by means of speculation, mystical
contemplation, or ecstatic trances are made over against the mystical theology
of Dionysius the Areopagite162 and others, including Miintzer and the Anabaptists, and Marcus,163 which Luther sees as the work of Satan (389, 13-391,
17).164
161Cf. Rel. B (390, 23-391, 25), where after referring to Solomon's
warning in Sir. 43: 1 (?) that those who search out the majesty are overpowered by glory, Luther says: For this reason Christ is not to be sought in his
majesty; however, he has put in his word into us which we have a mandate
to hear [sed propositus est nobis Christus in suo verbo, habemus mandatum,
ut hunc audiamus]. The vera notitia Dei is to be found in the crib and
swaddling clothes.
162Dionysius

Areopagita: De mystica theologia 1, 3; MPG 3, 1022.
See WA 5, 503, 9-10 where Pseudo-Dionysius deals with the transcendental
divine darkness, which eludes human knowledge, and the possibility of
mystical union between human beings and the divinity (StA 5, 278, n. 914).
Cf. THE 8, 774. For Luther's assessment of Pseudo-Dionysius, see WA 6, 561,
34-562, 11=StA 2, 247, 3-17.
163StA

(279, n. 942) notes that Markus Thomae (also called Stiibner),
a former Wittenberg student, was an adherent of Nicholaus Storch and
belonged to the Zwickau prophets, who claimed direct illumination through
the Spirit of God. His self-confident manner in Wittenberg in the winter of
1521/22 influenced Melanchthon for a short time. He even tried to persuade
Luther of the correctness of his teaching (among other things the rejection of
infant baptism). See Melanchthon's letter to the Elector of Saxony, 27 Dec.,
1521: MBW 1, 116, No. 192 (Lit.) = Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, ed. R.
Stupperich (Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlag, 1971), 158-161.
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His greatest achievement in this particular argument was to point out
that the Holy Spirit can act in two ways. There is the way of the uncreated
word, where he acts immediately, and the way of the incarnate word, where
he acts mediately. Luther concludes by reiterating even more concisely this
basic distinction which he made at the beginning of his responsio: On the one
hand, the Holy Spirit, as author and giver of the law on Sinai, is God in his
nature, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit, as our vivifier and sanctifier, is the
gift of the Father through Christ. In the former case, the Spirit works through
the law, in the latter, he works through the gospel. This distinction enables
Luther to say, contra antinomos, that contrition is the work of the Holy Spirit,
while at the same time denying that it is produced by the gospel. For when
the Holy Spirit brings about contrition in the heart, he is not working through
the gospel but through the law, because this work is not the proprium of the
gospel but belongs to the officium legis.
Argument 18165
The death of Christ is the cause of the mortification of sin. The
death of Christ is not law. Therefore, the law is not the cause of the
mortification of sin.
Proof of major premise: We have been buried together with Christ
through baptism into death [Rom. 6: 4].
Response: We have noted that passage of scripture: through the law
I died to the law [Gal. 2: 19]. Likewise: we died to sin that we may live to
righteousness [1 Peter 2: 24]. That is, through the grace which Christ
brings and bestows, we die to the law that accuses and condemns us.
1MLuther is obviously addressing the students of theology present
at the disputation when he says: Admoneo vos, ut istam Dionysii mysticam
theologiam, et similes libros, in quibus tales nugae continentur, detestemini
tamquam pestem aliquam (390, 3-5). He is afraid that the fanatics will
reintroduce such things into the church (no doubt after his death) and so
destroy sound doctrine.
16539 I, 391, 22-392, 15.
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Thus through Christ, who was made a sacrifice for sin and through
whom sin dies, we die to sin in order that it can no longer rule in us.
Therefore, insofar as we have died to the law and sin through faith in
Christ, and have been buried together with him, sins are dead to us, that
is, they cannot rage or exercise their tyranny over us [Rom. 6: 5-11]. This
is not dangerous, but a salutary death.
But it does not follow from this that the law has been abolished or
must be removed or that sin has been abolished to such an extent that it
is never felt by the godly. But on account of Christ, the fulfiller of the
law, believers are not driven to despair by the accusation and terror of
the law, but are raised up again by the word of Christ. Secondly, on
account of the same Christ, the victor over sin, they are dead to sin and
sin to them. However, insofar as they have the flesh, the law and sin
have dominion in them.
This argument= does not say any thing new, nor does it all together
refute the antinomian thesis: lex non est causa mortificationis peccati (391,
23), but it is a magnificent application of Romans 6: 5-14 to the Christian as
saint and sinner. Paul says in effect that since in Baptism we have died to sin
with Christ, sin can no longer rule over us. Luther, on the other hand, while
making no specific mention of Baptism, expands this, on the basis of Gal. 2:
19, to include the law so that his central premise is that when we die to sin in
Baptism we also die to the law. Hence he can say: Quatenus igitur mortui
sumus legi et peccato per fidem in Christ= et una cum eo sepulti sumus,
eatenus nobis mortua sunt peccata, hoc est, non possunt saevire et tyrannidem exercere suam in nos (392, 5-8). Crucial here is the diadic formula:
quatenus . . eatenus. The antinomians would not limit the statement in this
way. Luther however knows that Christians qua sinners still have the flesh
which needs to be mortified by the law.166 Therefore, contra antinomos, he
166in 39 1, 412, 1-8 (1 AD, Arg. 32) Luther says that mortification
based on the law continues in Christians insofar as they still have the
rebellious flesh.
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argues that it does not follow that legem esse sublatum aut tollendam aut
peccatum ita sublatum, ut prorsus a piis non sentiatur (392, 9-11). The law
must remain because sin remains.
He goes on however to make two statements on the basis of the gospel:
propter Christum legis impletorem, the accusation and terror of the law
cannot drive credentes to despair; second, propter eundem Christum
victorem peccati, they have died to sin and sin to them.167 But finally this
needs to be balanced by a statement sub specie peccati for Christians are also
sinners: Quatenus vero carnem habent, eaten us habent dominium in eos lex
et peccatum (392, 5-15). Here then Luther could both agree with the
antinomians and disagree. Their minor premise: Lex non est mors Christi
(391, 2) is only half true: the death of Christ is law for sinners because it says
clearly that Christ died because of our sin. On the other hand, the death of
Christ is gospel for saints because faith grasps Christ's death as gift pro nobis.
Whether then this message about the mors Christi is heard by the Christian,
who is simul iustus et peccator, as law or gospel will depend not only on
whether it is heard in faith, but also, and ultimately, on how the Lord is
pleased to use his word, for both the verbum and the usus are the Lord's.
Argument 19168
Whatever Christ commanded his apostles, he also commanded all
their successors. Christ commanded the apostles to preach repentance in
his name [Luke 24: 47]. Therefore, the knowledge of sin does not come
through the law, but through the gospel. Hence, the law is to be
abolished.
167Note how the two statements are based on two complementary
christological predicates: Christus impletor legis, and Christus victor.
16839

I, 392, 16-393, 15.
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Response: This argument concludes that repentance must be
preached in the name of Christ, therefore not in the name of the law.
The conclusion is proved from the nature of opposites, for Moses and
Christ are opposites. The minor premise is true but the conclusion is
false, because Christ himself says: I did not come to abolish the law but to
fulfill it [Matt. 5: 17]. He shows therefore what the law requires, namely,
its fulfillment, which no one could ever or has ever achieved.
Therefore, all sinners are cursed [Deut. 27: 26] and subject to eternal death
[Heb. 2: 15]. For cursed be every one who does not abide by etc. [Gal. 3: 10].
Secondly, he says that he fulfilled the law in order to redeem
believers from this exaction and curse of the law. Therefore, although
Christ makes no mention of the law, he shows from the very nature of
the case that the law has not been fulfilled, for he himself fulfills it. And
elsewhere Christ says: Repent and believe the gospel [Mark 1: 15]. When
he commands people to repent he shows that sinners are also transgressors of the law and cannot avoid the condemnation of the law in any
other way than by believing the gospel, which preaches that Christ has
satisfied the law.
This is the first time in the disputation that Luther has to deal with the
second key text169 used by the antinomians, Luke 24: 47,170 to prove that the
knowledge of sin comes through the gospel and not through the law.171 The
opponents, rightly recognizing the antithesis between Christ and the law (=
169The other being John 16: 8, which was used already in Arg. 16 (39
I, 386, 21-22). See 39 I, 342 (Pos., Th. 2 and Th. 3) for the antinomian theses.

170Kca ^.(0)
vn XAR'
w.iVal £76 Tell 0VollaT1 CCUTOU gEtorVOlaV Eic 64)Ecnv

aiLaptic;iv Eic ircivta Ta gev rt. The textual problem here is whether Kai should
be read for eic. We cannot discuss that here. However, it seems certain that
Luther's Vulgate (esp. in light of the other places in which he uses this verse)
took the dominical words to be a mandate to preach repentance and
forgiveness (RSV and NIV read Kai, but the modem Lutherbibel [Stuttgart,
1984] follows the Nestle-Aland text (26th ed.) and reads the etc: and daj3
gepredigt wird in seinem Namen Buf3e zur Vergebung der Siinden unter
alien Volkern").
171For other references to Luke 24: 47, see 39 I, 414, 1-5 (1 AD, Arg.
35), 416, 2-3 (1 AD, Arg. 36); 485, 13-14 (2 AD, Cond.); 572, 4-7 (3 AD, Arg. 36/9).
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Moses), conclude ex natura contrariorum that poenitentiam praedicandam in
nomine Christi (393, 2). In Luther's judgment however the antecedens is
true, but the consequentia false, because Christ himself said that he did not
come to abolish the law but to fulfill it (393, 3-5).
Luther in his responsio makes a subtle distinction which is lost on the
antinomians: To preach repentance in nomine Christi does not ipso facto
mean to preach contra Mosem, for Christ himself exercised a twofold office,
his officium proprium and his officium alienum. All depends then on the
proper distinction between law and gospel. When Christ is doing his opus
alienum he can be a veritable Moses, indeed a Mosissimus, who does not
abolish the law but ratifies it and makes it impossible to escape; yet on the
other hand, when he is doing his opus proprium he not only fulfills the law
for us, but defends us against Moses and sends him packing. Therefore, to
make Christ the antithesis of Moses unconditionally, as the antinomians do,
is to overlook the fact that Christ too can proclaim the law. Luther's
refutation then proceeds along two lines reflecting his law-gospel dialectic,
which is neatly encapsulated in Jesus' words: Non veni solvere legem, sed
implere. The non solvere means that he does not weaken the law in any way:
Ostendit ergo, quid lex requirit, nempe impletionem sui, quam nemo
unquam praestet aut praestiterit (393, 5-6). However, as soon as he has shown
sinners their terrible plight under the law, that omnes peccatores maledicti et
rei sunt mortis aeternae, and that they cannot fulfill the law, he immediately
goes on to announce the second and proper part of his work, his implere
legem, which means redemption from the exactio et maledictio legis (393, 89). Therefore, even though Christ does not expressly mention the law in his

199
final commission to the apostles, Luther insists that he shows that it has not
been fulfilled from the very fact that he himself fulfills it. Hence, to preach
repentance is to call sinners to repent in order to escape God's judgment, and
that is to preach the law.
It is clear then that Jesus' mandate in Luke 24: 47 is essentially no
different to the kerygma as summarized in Mark 1: 15: Poenitentiam agite et
credite Evangelio.172 In other words, Luther sees the dominical mandate as
being a statement of law and gospel: Repentance is the knowledge of sin based
on the preaching of the law, but it is evangelical repentance only if it finds
refuge from the condemnation of the law in the gospel of Christ. Even
though the link between repentance and the law is not explicit in the Lukan
passage, Luther would argue that both are there by virtue of the very nature of
Jesus' sacrificial death for the forgiveness of sins, as declared by the gospe1.173
In conclusion, two points need to be emphasized : 1) Luther talks of
Christ and his work as the fulfillment of the law; and 2) the gospel, by virtue
of the fact that it proclaims Christ's fulfillment of the law pro nobis, also
to-i Elicxyyehig. It is instructive to
compare both Mark 1: 15 and Luke 24: 47 with Peter's appeal as recorded in
Acts 2: 38 after his Pentecost sermon: petavotioate, khaivj Kan 13anticreritco
ElCaCrt0c1)1165.V E16 TO 0Vollan Ina0i5 XplOTOZ Eic asEaw Tav agar:m.iv iSp.oiv
xth A.itulteaee Thy ocape6v toi5 ayiov 7rvel5p.aroc. Although it is not
immediately relevant to Luther's argument, it is striking how repentance,
forgiveness (or the gospel) and baptism are inseparably connected. Luther
will make the point in a later argument that repentance is placed alongside
forgiveness to prevent it from veering off into despair; see 39 I, 485, 13-14 (2
AD, Concl.); 572, 4-7 (3 AD, Arg. 36/9).
intLETaVOETTE Kan 7r1OTEI)ETE EV

the gospel Luther says: quod contionatur Christum legi
satisfecisse (393, 14-15). Cf. 393, 24-25 (B): Christus venit non tollere legem, sed
implere, et ut ostendat legem atque ita declaret suum opus et officium.
1730f
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reminds us, in a backhanded sort of fashion, of the law that Christ has
satisfied and fulfilled.
Argument 20174
Paul is converted by the voice of Christ [Acts 9: 4-6]. The voice of
Christ is the gospel. Therefore, he was converted by the gospel and not
by the law.
Response: Christ's proper office is to announce grace and the remission of sins. Meanwhile, however, as we have often said, he declares
that he has not come to abolish, but to fulfill [the law; Matt. 5: 17]. Therefore, he says concerning his total work that he brings only blessing, that
is, grace and righteousness in the face of the curse of the law, to which all
people are subject, and from which those who believe him may be set
free.
On the other hand, in various places he threatens the secure and the
despisers and frightens them, but in this manner: Because you do not
want to hear my word that you are free from the curse of the law and
saved, therefore you will die in your sins. Certainly it is God's judgment
that whoever refuses the victor over sin and the fulfiller of the law
remains under the law and sin.
While Christ's opus totum is solus adferat benedictionem, which
means gratia et iustitia contra meledictionem legis, in order to achieve this
end he does his opus alienurn (though Luther does not use that term here) of
threatening and terrifying the securi et contemptores, but always in such a
manner [ad hunc modum] that the judgment is announced only after they
have rejected the gift of the gospel, which offers freedom from the law. And
this is the iudicium Dei, that those who refuse the victor peccati and impletor
legis have no alternative than to remain under the law and sin. Luther's
intention in the responsio was to refute the false understanding of: Vox
Christi est Evangelium (393, 17). However, he ends up speaking generally
17439 I, 393, 17-394, 6.
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about law and gospel without really clinching the argument.175 When he
returns to it later his argumentation will be far more incisive.176
Argument 21177
Contra 4
All who have faith also have sorrow for their sin. The Magi had
faith [Matt. 2: 1-2]. Therefore, they also had sorrow for their sin. Consequently, there is no need for the ministry of the law to create sorrow
for sin.
Response: I concede the whole argument. But the conclusion
drawn from it, that there is no need for the ministry of the law, is false.
Every believer, who by faith begins to overcome the terrors of the law,
lives his whole life in repentance. For the whole life of the faithful is a
kind of exercise against, and a hatred of, the remnants of sin in the flesh,
which murmur against the spirit and faith. The godly repeatedly feel
terrors. There faith fights against the lack of trust and despair, also
against lust, wrath, pride, vengeance etc. This battle continues in the
godly for as long as they live, in some more violently, in others more
mildly. Hence they have sorrow and hatred for sin combined with faith.
Therefore, they cry out with Paul: Wretched man that I am, who will
liberate me from the body of this death? [Rom. 7: 24]. Staupitz used to say
that death should be welcomed by believers because in this life there is
never an end to sinning, and that really is how things are. The hearts of
the godly are sadder on account of their sins and fear of death than they
are joyful over the life and inexpressible grace given through Christ.
Indeed, they struggle against this lack of trust and overcome it through
faith, yet this spirit of sadness always returns. Therefore, their life is one
of continual repentance until death.
I remind you of this on account of the author of the monstrous
theses and the papists, who seize on some actual sin and think that it is a
175The summary in. Rel. B (393, 30-394, 25) comes closer: Saepe
fungitur [scil. Christus] officio legis, ut cum minatur pharisaeis, cum obiurgat,
cum hortatur. Ita vox legis est, cum dicit ad Paulum: Quid me persequeris?

also 39 I, 405, 7-11 (1 AD, Arg. 27): Sed cum audiret: Saule,
quid me persequeris? ibi tangebatur lege, et desperasset, nisi iterum erectus
fuisset hac voce Christi: Surge et ingredere civitatem; 567 (3 AD, Arg. 33/6):
Acts 9: 4-5 contains the word of law (vox Christi) and 9: 6 the word of gospel
(vade etc.).
176See

17739

I, 394, 9-399, 6.
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light and momentary thing which can be gotten rid of through contrition, confession, and satisfaction. They also employed absolution, but
actually there was no absolution. For those who made confession were
not consoled with the word of God, and were never made certain that
their sins had been pardoned through Christ's satisfaction, but instead
they were assigned certain civil works. Moreover, they utterly dismissed
original sin saying that it is some infirmity of nature, which they called
tinder. Therefore, the repentance of all papists, Jews, and Turks has to do
only with actual sins, such things as murder, theft, adultery etc., and
when they are sorry for them and make satisfaction by means of [self-]
chosen works and cultic rituals they think that God is pleased and content. They do not even know what repentance is, much less do it.
On the other hand,178 with these words: Unless your righteousness
etc. [Matt. 5: 20] and again: Repent [Mark 1: 15 pars.], we are reminded that
the repentance of the godly is continuous, so that faith and the knowledge of Christ may overcome terrors, and that fear may be filial, not servile. For this reason especially, the devil lies in wait for us and prowls
around [1 Peter 5: 8], and although he may cause us to fall, we are lifted
up by the promise of Christ, which announces the forgiveness of sins.
Then, through faith we receive the Holy Spirit, who produces new
impulses and instructs the will in order that we may truly begin to love
God and hate the sin remaining in the flesh. However, because that
always returns and causes us trouble, we need a repentance that
continues until death. The Jews, papists, and Mohammedans know
nothing about this repentance, but only repent of certain actual sins, not
for the whole of life, but only for a time. And when they have done that,
by means of self-chosen works for this purpose, they think they have
made satisfaction for those before God.
In civil matters the situation is such that one makes satisfaction for
sin through a penalty, but this is not the case before God where sins
always remain grave and serious, even in the godly, which they neither
discern nor feel. Therefore, it is always necessary that they keep before
them the word that exposes sin, but to do it in such a way that the word
of faith may be added. Therefore, the repentance of the godly endures for
the whole of life. Hence, Paul says that we have a lamb, Christ, who has
been sacrificed for us, through whom we are pure and unleavened
[1 Cor. 5: 7-8], and yet he still commands us to cast out the old leaven. In
the papacy the doctrine of repentance was taught with such confusion
and obscurity that no one could understand it. On top of that, there was
that terrible abomination where for a long time the contrite did not even
178In

R this is the beginning of a new argument.
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know how much work they were to do for their sins. Moreover, even if
they knew and did many things, they still doubted the grace of God,
according to the words of Ecclesiastes: Man does not know whether he is
worthy of love or hate. Since, therefore, they could never be certain that
they had made satisfaction for their sins by means of their own works,
satisfaction was transferred from here to purgatory. This doctrine resulted in perpetual sorrow and finally the despair of consciences. People
never fled to Christ for refuge because he was feared more than the devil
himself. They thought of him as nothing but a stem judge etc. This erroneous and pernicious doctrine has now been purged away through the
gospel, which teaches us that satisfaction for sins is not to be imposed on
us, but has been imposed on Christ, the Lamb of God, who takes away the
sins of the world (Is. 53 [: 4-6, 11-12]). Knowing and believing this it is
impossible to doubt the grace of God unless one wants to say that Christ
died in vain.
It is especially important to know this doctrine because it overcomes
the terrors of the law and of sin and produces true repentance. We
brought this doctrine to light by the grace of God through the gospel, not
to abolish the office of the law, as these antinomians think, but to oppose
the papistic, or rather diabolical, abominations, and to heal the afflicted
consciences with this freedom that Christ has given us. These antinomians talk foolishly when they say that they want to remove the law from
the church and yet retain the revelation of wrath, for the revelation of
wrath is the proper effect of the law. We will not permit the law to be removed from the church. I have preached the gospel here for twenty five
years and yet never without the law, as the facts themselves bear witness.
For three months each year we diligently inculcate and teach the
catechism in separate sermons, not only to the uninstructed, but also to
the godly, because they still have the flesh that rebels against the spirit
[Gal. 5: 17]. Likewise, it is sung in our churches in German in order that
it may be understood by every one.
While I am still alive I diligently admonish you to prepare yourself
[for the battle] against such fanatical spirits, with the sure teaching of
God's word on all the articles of faith. For I am afraid that there will be
many such people, who may have been faithfully taught by us, who will
completely pervert and overturn some of the things they picked up from
us and will persuade people to agree to their errors. I am especially
saddened that people are so suddenly influenced by such inept and
ridiculous things and that they can be so easily turned aside from the
truth. Nature, having been corrupted by the sin of original guilt and
ruined through itself, is more than evenly prone to sinning. Moreover,
it does not care about sin, does not believe that God is so seriously angry
over sin and punishes it so severely, but proceeds with the sort of fright-
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ful security and contempt for God that we are forced to witness in our
day with great sadness. For the majority of our people take that liberty,
for which Christ has freed us from the terrors of the law, from sin and
eternal death, and turn it into a sort of security and licence for the flesh
to do whatever it wants [Gal. 5: 13].
Here surely there is no need to add fuel to the fire by rejecting the
law and playing down those sins which Christ predicted will be plain for
all to see before the last day, such as reveling and drunkenness [cf. Luke
21: 34], as if they could do the godly no harm. Rather, the words of
Christ, of the prophets, and of the apostles, must be driven home
diligently and repeatedly, on account of such hard and impenitent people
in the churches, for in these speeches they threaten such people with
destruction because of their sins [cf. 1 Cor. 6: 9-10]. Furthermore, also the
examples of God's wrath are to be set before them in connection with the
destruction of the whole world through the flood [Gen. 7], the burning of
the Sodomites [Gen. 19], and the overthrow of the kings. Likewise, we
are harassed and tormented in body and soul by the cruel tyranny of the
pope and the Turk, because of our sins. And yet these words and
examples are always to be mingled with the consolation of the gospel:
that God does not want the death of the sinner who repents [Ezek. 18: 23;
33: 11], that is, who begins to hate and detest sin, and receives Christ by
faith as victor over sin and every evil. Where that knowledge and faith
in Christ are to be found, continual repentance follows. This is not
loathsome and difficult, like that obtained from hypocrites, but delightful
and easy. Now sons through faith have the Holy Spirit who purifies,
sanctifies, and vivifies them throughout their whole life. We teach
about repentance in this way that people may understand that not only
actual sin, but sin as a whole, both original and actual, is never entirely
eradicated during their lifetime. Indeed, it has begun to be revealed
through the law and remnants of it remain in the saints, but because
they believe that it has been forgiven them through Christ, and they hate
it and thirst for righteousness, it is not imputed to them.
In summary, there is no condemnation for those who are in Christ
Jesus [Rom. 8: 1]. And even if they still do have remnants of sin, those
remaining deeds of the flesh are mortified by the Spirit. On the other
hand, those outside of Christ are cursed and condemned, and the law
demands of them that they pay even the very last penny [Math 5: 26].
Therefore, let us not give ear to those who desire to see the law banished
from the church. For its office is continually necessary and useful, not
only because the hardened are to be frightened, but also because the godly
are to be admonished to continue in the repentance that they have begun
until the end of their life.
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In his protracted and somewhat discursive responsio Luther particularly illustrates and emphasizes the nature of true repentance, and attributes
its antinomian perversion to a false doctrine of sin. The antinomian argument asserts that to have fides also means to have dolor de peccato. The
example of the Magi (as opposed to one of the apostles) to typify believers is
probably deliberately chosen, because these men lived outside Israel and so
did not live under the law. It is critically important to realize that the antinomians do not reject dolor or contritio as such; what they reject is the notion
that the law produces contrition. They simply assume that there is no true
faith apart from contrition, and with that Luther has no quarrel, as he says:
Concedo totum argumentum (394, 12). Naturally, he rejects their conclusion,
that this obviates the need for the ministry of the law quod dolorem de
peccato faciat (394, 11). However, there is such a fundamental difference in
their understanding of repentance that here Luther can lump the antinomians together with the papists, Jews and Turks because they all see repentance
as first and foremost having to do with actual sin and forget all about original
sin, which for Luther is always the root of sin. Indeed, the papists understood
original sin as an infirmitas in the human nature which they called Tomes.
Consequently, it was seen as fairly harmless. Actual sin, on the other hand,
was pardoned through the penitential system of contritio, confessio, and
satisfactio.179 The absolutio, the most importance part of confession and the
179See 1, 319-324

(Sermo de poenitentia, 1518) for Luther's early
exposition of repentance in contrast to that of scholasticism. See also 6, 543-9
for his examination of the scholastic understanding of repentance. His
critique here says nothing new. Its main points are that it overlooks original
sin, provides no absolution, and offers no certainty to troubled consciences,
which are always unsure of whether they have done enough opera civilia to
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reason for it in the first place, was there in theory but not in practise (395, 5-16;
396, 1-5). It is because of Luther's profound understanding of sin as first and
foremost originale peccatum that he keeps emphasizing that repentance is not
simply for a time, but for a lifetime: idea opus habemus poenitentiae, quae
durat usque ad mortem (396, 1; cf. 395, 3.4).180
There is another reason why repentance is continual: in this life
believers are never finished with the law. It can fight for them, against sin,
but it can also fight against them, driving them to despair. The first section of
Luther's response bears this out. Here he describes the vita christiana as a
battle against both the law and the remnants of sin in the flesh. Virtually the
first thing he says against the antinomian argument and its consequent
rejection of the law is that every believer struggles to overcome the terrores
legis, which means lifelong repentance: tota vita poenitet (394, 13-14). Again,
he can say that the vita fidelium is a battle against the flesh, which murmers
against the spirit and faith: exercitium et odium quoddam contra reliquias
peccati in carne (394, 14-16), or alternatively, that faith joins battle: Ibi pugnat
fides contra diffidentiam et desperationem. But this battle is not waged at a
uniform pitch, in some it is more intense than in others: Ista pugna manet in
fulfill the requirements for satisfactio. The confusion and hopelessness that
abounded is well expressed by the passage he cites from Eccles. 9: 1. On this
see Thomas Aquinas, Summa 2, 1 qu. 112 art. 5; L. 7, 326-7. On the dictum:
Sed gratia gratum faciens facit hominem dignum dei amore. Ergo nullus
potest scire utrum habeat gratiam gratum facientem, see 20, 7, 17-19; cf. 32, 329,
15-18 and RN; 38, 153, 25-34. The uncertainty of whether one had made
satisfaction for one's sins or not finally led to the introduction of the idea of
purgatory. On this, see StA 5, 288, n. 1177. See also StA 2, 340 n. 316; 401 n.
1084 and 1090; 402 n. 1094 and StA 5, 59, n. 495.
Omnis credens, qui coepit fide vincere terrores
legis, tota vita poenitet; cf. Luther's first Ablaf3these (1, 233, 20-21).
180 Also, 394, 13-14:
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piis, donec vivunt, in aliis vehementius, in aliis mitius. From all of this
Luther concludes that the life of faith is never without sorrow for sin: Habent
ergo dolorem et odium peccati coniunctum cum fide (394, 14-20). Despite
their difference over the law, Luther's conclusion here is the same as the
antinomian proposition: Omnis, qui habet fidem, habet etiam dolorem de
peccato (394, 9). Nor would Agricola and his followers have any cause to
object to Luther's description of the dynamic of evangelical repentance when
he says that after we have been made to fall by the devil, we are lifted up by
the promise of Christ, which announces forgiveness of sins. Then we receive
the Holy Spirit who creates in us novos motus and imbues [imbuit] the will
to begin loving God and hating the remnant of sin in the flesh that keeps
troubling us (395, 20).
However, there is one statement that Luther makes that seems to
encapsulate the difference in viewpoint between himself and the
antinomians regarding sin. He holds that coram Deo every sin is grandia et
gravia, also in believers, even if they can neither discern nor feel them. In
fact it is precisely because we can never properly know sin without the law
that Luther says: Idea semper opus est, eos habere in conspectu verbum
arguens peccatum. However, Luther hastens to add the qualification, or
limitation: sic tamen, ut accedat verbum fidei, for he consistently teaches,
notwithstanding the antinomian counterclaim, that the law does not expose
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the sin of believers to condemn them,181 but in order that they may receive
mercy from Christ.182
This point, that law and gospel each does its work in repentance, is
reinforced in the second part of the responsio where Luther specifically
addresses the problem of moral laxity and license, which he sees as a hallmark
(or at least potentially) of antinomianism, where the freedom of the gospel is
taken as a excuse for libertinism and securitas. Luther insists, vis-à-vis the
antinomian tendency to play down such sins as revelling and drunkenness
on the pretext that they cannot harm the Christian, and on account of the
duros and impenitent, that pastors must preach the law in all its severity, and
warn such people with the examples of God's wrath in the Old Testament.
But by the same token, these warnings and examples from the law must
always be mixed together with the consolation of the gospel [semper commiscenda est consolatio ex Evangelic)] in order that faith and the knowledge of
Christ may overcome the terrors of the law, and that the penitent may receive
Christ as victor peccati (397, 24-398, 14).183
181The accusation that the antinomians level against Luther is implicit in their Pos., Th. 16. We hope to address this problem later.
182This

is plain, for instance, from a text such as Ez. 18, 23; 33: 11,
which Luther alludes to later in this argument (398, 12-13). When the
transition from contrition to faith, from law to gospel, is not made, and the
law is permitted to drive the terrified conscience ad damnationem, the law
transgresses its divinely-appointed bounds and acts arbitrarily. This abusus
legis will be discussed later.
183This

is a point that Luther will continue to stress throughout the
disputations. In our opinion, it is significant that he uses the verb commiscere and not sequi in his admonition to keep law and gospel together
generally, and here especially when using stories from the OT to preach God's
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But faith does not stop with its confident trust in Christ's victory over
sin, but it continues joyfully to renounce sin every day. Furthermore, those
who are filii per fidem also have the Holy Spirit, who purifies, sanctifies, and
vivifies them, and he continues doing this throughout their whole life.184
This twofold understanding of repentance is another theme that will
frequently recur in the disputations as Luther attempts to counter the
antinomian error in the doctrine of sin, the law, and sanctification. He will
unfold this further on other occasions. Here he merely calls attention to the
fact that he teaches repentance in this way [hoc modo nos docemus de
poenitentia] because sin as a whole, both original and actual, is never entirely
eradicated in this life. Remnants of sin still cling to the saints, but because
they believe that it has been forgiven per Christurn, and they hate it and thirst
for righteousness, it is not imputed to them (398, 14-23). Because Christians
wrath and judgment. The sequence does not mean that the law has always to
be preached first and then the gospel, in that same predictable order. On the
other hand, if the law has been comprehended in its reality, the gospel can
only come after the law. It would appear that Luther's chief concern here is
that law and gospel are not confused (confudere or permiscere) or that the law
is not preached without the gospel lest the penitent be tyrannized by the law
and unable to receive Christ as victor peccati. On that, see our discussion of 2
AD, Arg. 21. Perhaps the point Luther is making here is that when preaching
examples of God's wrath as warnings, the gospel should always be
interspersed [semper commiscenda] and not delayed until the law has been
preached en bloc.
184As we said earlier, Luther states several times in this argument
that repentance is lifelong. In one place (395, 17-19) he says, on the basis of
Matt. 5: 20 and Mark 1: 15 that the repentance of the pii is to be continual so
that faith and knowledge of God may overcome terrors, and that fear may be
filial, not servile (cf. Rom. 8: 15). The distinction between timor servilis and
timor filialis played a role already in the scholastic discussion of the question:
what kind of godly fear should there be at a beginning of repentance. Cf.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa 3 qu. 85 art. 5; L. 12, 304-1. On the meaning of these
terms as they were used antinomian circles, see ch. 2.
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are simul iusti as well as simul peccatores, the indicative—imperative pattern
of Pauline parenesis best serves to illustrate the proper relationship between
justification and sanctification. On the one hand, Paul says that Christ, our
passover Lamb, has been sacrificed for us, and yet, on the other hand, he
exhorts us to cast out the old leaven--and while Luther (or the Nachschrift)
stops here, the second half of the verse reinforces the gospel basis of Paul's
appeal—that you may be a new lump, as you really are unleavened (1 Cor. 5:
7).
In order to counter the false notion that led the antinomians to think
that he virtually abandoned the law once he had discovered the gospel,
Luther says a few words about his own catechetical praxis. The fact that in the
early days of the Reformation the gospel needed to be preached rather than
the law, on account of the troubled consciences of the faithful,185 should not
be taken to imply, the Reformer warns, that he had abolished the law, which
as we saw in the last chapter, was a standard assumption in the circle around
Agricola. Luther relates that over the past twenty-five years in the parish
church of Wittenberg the catechism was taught in separate services186 for
three months each year, both for the benefit of the uninstructed [rudes populi]
185Cf.

Luther's remark that people knew of Christ only as a stem
judge and feared him more than the devil himself (396, 21): Non erat ullum
refugium ad Christum, quia plus timebatur, quam ipse diabolus. However,
through the preaching of the gospel this erroneous idea of Christus iudex was
replaced by the scriptural doctrine of Christus agnus Dei, who made full
satisfaction for the sins of the world (396, 23-397, 1).
1861t has been suggested that Luther is probably thinking of Bugenhagen's catechism sermons from the year 1534. On that, see G. Buchwald. See
also StA 5, 289 n. 1208 for reference as well as further notes on the catechesis at
Wittenberg and for references to this in Brecht.
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and the believers [pii] who still have the flesh to constantly contend with. In
addition to that he reminds his audience that the hymns are sung in German
in the evangelical Gottesdienst in order that again everyone may have the
opportunity of learning the catechism.187 Luther offers this as proof that he
and his coworkers have not abandoned the law. Indeed, he ends his
responsio by stressing again that the law is to be retained for two reasons: 1) to
frighten the hard-hearted Rum propter duros terrendos], and 2) to admonish
the godly to continue in repentance [tum etiam propter pios admonendos]
throughout their life. We will see later that this double skopos of the law
corresponds to his understanding of the duplex usus legis.
Although Luther does not develop the point here, he makes the crucial
observation in connection with his remarks on why the law must be retained,
that the antinomians talk nonsense when they claim to want to remove the
law from the church and yet still retain the revelation of wrath, for revelatio
irae is identical with proprius effectus legis (397, 9-11). The equation of ira and
lex, or more precisely, effectus legis, is perhaps the most important theological
statement he makes in this argument, and one certainly that he will come
back to several times.188
Argument 22189
In Paul we are given a clear example of how repentance is to be
taught. But he taught repentance based on the offence of the Son.
Therefore, it is not to be demanded on the basis of the law.
Luther's hymns: Dies sind die heiligen Zehn Gebot and
Mensch, willst du leben seliglich from 1524; see WA 35, 135-141; 426-29.
187Cf.

188a. 39 I, 415, 16-19 (1 AD, Arg. 36).
39 I, 399, 8-14.
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Response: I said above that unbelief in the Son is a double transgression. First against the law, which demands perfect fear, faith, and love of
God. However, because no one truly achieves it, all are transgressors of it
and are subject to death. Secondly, because they do not receive but hate
the Son, who came to fulfill the law etc [Matt. 5: 17].
As Luther says, he has already dealt with the argumenturn that repentance should be taught ex violatione filii in Argument 15.190 Therefore, he
(or the transcriber) merely summarizes the main point of that argument:
incredulitas in filium constitutes a double sin first against the law itself,
which demands perfect timor, fides, et dilectio Dei, and secondly, against
Christ who came to fulfill the law, for in Luther's mind whatever the First
Table of the law demands for Yahweh it demands also for Jesus, because Jesus
is Yahweh and God can never be understood or believed in apart from him.
Therefore, the violatio filii is not in the first place a sin against Christ, but
against the law, and the preaching of repentance ex violatione filii is not ex
evangelio but ex lege.
Argument 23191
The gospel is the preaching or teaching about the forgiveness of
sins. Therefore, repentance is to be taught based on the offence against
the Son.
Response: The argument seems to take the offence against the Son
to such a length that believers in the Son need to be especially careful lest
they forsake him through unbelief, but this does not abolish the law. On
the contrary, those who do not believe in the Son remain under the law
and all its curses, under God's wrath etc. (John 3 [: 36]). Therefore, there
is no greater sin than unbelief. For all sin has been taken away through
Christ, pardoned, and forgiven believers. Therefore, this argument
seems to contend that unbelief is to be avoided lest we forsake the Son.
19039 I, 384, 7-386, 16 (1 AD, Arg. 15).

19139 I, 400, 2-13. In R Args. 23, 24 and a large part of 25 are inserted
in the conclusion of Arg. 13. See above 39 I, 381 n. 1.
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But as we said above, since sin has been revealed through the law and
the Son has been given to fulfill the law and gives the spirit to fulfill it,
the ultimate offence against the Son is not to believe in him.
Luther's responsio continues the idea he began in the previous argumentum. There he stated that incredulitas in filium is a double transgression
of the law, here he says that unbelief (which is always unbelief toward the
Son) finally is not sin against the Son (such as forsaking him) but sin against
the law, for incredulitas is the fundamental sin. Hence, the person who is
incredulus filio remains under the law and its curses, for he rejects the Son
who came to fulfill the law and wipe out the curses. Therefore, the
conclusion is the same as above. To preach repentance ex violatione filii is to
preach the law for the violatio filii is in the first instance a sin against the law
and not against Christ, who in th gospel gives the penitent incredulus
forgiveness.
Argument 24192
Whatever works wrath does not serve repentance. The law works
wrath [Rom. 4: 15]. Therefore, it does not serve repentance.
Proof of major premise: Romans 2 [: 4]: Do you not know that the
kindness of God invites you to repentance?
Response: The argument is good and rhetorical in sense of being
useful, proper, simple, and delightful. If the kindness of God invites us
to repentance, the law is neither useful nor necessary for repentance. St.
Bernard says somewhere: The hard heart, which is moved by neither
threats nor punishments, must be enticed to repentance through the
divine gifts and promises, and should be taught the passion and death of
Christ, which he took on himself out of sheer love to free the human
race from the sin and death to which it was subject. It is true that when
we cannot gain the hard and impenitent by means of threats and terrors,
we should see whether we can bend them by means of God's promises
and gifts. Thus the sons of Korah, when they see their father sinning
against God and arrogating to himself the priesthood without a call and
19239 I, 400, 15-402, 7.
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mandate, in fact contrary to God's mandate, and that he was not at all
frightened by the threats and terrors of Moses, they employ rhetoric, they
remind their father of all the kindness God showed the people Israel in
liberating them from their cruel captivity in Egypt, and in leading them
through the Red Sea, in order that, with tears in their eyes, they may dissuade him, lest he, together with his family, oppose Moses and Aaron.
So too we use all the methods at our disposal to exhort people to repentance, that is, that they feel the power of the law.
Paul does the same in this passage, as if he says: God through his
word exhorts you by all means to stop sinning and listen to his promise.
He does not say that you should not be pained. In fact he especially
requires this since he lets you be exhorted in so many ways and in all the
rhetorical passages. Moreover, he does not say: God's kindness invites
you to sweetness and security or to contempt but to repentance, and he
consigns those who are not alarmed and moved to repentance, but
remain hard and impenitent, to store up wrath for themselves [Rom. 2:
5] as did Korah, who could not be moved to repentance either by the
entreaties or the tears of his sons.
This argument is similar to the two preceeding ones in asserting that
the gospel leads to repentance and not the law.193 This time the opponents
have a passage of scripture to support their argument. Paul says in Romans 2:
4: ayvoiav ISTI TO xpnoTOv roi5 0coi5 eic garavotav cre ay ; Luther therefore
readily admits that the argument is bonum et rhetoricum, by which he means
utilis, honestus, facilis, iucundus (400, 19-20). Nevertheless, he still cannot
agree with their conclusion that the law does not serve repentance.
Luther begins by citing Bernard of Clairvaux approvingly who
recommends alluring [alliciendum] the cor durum, which remains unmoved
by minae and poenae, by means of the divina beneficia et promissa, as well as
teaching it [inculcandam] the passio et mors Christi (400, 21-401, 4).194 He
193See 1 AD, Arg. 3 for list of similar arguments.
194Bernhard of Clairvaux: De consideratione libri quinque ad
Eugenium tertium, MPL 182, 730-1 (bk. 1, ch. 2, sect. 3): "Quid ergo cor durum?
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concludes from this that when we cannot reach the duri et impoenitentes
with minae and terrores, we should resort to the promissa et beneficia, and
then proceeds to illustrate this from the story of Korah's rebellion in Numbers 16 which he recounts with some embellishments.195 Luther especially
highlights the rhetorical effect of the words spoken by Korah's sons and says
that we need to use whatever ways we have at our disposal [quibus artibus
possumus] to exhort people to repentance, that is, ut sentiant vim legis (401, 414). But the question to which we must return is: Is this really repentance?
Reflecting on Romans 2: 4 he makes an important point: Non dicit [scil.
Paulus] non debeas dolere. Imo maxime hoc requirit, cum tot artibus et
omnibus locis rhetoricis sinat to exhortari (402, 1-2). In other words, even if
the benignitas (= promissa, beneficia) Dei invites and allures the duri, this
does not exclude the use of certain ars rhetorica for God can and does use all
means to melt hearts of stone. However, this does not mean that the tools of
rhetoric can ever manipulate God but they are simply used in his service.
This is abundantly clear from the story of Korah in Numbers 16. Even
though his sons pleaded with him with tears in their eyes as they recalled the
goodness and mercy of the Lord in his great act of deliverance from Egypt,
their words fell on deaf ears. The rhetorical effect of the tears reinforces the
words, but the outcome is never guaranteed because God can never be
constrained by us to act in a predetermined way. For Korah then and others
Ipsum est quod nec compunctione scinditur, nec pietate mollitur, nec
movetur precibus: minis non credit, flagellis duratur." For further parallels
see StA 5, 294 n. 1342.
195Luther

goes beyond the text in his exposition of the effect that
Korah's sons had on their father. He also preaches on one of these effects in a
sermon on 17 May 1528 (25, 465, 6-8).
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like him who are moved nec precibus nec lachrymis, there remains only the
fearful prospect of wrath (402, 3-7).
The second observation that we wish to make is that the effect
produced by the ars rhetorica is not in and of itself repentance but may be
simply sorrow and remorse, which admittedly God may then use to work
repentance. Luther recognizes that the benignitas Dei may lead to dolor, for as
he says, God invites to repentance, not ad suavitatem et securitatem. This
insight is extremely important because it points to the parting of the ways
between Luther and the antinomians. Repentance is not without the dolor de
peccato (in certain cases even the sensus legis), as Luther makes clear in his
first Thesenreihe. And precisely because that is the case, the law belongs to
repentance. Therefore, even if it should be that TO xp ti 43TO v

to

()cob- (Rom. 2:

4) leads to repentance, that for Luther does not ipso facto exclude the law, for
as we have seen already, the gospel cart also use the office of the law to do the
work of the law. This again proves that even if repentance arises ex
evangelio, that in no way implies the abolition of the law.196
Argument 25197
Contra 21
Abraham and the other fathers before Moses knew sin and death.
Abraham and those like him did not have the law. Therefore, sin and
death can be known without the law.
Proof of minor premise: The law was given 430 years after Abraham
[Gal. 3:17].
196Cf. 401, 27-402, 21 (B): Itaque, cum tot modis et rationibus ad

poenitentiam invitemur, hoc est, ut doleamus de peccato et proponamus pie
vivere, maxime confirmatur lex.
19739 I, 402, 10-403, 3.
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Response: The law indeed at that time had not yet been promulgated or written down, nevertheless, he still had the natural law inscribed on his heart, like all people [Rom. 2: 15]. Moreover, there should
be no doubt that the patriarchs taught the same as that contained in the
Decalogue, before the law had been revealed from heaven on Sinai, and
that this teaching flowed on to their descendants. They carefully impressed on their families the ungodliness and wickedness of those who lived
before the flood and who afterwards were destroyed because of this,198
and dissuaded them from idolatry and other sins lest they too should
perish. Therefore, they were not without doctrine, only it was put into
their hearts by nature. Afterwards, when the law was promulgated, a
public ministry was instituted to teach it.
The antinomians appear to have Paul on their side (Gal. 3: 17) when
they claim that sin (and hence death) can be known without the law. However, Luther has to remind them that the patriarchs also knew the law, not
the law of Moses, but the lex naturae insculpta cordi, whose content is the
same as that of the Decalogue. This natural law goes back to the very beginning, and so predates the lex e coelo revelata in Sinai which only came 430
years after Abraham (402, 12-17). It was on the basis of the lex naturae that the
postdiluvian fathers taught their families the difference between right and
wrong, and warned them against the impietas and malitia of those who were
wiped out by the flood.199 The natural law even provided the basis for teaching against idolatry: dehortati [sunt] eos ab idolatria et aliis peccatis, ne et ipsi
198With

exstincti R breaks off and continues with the last sentence
of Arg. 23 (see 381 n. 1).
199Schloemann, Natiirliches und gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther, 98,
speaks of a "tradition of law" among the patriarchs, "etwa auf Grund der
Kunde von der Sintflut und deren Zustandekommen als Strafe fur die
Siinden der Alten." In 39 I, 583, 11-13 (3 AD, Arg. 45/18) Luther recalls the fact
that at that time God still spoke with people directly from heaven, as in the
case of Abraham.
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perirent (402, 18-403, 1).200 Thus they were not without doctrina, insofar as it
was written on their hearts [vel tantum naturaliter cordibus indital. The
special public office of preaching the law was instituted at Sinai, which as we
will see from later arguments, both reinforces and clarifies the lex naturae
inscribed on the heart:201 Postea data lege ministerium publicum institutum
est ad earn docendam (403, 2-3).202 Strictly speaking, there has never been a
time when there has not been a doctrina legis alongside the lex insculpta.203
Argument 26204
Contra 1 and 2
Unbelief and ignorance of Christ is to be convictd at the beginning
of repentance. The law does not convict unbelief and ignorance of God.
Therefore, the law is not required for the beginning of repentance.
200It should be noted here that the natural law embraces both tables
of the Decalogue.
201See our discussion of 3 AD, Arg. 19.
202The one law is mediated in two ways: a) from the beginning it
was inscribed on the hearts of all people by nature: a) lex naturae insculpta
cordi; b) later it was given on Sinai to the Israelites: lex e coelo revelata in
Sinai; this latter is also said to be simply given or written: lex lata (or data) or
lex scripta. The ministerium publicum, instituted at Sinai, takes the place of
the fathers acting as priests to their families in teaching them God's will as
revealed in the lex naturalis. It makes known through the preaching of the
law that since Adam the essence of sin is incredulitas Christi. Although the
office of the holy ministry, instituted by Christ is properly speaking the
officium evangelii, it also embraces the ministerium publicum of Sinai,
inasmuch as the law is preached in the service of the gospel.
203Schloemann,

Natiirliches and gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther, 98.
For a discussion of the lex naturae and the lex Mosi (or lex scripta), see 39 I,
454, 4-16 (2 AD, Arg. 13); 539, 4-541, 5 (3 AD, Arg. 19), and also ch. 4.
20439 I, 403, 6-404, 8.
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The major premise is proved from Christ's words in John 16 [: 8]:
The Holy Spirit will convict the world, and because they do not believe
in me. The minor premise is clear because the gospel alone reveals unbelief and the ignorance of God and of Christ. In summary, the thrust of
the argument is this: the Holy Spirit convicts unbelief and ignorance of
Christ. Therefore, the law is not the beginning of repentance.
Response: The law convicts unbelief and ignorance of Christ
because it requires its fulfillment. The prophets also predicted that Christ
would fulfill it, as in Isaiah 9 [: 3]: The yoke of its burden you have
overcome, as in Midian. And the godly among the Jews knew this. They
of course did not have Christ present but promised, whom they believed
was going to restore everything that had been lost in Adam. Then when
Christ came, this sin of unbelief and ignorance of him was made known
throughout the whole world by means of the public ministry. Formerly,
at the time of the fathers it lay hidden in private corners and among
their posterity; however, it was made known in Judea. But all sin, from
the beginning of the world, was unbelief and ignorance of Christ, for the
promise concerning the woman's seed was given straight after the fall of
Adam, which was made known through the houses of the fathers until
the fullness of time [Gal. 4: 4].
Luther has already argued that unbelief in Christ is always the primary
sin205 and that it is first and foremost a sin against the law because the law
(First Commandment) demands faith in Christ. Therefore, as we have
already seen, Luther rejects the antinomian claim: Lex non arguit
incredulitatem et ignorationem Dei 206 which they then use as a ground for
eliminating the law from repentance, or more precisely, from the initium
poenitentiae, and replacing it with the gospel. The reason for rejecting their
2o5see 39 L 400, 4-13 (1 AD, Arg. 23); cf. 384, 7-386, 16 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
206See 39 I, 386, 19-22 (1 AD, Arg. 16), where John 16: 8 is also

adduced as proof that it is the Spirit and not the law who convicts the
unbeliever of sin. In the present Argument John 16: 8 is used as proof for the
major premise: Incredulitas et ignoratio Christi est arguenda in initio
poenitentiae. The minor premise: Lex non arguit incredulitatem et
ignorationem Dei is taken as obvious [patet], no doubt in light of the same
text.

220
claim is consistent with his earlier arguments: Lex arguit incredulitatern et
ignorantiam Christi, quia requirit impletionem

Sili.207 Luther

takes the

iugum oneris eius in Isaiah 9: 3 as referring to the law and understands the
whole verse as a prophecy about Christ: quod eam impleturus sit: Iugum
enim oneris eius superasti (403, 14-17). For the Old Testament pii he was
present, not in the flesh but as promise, and this promissio de semine muleris
was given immediately post lapsum Adae, for Christ, the promised seed, was
going to restore all that was lost in Adam.208 This promise was made known
in Judea, passed on per domos patrum until the time of fulfillment.
Therefore, the incredulitas et ignorantia Christi that still abounded was the
basic sin. Finally, with the coming of Christ, this sin was make known
throughout the whole world by means of the publicum ministerium, which,
as we saw in the previous argumentum, refers specifically to the office of the
law. (404, 2-8). Therefore, since lex arguit omne peccatum incredulitatis (404,
29), the antinomian argument is wrong, and the law constitutes the beginning
of repentance.
20739 I, 399, 10-11 (1 AD, Arg 22): incredulitatem in filium duplicem
transgressionem esse, first against the law then against the Son; cf. 400, 11-13
(1 AD, Arg. 23).
Natiirfiches and gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther, 98,
observes that there was proclamation of law and gospel immediately after the
fall: The announcement of the protevangelium at the gates of paradise is
paralleled by the preaching of the "protonomos." On the gospel, see WA 14,
140, 4ff (Gen.-Pred., 1523/24 on Gen. 3: 15, Rorer) where Luther says that
Adam (post lapsum) was a Christian, as were all his descendants, because they
believed in the coming Christ. On the law, see 14, 155, bff where he interprets
the cherub at the gates of paradise allegorically to mean the offitium
praedicandi legem. Thus Adam's faith is fides in Christum impleturum
legem (cf. 39 I, 403, 15-17).
208Schloemann,
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Argument 27209
Against the Response
D. Jonas:210 The godless and those who do not accept the gospel are
obdurate (2 Cor. [4: 4]). Therefore, the convicting word is not effective in
those not accepting the gospel. Therefore, the law is useless and unnecessary.
D. Martin Luther repeats the argument: The law is ineffective with
the hard and uninstructed without the gospel. Therefore, the impenitent can be moved by the gospel, not by the law.
Response: The law is for all, but not all feel its power and effect.
Nevertheless, the law is to be taught whether people are converted or
not. For God instituted the ministry of the law for this purpose: to reveal
and manifest sin. Those who are struck by it are struck. We have been
commanded to teach that everyone is a transgressor of the law and under
sin, and that whoever wants to be freed from sin and fulfill the law
should believe in Christ. In summary, God requires the obedience and
righteousness of the law from us as from his own creatures. But no one
achieves this, because he requires not only external obedience, but also
purity of heart, as Christ testifies: Unless your righteousness exceeds that
of the scribes and Pharisees you will not enter the kingdom of heaven
[Matt. 5: 20]. Therefore, the gospel must be preached: He who believes
and is baptized will be saved [Mark 16: 16]. But this does not imply that
the law is ineffective.
Here the respondent is asked by the proponent of the argument:
What do you say about Paul who, though he was totally immersed in the
law, did not know anything about the law, because he says: I was once
alive without the law? [Rom. 7: 9].
Response: Before his conversion Paul did not feel the power of the
law, he taught the law and yet was ignorant of it. But when he heard:
Saul, why are you persecuting me? [Acts 9: 4] he was struck by the law,
and would have despaired had he not been raised up again by this voice
of Christ: Rise and enter the city [Acts 9: 6]. I do not deny that a person
may be led to repentance by the cross or death of Christ.
20939 I, 404, 11-405, 11. The following two arguments (according to
the numbering of DHMVW 27 and 28) offer two different accounts of the
same discussion. The text of Arg. 28 is missing from G. StA 5, 300-308 prints
the Protokoll in synoptic fashion (as well as texts T and U of Rel. B) to
facilitate comparison of the ductus of the argument and the words used.
210 A

few MSS have the name Justus Jonas as opponent (HW for
Arg. 27, RV for Arg. 28).
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This and the following argument need to be considered together since
they are doublets, the only real difference being that this one is not as detailed.
The first responsio begins with a statement already made in argumentum 3:
Lex omnibus est communis, sed non omnes sentiunt eius vim et effectum,
nihilominus sive homines convertantur sive non, tamen docenda est lex
(404, 16-18). The law is one thing and the vis or sensus legis another, which
God effects when and where he wills. Our mandate is simply to preach the
law and to leave the rest to God: qui ea tanguntur, tanguntur, which Luther
repeats in German for emphasis: wens trifft, den triffts--for the efficacy of the
ministerium legis does not depend on its results, but on its divine institution.211 The law however demands the impossible, non solum externam
obedientiam, sed etiam munditiem cordis, as Christ himself makes plain in
Matt. 5: 20. Therefore, the gospel announces salvation apart from the law, but
this does not nullify the law. It simply means that for faith its demand has
been fulfilled in Christ (404, 18-405, 3).
The second responsio addresses the question of how Paul could be so
totally immersed in the law [qui in media lege] and yet not be convicted by it.
What Paul himself says in Romans 7: 9 about once living xcu pig vagov is
basically what Luther means when he argues that while the law is meant for
211Note that the ministry of the law has been instituted by God and
not by Christ: In hoc Iscil. docenda lex] enim instituit Deus legis ministerium
(404, 18-19). We take the mandatum in 1. 20 to be a reference to the
ministerium legis also, even though Christ is mentioned as the fulfiller of the
law: Nobis mandatum est docere, quod omnes homines sunt transgressores
legis et sub peccato, et qui velint liberari a peccato et legem implere, ut in
Christum credant (404, 20-22).
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all not all feel its power.212 Again: qui ea tanguntur, tanguntur, but only God
is the subject of the tangere.
The second responsio also answers very succinctly what Luther
intended in argumentum 20. In a word, that the vox Christi heard by Paul at
his conversion cannot automatically be equated with the gospel, as the
antinomians claim, because it contains both law and gospel. However, he
concludes that this does not exclude the fact that a person can also come to
repentance ex cruce seu morte Christi, as he admitted already in argument=
24 (405, 7-11), because the cross and death of Christ function here as law.213
This is another example of how Luther understands the law functionally; that
is to say, the law is first and foremost that which performs the office of the
law.
Argument 28214
D. Jonas: The ungodly who do not accept the gospel are obdurate215
(2 Cor. [4: 3-4]). Therefore, the convicting law is not effective except in
those who receive the gospel. Consequently, the law is of absolutely no
value to the ungodly without the ministry of the gospel. This is clear
from Paul, who, although he had heard the law often enough, having
been educated and reared in the law from his youth, as he boasts, and
indeed at the feet of Gamaliel, the greatest expert in the law, yet it is of no
use, neither was he converted to Christ [Acts 22: 3].
Doctor M. Luther: This argument holds that the law is ineffective
with the ungodly without the gospel. Therefore, the law is all together
212Luther takes this up again later; see, 39 I, 483, 9-19 (2 AD, Arg. 25),

and 529, 3-530, 3 (3 AD, Arg. 16), 530, 5-17 (3 AD, Arg. 17, left col.).
213StA 306, n. 1581: Rel. B

formulates this as a new argument.

21439 I, 405, 13-407, 15.
215Instead

of obdurati, StA 5, 300, 3 reads obscurati (i.e. their minds
have become veiled or darkened).
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ineffective in converting people, because it is clear that the ungodly are
not at all moved to conversion by the law, as is plain from Korah, Judas,
Cain, Absalon, Saul and others.
Response: In first place, the law is for all, but the sensation of the
law is not common to all. So too the gospel is for all, for the forgiveness
of sins is offered to all, but the understanding of the gospel and faith is
not common to all. Nevertheless, the law is to be taught and the gospel
is to be taught, even though there are but few who are struck by the law
or who either assent to or heed the gospel, for this is the way God has
decided to convert people and prepare them for receiving Christ.
Meanwhile, it strikes whom it strikes; we can do nothing more. We are
ministers, not lords who can teach and move the heart at the same time.
Therefore, it has to be said that all people are under sin and eternal death
and are to be liberated through Christ alone. Those who believe it, well
and good, as for those who do not, let them go, they are airriXrpaitEc
[Eph. 4: 19], that is, people who are past grieving, as Paul says, who are
moved neither by the law nor the gospel. Who can resist? Moreover,
God is the Lord who requires obedience from all his creatures. He who
obeys, let him obey, he who does not had better look out for himself.
However, the law must always resound: Unless your righteousness
exceeds etc. [Matt. 5: 20]. For through it God is effective and acts mightily,
where and when he wills, and what is it to you if it is ineffective?
Objection: But what do you say to the example of Paul, from which
alone it seems that those who spread this opinion about the law die?
Response: Paul knew nothing about Christ before his conversion,
thus neither did he know anything about the law, even though he was
totally immersed in the law; he used to teach the law, but he was
ignorant of it (Rom. 2 [: 19-24]). But when the law begins to sound from
heaven: Saul, why are you persecuting me? here for the first time Paul is
struck by the law and feels its power and force so that, smitten with fear,
he said: Lord, what do you want me to do? Here Christ adds a second
word: Therefore, go etc. [Acts 9: 4, 6]. Indeed, a person should be led to
repentance on the basis of Christ's cross or passion, but it does not follow
that the law is therefore utterly useless, ineffective, and nothing, and is
to be totally abolished. Rather, we come to repentance both from a
knowledge of the law and from a knowledge of Christ's cross or salvation. The law proceeds wholly and simply, as we usually say, by accusing,
condemning, convicting, driving to hell, and it deals with us most
severely. But the gospel is not like that. It compels and entices you to
repent in a most alluring way by means of a certain art or rhetoric. For
besides the forgiveness of sins and eternal life which it offers believers
on account of Christ, it also presents Christ as a shepherd, who took us
straying sheep up in his arms [Luke 15: 5], and again as the one who
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conquered our sin in himself, and who having triumphed over it
gloriously, nailed it to the cross. Whether you come to repentance by
means of the law or the rhetoric of the gospel, you will be one and the
same. Be that as it will, it is of no importance. However, we do not
abolish the law itself for this reason, but on the contrary, we establish it;
it is not removed but confirmed.
As already noted, argument= 28 offers a fuller account of the
previous argument. In both cases the argumentum aims at proving the utter
uselessness of the law without the gospel. Luther wholeheartedly agrees that
the law in and of itself cannot lead to repentance, but he rejects the conclusion
that because the law is inefficax in converting the impii it is therefore useless
and unnecessary. We can do no more than faithfully preach the law and the
gospel, which God then uses to work repentance where and when he wills:
Nos ministri sumus, no domini, qui docere et simul corda movere possimus
(406, 7-8). Those who reject the judgment of the law and refuse to see themselves as God sees them, sinners under sentence of eternal death, are in grave
danger of becoming durrihynx6tec. Although God can be rejected when he
works through the law because he is acting mediately, such persistent
rejection can result in a hardening which in the end puts one beyond the
reach of law and gospel. We however can never make that judgment and so
that we can only continue preaching the law to the impenitent (304. 10-16).216
In his second responsio in this argumentum Luther deals with the
example of Paul in more detail than in the argument= 27. Even though
Paul is steeped in the law and was taught it by the most famous rabbi of his
216See 39 I, 368, 5-369, 16 (1 AD, Arg. 3) for our comments on the fact
that the law is common to all, but not the effectus legis, while on the other
hand, the gospel, although meant for everyone, is not common to all, but
must be preached and believed.
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day, it is unable to convert him to Christ. With the pre-Christian Paul we
have the classic case of a man who knows the law and yet does not: etiam
cum totus esset in lege, legem docebat, sed earn ignorabat, ut est ad Romanos 2
(406, 19-21). The reason he does not properly know the law is because he has
never before been convicted by it or felt its power. This happens for the first
time when he hears the vox Christi on the Damascus Road: Saule, quid me
persequeris? hic primum tangitur Paulus lege sentit vim ac potentiam legis.
His immediate reaction is fear, which is consistent with the effect produced by
the law. Now Luther distinguishes between law and gospel in the vox
Christi. He needs to insist vis-à-vis the antinomians that just because it is a
word of Christ's does not automatically make it gospel. We have seen this
already. Here he says that the first part: Saule, quid me persequeris? is law
and the second part [altera vox]: Ergo vade etc. is gospel (406, 21-407, 1).
In the second half of the second responsio Luther discusses the fact that
we come to repentance ex cognitione legis et ex cognitione crucis Christi seu
salutis (407, 3-4). The way of the law is harsh and merciless, its works
accusando, damnando, arguendo, detrudendo ad inferos. On the other hand,
the way of the gospel is sweet and gentle, and uses all kinds of ways and
means or rhetoric to impel and entice us: blandissime te compellit ac pellicit
te arte quadam seu rhetorica ad agendam poenitentiam (407, 4-8). As well as
giving us remissio peccatorum, the gospel projects pictures of Christ, of which
Luther mentions two: that of shepherd [pastor] who takes in his arms the
straying sheep; and that of the conqueror of sin, who triumphs over sin
gloriously and nails it to the cross. For Luther the important thing is that
people come to repentance, not his being able to prove how. Hence, he will
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use whatever means are at his disposal:217 Sive iam lege sive Evangelii
rhetorica veneris ad poenitentiam,218 unum et idem eris. As in the case of
Luther's first response to this argument= (the idea that the ineffectiveness
of the law proves its uselessness), the conclusion here is the same: the law is
not removed but confirmed (407, 14-15).
Argument 29219
Contra 16
A shadow is not effective. The law is a shadow, as Paul says [Col. 2:
17], a shadow of things to come. Therefore, the law is not effective.
Response: Paul in calling the law a shadow is especially speaking
about ceremonial and judicial matters. But here we are dealing with the
moral law or Decalogue, which accuses and condemns our whole nature.
Therefore, it is called a hammer that smashes rocks [Jer. 23: 29], as we say
in our theses 220 something that these ceremonial and judicial laws do
not do.
This is the last of three arguments which attempt to prove that the law
is not effective. Luther in his brief response makes the crucial distinction
between leges caeremoniales et iudiciales, on the one hand, and the lex
moralis seu decalogus, on the other.221 The former are what Paul describes
with umbra for they belong to the old covenant, which was temporary and
217Cf. 39 I, 401, 12-15 (1 AD, Arg. 24): Sic nos [like the sons of Korah],
quibus artibus possumus, exhortamur homines ad poenitentiam, id est, ut
sentiant vim legis. Idem facit hoc loco [scil. Rom. 2: 4] Paulus, quasi dicat:
Deus per verbum suum omnibus modis exhortatur te, ut cesses a peccando et
audias eius promissionem.
218The

WA text has a spelling mistake: poenitentiem (407, 12/13).

21939 I, 407, 18-408, 2.
22039 I, 346 (ATh I, Th. 16).
221See also our analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 22.
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adumbrated the new. The ceremonial and judicial law of the old covenant is
a shadow of, that is, foreshadows, the new covenant and serves a governmental function. Therefore, the cultic and judicial law is transient, it points
ahead to Christ, so that when he comes, it has served its purpose and
disappears. The Decalogue, on the other hand, is not limited but universal,
not transcient but permanent, for it is written on the hearts of all people.
Furthermore, according to Luther's definition, the decalogus, in comparison
with the caeremonalia et iudicialia, is a true law, for by its very nature is a lex
accusans et damnans, which destroys the sinful nature. Hence, Luther also
calls it amalleus conterens petras (Jeremiah 23: 29).222
Argument 30223
Against the Scope of the Disputation
The church does not err. The church defines repentance as confession, contrition, and satisfaction. Therefore, your thesis224 is untenable.
Response: This is another one of the abominable and horrible
things in the kingdom of the pope, that they have confused public or
ecclesiastical repentance with evangelical repentance. The latter is what
the law teaches and effects whenever it smites and stabs our heart, and is
common to all people who are converted to Christ. But that other
ecclesiastical repentance is rather a kind of spectacle and solemn ritual
and for a long time already has gone by the board. Moreover, it was of
such a kind that anyone convicted of any really serious crime was forced
to repent before the whole church. Now although we have no doubt
that this was originally introduced with good intentions for specific
reasons, the fact is that later on profane and uninstructed men taught it
222See 39 I, 429, 5-7 (2 AD, Arg. 2) where Luther cites this passage

again to show to emphasise that God uses the hammer of his law to smash
stubborn hearts (rocks) and to humble the proud that he may have mercy on
them.
22339 I, 408, 5-409, 24.
224 propositio:

"thesis" or "definition."
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in a most godless way with injury to Christ, especially since even St.
Ambrose writes that it ought to be abolished, and again that it is enough
for it to be done once in a lifetime.
Therefore, it is a most serious abuse and an act of godlessness on the
part of the monks who, in order to introduce this repentance, taught
most shamelessly that we have to make satisfaction for all our sins
before God, just as we have to for this or that crime here in the sight of
the church. From then on innumerable satisfactions were performed,
and the cult of the saints and masses for saints flourished in great
number; there were also pilgrimages to the Holy Land and to St. James.
Granted, these things had a good beginning, namely, as a terror to the
headstrong and hardhearted, and those who were to be readmitted were
examined to see if they had truly repented or not. And admittedly, it was
good and salutary for those who repented in this way before the whole
church and who were thus absolved, because they had the sure
testimony of the whole church that they had truly been received back
into the church of Christ. But it was a most godless thing to do when our
papists, not content with this practice, taught we also have to make
satisfaction before God, and yet we are bound to be uncertain as to when
God has been satisfied. In the end they rather consigned people to
purgatory, but I do not know how they moved us poor wretches from
there into fools paradise. Thus, there was nothing certain for miserable
consciences, and no greater torture could be devised. This you should
know and remember. For their ignorance was so great that even after
they had been absolved by the church they were sent to purgatory to
make satisfaction for their sins.
All repentances of this kind have now been abolished. Look out
that you are not deceived if they ever come back. For this reason teach
people carefully the distinction between ecclesiastical and evangelical
repentance. For the latter continues throughout the whole of life and
does not make satisfaction for sins, but grasps Christ's satisfaction by
faith, and constantly fights against the concupiscence of the flesh, of sin
etc. Their repentance, on the other hand, is overflowing with errors and
blasphemies against Christ, and is all myth, yet we believed it, and
revered it as holy. These satisfactions, admittedly, had a good beginning,
but how much damage did they do the church by saying no one can ever
do them. For from this, as from a fountain, flowed all and indeed the
most ungodly errors.
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In this argumentum the opponents seek to overthrow Luther's
definition of repentance as stated in his first thesis225 with the papal
definition: Ecclesia definit poenitentiam esse confessionem, contritionem et
satisfactionem. The assumption behind the argument is: Ecclesia non errat.
The argument as such does not attempt to promote any antinomian doctrine,
nor do the opponents, one should think, in practice really agree with the
Roman definition of penance, for they themselves are evangelicals and claim
to be staunch followers of Luther. It seems rather that their purpose is to
adduce yet another argument to demonstrate the untenability of Luther's
definition of repentance, this time by showing that it stands in conflict with
that of the Roman Church. However, Luther was at odds with the church of
Rome on many counts, and secondly, the antinomians are being highly
arbitra ry,226 for they only cite the church as an authority where it suits them.
Luther, on the other hand, holds that the church can and has erred, and that
not the church but scripture alone is the final authority in all matters of
doctrine.227
Luther begins his responsio by making the important distinction
between publica seu ecclesiastica poenitentia, on the one hand, and evangelica
22539 I, 345 (ATh I, Th. 1): Poenitentia omnium testimonio et vero
est dolor de peccato cum adiuncto proposito melioris vitae.
226We

can only assume that the argument= represents a position
actually held by the antinomians, and is not simply an unrelated syllogism
given out for the purpose of academic debate.
227This

is argued most persuasively in the great treatise he prepared
in readiness for a general council WA 50, 507ff (Von den Konziliis and
Kirchen, 1539).
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poenitentia, on the other (9408, 8-9). At the time of the disputation the
former had already been abolished or reformed. Luther however warns his
students against it in case that such a flagrant error, abuse, and blasphemy
should ever creep back into the church (409, 15-24). As is well known, the
chief error was connected with the Roman doctrine of satisfactio, which was
Pelagian to the core, because it assumed that human beings could merit favor
coram Deo, or pay off debt, by means of satisfactions imposed by the church.
The basis for this goes back to the monkish idea: quod oporteat a nobis
satisfieri pro omnibus peccatis coram Deo, quemadmodum hic in conspectu
Ecclesiae pro hoc aut ilk flagitio (408, 19-21). The former gave rise to infinitae
satisfactiones et cumulati cultus sanctorum et missarum, along with
peregrinationes ad terram sanctam et divum lacobum (408, 21-409, 1). The
latter resulted in confessiones coram hominibus (the congregation) which
were so horrific that Ambrose recommended that such confession only be
made once in a lifetime, and then as close to one's death as possible.228
Originally, Luther concedes, this public confession had a bonum propositum,
especially where grevious sin had been committed, for who had repented in
this way before the whole church and had been absolved had certum
testimonium totius Ecclesiae, se vere ad Ecclesiam Christi receptum esse.
However, this ended up as abuse and blasphemy because Christ's substitutionary death was forgotten and human satisfactions put in its place.229 It
228Ambrosius, De paenitentia 2, 10, 95; MPL 16, 520=CSEL 73, 200.
See StA 5, 310 n. 1691.
229Whenever

people are misled into thinking that they can please
God by means of their own pious works they immediately fall into trap of not
knowing how much they need to do. This uncertainty is always characteristic
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showed how deeply the church was mired in the law and bereft of the gospel
when those who had been absolved were still sent to purgatory to make
satisfaction for remaining sins. Luther is bemused by how the church ever
ended up getting such people out of purgatory ins Schlauraffenlandt (409, 410). Evangelical repentance, on the other hand, is not once in a lifetime but
lifelong, it cannot be separated from faith, and it constantly fights against the
sin in the flesh.230
Argument 31231
Against the Response
The contrition of Peter and Judas are different. Judas's contrition is
only anger, error, and despair, but Peter's is not like that. Therefore, it is
necessary for Peter's contrition to have some other source than the law.
Response: This is what we have said above. The law and the prophets are until John [Matth. 11: 13]. This is long enough for it and it
ought not be endured any longer. But sometimes that demand, exaction,
and power of the law becomes so great, and is so sharp and acute that
unless the gospel came to our aid people would perish. Indeed, it is the
nature of the law to accuse, expose, terrify and condemn sins, to lead us
to hell, and to throw us into the teeth of death. But we do not permit it
to lead us to despair and kill us completely, as it did Judas, Cain, Saul,
and others, for it ought to be a pedagogue and driver not to hell, but to
Christ, as Paul says [Gal. 3: 24]. Therefore, if the law shows itself outside
these limits, have nothing to do with it, and watch out! I myself will
help stone Moses with the law. Hence, the law must be opposed232 if it
of life under the law which want to know how much is enough. See 409, 6-9:
Sed tamen fuit impiissimum, quod nostri papistae non contenti hoc usu
docuerunt, quod nos oporteat etiam satisfacere coram Deo, et tamen nos debere incertos esse, quando Deo satisfactum esset. The answer to this uncertainty for the papists was purgatory: tandem monstrabant magis in
purgatorium. Cf. 39 I, 395, 8-10, 12-15; 396, 4-5, 13-16, 18-21 (1 AD, Arg. 21).
230See 409, 16-18: Haec [scil. poenitentia evangelica] enim durat per
omnem vitam et non satisfacit pro peccatis, sed arripit fide satisfactionem
Christi et pugnat perpetuo cum concupiscentia carnis peccati etc.

23139 I, 409, 27-411, 21.
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advances any further: Now be off with you, don't you remember
anything? Until John! That is, it is enough that you are allowed to
demand and exact, but do not condemn or remove Christ. For you alone
do not belong to us, but also Christ himself, for he says: I indeed want
your sin to be revealed to you, but by the same token, once it has been revealed through the law, neither do I want you to die. Let this be my will,
and you, law, may accuse. But yet I delight more in life than in death [cf.
Ezek. 33: 11]. Hence, these are also the sweetest words in the gospel: Be of
good cheer, I have overcome the world [John 16: 33].
Therefore, these two things should not be separated from each other
for long, as the papists did, but they are to accompany each other. Otherwise, what happened to the papists will happen to us: when they taught
only the law—in fact it was not even the law, but merely human decrees-people fell into constant despair, and we used to lament, as David says: I
will moisten my bed with tears [Ps. 6: 7]. And it could not have been any
different, because no one ever spoke to us about faith in Christ: I do not
wish the death of the sinner etc. [Ezek. 33: 11]; again: Christ came into this
world to save sinners, of which I am the chief etc. [1 Tim. 1: 15]. For Peter
was as much saddened and struck by the law as Judas, and his repentance
was the same. But this was of benefit to Peter because it is written: The
Lord looked back at him [Luke 22: 61]. And, when you are converted,
comfort your brothers [Luke 22: 32]. That is the point. In this regard
Peter surpassed Judas. Because if this had not happened, he would have
died there and then like Judas. The Lord desires that we repent. But if
we remain in our sins, he will sudden come upon the ungodly and will
kill and overthrow them, as he did Sodom and Gemorrah, which he
utterly blotted out and destroyed. But humble yourself and acknowledge
that you are a sinner, and God will also forgive you [1 John 1: 9], so that
you too will hear these words: I do not desire the death of the sinner.
However, because the law strikes and terrifies some more than
others, even though all are offered comfort and salvation equally, Christ
came to save sinners [1 Tim. 1: 15]. Also [the Lord says]: I do not desire
the death of the sinner, but even this one believes strongly, another
weakly. And as each of these believes, so he triumphs over sin. Anger,
hatred, pride, dissipation are not those great sins, which besiege
especially the saints. Rather, the sins that assail the saints are the sins of
Judas, the sins of despair, presumption, hatred or anger toward God, and
other similar things. But in these also we should run to Christ by faith,
so that at any time we can say: Thanks be to God who have given us the
victory through our Lord Jesus Christ [1 Cor. 15: 57], and can say together
232Reading

see 39 I, 410,11.

suggested emandation occurrendum for occinendum,
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with Christ: I have overcome the world [John 16: 33], but only in Christ,
the victor.
Luther is in fundamental agreement with the both premises but rejects
the conclusion. Both Luther and the opponents agree that the contritio of
Peter and of Judas is different, but the antinomians conclude from this that
the contritio of Peter must have had its source in the gospel, whereas that of
Judas was based on the law. For Luther the explanation for the difference lies
not in an either-or but a both-and. The law is the starting point for
repentance, that nothwithstanding the fact that sometimes the gospel can
exercise the office of the law in leading a person to repentance, as he showed
in arguments 24 and 28. But the law itself cannot produce repentance, only
contrition (the first part of repentance). So the difference between Judas's
contritio and Peter's poenitentia is the gospel. Without the gospel there can
be no true repentance only despair, and as as we will see later in the later
disputations, despair in God and not in oneself: Legis quidem est accusare,
arguere, perterrefacere, damnare peccata, deducere ad inferos ac morti
obiicere. In the case of Cain and Saul and others like them, the law is indeed a
paedagogus et exactor, non in infernum, sed in Christum (410, 4-8). If left to
its own devices the law will drive you straight to hell, and if the gospel is not
close at hand to rescue you, that is precisely where you will stay. That is why
Luther warns that these two must not be kept apart for long: Itaque non
debent haec duo longe inter se separari, ut fecerunt papistae, sed se invicem
comitari (410, 18-19). This, as we will see in chapter 4, has important
implications for the preaching of the law. In a word, Luther says that law and
gospel must always be distinguished but at the same time they must not kept
apart for too long.
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The Lord has set limits to his law, that is, it is to be a paedagogus et
exactor in Christum. When however the law is allowed to kick over the
traces and become a law unto itself, Luther's advice is: valeat et caveat sibi, for
then the law must be warned off and put in its place:233 Apage, sis, numquid
meministi? usque ad Ioannem, hoc est, sufficit tibi, quod requirere liceat,
quod exigere; at the same time Luther can even plead with the law: noli
quaeso damnare aut Christum auferre. For the law is not the only one to
have a vested interest in the Christian: nam to [scil. lex!] non sola ad nos pertines; Christ himself does too, as he says: Volo quidem ut tibi ostendatur
peccatum, sed ostenso iam per legem peccato volo etiam, ne moriaris (410, 816). Luther's interpretation of Matthew 11: 13 is illuminating in this regard.
John in his office as the one who prepares for and points to Christ is at the
same time, in Luther's mind, synonymous with the end of the law (cf. Rom.
10: 4): The law and the prophets (who point to the law's fulfillment in Christ)
run until John; then comes the Christ. Luther's interpretation of the Baptist
here is not allegorical but theological. He sees John and Christ as representing
two eras, one the law, the other the gospel. Behind this lies his whole
understanding of the relationship between the two testaments, which cannot
be discussed here. The point he wants to stress however is that when Christ
comes, the law in its office as lex arguetrix et accusatrix must yield. How the
law operates under Christ for faith is a different story, and must await a later
discussion.
233Cf.

also Luther's defiant resolve to join in stoning Moses if he
goes beyond his limits: Ich wolt selbst den Moysen helffen steinigen mit dem
gesetze (410, 10). See 39 I, 366, 1-368, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 2) for a discussion of what it
means that "the law and the prophets are until John" (410, 1-2).
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The way that the law and the gospel are meant to work together is
superbly illustrated in the conversion of Peter in comparison with Judas:
Petrus enim tam contristatus est et tactus lege, quam ludas, et fuit eadem
poenitentia. The decisive difference is the gospel, and Luther takes the
respexit eum dominus (411, 4) as being tantamount to absolution. It is
precisely because he knows the grave danger posed by the law if it is not
followed without delay by the gospel that he says that the sins that most assail
the saints are not the sins of the Second Table, serious as they are, but those of
the First, the sins of Judas: desperatio, praesumptio, odium aut ira adversus
Deum et alia similia (411, 15-18). Such sins can only be overcome in Christo
victore (411, 21).
From this discussion it is already clear that the law will not reach its
divinely intended goal if it is not superceded by the gospe1.234 The
antinomians have no understanding of how law and gospel each has its own
proprium and that the Lord uses each in its own way to bring about
repentance. Hence, Luther rejects the antinomian conclusio that Peter's
contrito has its source, not in the law, but in the gospel alone.
Argument 32235
Contra 4
Mortification comes about through the knowledge of Christ and
through the Holy Spirit. Contrition is mortification. Therefore, contrition does not come about through the law.
Response: The mortification before faith is contrition. But this
comes about through the law because the law kills. The power of sin is
234Cf. 410, 19 se invicem comitari (cited above). This will become
even clearer in later arguments when Luther discusses this at greater length;
see 39 I, 441, 2-443, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 6); 445, 5-446, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 8).
23539 I, 411, 24-412,8.
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the law [1 Cor. 15: 56], which always accuses and mortifies us . Mortification in the justified however is not contrition, if indeed I have been
liberated from the law [Rom. 7: 6; 8: 2], as Paul says: he [Christ] redeemed
us from the curse of the law [Gal. 3: 13]. But the law remains as well as
mortification because our flesh is always rebellious. Therefore, the Holy
Spirit or faith always impresses the law on his flesh that it may give
over, lest sin be allowed to rule [Rom. 6: 12] or do as it pleases. But this
mortification is bearable and is a mark of the justified.
The argumentum equates contritio and mortificatio. Luther in his
responsio makes a distinction between the mortificatio ante fidem and the
mortificatio in iustificatis (412, 1-3). Hence, it is incorrect to say that the former proceeds per agnitionem Christ et per Spiritum sanctum. This is true
only of the saints who are eager for the Spirit or faith to apply the law to the
flesh in order to keep it in submission236 ne patiatur regnare peccatum, ne
quod velit peragat (412, 6-7).237 On the other hand, mortification in the
ungodly proceeds only by way of the law, which always accuses and kills.238
236Notice Luther's formulation in his description of how the Spirit
or faith uses the law in the Christian's life: Itaque Spiritus sanctus seu fides
semper inculcat legem suae carni ut cesset, ne patiatur . . . . (412, 6-7); cf 39 I,
394, 17-18 (1 AD, Arg. 21): Ibi [scil. in terroribus piorum] pugnat fides contra
diffidentiam et desperationem, item contra libidinem, iram, superbiam,
vindictam etc. Note that here too in this citation, as we saw in the previous
argument, Luther sees the sins of the First Table as constituting the greatest
battle to be waged in the saints. It is also worth noting that he says that faith
applies the law to the flesh to restrain it, not to the conscience to train it.
While we would not want to press this to the point of creating a false antithesis, nevertheless, the formulation does reflect the chief way in which Luther
views the role of the law in sanctification. This will be discussed further in
ch. 4.
237Since the Christian is under grace (Rom. 6: 14) and led by the
Spirit (Gal. 4: 18), sin (or the flesh) must be subjugated by the law so that it is
no longer peccatum regnans, but merely peccatum regnatum.
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It may at first seem as if Luther contradicts himself because he starts out
by saying that mortificatio ante fidem est contritio (412, 1), which is a
refutation of the antinomian equation contritio est mortificatio (411, 24-25),
and then finishes up saying that it is bearable for, and is a mark of, the
justified: Sed haec mortificatio est tolerabilis et lustificatoris (412, 7-8).
However, this is no contradiction at all once we remember that the Christian
is still burdened with the a ci g and hence needs the law to kill the flesh and
keep sin in check; in other words, to keep the Christian in lifelong repentance.
Moreover, Luther refuses to use the term contritio to describe the mortificatio
of the Christian since for him contritio is nothing more than dolor de
peccato, whereas the Christian is iustificatus per fidem and hence able to bear
the mortification imposed by the law. Thus, he says: Sed haec mortificatio est
tolerabilis et iustificatoris (412, 7-8).239
The law is only impossible and intolerable when it is unfulfilled as the
lex implenda, for then it is the lex accusans et condemnans. But since we
have Christ's own fulfillment as a gift through faith, the law is no longer
burdensome, although naturally it is still that for the flesh for which it
remains the lex implenda.240 However, even when the law does come with
238Luther also speaks of lex [semper] accusat in credentes qua sinners;
see 39 I, 367, 11-13 (1 AD, Arg. 2): Impiis tamen manet lex requirens et pios
quidem etiam accusat et terret, sed non potest in desperationem adigere et
damnare; see note to our discussion of Argument 2 for further parallels.
239Cf. 39 I, 374, 14-16 (1 AD, Arg. 7):

Sic legis exactio est illis, qui extra
Christum sunt, tristis, odiosa, impossibilis. Econtra iis, qui sub Christo sunt,
incipit fieri iucunda, possibilis in primitiis, tamen non decimis.
240See the discussion on the iugum Christi in 39 I, 380, 14-381, 10 (1
AD, Arg. 13); note esp. 381, 9-10: Ideo lex manet, sed onus seu iugum eius non
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its demands on account of the flesh, it is no longer unbearable because for the
justified the gospel should always accompany the law [se invicem cornitari]
and point the Christian away from the law's demand to the Christ as the law's
fulfiller.241
Argument 33242
Contra 24
Where there is sin there is also law. In the church of the Lord there
is no sin. Therefore, in the church of God there is no law.
Proof of minor premise: Eph. 5 [: 26-27]: Cleansing her by the washing of water in the word of life, that he might present her to himself as a
glorious church, without wrinkle or blemish.
Response: This text will be fulfilled in the future life, just as all
other statements about holiness and righteousness. Now we see in a
mirror dimly, but then face to face [1 Cor. 13: 12]. Here we are deemed
righteous on account of Christ, but there we will really be pure and
righteous, shining like the sun [Matt. 13: 43]. We who live here are not
without sin. Otherwise, why do we pray: Forgive us our debts etc. [Matt.
6: 12]. Likewise, I believe the forgiveness of sins.
The minor premise: In Ecclesia Domini non est peccatum (412, 11-12),
points to an unbiblical ecclesiology and indeed anthropology, as will become
clear in Luther's Praefatio to the Third Disputation. Here, the assertion that
the church is without sin is used to argue, syllogistically, that the church is
premit cervices eorum, quibus Christi onus impositum est, quod suave et
leve est.
241a. 39 I, 392, 11-13 (1 AD, Arg. 18): Sed propter Christum legis
impletorem credentes non adiguntur in desperationem accusatione et terrore
legis, sed verbo ipsius rursus eriguntur. For a full discussion of what Luther
means by the mitigatio legis, see our analysis of 39 I, 474, 8-475, 6 (2 AD, Arg.
21) as well as ch. 4. Luther's counsel in the previous argumentum applies:
Law and gospel must not be separated too long in preaching to the credentes,
but must be applied alternately [se invicem comitari], for it is the gospel that
makes the law bearable.
24239 I, 412, 11-413, 2.
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also without the law, based on the assumption (for which no proof is offered)
that where there is no sin there is also no law. However, Paul's way of
arguing (in relation to the 430 years between the promise to Abraham and the
law given to Moses) is rather to say that sin is not counted (in the sense of
being booked to one's account) where there is no law (Rom. 5: 13). Paul never
makes the general statement that the church is without the law; rather, he
always distinguishes carefully between law and gospel in their application to
the baptized as simul iusti et peccatores. The Ephesians 5 passage with its
baptismal allusion [Mundans eam (scil. ecclesiam) lavacro aquae in verbo
vitae] is adduced by the antinomians as a proof of the minor premise.
However, this evinces a false understanding of justification which is
connected with a defective anthropology and eschatology, for it refuses to
confess the simul which for Luther is an unfailing mark of the life of the
baptized this side of heaven, for Christians are always simul iusti, per fidem,
and simul peccatores, in quantum peccati. When Luther says of Paul's
statement in Ephesians 5: Hic textus implebitur in futura vita (412, 17), he
stresses the eschatological fulfillment in order to counter its absence in the
exegesis of the antinomians. However, we hardly need to prove that Luther
also knows the already-now but not-yet of faith, which can claim this text for
itself (and the church) here and now, iv Xpi Inc?, without thereby denying that
Christians, insofar as they still have the flesh, are also still awaiting their final
cleansing at the resurrection, after which the church truly will be without
wrinkle or blemish, no longer just per fidem, but then also substantialiter.
What Luther says about the Ephesians text also applies to omnes aliae
sententiae de sanctitate, iustitia etc.. Here we are deemed [reputare] righteous
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propter Christum, but there we will be mundi et iusti, no longer per fidem or
in spe, but realiter (412, 17-20). In this life we can never be more than simul
iusti et peccatores,243 but there we will be purely iusti because we will be sine
peccato.
Luther concludes by pointing the antinomians to two phrases in the
liturgy which ought to be a constant reminder that in this we, and hence the
church, are still sinners and in need of forgiveness: First, the Lord's Prayer
(5th Pet.): Dimitte nobis debita etc., and secondly, the Apostolicum (3d Art.):
Credo remissionem peccatorum (413, 1-2).
Argument 34244
The law of circumcision is superior to the Decalogue. But circumcision has been abrogated. Therefore, the Decalogue has been abrogated
even more.
Proof of major premise: The law of circumcision has the promise
concerning the seed [Genesis 17].
Response: Circumcision is not better or greater than the Decalogue
just because it had the promise concerning the seed, since the Jews also
243Luther views the church in this same duplex way; see the long
Preface to the Third Antinomian Disputations, 39 I, 489-496 passim; see also
351, 17-20 (ATa, HI, Th. 25-26); 514, 13-20 (3 AD, Arg. 6); 544, 3-4 (3 AD, Arg. 22);
cf. also 165, 10-18 (CMP, Arg. 16); 145, 9-147, 15 (CMP, Arg. 3):
Non debetis imaginari, Ecclesiam veram ita esse sanctam et piam, ut
sit absque macula et nulla peccata et errores habeat. Da wirdt hie [= auf Erden]
nicht auf3. Sed Ecclesia, quae erravit, est excusanda per remissionem
peccatorum. Claves enim absolutionis sunt datae Ecclesiae. Si peccavit,
remissa sunt ei peccata. Connivet Christus in istos errores tanquam pater
filio. Sic videmus Ecclesiam Iudaeorum (cui nostra non est aequalis) fuisse
contaminatam vitiis. . . Ideo petimus in oratione dominica: Dimitte nobis
debita nostra. Sancti non sunt omnino puri, sed incipiunt. Haec purgatio est
initium novae creaturae, sed nondum plenitudo.
On the related term partim sanctus, partim peccator (542, 18-19), see
our discussion of 3 AD, Arg. 21.
24439 I, 413, 4-20.
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had many prerogatives, as Paul says [Rom. 3: 1-2]: to them belong the
sonship, the glory, the testament, the giving of the law, the cultus and
the promise; to them belong the patriarchs from whom is the Christ
according to the flesh [Rom. 9: 4-5]. But then does this not make them
better off than the Gentiles, as Paul argues in Romans: Are we superior?
By no means! [Rom. 3: 9]. Even the most wicked have for the most part a
great many gifts and prosper. The Decalogue however is greater and
more excellent because it is inscribed in the hearts and minds of all and
will remain with us also in the future life. But that is not the case with
circumcision, nor will baptism remain. Only the Decalogue is eternal, as
a reality, of course, not as a law, for the very thing that is demanded here
will be present in the future life. Finally, the Decalogue is also nobler
because it drew Christ from heaven. For unless there had been a Decalogue accusing and condemning us, what reason would Christ have had
to descend?
Luther appeals to Paul to refute the argumentum that circumcision is
greater than the Decalogue on account of the promise of the seed. On the
basis of Romans 3: 1-2 and 9: 4-5, which Luther conflates, he cites the multae
praerogativae of the Jews and then notes that Paul concludes that this in no
way gives them any advantage over the Gentiles: Num quid praecellimus?
nequaquam (Rom. 3: 9: Ti

apoevigeea; ov Kama c). Paul goes on to say

that both Jews and Greeks are equal ix1; agaryrfav (3: 10). Luther, on the other
hand, remarks: Et pessimi quique homines plerumque habent maxima dona
et abundant.
Luther then introduces the first (and, in our opinion, the chief) reason
for the superiority [major et praestantior] of the Decalogue over circumcision:
quia est insculptus omnium cordibus et mentibus et nobiscum manebit etiam
in futura vita (413, 14-16). Here the decalogus is equated with the lex
insculpta, which in turn is the same as the lex naturae. Already in
argumentum 25 Luther maintained that the patriarchs also knew the law, not
the law of Moses, but the lex naturae insculpta cordi, whose content is the
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same as that of the Decalogue.245 This natural law goes back to the very beginning, and so predates the law revealed from heaven at Sinai, which only
came 430 years after Abraham.246 Furthermore, circumcision is a purely
temporal and temporary phenomenon which had its specific time and people
and now is finished. On the other hand, Luther asserts the universality and
eternity of the Decalogue, at least in terms of content [res]. For as he has
already said (arg. 7): Decalogus vero haeret adhuc in conscientia, so that even
if God had never promulgated the law through Moses, human beings would
still have a natural knowledge of the divine will summed up in the
command to worship him and love the neighbor.247 Again, Luther says that
unlike circumcision or even baptism, solus decalogus est aeternus, but he
adds an important qualification: ut res scilicet, non ut lex, quia in futura vita
erit id ipsum, quod hic exigebat (413, 16-18). The law is eternal,248 yet not as
245See above, on the difference between the law of Moses and the

Decalogue, see 39 I, 478, 16-18 (2 AD, Arg. 25). For a fuller discussion of the lex
insculpta and its relation to the Decalogue, see our comments on 454, 4-16 (2
AD, Arg. 13).
24639 I, 402, 12-17 (1 AD, Arg. 25).
24739 I, 374, 1-5 (1 AD, Arg. 7).
248Luther, as far as we can see, does not use the scholastic term lex
aeterna in the disputations, even though he can say that the decalogus est
aeternus. He is a long way removed from the "realistic" position of
understanding the lex naturae as possibly having independent objective
existence and finding its ontological basis in the eternal and unchangeable
world-law of divine reason (= lex aeterna). Schloemann, Natiirliches and
gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther, 52 n. 186, makes the important point that in
this whole problem we should never lose sight of the fact that in Luther, the
scholastic usage, according to which "lex" can be used to express the total
context of God's being and action, still suggested itself, but was more and
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lex, but only as res,249 that is, not as lex accusans, for in this life (as we have
seen) lex semper accusat, but there it will no longer accuse because it will have
what it demands, even as faith already now has that in the lex impleta. To
put it in terms that Luther will use more often in the other disputations, the
law in futura vita is not the demanding lex exigens or the lex implenda,
which Christians still encounter here on account of the remnant of sin in
their flesh, but the lex impleta whose demands have been satisfied by Christ
and even now given to faith.250
The second reason that the Decalogue is nobilior than circumcision is
quia traxit Christurn de coelo, for without the decalogus accusans et damnans
there would have been no need for Christ's descensus (413, 18-19). Luther is
not here trying to show the "necessity" of cur Deus homo in Anselmic
fashion, for he knows with Paul that our redemption was decided before the
foundation of the world. Rather, his argument is rhetorical. In searching for
ways to emphasize the superiority of the Decalogue Luther simply looks at the
law in the light of God's plan of salvation and says, as it were: o felix lex, for it
is ultimately Christ who makes the law a means of blessing.
more overcome. The problem of the lex aeterna will be taken up again in ch.
4.
249Cf. 413, 26-27 (B):

Tunc erit [scil. decalogus] in esse, quod iam

requiritur.
250See, e. g., 39 I, 350, 1-4 (Am, II): 46. Ita post Christum in futura
vita manebit impleta facta tunc ipsa, quod interim exigit, creatura nova. 47.
Quare lex nunquam in aeternum tollitur, sed manebit vel implenda in
damnatis, vel impleta in beatis.
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Argument 35251
D. Cordatus: Only that should be taught which Christ commanded

to be preached in his name when he departed. However, he commanded
repentance to be preached in his name [Luke 24: 47] not in the name of
Moses or of the law. Therefore, repentance should be taught from the
gospel, not from the law.
D. Martin Luther: So [you say] repentance is to be preached in the
name of Jesus etc. Therefore, not from the law.
Response: That is not the conclusion. First, because Christ himself
preached the law. For although he had come to fulfill the law, not
abolish it [Math 5: 17], he still showed what the law requires, in order that
his gifts may be committed to us all the more, as we have said above.
Secondly, repentance includes both law and gospel, for St. Paul wants
this repentance to be preached in the whole world in order that the
whole world may be held accountable to God [Rom. 3: 19]. But after it has
convicted all people concerning sin, righteousness, and judgment [John
16: 8], and shown that all these people have been locked up under sin
[Gal. 3: 22], then finally it will reveal him who says: Come to me all you
who have been burdened and I will refresh you [Matt. 11: 28]. Look, I am
coming and giving it to you. This is what it means truly to preach repentance and the forgiveness of sins in the name of Christ, namely, [to announce] that all are sinners, and secondly, that they are to be justified
freely through the blood of Jesus Christ (Rom. 3 [: 24-26]). Here both are
taught in the name of Christ, and these two parts, indeed necessary parts,
will remain in the church. If it is not taught in this way, people will
think that they are righteous, and will not seek Christ, and thus will be
condemned. Therefore, also the Holy Spirit is sent, and where he takes
full possession of people, they immediately begin to recognize more and
more their sins, and they begin to recognize also the blessings that we
receive freely through Christ. This is why the same Holy Spirit convicts
the world concerning sin, righteousness, etc.
This argumentum, brought forward by Cordatus, who as we saw in the
previous chapter was sympathetic to Agricola, is essentially a variation on the
theme of argumentum 19.252 He contends that poenitentiam tantum ex
25139 I, 414, 2-415, 6.
25239 I, 392 (1 AD, Arg. 19): Quicquid Christus praecepit suis
apostolis, idem omnibus successoribus praecepit. Christus praecepit apostolis,
in nomine suo praedicare poenitentiam, ergo non per legem est agnitio
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Evangelio docenda est, non ex lege (414, 4-5). In his response Luther
emphasizes that Christ's mission has two parts to it. His main purpose was
the adimplere legem (with the implication that he came non solvere legem).
However, before we are ready to receive his beneficia he needs to show us
quid lex requirat (414, 8-11).253 Secondly, repentance is based on the preaching
of both law and gospel. That means first of all preaching that omnes
homines conclusos esse sub peccatum, and then pointing them to Christ as
the one who offers refreshment particularly to those who have been
burdened by the law (414, 11-17).254
Luther also finds these two parts of Christ's mission expressed in the
mandate, given to his disciples in Luke 24: 47, to preach repentance and
forgiveness of sins. Since the two parts of his mission correspond to law and
gospel, the law being his opus alienum, the gospel his opus proprium, it
follows that for Luther, preaching repentance here means preaching the law,
while the proclamation of the gospel corresponds to the announcement and
bestowal of forgiveness. However, this clearly is contrary to antinomian
exegesis, according to which in nomine suo is to be taken in apposition with
praedicari poenitentiam, leading to the conclusion: Ergo poenitentiam
tantum ex Evangelio docenda est, non ex lege (414, 4-5). Furthermore, Luther
holds that each part of the divine mandate, repentance and forgiveness of
peccati, sed per Evangelium. Igitur lex est tollenda. Virtually the same
argument is proposed in 565, 13-15 (3 AD, Arg. 32/5).
253414, 9-10:

Etsi enim venisset, ut adimpleret legem, non ut
solveret, tamen interim ostendit, quid lex requirat, ut sua beneficia eo magis
nobis commendentur, ut dictum est supra.
254Cf. 39 I, 407, 3-4 (1 AD, Arg. 28): We come to repentance both ex

cognitione legis and ex cognitione crucis Christi seu salutis.
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sins, is to be taught in nomine Christi (414, 20).255 He finds this interpretation
to be consistent with Pauline theology and thus concludes that this is what it
really means to preach repentance and forgiveness of sins in nomine Christi,
namely, quod omnes sint peccatores, et deinde, quod iustificandi sint gratis
per sanguinem Iesu Christi (414, 17-19).
It is clear from Luther's exegesis of Luke 24: 47 that he is not taking
poenitentia there in the strict sense of dolor de peccato and bonum
propositum, as he himself defines it in his first Thesenreihe, but rather in the
broader sense of dolor or contritio, unaccompanied by faith, and hence
produced only ex lege. Nevertheless, how one defines repentance is not the
decisive issue, as long as it is clear whether one is defining it stricte or late. In
either case it constitutes a denial of the antinomian claim that repentance is to
be taught only ex evangelio and not ex lege, for even when it arises from the
preaching of the gospel, it is not strictly speaking the gospel itself which is
working repentance but it is a case of the gospel using the office of the law for
that purpose.
Luther finishes his responsio by briefly explaining why neither law nor
gospel may be omitted, and more specifically, why it is impermissible to say
255Se

above n. 170 on the textual problem associated with Luke 24:
47. We saw in our analysis of arg. 19 that Luther there takes a slightly
different tact than here. He emphasizes that to preach repentance in nomine
Christi does not ipso facto mean to preach contra Mosem, for Christ himself
exercised a twofold office, his officium proprium and his officium alienum.
Here he stresses that the two necessary parts of the church's proclamation, law
and gospel, correspond to the preaching of repentance and forgiveness, and
that both are to be preached in the name of Christ. Cf. 39 I, 345, 16-23 (Am, I)
where in Th. 1 and Th. 4 he says that the two parts of repentance are dolor (ex
lege) and bonum propositum (ex evangelio).
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that repentance arises only ex evangelio. First of all, he insists that without
the preaching of law and gospel [hae duae partes] there would be a grave
danger that people would consider themselves righteous and not seek after
Christ [ad Christum aspirabunt] and thus be condemned. Secondly, Luther
links this work of law and gospel in nomine Christi to the work of the Holy
Spirit. When the Spirit fully indwells a peson, he immediately begins to
recognize his sin more and more clearly as well as the blessings he has
received through Christ [subinde magis ac magis innotescunt peccata,
innotescunt et bona, quae per Christum gratis accipimus] (415, 1-5). Luther
leaves us in no doubt that he is not thinking here of the Holy Spirit as the
author of the law, who convicts us of sin, but of the Holy Spirit as gift and giftgiver, sent by Christ to sanctify and vivify.256 Consequently, Luther's
emphasis here is not on the Spirit's law-work of convicting us of sin but on
his gospel-work of strengthening faith. However, as a result of his work and
in the light of the gospel, we come to a far deeper knowledge of our sin than
we could have ever attained to under the law,257 and at the same time a
grateful recognition of the boundless blessings [bona] which God has given
gratis us in Christ. But is not this line of interpretation now called into
question by Luther's last final sentence in which he says that the same [idem]
Spirit convicts the world concerning sin [arguit mundum de peccato] etcetra,
since this is the very text which he used earlier to demonstrate the law-work
256This

distinction, it will be recalled, was made by Luther in 39 I,
388, 23-391, 20 (1 AD, Arg. 17).
257To use the language of 1 AD, Arg. 32, this is not contritio, which
is ex lege, but mortificatio, which is ex lege et evangelio.
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of the Spirit? In our opinion this transition does not contradict the point we
have just made. It rather reminds us that even the Spirit's law-work [opus
alienum] is oriented to the gospel [opus proprium], and that without it we
would not be in the position of being able to receive the bona God gives us in
Christ. This then is in line with what Luther says at the beginning of his
responsio: Christ came to fulfill the law and yet at the same time he shows us
what the law requires in order that we may the better be able to receive his
gifts.
Argument 36258
Question: Show me in what passage Christ has commanded us to
preach the law.
Response: Christ says in Matt. 5 [: 19]: He who teaches and does thus
will be called great in the kingdom of heaven.259 It is sophistry to argue:
Christ does not say, preach the law, therefore, the law is not to be
preached.
Response: That is true according to grammar and if the words are
taken at face value or Texviicoic. For in grammar, repentance and law are
certainly different words, but in point of fact, to preach repentance and to
preach the law is the same thing; they are not different but the same.
The law is the revelation of wrath because repentance, at least in part,
insofar as it reveals sin, and the revelation of wrath, are effects of the
law. For even if we do not use these letters LEX, we are still dealing with
the reality itself. The trembling of the conscience, even sadness, are
transferred from letter and grammar into sensation, and kill the heart.
If the gospel concerning Christ did not come, the result would be despair
and the repentance of Judas. But lest this should happen, Christ commanded that repentance and the forgiveness of sins be preached in his
name, that is, the gospel [Luke 24: 47]. What is at stake here is not the
word law, but the reality itself.
25839 I, 415, 8-416, 3.
259Instead of the following, R makes a new argument: But he does
not command the law to be preached, nor is any statement to be found in the
NT commanding the law to be preached. Therefore, in the NT the law is not
to be preached.
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Luther's responsio here is very important because it goes to the heart of
one of the central issues in the antinomian controversy. The nub of the issue
is this. One of the arguments used by the antinomians to justify their dismissal of the law is that Christ no where commands us to preach the law.
Luther, on the other hand, counters their argument by pointing out that Jesus
plainly commands that we preach repentance, and that in point of fact, to
preach repentance is the same thing as to preach the law [quoad rem idem est
praedicare legem, et non sunt diversa, sed idem], even though the words
poenitentia and lex are different iuxta grammaticam and if taken materialiter
seu Texvixac (415, 13-16).
Luther then approaches the matter from another angle and maintains
that both repentance--or to be more precise, a part (the first part) of repentance, quatenus ostendit peccatum—and wrath, or more exactly, the revelation
of wrath, are effectus leg-is (415, 16-18). In other words, repentance and the law
are bound together because the effect of repentance, the revelation of sin, and
the effect of the law, the revelation of wrath, are correlatives.260 Luther could
have also said that repentance, at least ex parte, is an effectus legis. His main
point however is that the effect of the law does not depend on the letters LEX;
for even if you do away with the letters, you cannot abolish the reality itself
[ipsam rem] which the word lex signifies (415, 18-19). The letters LEX do not
point to a higher reality but to the inescapable effectus legis, such as ira, pavor
conscientiae, tristitia (415, 17-19). The reality of the law can never be removed
even if one discards its letters. Although Luther does not say it here, we
2600n

21).

the equation of law and wrath, see 39 I, 397, 9-11 (1 AD, Arg.
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know from previous arguments that the reason for this is the fact that the law
has been inscribed on the heart.261 Speaking metaphorically, he says that
these effects of the law are transferred into sensations and kill the heart
[transferuntur in sensum et cor occidunt] (415, 18-20).262 And this would be
terminal (as it was for Judas) were there no gospel to rescue us from the
catastrophic effectus legis, whose natural end is desperatio.
Finally, Luther points out that it was in order to provide a way of
escape from just this despair and death that Jesus commands repentance and
forgiveness to be preached in nomine suo, for the remissio peccatorum is
nothing else then the evangelium (416, 2-3). Therefore, to bring the argument
back to where it began, Luther maintains that our Lord's mandate in Luke 24:
47 includes the proclamation of the law, even if the word law is not mentioned expressis verbis. His main point remains irrefutable: What is really at
stake here, vis-à-vis the antinomian rejection of the law, is not a matter of
words or letters [grammatica, vocabula, vox], but of the reality itself [res ipsa].
Argument 37263
It is superfluous to use many things to do what can be done by
fewer. The gospel presupposes that we have sins. Therefore, it is not
necessary for the law to be taught.
Response: Law and gospel cannot and ought not be separated, just as
repentance and forgiveness of sins cannot and ought not be separated,
because they are so bound together and intertwined. For to preach the
forgiveness of sins is nothing else than to make know and show the
261Cf. 39 I, 456, 19-457, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 13): Nam etiamsi tollas has

literas: LEX, quae facillime deleri possunt, tamen manet chirographum
inustum cordibus nostris, quod nos damnat et exercet.
262The

sensus or vis legis already belongs to the effectus legis.

26339 I, 416, 5-417, 6.
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presence of sin. Forgiveness itself shows that sins are present, and it
cannot be understood what fulfillment is unless it is understood what
the law is, so that the forgiveness of sins cannot be understood unless it
is first known what sin is, nor can fulfillment even come about unless
some law is established. Therefore, it is significant that Christ says: I
have come to fulfill the law [Matt. 5: 17] and not a jug of wine. What
would Christ have fulfilled if the law had been abolished? Moreover,
whence would we know what we are by nature? or again, that the whole
world is in the power of the evil one [1 John 5: 19]? Whence would we
and all people, from Adam to the last person born, know that we are
sinners, if the law had been entirely abolished?, the very thing that these
good-for-nothings are attempting.
The argumentum that Luther refutes here is that the law and its work
is unnecessary because the gospel presupposes that we are sinners. In order to
counteract the antinomian error of pulling law and gospel apart Luther here
stresses their inseparability: non possunt nec debent separari, for they are inter
se colligata et implicata (416, 8-10). He can go part of the way with the
antinomians when they say that the gospel presupposes that we are sinners.
However, that presupposition is justified only because the law first does its
work in revealing sin. But he goes even a step further. Not only does forgiveness presuppose sin, it also shows it and makes it known: Nam
praedicare remissionem peccatorum nihil aliud est, quam indicare et
ostendere adesse peccatum. Ipsa remissio indicat adesse peccata (416, 10-12).
Forgiveness requires a prior knowledge of what sin is. The same holds for
fulfillment. Christ cannot fulfill the law unless the law is first established:
nec fieri etiam potest impletio, nisi constituatur aliqua lex (416, 13-14).
Luther's thinking is being guided by the words of Matthew 5: 17 where
Jesus describes his mission as legem implere, not, as Luther quips, aliquod
vasculum vini implere. Without the law we would not know the facts of our
sinful condition. Here he lists three things in particular: 1) what we are by
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nature; 2) that the whole world is in the power of the evil one; 3) that we are
sinners (416, 16-20).
However, as we have already seen, he also says that forgiveness not
only presupposes that we are sinners, but also makes it known to us, insofar
as the very act of being forgiven per fidem makes us mindful of the fact that it
is precisely as sinners that we are recipients of his forgiveness. Or to put it
another way, those who receive forgiveness can do no other than confess that
they are poor, wretched sinners. Such a confession and knowledge of sins is
not only presupposed by the gospel but also indicated and confirmed by it.
However, this does not mean, as the antinomians claim, that the gospel
renders the law superfluous. It is the law after all that exposes sin in the first
place, even if this is done under the auspices of the gospel. On the other
hand, our being forgiven confirms to us that we are indeed sinners. Here
then we have the right relationship between law and gospel, where each has
and does its own proprium officium, without which the other could not do
what it does. This, finally, is why Luther insists, contra antinomos, not only
that the law must be retained and taught in the church, but also that law and
gospel cannot and ought not be separated.
PART 2
The Second Disputation Against the Antinomians
12 January 1538
Introduction
Luther was annoyed that Agricola had not been present for the First
Disputation. Hence, another disputation was necessary. As planned, a second
set of theses was drawn up by Luther and circulated before the end of December 1537. They deal with the proper distinction between law and gospel in
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justification. This is an important topic because, as we saw in the last chapter,
Agricola was critical of Melanchthon for teaching that repentance is necessary
for justification. In reaction to this, Agricola held that the law played no role
at all within the context of justification. Luther's theses show that neither
legalism nor antinomianism is the answer. Rather, law and gospel need to be
correctly distinguished. How this is to be done will become clear as we
proceed. The theses for the debate are now set out in translation below
followed by a summary of their content.
Theses264
Translation
1.Not only is the law not necessary for justification, but it is utterly useless and completely impossible.
2. However, for those who keep the law in the hope of being justified, it
even becomes a poison and bane for justification.
3. When justification is at stake, one cannot say enough against the impotence of the law and that most pernicious trust in the law.
4. For the law was not given in order to justify or make alive or to help
in anyway toward righteousness.
5. But in order to reveal sin and work wrath, that is, to render the conscience guilty.
6. Death is not inflicted that through it we might live, nor the sin with
which we are born that through it we might be innocent of it.
7. Therefore, the law was not promulgated that through it we might become righteous, since it can offer neither righteousness nor life.
26439 I, 347-350: Disputatio secunda D. Martini Lutheri contra
Antinomos.
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8.In sum, as far as heaven is from earth, so far ought the law be separated from the justification.
9. And nothing is to be taught, said, or presented in the matter of justification, except only the word of grace offered in Christ.
10.But it does not follow from this that the law is to be abolished and
removed from what is preached in the church.
11.Rather it is more necessary that it be taught and urged that it is not
necessary but impossible for justification.
12.And that people who are proud and presumptuous about their
powers be instructed that they cannot be justified through the law.
13.For sin and death are to be shown as much as possible, but not because they are necessary for life and innocence.
14.But that people might know their own unrighteousness and lost
condition, and thus be humbled.
15.If sin is ignored, a false innocence is presumed, just as it can be perceived in the heathen and later in the Pelagians.
16.If death is ignored, it is presumed that this life is all that there is,
and that there is no other in the future.
17.For unless the law teaches both it is not clear enough that the law is
especially necessary and useful.
18.Anything that reveals sin, wrath, or death exercises the office of the
law, whether it occurs in the Old Testament or in the New Testament.
19.For to reveal sin is nothing else, nor can it be anything else, than to
be the law or the effect and most proper power of the law.
20.The law and the revelation of sin, or the revelation of wrath, are interchangeable terms, just as being human and risible or rational.
21.To remove the law and retain the revelation of wrath is the same as
denying that Peter is a man while affirming that he is risible or rational.
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22. It is just as smart to remove the law and yet teach that sin has to be
forgiven.
23. For the scripture of the Holy Spirit says that without the law sin is
dead [Rom. 7: 8], and, where there is no law there is no transgression [Rom. 4:
15].
24.Just as it is impossible for there to be sin or for it to be known without the law, whether written or inscribed [Rom. 2: 15].
25. It follows from that: Since there is no sin (the law having been removed), there is also no Christ as redeemer from sin. For thus Christ himself
says: The healthy have no need of a doctor? [Math 9: 12]
26. Since however Christ came not to abolish the law but fulfill it, he
came in vain if there is no law to be fulfilled in us.
27. And since God's law requires our obedience to God, these nomomachians also do away with obedience to God.
28. It is clear from them that Satan, in these instruments of his, says
the words which teach sin, repentance and Christ.
29. But, in fact, he removes Christ, repentance, sin and all of scripture,
together with God himself, its author.
30. And it is his intention to cause the most pernicious security, contempt for God, freedom from punishment and continual impenitence, more
than Epicurus himself.
31. That saying of theirs attests to this, namely, that the law convicts
sin, and indeed without the Holy Spirit, only for the purpose of condemnation.
32. Here it is clear that the kind of sin they want taught is that which
does not condemn, perhaps even that for which there is salvation without
Christ.
33. For if sin does not damn, it remains possible that Christ did not redeem us from damning sin, and thus neither from the wrath of God.
34. For sin that does not damn is a better sin than righteousness and life
themselves.
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35.For what is more blessed than having sin that does not damn, that
is, nonexistent sin.
36.Therefore, with the law removed, we are saved from sin in such a
way that we do not need Christ the mediator etc.
37.But this too is false, that the law convicts sin without the Holy
Spirit, since the law has been written by the finger of God.
38.And all truth, wherever it is, is from the Holy Spirit, and if the law
is prohibited God's truth is prohibited.
39.To remove the law on account of this office, that it exposes sin only
to condem, is plain insanity.
40.For this is the power of sin, as Paul says, that sin is the sting of
death, and the law is the power of sin [1 Cor. 15: 561.
41.Let us then eat and drink and let us sing under these teachers: Let
him who worries about tomorrow perish [Matt. 6: 341.
42.For the law, the power of sin, has been removed, and thus with the
power of sin removed, even death and hell have perished.
43.Not through the blood of the Son of God, the keeper and fulfiller of
the law, but because we deny that it is the law of God that is fulfilled.
44.Everything (that they say) about sin, repentance, Christ, and the forgiveness is nothing but sheer lies and worthy of Satan himself.
45.For the law was there before Christ, indeed as our accuser. However, now under Christ it has been satisfied through the forgiveness of sins,
and from now on is to be fulfilled by the Spirit.
46.Thus after Christ, in the future life, the new creation will then abide
as fulfilled fact itself, which meanwhile the law has demanded.
47.Therefore, the law is never abolished in eternity, but will remain,
either to be fulfilled in the damned or having been fulfilled in the blessed.
48.These veritable disciples of Satan seem to think that the law is temporary and has ceased under Christ just like circumcision.
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Structure
Theme: The Law and Justification
A. The Law is Unnecessary for Justification (1-17)
I. The Law vis-à-vis Justification (1-3)
1.unnecessary and useless (1)
2. opinio iustificationis is a bane (2)
3. impotent (3)
H. Purpose of the Law (4-7)
1.not for justification (4)
2. to reveal sin, work wrath, accuse conscience (5)
3. illustrations:
a) purpose of death is not life (6a)
b) sin does not result in life (6b)
c) inference: law is not intended as ameans to
righteousness (7)
III. The Law does not Justify (9-10)
1.law to be kept separate from justification (8)
2.word of grace in Christ alone justifies (9)
IV. The Law Must Not be Abolished (10-17)
1.the proud and presumptuous must be shown that keeping the
law is impossible for justification (11-12)
2. law shows sin and death to humble proud and reveal
unrighteousness (13-14)
3.conversely: to ignore sin and death (=to deny the law) leads to
false innocence and denial of eternal life (15-16)
4. inference: law is necessary for teaching sin and death (17)
B. The Office of the Law (18-48)
I. Law, Sin, Death and Wrath (18-27)
1.office of the law: to reveal sin, wrath or death (18-19)
2. equation: law=revelation of sin/wrath holds true (20)
a) result:
aa) impossible to remove law and yet retain wrath (21)
bb) impossible to remove law and keep forgiveness of sin (22)
b) reason:
aa) no law means no sin, no transgression (23-24)
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bb) no sin (assuming no law) means no redeemer (25)
3. implications of the antinomian abolition of the law
a) Christ the fulfiller of the law came in vain (26)
b) abolition of obedience (27)
H. The Antinomian Error (28-48)
1. law, Christ, and sin:
a) paradox: per antinomians Satan teaches sin, repentance and
Christ, yet per them he also removes Christ, repentance,
sin, all of scripture together with God its author (28-29)
b) result: demonic security, contempt of God,
impenitence (30)
aa) proof: antinomian dictum: law exposes sin only for the
purpose of condemnation (31)
bb) corollary: they want to teach non-condemning sin (32)
c) antinomian doctrine:
aa) Christ did not redeem us from damning sin nor
from the wrath of God (33)
bb) no law means no condemnation, and this in turn means
that there is no need for Christ the mediator (34-36)
d) Luther teaches contra the Antinomians:
aa) law convicts sin without the Spirit since God has written
the law on our hearts (37)
bb) to prohibit the law is to hinder God's truth for all truth is
in the Spirit (38)
cc) to remove the law because it condemns is insanity law is
power of sin and sin is death's sting (39-40)
2. Christ the fulfiller of the law
a) antinomian dictum: Let us eat and drink . . .: the law has been
removed and thus the power of sin with it (41-42)
b) antinomian doctrine: the law fulfilled by Christ is not God's
law: hence it is not removed by Christ's obedience (43)
c) Luther's doctrine:
aa) the antinomian doctrine is sheer lies for the accusing law
existed before Christ, but under him it has been satisfied
and is now to be fulfilled by the Spirit (44 45)
bb) in the future life the law will remain the fulfilled law and
the new creation will be complete (46)
cc) the law is not temporary, but will abide for ever, either to
be fulfilled in the damned or having been fulfilled in
the blessed (47-48).
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Summary
The second Thesenreihe has as its theme the law and justification.
Here Luther rejects both the antinomian unqualified rejection of the law and
the Pelagian insistence that the law is necessary for justification. By and large
the antinomians have misunderstood Luther's rejection of the law in the article of justification and have misapplied this to law in general. Therefore, he
has to argue either against the necessity of the law in justification (Theses 110) or for its necessity outside justification (Theses 11-48), depending on the
particular opponents he is fighting against.
Against the Pelagians Luther stresses that when it comes to justification
the law is not only unnecessary, but useless and thoroughly impotent (Ths. 13) for the law was given, not as a means to righteousness or justification, but
to reveal sin, work wrath, and accuse the conscience (Ths. 4-7). For this very
reason the law is not to be abolished. The law humbles the proud by showing
them their sin and unrighteousness and threatening them with eternal death
(Ths. 11-17). Since the law is basically the revelation of sin and God's wrath, it
is impossible to remove the law and yet claim to retain wrath, as the antinomians did. Since there can be no sin or transgression without the law, abolishing the law means at the same time abolishing sin and hence abolishing
the need for Christ the redeemer (Ths. 18-27). The antinomians are the
mouthpieces of Satan who uses orthodox statements of the truth to mask
blasphemous heresy (Th. 28-29). His real purpose is to deceive and mislead;
his aim is security, contempt of God, and impenitence (Th. 30). The antinomians accuse Luther of teaching that the law reveals sin only to condemn
(Th. 31); they, on the other hand, claim that the condemning law is finished,
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and so deny that sin leads to condemnation (Th. 32). Thus, they obviate the
need for Christ (Th. 33). Luther mockingly replies that sin which does not
damn is better than righteousness and life itself (Th. 34-35). The implication
of antinomian doctrine is that it renders Christ as our mediator unnecessary
(Th. 36). But they err in thinking that they can remove the law; the fact is that
they cannot escape the law, indeed, it convicts sin even without the Spirit because God has written it on the hearts of all people (Th. 37). Hence, the law
cannot be removed (Th. 39). Luther teaches that only in Christ is the accusing
law satisfied and from now on is to be fulfilled in us by the Spirit (Th. 45),
whereas the antinomians do not even believe that it was the law of God
which Christ fulfilled (Th. 43). The law will never be abolished: it will continue in the future life as the law which must be fulfilled in the damned or as
the law which has been fulfilled in the saints (Ths. 46-48).
Luther's Preface
Luther gives thanks to God for shedding the light of his word on the
matters about to be dealt with and for the opportunity to discuss and teach
Christian doctrine. In former times all this was shrouded in deeep darkness.
Not even the law was properly understood, since not only it but almost everything lay buried in godless opinions. Even on the rare occasion when the law
was taught the papists presented it in such a way as if it demanded nothing
beyond our powers, and they did this to show that our human powers or free
will are still intact and that by them we can satisfy and fulfill the law ourselves. This is the error of the Pelagians (who sailed under the colors of the
church and of Christ himself), as well as of Occam and the moderns, who
falsely teach that reason, without the Holy Spirit, can love God above all else,
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and that Christ obtained only the first grace in order to enable us to fulfill the
law ourselves.265 Luther furthermore notes that one of them wrote that the
grace of the Holy Spirit is not required for a good work. In support of this he
appeals to a sentence of St. Jerome in Gratian: Whoever says that God has
commanded impossible things, let him be anathema.266 This and similar
statements are to be found in the teaching of the scholastics who make the
law possible so that it can be fulfilled by us even without the Holy Spirit.
Luther sees the work of the devil behind all this and exhorts his hearers to pray to the Lord that he would also preserve his own members against
the power of the evil one. For the devil, ever since he first began to persecute
and hate this Christ in paradise, and to bite his heel, cannot stop, nor can we
promise any one peace and quiet.267 There is no hope of peace, but here we
will always have to be ready for battle, always ready to fight, and indeed to
fight with the fiercest foes, as Paul says: Our battle is not against flesh and
blood but against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places
(Eph. 6: 12).
In view of this, Luther wants to use the disputation to try to prepare his
students for this kind of warfare and battle, so that they may be able to stand
all the firmer in the evil day (Eph. 5: 13). Nothing is more certain, Luther
warns, than that Satan will not leave one stone unturned, and that although
his powers have been shaken he will work unceasingly until he has once
2650ccam,

Sent., lib. 3, qu. 8D.

266Hieronymus,
267Reading

Adversus Pelagianos, lib. 2, 11 (MPL, 545).

the variant polliceamur (39 I, 420, 13).
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more removed from our midst the scriptural doctrone of justification. For
this is what he has always done and will do as we can see from the papacy.
Therefore, he urges the men to debate carefully and exercise themselves diligently in this doctrine by listening, studying, meditating, living and dying until they reach that itA npoctio pia in theology, of which Paul speaks in
Romans,268 so that they may cling to what is certain and not be blown away
from the teaching of the truth by the changing winds of doctrine (Eph. 4: 14).
On the other hand, Luther also warns that they should not be falsely secure in
this matter, or think that they are too wise or certain. For no mind or wisdom
is too great to be deceived by the devil. The extraordinary cunning and
wickedness with which he often captivates and fascinates good minds is truly
amazing. This, he warns, should make us all the more diligent and attentive,
that we may redeem the time (Eph. 5: 16), let the word of God dwell in us
richly (Col. 3: 16), and see to it that we are armed and ready for the battle
against Satan. What Luther says here will be taken up again in the next
chapter when we deal with parenesis and spiritual warfare.
With that introduction, Luther says that for the present we will confine
ourselves chiefly to the matter of the law, whether it is necessary or useful for
justification; also whether, when we have the law, we are able to keep it by
our own powers. For him the answer to that question is already dear. However, that does not mean that the law is to be immediately abolished and
thrown out of the church, as the antinomians claim, for we are born with a
natural pride which the law must remove and suppress so that we do not
268/rx

po0 pi a does not occur in Romans. Perhaps he meant 1
Thess. 1: 5. Yet cf. Rom. 4: 21.
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think, like the papists, that we can do all that the law requires. But when at
length this beast has been slain and seized by Christ the mediator, the law will
become possible and easy.269 This issue will be taken up again in the next
chapter where we hope to discuss how to preach the law to the baptized, and
at the same time to examine briefly the so-called tertius usus legis.
Disputation
Translation and Analysis of Arguments
Argument 1270
[Contra 5]
The chief articles of faith are in scripture. Scripture says that the
revelation of sin occurs through the gospel. Therefore, the revelation of
sin does not occur through the law.
Proof of Minor Premise: Rom. 1 [: 18]: The wrath of God is revealed
from heaven against all wickedness.
Response: The argument rests on the phrase "from heaven." For in
this passage heaven seems to denote the gospel which has come from
heaven through the Son of God; the law however seems to be from
earth. But to say, the wrath of God is revealed from heaven, is to say
nothing else than that God's wrath is revealed, and that this wrath is divine and heavenly, not earthly. For clearly our sin is not something
simple and light, as the sophists taught by watering down original sin,
but rather we are subject and liable to heavenly and divine wrath, by
which we are to be damned eternally and punished with eternal death.
Therefore, it is significant that it says, "from heaven," that is, divine, not
earthly or human like the wrath of the emperor, who can kill only the
body and cannot destroy both body and soul in Gehenna, like that divine
wrath [Math 10: 28].
But back to the argument: "revealed from heaven" must not be understood as referring to the gospel. For as we have said earlier, the
proper office of the gospel is to teach and preach Christ and to set forth
his gifts. But nobody can preach the gospel without the law. For how is
it possible to illuminate and magnify the gifts of Christ unless they are
269Palat.

1827 omits the following arguments 1 to 3 parag. 2, and
concludes immediately without a paragraph: Deinde etiam secundo modo etc.
27039 I, 423, 1-425, 5.
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first put within the perspective of our pitiful condition which we fell
into through sinning against the law right at the very outset? In the
same way, if a doctor wants to cure somebody in accordance with rules [of
medical practice], he must first inquire carefully into the disease and its
causes, and only after he has laid these out before the recalcitrant patient
and convinced him that he has fallen victim to a grave illness and that,
unless treated with medicine, he will die, does he finally begin to speak
of medicine, treat him, and promise him health. On the other hand,
who would not ridicule a doctor if all that he ever wanted to do was to
talk about rhubarb, which cures cholera, and meanwhile never told anybody that they were ill with cholera? Thus here the rhubarb, that is the
gospel or Christ, came to cure the cholera, that is sin, the disease of origin, death and the devil, which has beset us. The disease is exposed in
order to be healed; it ought not be exposed in order to kill the sick person.
This is what Christ did in Matthw 5, when he said: Unless your righteousness exceeds etc., and where he preaches and interprets the law or
wrath. This exposure of sin will be the same, whether it happens
through the law or the gospel, whose special task it is to teach the Son of
God and the forgiveness of sins on account of Christ. For we are not all
called to Christ in the same way.
Although Romans 1: 18 has already been mentioned in the First Disputation as a proof for the antinomian doctrine that the gospel exposes sin,271
here it is discussed fully for the first time. Luther notes at the outset that the
antinomian argument rests on the phrase de coelo (423, 7). This does not
mean that the gospel reveals wrath (424, 3-4). In fact this verse has nothing to
do with the gospel. Antinomian exegesis holds to the equation de coelo=ex
271For a complete listing of all the arguments in which the antinomiam thesis (that the gospel does the law's work of revealing sin) is brought
forward, see the note to 1 AD, Arg. 16. Paul Althaus, "Durch das Gesetz
kommt Erkenntnis der Sande." Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der exklusivchristologischen Dogmatik, in, Solange es 'Heute' heifit. Festgabe fur Rudolf
Hermann zum 70. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1957), 7ff, finds in K. Barth the chief
thesis of the antinomians, that the revelation of wrath and the recognition of
sin is possible exclusively through the gospel, which of course is strongly reminiscent of Agricola's "christological" interpretation of Romans 1: 18; on the
very Barthian interpretation of Luther by G. Heintze, see Althaus, 281; against
it see G. Wingren, Die Methodenfrage der Theologie, 39, 45-46, 53ff, 87ff.
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evangelio because it assumes that the gospel comes from heaven. Luther, on
the other hand, argues that the phrase means nothing more than that God's
wrath is divina ac coelestis, hence not terrena. This in turn is meant to underscore the seriousness of sin. As Luther has stressed earlier, far from revealing wrath, the proprium Evangelii officium is praedicare Christum et illustrare eius beneficia (424, 4-5).272
Luther then uses the rest of the responsio to illustrate the fact that the
law is the indispensable presupposition of the gospel, and that nobody can
preach the gospel without the law. He likens the way a doctor deals with his
patient to how God deals with us through law and gospe1.273 It is premature
to speak of medicine before the doctor has carrid out the diagnosis. If the
doctor wants to act iuxta canones, in other words, follow standard procedure,
he will first inquire de morbo et de causis morbi, then in the light of the
272He

makes this point several times in the First Disputation; see 39
I, 387, 2-4 (Arg. 16), 393, 19-20 (Arg. 20) etc.
273Jesus

statement in Mark 2: 17 (although not cited in this argument) is fundamental for understanding his own ministry in terms of the
application of law and gospel. When Jesus says parabolically that the well
have no need of a physician, that does not imply that there really are people
in this world who are perfectly healthy and have no need of the services of
the heavenly physician. His point rather is that people think they are healthy
until they are told that they are sick, and therefore it is only after they have
heard the diagnosis of their condition that they are ready for the doctor to give
them medicine to heal them. The proclamation of the forgiveness of sin,
which is the officium of the gospel, presupposes the knowledge of sin. As we
will see at the end of Luther's responsio, this can come in two different ways.
Be that as it may, the good news of the gospel can only be understood in
contrast to (or against the background of) the judgment of the law. See
further 39 I, 517, 3-11 (3 AD, Arg. 7). Christ's work would be unnecessary
without the law, see 546, 10-19 (3 AD, Arg. 23). The law first prepares the
material=the penitent sinner for Christ, see 548, 19-23 (3 AD, Arg. 23). Cf. also
578, 18-22 (3 AD, Arg. 40/13).

267
diagnosis, he will need to persuade the recalcitrant patient, whom Luther calls
ferox aegrotus, that the illness is gravissimus and if untreated will be

terminal. Only at that point does the medicus begin talking about medicina
and cures. Luther ridicules the monomania of the doctor who only talks
about cures (he chooses the example of reubarbarum, which in his day was
the treatment for cholera) without ever telling his patients that they are ill.
Now he makes the application to law and gospel: Ita hic reubarbarum,
id est, Evangelium seu Christus venit, ut medeatur cholerae, id est, peccato,
morbo originis, morti et diabolo, qui nos obsedit (424, 16-18). The purpose of

the exposure or diagnosis of the disease (morbus ostendere) is aegrotum
sanare, not occidere (424, 18-19). Luther views the preaching of Christ in Mat-

thew 5 in exactly the same way. His use of the law there where he praedicat et
interpretatur legem sive iram may be devestating, but its purpose is salutary.

Not until Christ has laid bare the disease of our soul, our peccatum and morbus originis, can he apply the medicine of the gospel. We note in passing that

here clearly Luther interprets Jesus' use of the law in his sermon as the usus
theologicus. He is aware that non omnes eodem modo vocamur ad Christurn. Consequently, while he affirms that the gospel's proprium is filium Dei
docere et remissionem peccatorum propter Christum, at the same time the ostensio peccati can also happen per Evangelium and not only per legem (425, 2-

5). This brings us back to the antinomian syllogism at the beginning of this
argument. On the one hand, Luther could accept the minor premise: Scriptura dicit, ostensionem peccati fieri per Evangelium, but on the other, he

would have to reject the conclusion: Ergo ostensio peccati non fit per legem.
For while he grants the possibility that God may use the gospel rather than
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the law to make sin manifest, he rejects the antinomian absolutization of this
into a law which in principle excludes the fact that ostensio peccati fit per
legem. God is not subject to any absolute principles that we may propose. He
works with each of us in his own way, using law and gospel as he sees fit:
Nam non omnes eodem modo vocamur ad Christum (425, 4-5).
Argument 2274
Against the Refutation
Bad things must not to be done so that good things result. But the
preaching of the law is bad. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Proof of minor premise: The law drives people to despair. I prove it
from a comparison: a doctor should not begin by aggravating a disease,
but rather should treat it with medicine. In the same way a preacher
should only comfort and not terrify.
D. M. Luther: The argument is this: to drive to despair is bad. The
law drives to despair. Therefore, the law is bad. Just as what is diseased
becomes more inflamed and enlarged when probed by the doctor, so sin
becomes more conspicuous and aggravated when the law strikes us and
Moses urges us with his rods and horns.
Response: The security and pride of this most pestilential beast are
so great that they cannot be confounded and crushed enough, so that no
matter how you oppose it, you can hardly achieve a thing. So deeply has
this whole nature been corrupted and plunged into the original sin.
Take the case of a good and faithful doctor having a stubborn and recalcitrant patient, who, even though he succumbs to a grave illness, ridicules
and laughs at all medicine, even going so far as to throw it in the doctor's
face. Here what else can the good doctor do than make him so weak with
medicines that finally neither his hands nor his feet can do a thing? In
the same way, when God the Father saw that we were held captive by the
devil to such an extent that afterwards we could not even remember
those laws which formerly he had written with his finger on the hearts
of all, he was forced to give us some Moses who would terrify our minds

and senses also with written laws in order that finally, moved by the sensation and power of the law, we might learn to beg for help and aid.
The devil, on the other hand, imitating the bad doctors, who because they are angry with sick people give them poison instead of an antidote, tricks people with his cunning, and makes them so sad and dis27439 1, 425, 8-430,11.
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couraged that, deprived of hope, they finally despair of the forgiveness of
sins, like Judas, Saul, Cain and others. For this is the nature and characteristic of the devil.
But neither the Holy Spirit nor Christ in the gospel saddens us like
that for he drives us to despair in order to save us, not to kill us. For he
exposes and reveals sin and leads you to a knowledge of yourself that you
may look to Christ the more quickly and eagerly. He says: Look, you
have been saddened and afflicted, you have been led to hell through the
law and the deadly cholera that torments you, but do not despair. The
best rhubarb [remedy] by far is here, namely Christ; take him and you will
live. As soon as he has been received by faith he immediately enters a
very great battle; the two most powerful giants enter the fray and swallow up in turn the whole world, namely the two deaths, death itself and
Christ's death. But Christ immediately shouts out: I am death's death,
hell's hell, and the devil's devil; do not be afraid, my son, I have conquered. That is just what happens and the troubled are comforted, if
ever they are struck by terror, evangelically, and on account of Christ's
death. Terror is present, even acute, depending on the person, but soon
we also hear the voice from the other direction: Be assured, my son, I
have come to save that which was lost; you will not die.
However, Satan is a bad dialectician, he does not distribute properly,
and divides even worse. He is a herald of death and despair, life and the
forgiveness of sins is obliterated. Therefore, I admonish you men, who
some day in the future will be teachers in the churches: learn and distinguish these things properly. For at some time or other, people with
troubled consciences will come to you, whom the devil harasses in an extraordinary way and permits no peace. In such a case there is no need to
sharpen the law, for they have already been struck enough by the power
of the law, and are afflicted and terrified. Rather, begin like this: My
brother, you are sad and feel the law or the wrath of God in your heart.
That is good and necessary. But, on the other hand, it is also the will of
God that you are not discouraged and tormented too much, but that you
also receive comfort and are cheered. Each of these two is the command
and will of God: to believe that by the divine law you are held under
penalty of eternal damnation, and to believe that he does not want you
to despair of his divine mercy toward you but to learn to flee, when contrite and terrified, to the mercy promised in Christ, even when you see
nothing but sin and death. For this is how God wonderfully makes his
saints, by creating life from death and righteousness from sin.
That is how the churches are to be taught, and you will sometimes
find and experience young people in the church (for we are not all
equally tempted by Satan) whom the devil holds captive and harasses so
much that sometimes they come to an unfavorable conclusion about
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their life. But see that you comfort them so: Dearest brother, in harassing
you like this, Satan is acting in his customary way, and this is how it
must be that in the end you may triumph over him the more gloriously.
But they say: God hates me, has forgotten me, and does not want me. On
the contrary, he does want you and bids you through my mouth and that
of St. Paul's to hope in him and believe that Christ died and was raised
for you, and that by his death the wrath of God the Father has been appeased, and that the Father has been reconciled to you. If you doubt and
despair here, you sin against the first commandment, which wants you
to believe that he is your God, not the enemy, not the devil, not death,
and not sin. This you should know, urge, and believe, because final
pride and final doubt are each a sin against the Holy Spirit.
And this is also the reason why God has instituted the ministry of
preaching in the church, namely, that brother may teach brother and
wherever necessary comfort him lest those terrified by the devil immediately despair. He wants us to be humbled, but on the other hand, he
also wants the humbled to be comforted. However, the stubborn and recalcitrant, or as scripture calls them, hills and mountains [Is. 40: 4], and
those who boast of their own strength, God wants to destroy and confound with his hammer [Jer. 23: 29]. For this kind of people is so hardened that they are not frightened by any law at all, by any threats, not
even by any promises, in fact not even by the examples of the flood, the
Sodomites, and the overthrow of many kings, especially of the Jews, not
to mention that even when they see death present and staring them in
the face, they are not at all terrified, nor do they know themselves, much
less can they be recalled or drawn back from this position. The power of
the devil is so great that he can harden those who boast of their own
strength to such an extent that even if they should see Sodom go up in
flames before their very eyes and the whole world submerged by a flood,
they would still not be terrified.
On the other hand, he saddens and harasses the terrified to such an
extent that if they actually heard God himself speaking from heaven,
they could scarcely accept or admit the comfort, but would howl it down
and contradict it; in fact, anything at all that is offered to them by way of
comfort they overturn. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to work as a
pastor and have the care of souls. And I frankly confess that in this matter I am often left in the lurch, I work and I fail. I cannot do it myself,
nor am I strong enough to be able to resist the devil. However, the safest
thing is to take the middle course, inclining neither too much to the
right nor to the left. Each is dangerous, and for this reason, as I have said
already, the ministry of the word was instituted, that we may teach both,
that is, law and gospel. One without the other can neither be properly
taught nor considered without danger, just as doctors should not only
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busy themselves with inquiring into diseases and showing their causes,
nor only with cures, but should see to it that both are done. Thus here
too it must be divided properly lest only one part be taught in the church,
whether fear and sorrow or comfort and joy, but both are to be taught at
the same time. For despair, if alone, is bad and is death itself. But if the
gospel is added, then it becomes evangelical despair, which is good. For
this leads us to Christ, since it is written: "The poor have the gospel
preached to them," that is, the terrified and afflicted [Matt. 11: 5].
The antinomian argumenturn is really a refutation of Luther's previous counterargument and asserts, using annother illustration from medicine,
that a doctor should not do anything to aggravate a disease, but simply administer the medicine. The substance of Luther's rejoinder is that on account of
original sin, people by nature are stubborn and refuse to believe that they are
sick and in need of medicine. Therefore, the law must first do its work in
bringing people to the point where they will let themselves be given the
medicine. However, Satan exploits the use of the law for his own destructive
purposes and hence pastors need to be careful never to separate law and
gospel so as to have only one without the other lest Satan drive people to despair. Now we examine the responsio in detail.
So deep is the corruption of human nature through the vitio originis,
that the securitas ac praesumptio of our sinful nature, which Luther calls a
pestilentissima bestia, cannot be sufficintly overcome [confundi et contundi]
in any other way than through the exercise of the law (426, 2-5). However, the
crushing work of the law is never an end in itself, but always serves the lifegiving purpose of the gospel. Luther illustrates this using the analogy of fidelis medicus and the praefractus et ferox patiens. The patient is obdurately
unaware of the seriousness of his condition [graviter decumbat] and treats the
doctor and his medicine with utter contempt [imo wirfft sie dem Arzt noch
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dem Kopffe]. In the interests of the patient's health, the bonus medicus can

only do one thing: ut medicinis eum ita debilitet, ut tandem nec manus nec
pedes quicquam possint (426, 5-9). Only after he has overcome his resistance

can the good doctor give the patient the medicine he needs. However, the
analogy breaks down at this point because God does not force his gifts on us.
Hence, Luther does not press the point but makes a different application.
Owing to our dreadful plight as a diabolo captivos teneri, we suffered
such serious amnesia that we completely forgot all those laws quas antea suo
digito in cordibus omnium scripserat, and consequently God was forced to

send some Moses275 with his leges scriptae in order that tacti sensu et vi legis
disceremus opem et auxilium implorare (426, 9-13). From this it is clear that

Luther sees no essential difference between the lex insculpta and the lex
scripta or lex lata at Sinai.276 The lex Mosi was basically a renewal or

reminder of the lex naturae and was necessitated by the fact that knowledge of
the latter had been forgotten due to the fall. This then is an important passage
275The

formulation is interesting: coactus est [scil. Deus] Mosen
aliquem dare (426, 11-12). M. Schloemann, Natiirliches and gepredigtes
Gesetz bei Luther (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1961), 105, suggests that
the Christian preacher, like Christ as interpretator legis, becomes "Moses
aliquis" who keeps God's absolute demand anew "before the eyes of people"
who always try to keep suppressing it in their heart through idolatry. He also
notes (ibid., n. 325) that through the "aliquis" Moses becomes interchangeable
with his law so that he is really only an example of the lex praedicata in general. The matter of the lex naturae, lex praedicata, and lex scripta will be taken
up again.
is the same "digitus Dei" that writes the law on the tablets of
stone and on the hearts of all people (426, 10-11).
2761t
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for documenting that in Luther the written law and the natural law are one
and the same in regard to content.277
Meanwhile, Luther says that the devil uses the (good) law for evil ends.
In this he imitates the mali medici who give the aegroti not an antidotum,
but venenum, in the hope that he will end up despairing of forgiveness like
Judas, Cain, Saul and others. On the other hand, the Holy Spirit and Christ in
the gospe1278 drive to despair causa salutis, non mortis. Again, the purpose of
the Spirit's exposing your sin is ut eo citius, eo ardentius respicias ad Christurn. He does not prolong the suffering of the contristatus and afflictus, who
have been tormented per legem et choleram nigram; rather he says to them:
noli desperare, adest reubarbarum longe optimum, scilicet Christus, hunc
accipe, et vives (426, 14-427, 4). The Christian then is caught up in this great
battle of the giants, namely, the duellum between the duae mortes, mors ipsa
et mors Christi.279 But the outcome has already been decided, Christ emerges
from the fray as mors mortis, so that anyone who is suffering pangs of conscience induced by the gospel or the death of Christ lei evangelice et Christi
277For

a fuller discussion of the relation between the lex naturae or
lex insculpta and the lex Mosi or lex scripta, see 39 I, 454, 4-16 (2 AD, Arg. 13).
278The

word Evangelium in the phrase Christus in Evangelio (426,
18) surely refers to the book of the gospel or the literary gospel rather than the
preached gospel. There is no need to resort to the difference between the
gospel in the narrow sense and the broad sense to explain Luther's phrase
here (cf. FC SD V, 27; CA Apol. IV, 62, 257; XII, 31, 45).
279This

battle is waged within the Christian and for the Christian
rather than being one in which he actively participates: Hoc per fidem recepto
[scil. Christus] statim initur duellum maximum, committuntur invicem
fortissimi gigantes, qui vel totum mundum devorarent (427, 4-6).
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more terror incuditur] is thereupon immediately reassured: noli timere, fill
mi, ego vici (427, 4-11).280
The rest of Luther's responsio is basically an admonition to the students of theology present in the audience and so constitutes a digression. It is
also a reminder that he saw these disputations as serving a valuable didactic
purpose for those preparing to be doctores ecclesiarum. In substance it has to
do with the application of law and gospel to specific pastoral situations, notably where people come to the pastor so troubled in conscience that they are
unable to believe the gospel. Luther attributes such problems to Satan and describes the people as miserae conscientiae, quas diabolus mirum in modum
exercet nec ullam quietem sinit (427, 12-16).281 He suggests that the pastor be280Here clearly the adverb "evangelice" is being used in the broad

sense and in apposition with Christi more. The message of Christ's death can
induce terror if heard as law, and it will be heard as such if it is not proclaimed as a death pro me. For a discussion of this passage, see the note in
connection with our analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 21.
281Luther's characterization of Satan as a bad dialectician
emphasizes the point that the devil will break every canon of grammar and
theology in order to confuse consciences and drive them to despair of Christ:
Verum sathan est malus dialecticus, non bene disponit, peius etiam dividit,
mortis et desperationis buccinator est, vitae et remissionis peccatorum
obliviscitur (427, 11-13). The term "disponere" refers to the rule of logic which
states that a term must be used in such a way as to refer to every member of
the class named. Hence, the argument: All men are fallible; Christ is a man;
therefore, Christ is fallible is false, for "man" is not properly distributed since
it does not accurately describe Christ who is both God and man. The term
"dividere," on the other hand, refers to the distinction between law and
gospel in theology. That means proclaiming the gospel to the penitent, telling
the despairing that God wishes them to despair only of themselves and not of
Christ, and preaching the law to the proud and secure that, humbled by his
judgment, they may be raised up by his promise of pardon. Cf. 427, 29-428, 3
(B): Sed diabolus male dividit, quia praesumentes et securos in securitate
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gins by saying to the penitent: Mi frater, to es contristatus et sentis legem seu
iram Dei in corde tuo. Bene est, sic debet fieri.282 Sed tamen e contra etiam
haec est voluntas Dei, ne nimium te afflictes aut crucies, sed consolationem
quoque admittas et exhilareris (427, 18-428, 1). He tells them to remind those
harassed by the devil that God's mandatum and voluntas are twofold, corresponding to law and gospel: not only are they to believe that they are under the
condemnation of the law on account of sin, but they are also to believe the
mercy promised in Christ. Those whom Satan has blinded by his cunning
think that God is the enemy and wills to destroy them. Therefore, pastors are
to tell the contriti et perterrefacti that they must learn to flee to the mercy
promised in Christ, even when they see nothing but sin and death (428, 1-6).
Alternatively, pastors should comfort the penitent this way: Charissime
frater, quod sic te exercet sathan, facit pro suo more, et sic oportet fieri, ut tandem ei gloriosius triumphes. And when he objects that God has forgotten
him and cast him aside, they are to reassure him that, on the contrary, he is
dear to him, and that God bids him through the mouth of his pastor, and that
of St. Paul, to believe that through Christ's death and resurrection, his wrath
obfirmat, pavidos vero, qui opus habent consolatione, magis perterrefacit, ut
eos terroribus et aeterna morte opprimat.
282These

seelsorgerlich words are not a proclamation of the law.
Rather, they are intended to make it clear to the penitent that his Anfechtung
stems from his acute sensus legis. This acknowledgement of the effectus legis
immediately prepares the ground for the comfort of the gospel. We might
add further that it is important to interpret the experientia legis so that people
do not simply explain it away psychologically, but understand it theologically
as the revelation of God's judgment on sin. Therefore, in the special situation of Anfechtung the two words of law and gospel can still be spoken, but in
different ways: one (law) is an interpretation, the other (gospel) a proclamation.
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has been placated and that he, the Father, has been reconciled (428, 11-16). On
the other hand, he must be told that refusal to believe this is finally pride and
constitutes a sin against the first commandment and the Holy Spirit.283
Luther points out that this is why God instituted the ministerium praedicandi
in Ecclesia: ut frater fratrem doceat ac ubicunque opus sit consoletur, ne statim
a diabolo perterrefacti desperent (429, 1-4).284
Luther then goes on to give examples of the power of the devil which
manifests itself in two different ways: he hardens people to such an extent
that they are not at all frightened by the law, threats or even death; on the
other hand, he can terrify the contrite so much that they refuse to be comforted by the promises of the gospel (429, 7-19). In the face of all this Luther
frankly confesses the extreme difficulty agere pastorem et curam animarum,
and his own inability to resist the devil by himself. His advice therefore is
this: Est autem tutissimum media via incedere, neque nimium ad dextram
283See 428, 16-17:

Hic si dubitaveris ac desperaveris, peccas contra
primum praeceptum; and 428, 19-429, 1 (addressed to the students): Hoc iam
scire et urgere debetis et credere, quia et finalis praesumptio et finalis dubitatio
utraque est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.
ministerium praedicandi here seems to refer specifically to
holy absolution in private confession before the pastor, whereas the words below about the via media probably refer to the public preaching of law and
gospel, which is always more difficult because the pastor does not know the
exact situation of his hearers. In such a case he must always preach both law
and gospel, being careful to distinguish but not separate them; see Luther's
critique of the antinomians in 39 I, 574, 5-575, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 36/9). On the ministerium praedicandi, cf. SA III/IV (Vom Evangelio), where speaking the
gospel per mutuum colloquium et consolationem fratrum is included among
the means of grace (BSLK, 449). That Luther understands this as private confession and absolution is clear from SA III/VIII, where he explicates it under
the heading Von der Beicht (BSLK, 453).
284The
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neque ad sinistram declinare.285 That this is not merely a piece of
Aristotelian ethics is clear from what follows where he relates it to the
preaching of the law and the gospel: Alterum sine altero non potest
commodo doceri nec sine periculo tractari. Just as doctors should concern
themselves with both the cause of the disease and its cure, so pastors must not
neglect either law or gospel. Luther especially warns about the need to divide
properly lest only one part (law or gospel) be taught instead of both at the
same time [utrumque simull. The simul here does not connote confusion of
law and gospel, but vis-à-vis the antinomian rejection of the law, it means
that the gospel must not be preached without the law. By the same token, the
law must never be preached without the gospel for that leads only to despair,
which, left to itself, becomes diabolical. On the other hand, sin autem accedat
Evangelium despair becomes evangelical, which is good for it leads us to
Christ (430, 8-10).
Argument 3286
Contra 48
Take away the effect and you take away what actually caused it. The
effect of the law has ceased. Therefore, the law itself has ceased, and as a
consequence it is to be abolished and removed.
D. M. Luther: It is a good argument and to the point. When a thing
actually ceases, its effect also ceases, just as a builder ceases from once the
house has been completed and the thing done. But the effect of the law
has ceased, that is, the reason why it was law, because Christ has borne all
sin. Therefore, the law has ceased.
Response: We concede the whole argument. Where sin ceases the
law ceases, and to the extent that sin has ceased the law has ceased, just as
Ovid's Metamorphoses (2, 137): "in medio tutissimus ibis,"
noted in the Nachtreige, 39 II, 428, to p. 429, 22. The parallel was found by
Buchwald.
285Cf.

28639 I, 430, 14-435, 13.
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in the future life the law has to cease unconditionally because then it will
have been fulfilled. For no trace of sins will be left there, nor any sin
which could be accused by the law. So also in this life the office of the
law has already ceased insofar as sin is dead. Furthermore, it ceases
among Christians in two ways: first, imputatively. When I receive the
forgiveness of sins on account of faith in Christ, I am also wholly free
from sin, as if there were no sin, as if we were already in heaven. For it
is taken away through Christ, as Isaiah [9: 3] says: The yoke of the burden
and the rod of the exactor, or that exaction of the law by which we are all
condemned. Thus since we have Christ who swallows up our sin in his
own body and removes the rod of the exactor, the sin in us is completely
removed and truly ceases, but imputatively, not because we have thus
merited this.
Following on from this, we observe that sin also ceases in us a second way, formally. Although some remnants of every kind of sin still
cling to us—sins against both the First and Second Table, such as lack of
trust, vanity, fear, and doubt287 toward God, as well as despair; also sins
of anger, concupiscence, hatred, and hostility etc.—nevertheless, sin ceases
in us formally because we intercede for these before God the Father,
through Christ Jesus, saying or praying: Forgive us, Father in heaven,
our debts, and he forgives the sins of those who ask him, according to
this word of John: If we, on our part, confess our sins, God is faithful and
just to forgives us our sins [1 John 1: 9]. And indeed it is in this way that
sin is removed formally and expurgatively because here from day to day I
more and more cleanse and mortify the sin that still inheres in my flesh,
until finally all this belonging to the old self is removed and destroyed,
and a pure and blameless person emerges, without any stain or blemish.
But it does not follow from this that the law therefore is not to be taught,
because the common people, for the most part, are recalcitrant, proud,
rude, and deceitful, wild, and boastful, and without the preaching of the
law they would never get to know about their vices and sins. In fact the
saints themselves need the law as a kind of instructor since there is a
continual battle being waged in them between the spirit and the flesh
(Rom. 7 [: 23]): I perceive another law in my flesh at war with the law of
my mind etc. But it is only for the saints and believers that this is not
imputed on account of Christ and because he fights against sins lest they
allow sin to rule. Thus saints are under the law and without the law.
It must also be carefully noted that there is a difference between an
empty law, on the one hand, whether quiescent or simply taken for
287Hermelink (ibid., 432, n. 1) notes that all the MSS have the error
"dilectionis."
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granted, and a law that accuses us or the autograph of the decree written
on our minds, on the other. As for the angels and saints in heaven, the
law is an empty speech for they do the things of the law with joy, and in
them the law motivates less than any ciphers. But with us that is not the
case. Rather it is an effective thing, which pricks and burns the heart so
much that one would despair if comfort had not been provided from
elsewhere. It is a law that accuses and frightens us, as Augustine says:
The letter is law without grace. In the same way those 10, 000 talents in
Matthew 18 [: 23ff], entered into the register or book of accounts, are in
themselves nothing but empty ciphers, a kind of barren and miserable
arithmetic devoid of substance. But for the person who owes the money
(and that is all of us), they are not empty or of no account, as supposed,
because they especially vex my conscience, harass me beyond measure,
and give me no peace day or night. But yet when some rich person
comes along with a sack full of gold and silver coins, which are not
empty ciphers but solid, the ciphers are satisfied. Thus Christ came to us
and redeemed us from those 10, 000 talents and ciphers that pricked our
conscience, paying in excess with sterling silver and genuine gold coins,
that is, with his precious blood, as Peter says [1 Peter 1: 19]. Whenever we
speak about the law we are not talking about an empty law and ciphers,
as can the angels, since they know no law at all and are without the law,
but about a law that accuses, holds us accountable, and makes demands.
However, as I have said, we are also free from this law in a twofold
way, and it ceases through Christ for he fulfills that emptiness, and I in
him. Firstly, imputatively, since my sins against the law are not imputed
to me and are pardoned, on account of the precious blood of the spotless
lamb, Jesus Christ my Lord. Then expurgatively, since, after the Holy
Spirit is given to me, I begin in earnest to hate everything that offends
his name and to pursue good works. And if any remnant of sin is left in
me, I purge it out until I become wholly clean, and I do this by the same
Spirit who has been given on account of Christ. Therefore, for us to try
to pay the law out would be an exercise in futility because we do not have
the coins, according to the reckoning of the arithmeticians, to satisfy it.
But here Christ has come in our place, makes good what we lack, and by
his blood erases the autograph of the decree which stood against us [Col.
2: 14], until finally the law was satisfied by the one in the place of us all.
That is what we call the law. Formally, sin is removed when it is cleaned
out and evacuated, likewise the law itself formally ceases when its demand is fulfilled in us and we do it spontaneously and willingly, not so
much because of the law demands it as out of a love for righteousness,
for what is upright, and for God himself. A law is empty which does not
have what it demands or convicts, because people do by nature what it
requires, just as that law, "be fruitful" is empty for a fruitful and fruit-
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bearing tree because it produces fruit by nature. Here the law has no
greater efficacy than wax or ciphers made with chalk in paying off a debt;
such is the law for the angels themselves. On the other hand, a law is effective which demands, accuses, and damns those who are subject to it
but do not satisfy it. Such is the law for humans beings, but Christ has
paid the whole debt, once for all, which kept us under obligation to the
law, and has made satisfaction for us so that, although the law is otherwise effective in our case, it is nevertheless empty and has ceased for us
also, and that in two ways, first imputatively, and then formally and expurgatively (as we said before). Therefore, I concede what the argument
implies, namely, that the law has ceased; nevertheless, how that is to be
understood is not explained.
Luther's responsio, which again is fairly lengthy, is not so much a refutation of the antinomian argumentum as an elaboration and clarification, for
he agrees with it in principle. The weakness of the antinomian position, and
the reason they can argue for the abolition of the law, is their failure to understand the Christian as simul iustus et peccator. The main theological point
undergirding the whole discussion is that for Christians the law ceases in two
ways: imputatively, and then formally and expurgatively. This in turn is
based on the premise that in quantum cessavit peccatum, tantum cessavit lex
(431, 5-6). The kernel of Luther's argument is this: In this life sin still remains, even in the saints, but is forgiven imputatively, propter fidem in
Christum; however, by the power of the Spirit and prayer it also begins to
cease formally in that sin is gradually expelled, but this will only happen fully
in the future life. Let us turn now to our analysis of Luther's responsio.
In the futura vita there will be no lex accusans only the lex impleta because the law will have nulla citatrix peccatorum to accuse. In hac vita however, although sin has been forgiven propter Christum per fidem, it has not
been removed. Therefore, Luther formulates his statements very carefully
when he says: Ha et in hac vita eatenus cessavit iam officium legis, quatenus
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peccatum fuerit mortuum (431, 8-9). The phrase eatenus . . . quatenus288 does

not imply a progressive justification because Luther plainly says that propter
fidem in Christum we receive the forgiveness of sins and are entirely free

from sin. He also says that sins are removed, and hence the sceptrum
exactoris (Is. 9: 3) or exactio legis, because we have Christum devorantem in
suo corpore peccatum nostrum et sceptrum exactoris auferentem. This work

of Christ for us which is received by us per fidem, or as Luther says, imputative, represents the first of two ways in which sin is removed (431, 10-17).

Secondly, it is removed, or begun to be removed, formaliter289 and expurgative, because hic de die in diem magis ac magis expurgo et mortifico peccatum adhuc haerens in came mea, donec hoc tandem totum, quod est veteris
hominis, tollatur et consumatur et evadat purus et clarificatus homo absque
omni macula ac labe (432, 741).290 However, it is of the utmost importance to
288For

other instances of this phrase, see the notes to 1 AD, Arg. 12.

289The

word formaliter is a term from Aristotelian logic which was
taken over by the medieval scholastics and used in their fourfold schema of
causality. The causa formalis (whence formaliter) is the third cause, following
the causa efficiens (the effective cause or agent of the change) and the causa
materialis (the material cause, the substantial basis of the change, the materia
on which the causa efficiens operates). The causa formalis, or formal cause, is
the essentia or quidditas of the thing caused and is determinative of what it is
to be. The final cause, or causa finalis, is the ultimate purpose for which a
thing is made or an act performed. In the logic of causality, the final cause
takes precedence over the material and formal causes; that is, the end determines the means. We note also Luther uses the terms formaliter, substantialiter and realiter interchangeably; cf. e. g.: 39 I, 95, 16-18 (hist., Arg. 6): Nos
autem hic dicimus, quod peccatum originale, quamquam est remissum imputative, et ita submovetur, ut non imputetur, tamen non tollitur substantialiter aut realiter . . . .
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observe, if we are not to misunderstand Luther's doctrine of sanctification,
that the above sentence is really tightly connected to, dependent on, and descriptive of, the preceeding one (431, 18-432, 7) in which he describes the cessation of sin in us formaliter in terms of justification and forgiveness. The
formulation here is most instructive. He says that although reliquiae omnis
generis peccatorum et contra primam et secundam tabulam still cling to us,
nevertheless, sin ceases in us formally because we intercede for them before
God [pro istis interpellamus apud Deum patrem] asking his forgiveness in the
name of Christ, as we do each time we pray the Fifth Petition of the Lord's
Prayer, or because we confess our sins and receive his forgiveness according to
the promise of 1 John 1: 9. It is clear from this that Luther sees sanctification
predicated on justification, and the formal removal of sin or the cessation of
sin (in the sense of 1 John 3: 6: ncic 6 iv aQn givcov ovx agapicivei) as nothing more than the application to the credentes of the forgiveness of sins per
fidem in Christo. In other words, the active subject in sanctification is Christ
and the Holy Spirit, and when Luther speaks of our involvement, he usually
qualifies it by linking it with the power or agency of the Spirit.291 He makes
290Cf. 39 I, 112, 3-6 (Iust., Arg. 19): . . . sed debemus expurgari et
crescere de die in diem in bonis operibus, et tamen scire, quod vivimus sub
misericordia, ubi habemus pacem conscientiae. Cf. also 113, 22-23 (hist., Arg.
20); 177, 11-12 (De horn., Th. 39) where Luther also speaks about the possibility
of spiritual regression; 236, 11-13 (PT, Arg. 17); 439, 3-6 (2 AD, Arg. 5), 510, 1-17
(3 AD, Arg. 4); 551, 6-7 (3 AD, Arg. 25).
291Sanctification could be described as the purification [expurgare] of
the Christian or the Spirit-led battle against the reliquiae peccati or the flesh
(cf. the regressus ad baptismum as dying to the old and rising to the new) and
is really part of the lifelong repentance of the Christian. This purifying or expurgative work is mostly ascribed to the Holy Spirit (see here 434, 8-12, discussed below). Luther often talks about faith fighting against the remnants of
sin in the flesh: see e.g. 39 I, 356, 23-24 (Am, V, Th. 43); 398, 24-399, 1 (1 AD,
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this clear a little later when he says that there are two reasons for the nonimputation of sins, first, propter Christum, secondly, because Christ himself
fights against sin: quod pugnat [scil. Christusl pugnat cum peccatis, nec patiantur dominare peccatum (432, 17- 433, 11292 Although Luther says that
more and more expurgo et mortifico peccatum adhuc haerens in came mea,
donec hoc tandem totum, quod est veteris hominis, tollatur et consummatur
. . . (432, 8-10), this does not mean that we become quantitatively less and less
sinful to the point where we could actually attain perfection in this life.293
This idea must be rejected because sinless perfection is an eschatological reality and will only be attained in the vita futura when, after the final removal
of all sins and the destruction of what is vetus in the vetus homo, each Christian will appear purus et clarificatus homo absque omni macula a labe (cf.
Eph. 5: 26-27). Nevertheless, Luther at the same times certainly expects a real
Arg. 21); 474, 17-20 (2 AD, Arg. 21); 493, 6-9; 494, 8-13 (3 AD, Praef.); 513, 1-7 (3
AD, Arg. 5).
292Luther

also makes the connection between justification and
sanctification clear when he begins his statement in 432, 7-11 about how sin
ceases in us formaliter with the words: Atque hoc modo, which refer to the
preceeding sentence in 431, 18-432, 7 with its statement about justification.
2930. 435, 20-23 (B):

deinde replet [scil. Christus] etiam [legem] per
Spiritum sanctum in nobis, quia quando credimus in eum, dat nobis Spiritum sanctum, qui inchoat hic in nobis novam et aeternam obedientiam, sed
in resurrectione mortuorum perficiendam. On the other hand, there can be
no doubt from the way Luther expresses himself that he does expect real
growth in holiness and the fruit of the Spirit in the Christian, in the same
way as a good tree cannot but bear good fruit. However, it is the Spirit's fruit,
which he produces in us, just as the life of the baptized is Christ's own life
lived out in them (cf. Gal. 2: 20). Note also how when Luther talks about impletio legis formaliter or peccatum expurgare et mortificare, he always does so
in connection with the operation of the Holy Spirit. This will be discussed further in connection with the later arguments.
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growth in holiness, for after having received pardon for sins imputative, he
says that I then [deinde] receive the gift of the Holy Spirit and begin expurgative to hate everything that offends his name and to pursue good works, and

if any remnant of sin is left in me, id expurgo, donec totus mundus fiam,
atque hoc in eodem spiritu, qui datus est propter Christum (434, 6-12).294 By

the same token, we know in advance that when he says: donec totus mundus
fiam Luther does not mean that I actually become altogether pure and holy al-

ready in this life in a verifiable way.295 Hence, it can only refer to the gracious
294Cf.

39 I, 99, 25-29 (hist., Arg. 8): Primum enim purificat

imputative, deinde dat spiritum sanctum, per quem etiam substantialiter
purgamur. Fides purgat per remissionem peccatorum, spiritus sanctus purgat
per effectum. Haec est mundificatio et purificatio divina, quae de coelo
demittitur, sed per fidem et spiritum sanctum (emphasis ours). Sometimes
Luther omits the primum and at other times he will substitute insuper for
deinde. Regardless of the variations in terminology, the first part corresponds
to justification (Christ fulfills the law pro nobis, extra nos, and prop ter
Christum per fidem, God deems [reputare] that we have fulfilled it
imputative), and the second to sanctification (Christ fulfills the law in nobis,
per Spiritum sanctum). Hence, these two terms and the facts they represent,

while they must be distinguished, should not be understood in a temporal
sequence, for they belong together, although the second always presupposes
and grows out of the first. For other occurrences of the primum-deinde
Begriffspaar (whether fully or partially expressed), see 39 I, 372, 19-373, 4 (1 AD,
Arg. 6) where the deinde signals the gift of the Spirit through whom we can
delight in the law and who gives us the will to keep it; 380, 2-5 (1 AD, Arg. 12)
where the insuper signals the Spirit who enables us to begin keeping the law
already here; 383, 5-10 (1 AD, Arg. 14). In 1 AD, Arg. 15 the primum-deinde
contrast refers to something quite different: the twofold [duplex] way in which
unbelievers sin.
295Cf.

39 I, 444, 4-6 (2 AD, Arg. 7): In Christo tamen imputative habe-

mus perfectam impletionem, ut in hac vita expurgative non possumus perfecte mundari, propter peccatum habitans in came nostra. The antinomians,
on the other hand, thought that sin in its entirety was removed formaliter in
this life already as we see from the fifth Thesenreihe: 46. Videtur satis aperte,
Antinomos opinari, peccatum esse formaliter et philosophice seu iuridice
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appropriation and reception of the forgiveness of sins which I am given imputative through faith. We cannot satisfy the law ourselves even as iusti,
quia wir haben der miintz nicht nach der Arithmetiken, but we can cling in
faith to Christ who fulfilled it pro nobis and loco omnium nostrum by paying
our debt in excess296 with the gold and silver of his most precious blood (433,
1749).
A few deductions from the above seem to be in order. We have observed that Luther keeps the imputative and formaliter et expurgative aspects
of the cessation of sin together. The formaliter presupposes and grows out of
the imputative, and yet the latter would wither like a fruitless tree if it did not
realize itself in a holy life, for there can be no justification without sanctification. At the same time, our sanctification, real as it is to be, will never take us
beyond the point where holiness can be anything other than the forgiveness
of sins, or where we become the active subjects rather than the Christ= in
nobis who lives his life in and through us. It follows then that in this life our
progressus (our word not Luther's) in sanctification will never approach perfect holiness in ourselves because there is no sinlessness this side of heaven,
only the forgiveness of sin's propter fidem in Christum. Rather, any growth
in holiness will lead Christians ever and again to the confession of sins and
the continual reappropriation of forgiveness through the means of grace.
sublatum per Christum; and again 48. Relative enim, non formaliter aut substantialiter est peccatum sublatum, lex abolita, mors destructa (356, 27-32). See
Arg. 7 for more on the imputative-formaliter contrast.
296Note

that the idea of paying the law out in excess (here mit
truckenen taler unnd guten gulden bar uber bezalet) is an important and
characteristic emphasis of Luther's when he talks about Christ's fulfillment of
the law.
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Now it is precisely because the ongoing expurgation of sin in the baptized is nothing other than living in daily repentance297 (cf. 2 Cor. 4: 10: IrcivTOTE ThV

viicpw 01V to 111Cia EV T) CidjIan irepul)ipovrec, iva

Kth n Cwn Tov

Incroi5 iv ToT aoigari luSiv Over:1636o that Christians still need the law: Imo
ipsi sancti opus habent lege quasi monitore quodam, cum perpetuum bellum
sit in eis spiritus et carnis, Rom 7 [: 23] (432, 14-16). This is an important
statement, if only because of his use of the phrase monitor quidam. The word
monitor can denote a prompter, adviser, or instructor. Thus, Luther maintains that the sancti need the law to guide or instruct them in the ongoing battle with the flesh for they are sub lege et sine lege (433, 1). Although he does
not further explicate the role of the law in the vita christiana, it seems clear
that the accent here again falls on the second use or usus theologicus. This
certainly does not exclude the fact that the law as monitor may also instruct
Christians in spiritual warfare and in what good works are pleasing to God,
but it appears that Luther envisages no special didactic use of the law for the
sancti which is separate from the primary usus legis as lex arguens (in the
double sense of exposing and accusing sins). This is clear from the final words
297j

39 I, 396, 10-13 (1 AD, Arg. 21) Luther brings into very close
connection the indicative of Christ's substitutionary atonement for us and the
imperative of sanctification: Durat ergo piorum poenitentia per totam vitam.
Hinc Paulus ait, nos habere agnum pro nobis oblatum Christum, per quem
sumus puri absque fermento, et tamen interim iubet nos expurgare vetus
fermentum (emphasis ours). 113, 26-114, 3 (Iust., Arg. 20) is a very instructive
passage because here Luther mentions the instrumenta of purification: Nam
quotidie orare, quotidie audire et meditari verbum et accedere ad sacramenturn etpurgare saniem et putredinem [sic] debemus; ergo debemus uti his instrumentis, ut purgemur, mundemur ex sanie peccati, donec vere et prorsus
purgetur. Cf. 112, 3-4 (Iust. 19); 204, 23-24 (PT, Th. 39); 236, 11-13 (PT, Arg. 17);
350, 24-27 (Am, III, Th. 9, 10).
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of the sentence just prior to where he talks about the law as monitor: nec sine
praedicatione legis sua [scil. vulgus] vitia et peccata unquam cognosceret (432,
13-14). Even among believers sins cannot be recognized without the law 298
Luther distinguishes between a lex vacua and a lex efficax, the former
applies to the saints and angels in heaven, the latter to sinners on earth. We
have already seen him make a similar sort of distinction in the First Disputation when he argued that the law was eternal, not as lex but as res,299 for here
the law is still lex implenda, but there purely lex impleta.30° That is just another way of saying what he says here: in heaven the law will remain, but
only as the fulfilled law because its demand will then be perfectly satisfied so
that it will no longer be an operative law, which is always lex accusans, reos
agens et lex exactrix (434, 3-4). Hence Luther calls it a lex vacua, whether quiescens or simpliciter sumpta, and distinguishes it from the lex accusans nos
seu chirographum decreti scriptum in mentibus nostris (433, 1-5). Furthermore, for the saints and angels in heaven the law is a mere oratio vacua, for
298When Luther says in 433, 1 that Christians are sub lege et sine
lege, he means they are sub lege quoad peccatores, while on the other hand
sine lege quoad sanctos. Christians are no longer sub lege (and Paul in Gal. 5:
1 warns them against falling back into slavery under the law) because sin is no
longer regnant but is now ruled. Cf. Rom. 6: 14: aitaptia yap vµwv Pi)
ruptetioet• oi) yap Eat' ince %/alloy axx« tenth Xciptv.
299See 39 I, 413, 17 (1 AD, Arg. 34).

"Christ has already fulfilled the law for us so that in faith we can
already regard the law as lex impleta; however, for our flesh it still remains a
lex implenda, which we ourselves will only completely fulfill in heaven after
the flesh has been destroyed.
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they do it cum gaudio so that they are not motivated by it301 in the slighest

[minus agit in illis lex quam ullae cyphrae]. For us, on the other hand, the
law is a res efficax, pungens ac urens cor. Luther quotes Augustine here as
saying: Litera est lex sine gratia and goes on to illustrate this with the 10, 000
talents of the parable in Matt. 18: 23-35.302 The ciphers as a book entry are vac-

uae cyphrae et infelix et misera quaedam arithmetica, ut cui rerum nihil subsit, but to a debtor, on the other hand, they are not vacuae neque de nihilo,
but vex and harass the conscience without limit until some aliquis dives
comes along and satisfies the ciphers with res solidae.303 As we have had
occasion to observe before, Luther does not say that Christ simply paid the
debt on our behalf, but he stresses that he paid far in excess of what he had to,
and furthermore that he paid in the best silver and gold, that is, with his
precious blood (cf. 1 Peter 1: 18-19) (433, 5-434, 1). Alternatively, he can also say
301For

the saints here on earth the story is different; while they
delight in the law lc at& Eau) 'dvepui no v (Rom. 7: 22), the flesh rebels against it
and must be coerced by threats, punishments and promises.
302Augustine,

"Enarratio in Psalmum LXX," 1, 19; Opera 4 (MPL 35,
888). Unlike the mature Luther, Augustine puts the gospel under the Oberbegriff of lex so that he distinguishes between the law without grace and the law
with grace = lex spiritualis. Although Luther cites him here he has long
parted with his notion of spiritus et littera.
B understands the lex vacua in a different light. For sinners the law exigens is empty and demands fulfillment, whereas for the saints
the lex is impleta and hence not vacua: Lex certe quando ad nos non est impleta, sed est vacua, ideo accusat nos et exigit sui impletione . . . Quomodo
enim vacuae ciphrae vexant debitorem, quando non potest solvere debitum,
ita lex est vacua litera seu ciphrae vacuae poscentes a nobis impletionem (433,
22-434, 20). This is the opposite of what Luther states in 434, 1-2 (A) where he
notes that when we speak about the law (as sinners), non loquimur de vacua
lege et cyphris, like the saints can do in heaven.
303Version
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that Christ's substitutionary action [in nostrum locum or per unum loco
omnium nostrum] did what we lacked304 [supplet, quod nobis deest] when
with his blood he wiped out the handwriting of the decree describing our
indebetness, an obvious allusion to the lex scripta of the law of Moses [et suo
sanguine delet chirographum decreti, quod erat contra nos].305
It is worth noting in passing that more often than not it seems that
Luther prefers to describe Christ's atonement as satisfying the demands of the
law. Earlier he spoke of Christ redeeming us from the lex accusans, reos agens
et exactrix (the 10, 000 talents and ciphers that pricked our conscience) by paying with his blood (433, 17-434, 4); here he says the same; not that Christ conquers the law (although that is the thrust of Col. 2: 14-15), but that he cancels
the debt [chirographum decreti] until finally satisfactum sit legi per unum
loco omnium nostrum (434, 14-16).305
3o4This phrase is reminiscent of Paul's words in Rom. 8: 3: TO yCzp
aenSvaTov Toi5 vOgov iv rjaeivet oax ttic crapiccic, eiec TON, icruToili viOv
netultac iv ogoictitian crapick ap.airciac . .
305Luther here has in mind Col. 2: 14 where Paul describes Christ's
over the law: Waifijrac Tb KO' hp.av xitpaypacimv Toic bantam v \v

victory
inrEvavtiov

306See also 435, 8-10, where Luther says of the law: Christus semel
omne debitum, quo legi sumus obligati, exsolvit ac pro nobis satisfecit. Not
that Luther cannot also speak of the atonement in terms of the Christus victor
motif. Perhaps the classic passage is 39 I, 427, 4-8 (2 AD, Arg. 2) where Christ,
once received in faith, enters the fray and fights death to the death. But it is
instructive to note that even here it is not the law that Christ engages in mortal combat, but death (and then by extension hell and the devil, for his victory
cry is: Mors mortis, infernus inferni, diabolus diaboli ego sum). In 431, 14-16
(1 AD, Arg. 28) Luther speaks of Christ devouring sin in his own body, and
removing the sceptrum exactoris (an allusion to the law). Of course we need
to remember that for him there is a close nexus between sin, death, Satan and
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The final section of the responsio is a summary in itself. While keeping a fine balance between these two parts, Luther surprisingly puts the stress
on the imputative aspect, even though one might expect it to fall on the formaliter and expurgative side since this is the side that is most in danger of becoming lost among the antinomians. This testifies to Luther's strong conviction that without the imputation there would be no evangelical expurgation.
Formally, sin is removed quando ipsum expurgatur et evacuatur, just as the
law itself ceases when we do what it demands, spontaneously and willingly
[ultro et volentes] 307—and now comes the gospel motivation for keeping the
law, which the antinomians wanted to stress exclusively--non tarn, quia lex
exigit, quam ex amore iustitiae et recti et Dei ipsius.308 Again, as we have already seen, when the law receives it due, as it does per Christurn, it ceases to
be a lex efficax and becomes a lex vacua, a toothless tiger, so to speak, which is
no more effective in driving people to obedience than wax or chalk ciphers
are in paying off a debt [quam cera, seu ciphrae creta factae in solvendo debito].
This is the law of the saints in heaven. Luther cites as an example of a lex
vacua the law of growth rooted in God's creative command which he first uttered when he created the world: 'fereas fructum." This lex, as Luther says, is
the law. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that when he speaks of the law within
the framework of the atonement, he is more likely to speak in legal terms, especially that of making satisfaction.
307Luther often says that the new life flowing out of faith is spontaneous: see 39 I, 46, 28-30 (De fide, Th. 34): Fatemur opera bona fidem sequi debere, imo non debere, Sed sponte sequi, Sicut arbor bona non debet bonos
fructus facere, Sed sponte facit; cf. 250, 4-5 (PT, Arg. 28); 283, 17-18 (VN, Arg.
6/7); 321, 11 (VN, Arg. 43/40); 354, 3-6 (Am, IV, Ths. 35-36).
308See ch. 2 for background on the antinomian teaching that repen-

tance is to arise ex amore Dei or ex iustitia Dei.
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vacua for arbor foecunda et pomifera, because they produce their fruit natura
sua and need no command.309 We, of course, are not like that, but because of
the reliquiae peccati we need the lex exigens et arguens, which drives, accuses,
and damns. Yet on the other hand, we have been liberated from the lex accusans et condemnans already, so that propter fidem per Christum or imputative, we can say: ut quamquam alioqui efficax apud nos lex, vacua sit tamen et
cessarit nobis quoque (emphasis ours).
Argument 4310
Contra 10
Paul says in Gal. 5 [: 181: If you are led by the Spirit you are not under
the law. But the church is led by the Spirit. Therefore, the church is not
under the law.
Response: This is an argument I have already mentioned. We are
not under the law, that is, the law that accuses us, just as it is incorrect to
say that angels are under the law, for they satisfy the law in all points,
and they do this spontaneously by their nature, which leads them to do
this, not because the law demands it. Therefore, the law cannot accuse
an angel. But in a different way, neither are we under the law nor can it
accuse us, because it has already been fulfilled by an alien righteousness,
that is Christ's, and this in the name of all of us. This therefore is my
head, that is, Christ, and since he is continually with me, I do not worry
much about the disturbing law.
My second response is this: we are not under the accusing law. For
having received the Holy Spirit, we begin to loathe and hate sin, and to
purge this out with the help of the Holy Spirit, not assenting to sin, but
fighting against it. Since however the sin that we have is of such a kind
that it does not rule, but rather is compelled to serve me for good, what is
it that we fear or that causes us grief? For we have the sure testimony of
the Holy Spirit in our hearts, that on account of Christ our sins have
been certainly pardoned, for he has given me his fulfillment. Next, there
309FC

SD VI uses similar examples from the world of nature and
the nature of the planets to describe analogically how Christians qua saints do
things with a free and merry spirit, spomtaneously, without any instruction,
exhortation, or outward coertion (see BSLK, 964 et passim).
31039

I, 435, 16-437, 3.

292
is the testimony that even if occasion, place, and time permit me to engage in fornication, adultery, theft etc. without any disgrace or penalty, I
nevertheless do not do it. Here in fact and in myself I know that the
Holy Spirit dwells in my heart and is at work there.
Luther's two part responsio is basically a short summary of his much
longer response to the previous argumenturn. The antinomians argue that
Christians are not under the law, taking as their sedes Paul's words in Galatians 5: 18: El 45'c irveliLtan dyecree, ()ASK koie unto veittov. Luther clarifies that by
saying that we are not under the law in the sense of the lex accusans. This is
true in two ways: first, because it has already been fulfilled vicariously by the
aliens iustitia, id est, Christi, et hoc omnium nostrum nomine.311 The law
cannot accuse angels either, but for a different reason: they fulfill it perfectly
ultra natura sua, and not because the law demands it (436, 1-8). The second
reason [Deinde etiam respondeo secundo] why, according to Luther, Christians are free from the lex accusans is because after they have received the
Spirit they begin to fight against sin and expel it: Recepto enim Spiritu sancto
incipimus detestari peccatum et odisse, expurgamusque hoc ipsum adiuvante
Spiritu sancto, and one of the ways in which we clean out the sin is by non
consentientes peccato, sed repugnantes (436, 8-11).312 However, even the
311Cf. 436, 20 (B): Non estis sub lege, primum imputative propter
Christum. As we noted already in connection with the last argument, Rel. B
sees the law in the Pauline sense (lex accusans) as empty: Nam Paulus per
legem intelligit legem vacuam, non impletam (436, 19).
312Cf. 436, 22-25 (B): Deinde et vos ductu Spiritus sancti incipitis
satisfacere legi, atque ita non estis sub lege imputative, neque formaliter . . . .
The impletio legis happens in a twofold way (as we saw in the last Argument), the first by imputation of Christ's alien righteousness, see 39 I, 203, 1617 (PT, Th. 17); 235, 17-236, 8 (PT, Arg. 17); 242, 20-23 (PT, Arg. 23); the second
by the working of the Holy Spirit in us and with us: see 380, 5-6 (1 AD, Arg.
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reliquiai peccati that are to be expelled no longer rule believers, but are rather
compelled to serve our good. The saints may still feel carnal impulses, yet
they no longer follow their evil promptings, but instead fight against them (cf.
Rom. 7: 20). Therefore, Luther exclaims, since we are under the control of the
Spirit and not of our flesh, what have we to fear from sin [quid est, quod
timeamus aut doleamusl.
Luther closes his responsio by offering two reasons why we have nothing to fear from the reliquiae peccati which still clings to us. First, we have
the sure testimony of the Holy Spirit in our hearts, [certum testimonium
Spiritus sancti in cordibus nostris] that propter Christum, our sins have certainly [certo] been pardoned, for he has given us his impletio as a gift (436, 1315). Here the Spirit's testimonium points us to Christ's work of justification
extra nos as the abiding ground of our confidence before God. Secondly, we
also have the testimonium of the Spirit pointing to his own work of sanctifi12): Insuper [Christus] dat Spiritum sanctum, ut incipiamus hic implere, in
futura vita erimus similes impletores Christo; cf. 236, 11-13 (PT, Arg. 17); 373,
1-6 (1 AD, Arg. 6); 468, 14-469, 3 (2 AD, Arg. 16). The first happens through
faith, the second through love: 203, 14-15 (PT. Th. 16): Lex igitur dupliciter
impletur, scilicet per fidem et charitatem. The first is already perfect, the
second is still imperfect and will only be perfected after death: see 39 II, 214, 4-8
(Marb., Arg. 15): Fides heist ann sich selbst iustitia perfecta, et e contra charitas
imperfecta. Nos autem oportet habere iustitiam perfectam. Linde ergo habemus, cum charitas sit imperfecta? R.: Per Christum, qui iustitiam habet perfectissimam, et nos earn applicamus fide; 39 I, 241, 25-27 (PT, Arg. 22): Sic
duplex erit iustitia, perfecta, quae est imputatione perfecta, imperfecta, quae
per suam naturam ita est, et haec est ex operibus nostris, non ex fide; cf. 443,
25 444, 18 (2 AD, Arg. 7) (B): Iustificatio et impletio legis debent fieri, sed
utraque est duplex, perfecta et imperfecta. Perfecta impletio aut perfecta
iustificatio est, quae nobis imputatur propter Christ= fide. Imperfecta impletio legis est, quando Spiritus sanctus incipit formaliter implere legem in
nobis, seu quando per Spiritum sanctum nos incipimus implere legem. Cf.
208, 9-19 (PT, Arg. 3; the respondent is not named).
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cation within us, to the effect that even if the opportunity [occasio, locus,
tempus] arose to indulge in carnal sin, theft, etcetera with impunity [sine
omni infamia aut poena], we nevertheless would not do it (436, 16-437, 1).313
Luther sees this as a real internal witness [hic reipsa et in me] to the presence
and work of the Holy Spirit in our heart: Hic reipsa et in me ipo experior Spiritum sanctum habitare in corde meo et efficacem esse (437, 1-3). In our opinion, this last point is to be taken as a second testimonium of the Spirit even
though Luther does not repeat the term.314 The first testimonium is to
justification (imputative), the second to sanctification (formaliter). These two
also go hand in hand. Like law and gospel they must always be distinguished
but never separated. Indeed, Luther says that the very fact that he struggles
against sin and does not let it gain the upper hand (cf. Rom. 6: 12-14) is for
him evidence that the Holy Spirit dwells in his heart and that he is efficax
(437, 1-3).
These two testimonia are important for the argument contra antinomos. Not only do they demonstrate a coherence between justification and
sanctification, which is absent in antinomianism, but also an agreement be313M Rel. B (436, 22-437, 18) shows in more detail, this is not without a struggle in Christians. Saints also feel carnales motus et cupiditates, but
they resist them by the Spirit. Sometimes however they fall: saints can be
overcome [stuprare] by another man's wife or children, they can [be tempted
to] take vengeance on their enemy, but even though they are incited to action
by these primi affectus in came mea--utpote et libido--yet they do not succumb
to these pessimas consultrices, but heed [parere] the will of God.
314Grammtically, we take the second quod in 1. 16 (introduced by
deinde) to be also governed by testomium Spiritus sancti (1. 14). This second
testimony is also reflected in the peccatum detestari et odisse or again in the
non consentientes peccato, sed repugnantes (436, 10-11).
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tween the sanctified life lived lc ath nveiii.ta and the content of the Decalogue
as lex insculpta in cordibus nostris. Therefore, the antinomian attempt to
drive a wedge between the Spirit and the law (= Decalogue) has been shown to
be a false antithesis. The law is not against the Spirit but against the flesh (the
battle of the irveiii.ta against the (nig is lifelong), and secondly, the law is received by faith as the lex impleta and this is the very path along which the
Spirit leads those who have the lex Christi impleta through faith.
Argument 5315
Contra 10
Whatever keeps us from God's love is not to be taught. The law
keep us from God's love. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Proof of the minor premise: From the canonical book of John: Love
casts out fear (1 John 4: 18).
Response: This is a good argument. The scholastic doctors make a
subtle distinction here between servile love and filial love. But they can
be separated more easily in words than in reality. Therefore, it is more
advantageous to continue in the way of law and gospel. That way we
will come closer to it. The law, in exacting and demanding its fulfillment, accuses, kills, drives people to despair and makes them so anxious
that they do not know which way to turn. But you will say: Therefore, it
is only right that it should be driven out from human society, since it
produces nothing but terror and not love in our hearts. My response to
that is no; rather the law is to be summoned all the more and set before
your eyes that when you hear it you may know that you do not love, and
that that fear is a sure sign to you and to others that there is no love in
your heart. For if you had love, the law would not distress you the way it
does. The law is not so great that it can drive love out of your heart, if it
is true and unfeigned, but the more you fear, the more the law needs to
be urged, until you see that you do not love with your whole heart as the
law demands. This is also what John says in that same passage: whoever
fears is not perfected in love (1 John 4: 18), which is to say that by the very
fact that you fear you show that you do not yet love or have not yet
grasped the gospel concerning Christ. Furthermore, what John says,
namely, that perfect love drives out fear, is right. For that is how it must
31539 I, 437, 6-440, 15.
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be, because what he is describing there is that continual battle of the believing saints (which we often hear about in Psalms) as they cry out and
lament over their troubles, even when they are not burdened by any actual sin, since they are overwhelmed by terror, fear and trembling, as the
Psalmist says: Fear and trembling have overtaken me and I am in great
anguish (Ps. 55: 5, 6). Paul also writes in Rom. 7 [: 221: I delight in the law
of God etc. For this reason, when fear or terror of such a kind gets at you
that and there is no denying that you do not yet have perfect love and
you realize that you are not going to resist here, then it is that with all
your might you should hasten to Christ and try as you are able in these
terrors and troubles to know and apprehend Christ and faith. But this
faith ought to be so great that love is kindled in us and that day by day
fear is banished more and more until finally, when all fear and terror has
been completely overcome and banished, love will rule in us wholly.
Where fear now drives me to love, it happens in such a way that finally
love will swallow up fear and become perfect love. It is concerning this
that John says here, as it were: You ought not be so fearful and afraid,
neither ought you remain and persist in this fear, but break through this
monster as much as you can to love, and do not stop until this fear does
not rule in you any longer. For what is needed is that the Spirit is ruling,
as Paul says: To be sure, I face sin and despair; I see death. Is not how it is
always going to be? By no means, but I must strive and hasten with
might and main to this: I do not desire the death of the sinner (Ezek. 33:
11). You will not die (2 Sam. 12: 13). Here love rejoices far longer than
there was terror. For now I have something else set against this, namely
God, who loves me, and I love him and the neighbor. Any remnants of
fear and terror perish in this love. You will observe that consciences are
to be taught in such a way that from the midst of hell they learn to look
up to the highest heaven and lay hold of God who in Christ is lovable
and reconciled.
Now I return to the argument. The word fear is equivocal. For fear
is duplex: fear without love, and fear with love. Fear without love calls
me away from love, and is satanic and evil; this the law does not teach.
But, on the other hand, fear with love, or fear based on the law, calls me
evangelically to love in such a way that having been humbled I may
know myself, who I am, namely, a person who does not have love.
Therefore, where it is revealed it ought to cease; now that its office has
been discharged, it ought not terrify, diabolically and carnally, that is,
simply drive to despair, but after my evil has been revealed, it ought to
compel me to take refuge in Christ. This calling away and mortification
is salutary, evangelical, and useful, in that it calls us away from ourselves
and not from grace or the forgiveness of sins, or from Christ. Therefore,
learn well how to distinguish between those two things. For the devil
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drives and terrifies in such a way that you perish and die. On the other
hand, the gospel and God do not want you to perish, but rather to be
saved and live (Ezek. 33: 11). It is enough that you have been terrified
and mortified, now believe in the Son and you will live.316
The argumentum calls for the abolition of the law based on two premises: the first, that God's love is paramount, and the second, that law and
love are antithetical, for the law gives rise to fear and perfect love drives out
fear. Luther's responsio begins with a reference to the scholastic distinction
between charitas servilis and charitas filialis, which he abandons in favor of
his own law-gospel distinction because of the former, he says, facilius verbis,
quam re possunt separari (437, 2-3).317 The reason he abandons this modus
loquendi is because it finally tries to locate the ground of certainty coram Deo

in our pious hearts [in nobis] instead of at Calvary and in the word, Baptism,
Absolution, and the Lord's Super [extra nos]. Then after a very instructive
interlude on the nature of repentance under the gospel in terms of the relationship between fear and love in the vita christiana, based on 1 John 4: 18,
316Hermelink

notes (39 I, 440, n. 1) that Palat. 1827 fol. 30b has a
marginal note from the hand of the editor who has corrected all the worst errors of the first copyist, which says: Desunt quaedam argumenta et eorundem
solutiones.
317The

distinction is made by Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. 2, 2
quaest. 19 art. 6. Cf. the related terms filialis timor and servilis timor; see CA
XII, 38 (De Poenitentia) where filialis timor is defined as talis pavor, qui cum
fide coniunctus est, whereas servilis timor occurs ubi fides non sustentat
pavidum cor (BSLK, 258, 38); cf. FC Epit. IV (BSLK, 788, 12; von guten Werken,
Affirmative, Th. 7) and FC SD N (BSLK, 966, 16; vom dritten Brauch des
Gesetzes Gottes), where the terms are not used but the idea occurs. Although
it is timor and not charitas that is in focus here, these references nevertheless
exhibit the same type of scholastic distinction between servilis and filialis as
we find here. The same terms recurs at 39 I, 565, 8-11 (3 AD, Arg. 31/4), where
the argument is also parallel to the one here.
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he returns to the argument where he makes an important distinction
between evangelical and diabolic fear and the different ways in which they
work in repentance. This, as we shall see, is Luther's answer to the scholastic
distinction (accepted by the antinomians) between filial and servile fear. But
we begin with an analysis of Luther's discussion of fear and love.
The principal objection to the law here raised by the antinomians is
neatly summed up by Relation B: Lex accusat et adigit ad desperationem. Sed
desperatio pant odium, quod est charitati contrarium. Ergo lex avocat a sui
impletione, id est, a charitate (437, 27-29). They claim that the law ought to be
eradicated from human society altogether [ut extra hominum consortium eiiciatur] because it produces nothing but terror and not love (437, 15-438, 1).
Luther, in typical dialectical fashion, comes back and says, on the contrary, it is
precisely for that reason that the law needs to be urged all the more until you
see that you do not love with your whole heart, as the law demands.318 If you
did have love, the law would not distress you the way it does, for love casts
out fear (1 John 4: 18).319 Luther interprets the lack of love as an indication
318438, 2-4: eo magis accersenda est lex et collocanda ante tuum conspectum, ut illa sonante scias, to non diligere, et ille timor certissimum
signum est et tibi et aliis, nullam charitatem esse in corde tuo. This at first
sounds strange because we are accustomed to hearing Luther say that people
who are full of fear and terror need to hear the gospel, not the law. However,
the antinomians held that, one of the reasons the law was not to be taught
was that it could only cause fear and not love. Luther however wants to emphasize that is exactly what the law is meant to do, for love can only arise
from the gospel. Hence, people first need to be shown their own lack of love
so that they look away from themselves and are ready to receive Christ's perfect love as a gift.
319Cf. also, 1 John 4: 19: iweic

nµag•
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that you have not yet let yourself be fully permeated by Christ's love jostendis, te nondum diligere seu arripuisse Evangelium de Christo] (438, 10-11).
The Pauline motif of the struggle between the flesh and the spirit
which will continue in those who are simul iusti et peccatores until death,
finds its correlate here in the tension between fear and love.320 However, the
fear produced by the law as it reveals our sin, our lack of love, is not an end in
itself but a means to an end, the gospel of Christ in which God's love overcomes and banishes all fear, but that will only be accomplished in the eschaton. Until then fear can serve an evangelical purpose (Luther will talk more
about this later) when it makes us cognizant of our lovelessness and leads us
to despair of the hope of ever finding any help in ourselves, and then (with
the aid of the gospel) directs us to him who is our only hope and consolation,
whom we can grasp in faith amid all our terrors and troubles.321 Since love
will not rule in us wholly [prorsus] until after the death of the flesh, faith lo320Luther

alludes to the struggle of the saints, who cry out and
lament over their troubles [mala], even when they are not afflicted by any
actual sin [etiam cum non adferunt actuale aliquod peccatum], since they are
shaken by terror, timor et tremor, as the psalmist says: Timor et tremor
ceciderunt super me et contristatus sum nimis [Ps. 55: 5, 6], and again Paul in
Rom. 7: 22: Condelector legi Dei etc (438, 12-17).
321438, 17-439, 3: Ideo autem eiusmodi terror aut timor immittitur,
ut reipsa experiaris, te nondum habere perfectam charitatem, quod cum sentias, non hic resistendum erit, sed quantum potes, accelerandum ad Christum
et conandum, ut possis in illis terroribus et malis et agnoscere et apprehendere Christum et fidem. The terror aut timor, which are the effectus of the
law, reveal that the law has not been fulfilled (the lack of perfecta charitas).
The solution however is not to resist the fear in the hope of overcoming it
and growing in love, but of recogizing one's poverty of love and hastening to
the one place where love freely abounds, to him who is love incarnate, and
taking hold of him by faith.
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cates its confidence not in our love for God but God's prior love for us in
Christ. Nevertheless, under the impetus of faith love grows day by day in
overcoming fear, but this will always remain incomplete until the last day
when fear, death, and the law are finally conquered, faith is fulfilled, and love
alone holds sway [Haec autem fides tanta debet esse, ut accendatur in nobis
charitas et timor de die in diem magis et magis eiiciatur, donec tandem devicto et eiecto omni terrore et tremore prorsus regnet in nobis charitas] (439, 36).
This description of sanctification in terms of love overcoming fear is
the Johannine counterpart to Luther's customary Pauline mode of expression
which pictures it more in terms of the ongoing expurgation of sin through
the working of the Holy Spirit. The saint-sinner struggle can be described in
different ways. Paul writes that we should walk by the Spirit and not gratify
the desires of the flesh (Gal. 5: 16). Luther, trying to stay more with the language of John, says that we should not remain a captive to fear but break
through this monster as much as possible and take hold of love, and that we
should keep doing this until the fear subsides [Tu non debes ita timere ac terreri, neque in istis manere ac persistere, sed quantum potes per ista monstra
perrumpere ad charitatem neque cessare, donec haec non timor in to regnet]
(439, 8-11). The timor regens is a correlate of lex regens et accusans, whereas
Luther says that Christians are marked by the charitas regens which corresponds to the Spiritus regens and as given with justification. The only way
forward is to listen to the gracious, liberating words of Christ
When we are burdened by the accusation of the law and tempted to
doubt that the promise of the gospel is for us, the only way to break out of this
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bind is to listen again to those gracious death-destroying and life-giving words
which, for Luther, epitomize the gospel: Nolo mortem peccatoris. Non morieris (Ezek. 33: 11; cf. Ps. 118, 17).322 This is the word we long to hear, for it banishes fear and terror. And when consciences have been taught to properly distinguish between law and gospel, they can look up from the abyss of their existential hell and believe the promises of the gospel inspite of the fact that
death stares them in the face and all that they feel is the weight of the law
pressing upon them. That is the time to cling in faith to the great "nevertheless" of the gospel which proclaims to us that God loves us and has forgiven
us, despite all appearances to the contrary323 (439, 12-440, 1).
This first part of the responsio has been instructive in that we have
heard Luther discussing repentance in terms of fear and love rather than contrition and faith. However, he has studiously avoided using the language of
the two loves because to attempt a distinction between charitas servilis and
charitas filialis within us can never lead to certainty. In this life our love can
never be free of fear because the law needs to coerce and restrain the sinful
flesh, and insofar as we are still sinners, the law is always accompanied by
fear. What Luther does is retain the fear-love way of speaking (given in the
argumentum) but at the same time couples it with a careful distinction be322In the confidence of God's grace faith can always rejoice that his
love will outlast his terror. Thus Luther: Hic exultat charitas longe maior,
quam ipse terror erat (439, 15). This evokes Ps. 30: 5.
323Consciences

taught to distinguish law from gospel no longer
trust their own feelings but only him who in the gospel is set over against the
terrors of conscience and the accusations of the law [Iam habeo aliud
obiectum, videlicet Deum, qui me diligit, et ego eum diligo et proximum]
(439, 15-17).
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tween law and gospel, where fear is the effectus legis and the charitas Dei corresponds to the gospel. And when he exhorts us to break through the monster of fear to love, that is possible only because Christ has broken through it
from his side and has overcome it with love.
The main point Luther makes in the final part of the responsio is that
the word timor is an aequivocatio, for timor itself is duplex (440, 1-2). It can
either be evangelical or diabolical, depending on who is driving it, or whether
it is with love or without love. This is equivalent of the contrast between
godly grief and worldly grief that Paul makes in 2 Corinthians 7: 10, the one
leading to repentance (evangelical), the other to death (diabolical).
Once again taking 1 John 4: 18 as his point of departure, Luther distinguishes, not between two kinds of love, but between two kinds of fear based
on his distinction between law and gospel: Timor sine chatitate and timor
cum charitate. The former is sathanicus et malus, and hence not taught by
the law, because it calls away from love [avocat a charitate]; the latter, on the
other hand, is ex lege and so should be allowed to humble me only until I
recognize that of myself I am sine charitate, and then, after it has exposed my
malum, it ought to compel me to take refuge in Christ [cornpellere me, ut
confugiam ad Christumj (440, 6-9). This avocatio et mortificatio Luther calls
salutaris et Evangelii et utilis because it turns us away from ourselves, and
unlike the other, which simply drives to despair, does not call us away from
grace, nor the forgiveness of sins nor from Christ. In short, the devil uses
timor or avocatio (these terms are correlatives) for his own purpose, which is
always death; God, on the other hand, uses timor or avocatio for his own
purposes, which means life and salvation. Here the law must not be permit-
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ted to go beyond its limit,324 but after it has done its work, the penitent needs
to be told to believe in the Son and he will live [Satis est, to esse perterrefacturn et mortzficatum, nunc crede in filium et pipes] (440, 3-15).
Argument 6325
Contra 1
Whatever diminishes sins makes for righteousness. The law diminishes sins. Therefore, the law makes for righteousness.
Proof of Minor Premise: The law is our pedagogue to Christ [Gal. 3:
24].
Response: You know that the use of the law is twofold, first for restraining sins and then for exposing sins. Furthermore, Paul says in
Rom. 4 [: 2]: If Abraham was justified by works of the law, he has grace,
but not before God. Therefore, that pedagogy is absolutely useless before
God. The righteousness of the world has its own glory and its reward in
this life among human beings, but not before God [Matt. 6: 1-18]. Secondly, if pedagogue is taken as referring to worldly pedagogy, it is understood, as I have just said, that nothing is effected in the sight of God by
means of this pedagogy. But if it is taken spiritually and accepted in the
sight of God, as I have said a little earlier with regard to the law terrifying
the conscience, not diabolically but evangelically, it is different, for there
pedagogy does effect something. For this phrase, "pedagogue to Christ,"
is a word of comfort, and the most proper and delightful definition of the
law. It affords me great consolation and confidence because I hear that
the law is a pedagogue, and indeed to Christ, and not a devil or robber,
who does not use pedagogy but despair. However, the law does not operate like that but exposes your sin. This it piles up as much as it can,
and especially terrifies your heart so that you despair completely. But in
the midst of your terrors, Paul comes with a word of comfort: do not be
overly sad, do not torture yourself like that, as if there were no hope;
there is no dying, because the law is not a robber or a devil but a pedagogue who wants to lead you in this way to Christ.
Certainly a pedagogue does not act in such a way with children that
he simply kills them or banishes them from their inheritance, appointing other heirs in their place. That is the nature of the enemy, of the kidnapper, and of the devil. But it is nature of a good pedagogue to train,
with great faithfulness and care, the child committed to his guardian3240n the limits of the law, see 1 AD, Arg. 31 and 2 AD, Arg. 8.
32539 I, 440, 18-443, 4.
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ship, to accustom him to his proper duties, and to shape his character in
such a way that the child may become as fit as possible for whatever duties are to be undertaken, and be the finest heir of his father. Indeed, he
disciplines him and sometimes treats him very harshly, not to kill him,
but to return him to the head of the household a better child. That is
how you should think about the law, says Paul, and not consider it as
anything other than a pedagogue to Christ. If it terrifies and harasses
you, that is only good and right, but always say to yourself: I am being
taught. Now I am certain that I am dealing with a pedagogue and not a
robber, that I am under a pedagogue and not a robber. That is, the law is
the kind of pedagogue that, by terrifying, harassing, and mortifying you,
leads you to Christ and prepares you for Christ himself. This is how I regard the pedagogue: staff of the exactor and the switch on my shoulder
(Is. 9: 4). Why? to kill me? No, but to lead me to Christ. For it is a pedagogue to Christ, not a robber to the devil. Therefore, a godly preacher
speaks about the law in such a way that the minds of the godly are not
thrown into despair, but rather cease from being saddened and take hold
of Christ, who came to save the lost (Matt. 18: 11), the restorer of all
things, as Peter says (Acts 3: 21).
The responsio starts out with an articulation of the Luther's duplex
usus legis.326 First, the law is used to restrain sins [primum coercendi delicta],
secondly, to expose sin [deinde ostendendi delicta]. He needs to make this distinction in order to show the ambiguity in the antinomian syllogism with its
implication that the law serves to make one righteous [facit ad iustitiam] because it diminishes sin. Luther's rejoinder, based on Romans 4: 2 is that
Abraham's obedience to the law does not merit grace and that illa paedagogia
apud Deum prorsus inutilis est (441, 1-5).327 Here illa paedagogia is equated
duplex usus legis Luther can also simply say duplex est
lex in 39 I, 460, 21 (2 AD, Arg. 14); cf. 483, 14-19 (2 AD, Arg. 28), where he distinguishes the law grammatice et civiliter, on the one hand, and theologice et
spiritualiter, on the other.
3261nstead of

327441, 19-20 (B)

makes this even clearer: Major est ambigua.
Quicquid minuit delicta, facit aliquid ad iustitiam politicam, sed nihil tamen
facit ad iustitiam coram Deo.
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with the primus usus legis. This produces the iustitia mundi=iustitia civilis,
which has its gloria and praemia in this life inter homines, but not apud
Deum. The same inutilis paedagogia results when the paedagogus of Gala-

tians 3: 24 (the antinomian proof-text) is understood de carnali paedagogia.328
However, when the paedagogia=secundus usus legis and is thus taken spiritualiter et coram Deo, and where the paedagogus is correspondingly under-

stood in Christum, then this paedagogia is not useless but aliquid efficit (441,
5-11).329
The nature of this pedagogy (=secundus usus legis) is then illustrated by
means of the example of the young boy placed in the custody of a paedagogus.
The bonus paedagogus does nothing that is not in the boy's best interests, and
even though the discipline he must inflicit will at times be painful, its aim is
to prepare him for his officia as heir and return him to the paterfamilias a better child. The malus paedagogus, on the other hand, does not have the boy's
best interest at heart, but wants only to torment, kill or kidnap him. Luther
says this is just like the way the devil uses the law.330
328See

also the conclusion to the Second Disputation (39 I, 485, 9-24)
where it is clear that the antinomians refer the paedagogia of Gal. 3: 24 to the
usus civilis.
329Luther

does not push the argument all the way here. The antinomian argumentum asserted: Lex minuit delicta, where obviously the lex is
understood in terms of the usus civilis. However, Luther will make it clear
in other arguments that when lex is understood in terms of the usus theologicus (which is the real issue here), then the opposite is the case, and instead of
diminishing or restraining sin the law actually incites sin in order that, as
Paul says, n award a may be shown to be lc ae` L ICE p8oXitv aliaptco Ak cf. Rom.
5: 20. The antinomians of course reject the theological use of the law for this
very reason (see Pos. Ant., Th. 16; 1 AD, Arg. 10).
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Thus we have not only two uses of the law in the sense of the duplex
usus legis, but also two ways in which the law can be used, that is, either
evangelice or diabolice (441, 10).331 In the former sense, all discipline should
be regarded as training [paedagogia]; even the fear and terror produced by the
law are not to be seen as ends in themselves but as means to the evangelical
end of leading people into the arms of Christ by first having them despair of
themselves and their own claims to goodness coram Deo. In the latter sense,
on the other hand, the devil abuses the law by deflecting it from its proper
purpose and driving people away from Christ instead of to him.332 Thus used
evangelically, the law is a paedagogus in Christurn, non latro ad diabolum
(442, 12-443, 4). The demonic use of the law, which is really the abusus legis, is
nothing else than the diabolical perversion of the theological use of the law.
Argument 7333
Contra 2
We have faith in Christ on account of righteousness. The fulfillment of the law happens for us through faith. Therefore, the fulfillment
of the law is effectual on account of justification.
330Luther will make it clear in 2 AD, Arg. 8 (39 I, 445,20-446, 5) that

the law by itself can do nothing but strike terror into our hearts. Only the
gospel can turn the latro into a paedagogus.
331See 39 I, 430, 18-20 (2 AD, Arg. 2) (B):

Duplex est desperatio,
evangelica et diabolica. Evangelica desperatio, ad quam lex adigere debet, non
est mala nec manet semper, sed quasi praeparat ad concipiendam fidem in
Christum . . . .
332The devil wants people to despair of salvation (hence of God)

and not of themselves; in this he is like the bad doctor whom Luther describes
in 2 AD, Arg. 2; see esp. 39 I, 426, 29-427, 25 (B). Luther makes it very plain
that the law is not meant to lead people to despair but to Christ; see 410, 6-8 (1
AD, Arg. 31); 530, 7-8, 17-531, 19 passim (3 AD, Arg. 17).
33339 I, 443, 7-444, 11.
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D. Martin Luther: The argument is this: we are justified through
Christ, and having been justified we fulfill the law. Therefore, the fulfillment of the law is effectual on account of justification.
Response: If there is no equivocation in the words justification and
law I concede the whole argument, because according to Rom. 8 [: 3, 4]:
God sent his Son in the flesh that the law might be fulfilled in us. Moreover, because the law must be fulfilled, it is necessary that justification
and fulfillment each occurs in us. But if the argument means that our
fulfillment of the law is justification, then the whole argument is false,
because we do not fulfill it, yet it is true that to the extent that we do fulfill it we are justified. But we fulfill it imperfectly, therefore we are justified imperfectly. In Christ however we have the perfect fulfillment imputatively, for in this life we cannot be perfectly cleansed expurgatively
on account of the sin dwelling in our flesh. Also that righteousness of
the law in us is not simply poison per se, as our thesis says. But it becomes a poison when people, whoever in the world they might be, become proud of themselves and of their salvation on account of this kind
of righteousness. However, it is especially commended in the saints because they have the Holy Spirit, who works such virtues in them in his
own way.
Much of what Luther says here about the twofold fulfillment of the
law, that is, imputative and expurgative, has already been discussed in connection with argumentum 3. However, what he says about the iustitia legis
in nobis needs to be clarified. He agrees with the antinomians that impletio
legis valet propter iustificationem (the conclusion of the syllogism) provided
there is no equivocation in the words iustificatio and lex (443, 7-12). By that
Luther means that so long as Christ is the fulfiller of the law our fulfillment
of the law is in Christ.334 But he also knows with Paul that not only is the law
to be fulfilled in Christ, but also iustificatio et impletio must each occur in us:
Misit Deus filium suum in carnem, ut lex impleretur in nobis.335 By as334An

equivocation at this point would be the belief that our fulfillment of the law merits justification (=opinio legis).
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serting the impletio legis is effectual [valet] propter iustificationem the
antinomians mean that the law is fulfilled in Christians completely at the
moment of justification, not only imputative but also realiter and finaliter.
They did not distinguish between these two because they did not teach that
Christians have the reliquiae peccati clinging to the flesh. We have already
seen that they dropped the simul for the same reason. Hence, they taught that
the iustificati were solum sancti and not also simul peccatores.
Luther, while agreeing that first and foremost Christ has fulfilled the
law pro nobis and extra nos, also stresses that the law is fulfilled in nobis.
This means: first, Christ's fulfillment of the law, which is imputed to Christians per fidem, is also effective in them as the basis of their own formaliter
fulfillment. Secondly, the law is to be fulfilled in Christians themselves expurgative as the remnants of sin adhering to the flesh are begun to be expelled
by the activity of the Holy Spirit. Even as sancti we cannot fulfill the law ourselves, not even with the help of the Spirit. Therefore, our own fulfillment
can never be complete nor can it ever be anything we can claim credit for.
Hence, the rule obtains: Quantum implemus, tantum iustificamur. Here iustificare for all intents and purposes can be equated with sanctificare. Luther
uses iustificare here in the sense of the second and final iustificatio which will
ultimately coincide with our complete sanctificatio. He does this to emphasize that justification will not be completed in us until the perfect fulfillment
of the law given us by imputation is perfectly fulfilled in us (which will only
take place after the final destruction of the Gig). In the first justification sin
was conquered in Christ's body, in the second justification it is to be conRom. 8: 3-4:0 Oeec rbv icayroisi vibv Kip:Iliac iv Op.otufgan aapicbc
ap.airriac . . Tva tb oncaicolla 'Mi.)- V01101) lanpo) eq. iv Aviv
335
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quered in us also. While the first justification was instantaneous and complete [totus-totus], the second (= sanctification) is progressive and partial
[partim-partim]. Because this side of heaven our fulfillment of the law is only
partial, our formal justification therefore is only imperfect [Sed imperfecte
implemus, ergo imperfecte iustificamur], nor can we be perfectly cleansed expurgative on account of the sin dwelling in our flesh (444, 2-4). By linking
the cleansing of sin expurgative to iustificare, it is clear that Luther is not
speaking about the first justification here but about the second or formal justification.336
It is significant that Luther uses the language of justification where we
have traditionally spoken of sanctification. This however serves to emphasize the close connection that Luther sees existing between justification and
sanctification.337 Indeed, for him justification is sanctification, but unlike the
antinomians he makes a distinction between the already-now of faith and the
336Furthermore, the statement, quantum implemus, tantum iustificamur, would not make sense if applied to the first justification because in 1
AD, Arg. 14 Luther says that the law is impossible for justification; on the
other hand, in 3 AD, Arg. 7 he discusses the danger of saying that the law
commands us to do the impossible. Moreover, if the statement applied to the
first justification it would suggest that it could be something partial, which
Luther himself rejects. Again, with quantum implemus, tantum iustificamur
Luther is not suggesting that in theory at least it would be possible for us to
justify ourselves, or that some need less grace than others because they have
advanced further in fulfilling the law, for he knows with James: lionc yixp
Oxov 'thy v6p.ov Triptioti irrafori SE iv ivi, yiyovev ircivtcov i'voxoc (James 2:10).
337This is also reflected in the two ways that CA (Ap. IV) speaks
about justification: both as iustos effici and iustos reputari. Thus: Et quia
iustificari significat ex iniustis iustos effici seu regenerari, significat et iustos
pronuntiari seu reputari. litroque enim modo loquitur scriptura (BSLK, 174,
72).
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not-yet of hope because he holds to the Pauline doctrine of the Christian as being simu/ iustus et peccator.338 Therefore, our justification propter Christum
per fidem is perfect and complete, coram Deo, since it is given to faith imputative. Likewise our sanctification too, coram Deo, is perfect and complete,
even though it is still incomplete coram mundo. To balk at this point is to
fall under the condemnation of introducing a split between justification and
sanctification, ascribing the former to God and the latter to us or to some synergism.
In the light of the above, we can properly understand Luther's words:
Quantum implemus, tantum iustificamur (444, 2-3) as a reference to final justification or sanctification when the law will be fulfilled in us completely, not
just imputative, but realiter and substantialiter. Therefore, he can say that
iustitia legis in nobis is not simpliciter venenum per sese (444, 6-7).339 Thus,
the iustitia legis in nobis is not a bane per se, but can become such if people
become proud of it and see this as their own achievement (444, 7-9). Therefore, it should never be commended those outside of faith, for it will inevitably be understood in the way of the opinio iustificationis (= worksrighteousness), which is innate to fallen human nature. On the other hand,
Luther highly commends the iustitia legis in nobis to the saints, quia illi
338There is also a parallel here to the way in which Paul speaks
about salvation. On the one hand, we have already been saved (= justified) by
faith in Christ, on the other, we will finally be saved from God's wrath on the
last day: roA.A.‘y AV lifiXhov oticcao.)eiviec viiv iv r6): digan aiitoii ow e nodge0a
Si` crtitoii ?nth t rtc 43 pytic (Rom. 5: 9).
339He refers to 2 AD, Th. 2 (39 I, 347, 29-30): Qui autem opinione
iustificationis legem servant, its ipsa etiam venenum et pestis fit ad iustificationem.
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habent Spiritum sanctum, qui tales virtutes in eis operatur pro suo modo
(444, 6-11). It can be taught to the saints because they have the Holy Spirit who
works the impletio legis in them so that the tales virtutes or good works that
he brings about in us, pro suo modo, will not get booked to our account (to
our glory) but to his. Nevertheless, the impletio legis in nobis must never be
allowed to become the ground of our hope and confidence before God which
for faith rests in Jesus only. Luther comes back to this point after having followed the line of thought suggested by the argumentum. What finally holds
beyond any doubt that may be prompted by some reference in nobis, is in
Christum tamen (444, 4).
Argument 8340
Contra 1
For the forgiveness of sins a recognition of sins is required. The
recognition of sins comes only through the law. Therefore, the law is required for the forgiveness of sins. And since nobody can be justified unless first their unrighteous deeds are recognized, it follows that the law is
useful for justification.
D. Martin Luther: The argument is this: the recognition of sin is
required and useful for justification. For there is a kind of salutary despair that brings eternal life. Therefore, the law is useful for justification,
for this is its effect: It makes you despair thus and realize that you do not
have that righteousness.
Response: When we speak about the law we am speaking about
the proper effect of the law, what the law itself can effect or be responsible
for in this totally corrupt nature. We all know already from experience
that the only thing that the law can effect is to create despair. The law
does not make me a better person, it does not make me loving, nor
hopeful nor obedient; indeed it cannot. For by itself it can do nothing but
afflict, destroy, and disturb consciences. And we speak of these things as
often as we mention the law. However, the fact that we say that despair
is useful we owe, not to the law but to the Holy Spirit, who makes of the
law not a robber or a devil but a pedagogue. Thus when we discuss the
law we are discussing the nature, the power and the effect of the law,
34039 I, 444,14-448, 7.
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what it can do by itself, but when the law is taught the gospel succeeds it
or supervenes: Listen here, law, it says, see that you do not overstep your
boundary or limits. You are to be a pedagogue, not a robber, you can
make people terrified, but beware that you do not end up killing them all
together as you once did with Cain, Saul, Judas and others. Remember
that you are a pedagogue. This is your office, not that of devil or robber
but pedagogue. But this does not happen by the power of the law but of
the gospel and the Holy Spirit, who interprets the law in this way. For
the law by itself can only strike terror and lead to hell. But then the
gospel comes along and removes the barb of the law and turns it into a
pedagogue. And indeed the law must be interpreted through the gospel
and brought back, through an impossible use, to a salutary use, to Christ.
By its own power, the gospel makes the robber into a pedagogue, and
snatches those who have been killed through the law and brings them
back to Christ; that is something which the law did not do.
Furthermore, you must always stay with the principal definition
of the law: that it works wrath, hatred and despair, not joy, salvation or
mercy. Moreover, it is quite wrong to say that the law is required for justification. For many things are required for justification, but they do not
contribute anything to justification nor do they effect it. For instance, I
am required for justification, and food and drink even more so, because
without these I cannot live. And since there could be no food and drink
without grass, meat, corn, wine and water, these things are required for
justification, and sheep and cattle too. But what is it I am saying? For
indeed some think that they are very clever when they can come up with
some syllogism containing these words: "require" and "necessary."
Meanwhile, they fail to notice that these words are equivocals and speak
only about the material cause and not the efficient cause. The ancient dialecticians used to say: Equivocals have no place in disputations. Disputations are for univocals and not equivocals. Also: equivocation is always the mother of error. For equivocations produce inept and silly sophistical arguments about words and not debates about facts. Therefore,
you must avoid such things and bring to bear those things which are to
the point. I want you to take these remarks as an admonition.
However, we are speaking here, not about the material cause, but
the efficient cause: whether the law can effect justification? And our answer is no, because it is only a ministry of death [2 Cor. 3: 7] and works
wrath [Rom. 4: 15]. But if I am to become righteous from mortification
and fear, then it is necessary for the ministry of the Spirit to be added,
that is, the gospel or the finger of John who says: Look, the Lamb of God
[John 1: 29], you will not die [2 Sam. 12: 13]. I am required for justification, that is true, materially, of course, but the material thing is not the
effective thing, nor does it add anything to its formation, but it suffers it-
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self to be formed from an efficient factor or cause. Therefore, on the last
day I, Martin Luther, am also required to be present for we will be
snatched up into the air to meet with Christ [1 Thess. 4: 17] and then, together with the others, I will be led with a glorified body into heaven.
But what will I do there? Nothing, but I will be acted upon. For Christ
the Lord will carry us across into heaven, we will not do it ourselves.
Therefore, I am justified as one who is acted upon, but I myself do nothing. Thus a robber or miser is certainly not justified actively but passively. We are dealing here with Christians not with Turks, and the disputation is about how one becomes a Christian, through oneself or
through another. We are speaking univocally about passive justification, whether there is anything in the whole law which cooperates in
producing righteousness. Here we are not talking about material prerequisites, otherwise we might as well also say that an ox, a cow, horse, a
hen, and clothing are also required and necessary for justification, because without them life is not possible. To sum up: material remains
material unless Christ has taken it, shaped it, justified it and glorified it.
And thus, "require" and "necessary" will remain duplex, that is, materially and effectively.
This argumentum (like the previous one) opposes Luther's first thesis.341 It maintains that lex est utilis ad iustificationem. This is predicated on

two facts: 1) there is a kind of salutary despair [salutaris quaedam desperatio]
which brings eternal life; 2) the law makes us realize that you do not have
that righteousness (445, 1-4). Before he deals with the question of the necessity of the law for justification, he proceeds to define the law in its proper
sense.
Luther makes it clear from the outset that whenever he speaks about
the law he is first of all speaking de proprio effectu legis, what it can effect or
be responsible for [efficere seu praestarej in this wholly corrupt nature. As he
has said before, the proper effect of the law is to bring about despair, afflict, de34139 I, 347, 27-28 (Am, II, Th. 1): Lex non solum est non necessaria
ad iustificationem, sed plane inutilis et prorsus impossibilis.
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stroy, and disturb consciences.342 Luther is emphatic that whenever we mention the law these effects come to mind: Et de his rebus loquimur, quoties
legis mentio fit. (445, 10-11).343 Contrary to what natural reason may think,
Lex non facit me meliorem neque amantem neque sperantern neque obedientern facit, imo ne potest quidem (445, 8-9).344 The fact that desperatio is utilis
for justification is not owing to any special virtue in the law, but is due entirely to the Holy Spirit [id non fit beneficio legis, sed Spiritus sancti], who
prevents the law from turning the despair of self into despair of God and thus
ultimate condemnation as in the case of Judas.345 The Spirit does not allow
the law to become a robber, but makes it a paedagogus.346 However, in order
342Cf. 39 I, 382, 6-7 (1 AD, Arg. 14): Tamen is eius proprius effectus
est, ut reos faciat et humiliet homines ac iram Dei ostendat; 397, 11 (1 AD, Arg.
21): . . . cum tamen revelatio irae proprius sit effectus legis; 415, 16-18 (1 AD,
Arg. 36): Lex est revelatio irae, quia poenitentia saltem ex parte, quatenus
ostendit peccatum, et revelatio irae sunt effectus legis. In this world the
propriissimus effectus legis (348, 27-28 [Nrh, H, Th. 19]), can never be separated from the materia legis; cf. 454, 19-457, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 13); 458, 27-461, 18 (2
AD, Arg. 14); 530, 7-532, 7 (2 AD, Arg. 17); 578, 1-579, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 40/13A).
343The spiritual office of the law, to punish and drive to despair, is
given with every form of the law, whether it is the lex scripta, lex praedicata,
lex naturae, or the lex lata of the state.

446, 6-7 where Luther gives as the principalis definitio legis,
quod operetur iram et odium et desperationem, non gaudium, salutem aut
misericordiam.
344Cf.

345When we speak about the effect of the law, we are speaking about

what the law does per se, without the gospel or the Holy Spirit: Sic quando agitur de lege, agitur de natura et vi et effectu legis, quid ipsa per sese possit (445,
13-14).
346Cf. 39 I, 441, 2-443, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 6).
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for this to happen the gospel must be preached straight after the law [. . . sed
cum docetur lex, succedit seu subintrat Evangeliumj.347

The gospel then addresses the law, so to speak, and tells it to stay within
its appointed bounds: Audi, inquiens, o lex, vide, ne extra tuas regiones aut
saepta transilias. Tu paedagogus esse debes, non latro, perterrefacere potes,
sed cave, ne prorsus occidas, ut olim in Cain, Saul, Iuda et aliis fecisti, memento to paedagogum esse (445, 15-18).348 The law needs to be reminded that

it is a paedagogus, for its proper office is to lead to Christ: Hierher tuum officium, non diaboli aut latronis, sed paedagogi. Here Luther can describe the officium legis as that of being a paedagogus in Christum, and yet he has said

earlier that the proprius effectus legis, what it does per se, is only efficere desperationem, affligere, perdere, turbare conscientias (445, 5-10). Consequently,

we see that it is God's intention that the desperatio etcetera created by the law
be used in the service of the gospel. However, that will not happen
automatically, because the law is so eager to prosecute sin that unless the Holy
Spirit through the gospel actively intervenes to direct the process, the law will
miss the mark, overstep its bounds, and end up consigning its charge to hell.
The law's memory is long when it comes to accusing people of sin, but short
347This is what distinguishes the lex praedicata from the lex
naturae. The special thing about the law in preaching is that it is always
accompanied by the gospel and therefore turns a latro into a paedagogus.
This, as we shall see again later, is the real mitigatio of the law produced by
the gospel. It does not apply to the law per se, which still threatens the godly
qua caro, but to the believers who hear the voice of the gospel which has been
added after the law and through it calls them to close their ears to the lex
condemnatrix and to listen only to the comforting words of the impletor legis.
348Cf. another address to the law in 39 I, 410, 10-16 (1 AD, Arg. 31)

where it is reminded that its days are limited usque ad Ioannem.
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when it is a question of preparing them for the gospe1.349 Here the law needs
to be reminded that when it is working to bring about repentance, it is not
working for itself, but is employed by the gospel. But more than that, the law
is impotent to do anything except terrores incutere et deducere ad inferos.
Therefore, only the gospel can remove the barb of the law [aufert cuspidem
legi] (446, 1) so that it does not end up kidnapping its charges, but instead
safely delivers them, like a good paedagogus, to Christ. This gospel-oriented
work of the law can only be understood in the light of the gospe1,350 just as it
is only the power of the gospel which does the impossible, bringing the law
into a salutary use by leading people to Christ: Atque ita debet lex per
Evangelium interpretari et reduci per impossibile et ad salutarem usum, ad
Christum. And where the law has already exceeded its bounds and robbed
people of life, the gospel makes it a pedagogue who snatches them back from
death and brings them to Christ [et Evangelium sua virtute facit ex latrone
paedagogum et rapit ilium occisum per legem et reducit ad Christum, id quod
non fecit lex] (446, 1-5).
action of "reminding" goes in two directions: first, the lex
praedicata reminds us of the natural experience of the law, which is always
prior [see 39 I, 454, 12-16 (2 AD, Arg. 13); 539, 14-541, 5 (3 AD, Arg. 19); 549, 16550, 7 (3 AD, Arg. 24)], but then the law (both as lex praedicata and lex naturae)
also needs to be reminded of its limits by the gospel.
349The

350The work of the law must be interpreted by the gospel. The
materia (res) legis cannot be grasped in the law, but really only outside, in the
future fulfillment begun by Christ (Schloemann, 123 n. 385). Since the law,
although it is good and holy and is not the causa efficiens peccati, can have no
other effect on us than causing new sin and driving us to despair, on account
of our corrupt nature, the bonitas legis can only be received by us through
faith in the light of the gospel.
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In the second part of his responsio Luther explains why it is incorrect to
hold that the law is required for justification. He points out the need to distinguish between the causa efficiens and the causa materia. Many things are
required for there even to be someone here whom we can speak of in connection with justification. There is all that is needed to feed and sustain him, but
these things do not produce or effect justification, but merely belong to the
material cause. Here he mocks his opponents way of speaking of what is required and necessary. Luther says: Nos autem hic loquimur non de materia,
sed de causa efficiente. The reason why the law cannot effect justification lies
in the very nature of the law which he has just described in discussing its
proprius effectus or principal is definitio. It is only a ministerium mortis et
operatur iram so that without the ministerium Spiritus, namely, the Eva ngelium seu digitus Ioannis which says: Ecce agnus Dei, non morieris, we
would be dead and not justified. When we are justified we do nothing, we
are non active, sed passive, but like materia something is done to us, for we
do not become Christians by ourselves, but through another. However, the
law does not effect our justification but simply prepares the materia for it, and
likewise the materia is not the res efficax . . . sed patitur se formari a factore
seu causa efficiente (447, 8-10). Hence, if it is said that the law is "necessary" or
"required" for justification, we must clearly define our terms because these
two words are aequivoca or duplex for they can be understood either materialiter or effective.351
351Luther introduces this further distinction between univocals and
equivocals to further clarify the matter in hand. He cites the rule of the old
dialecticians: Aequivoca non intrabunt disputationes. Disputationes sint
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Luther's position, as we have already indicated, is clear: the law does
not cooperate in justification [cooperari ad iustitiam] but rather is useless for
that purpose because per se it only kills and damns and must be superceded by
the gospel to stop when it has driven people to despair of themselves, before
they despair of God also. God's intention is that the law serve the gospel as
paedagogus, but without the gospel it cannot be anything more than a robber
or a devil. Although its office is that of paedagogus and not diabolus aut latro,
this could not be known without the interpretation of the gospel and the
Spirit (445, 18-20).
Argument 9352
Contra 7
The law of God is a living word and has been ordained to give life
[Lev. 18: 5; Rom. 7: 10; Heb. 4: 12]. Therefore, the law gives life.
Proof of Conclusion: Whatever agrees with the definition of a term
agrees also with its etymology.
Response: The argument is good. The law of God is a living word.
Therefore, the law of God gives life. God is a living God. Therefore, God
gives life. The Holy Spirit is living. Therefore, the Holy Spirit gives life.
It appears to be an apt argument and valid in form, but it is misleading.
The ungodly, the covetous, and the adulterers have a living law. Therefore, the ungodly, the covetous, and adulterers are justified because the
law of God is good, just, and holy [Rom. 7: 12]. Therefore, the law of God
makes people good, it justifies and sanctifies them. The law of God is a
good and living word. Therefore, it gives life. Here Paul responds in
Romans: That which was good has worked death in me. The law indeed
is good, but I am carnal, sold under sin [Rom. 7: 13, 14]. Therefore, it neither justifies me nor gives me life, because the material is bad and corrupt because of original sin, sold-out under sin. Besides, God is good and
the highest goodness, and yet he does not make everybody good. We see
that he is so good and generous that he sends rain on the good and bad,
makes the earth fruitful and humans fertile etc [Matt. 5: 45]. But what do
univocorum, non aequivocorum. Again: Erroris mater est aequivocatio
semper (446, 18-20).
35239 I, 448, 10-450, 14.
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people do? No one gives thanks, no one becomes better through this
great goodness of God's, indeed they become worse, as you see. Who is
the cause of this? Certainly not God but we who have turned away from
God, and sin, which we fell into through the disobedience of Adam, so
that his wisdom and goodness are ineffectual in us. Indeed, we have
been made foolish through our own wisdom, as it says in Corinthians [1
Cor. 1: 20]. The cause is obvious: our nature is evil and corrupt.
Therefore, the Lord, God the Father, was compelled to dispense and
bring to us some remedy, none other than his Son, in whom all, as many
as are sanctified, given life, and made good, become good, alive, and
holy. God himself is good and holy, and yet the psalmist says: With the
good you will be good, with the perverse you will be perverse [Ps. 18: 26,
27; 2 Sam. 22: 26, 27]. He is life for one and death for the other; one he
prospers, the other he frustrates. But God is not to blame for that. The
cause of all this is our sin, as I have said and as Paul complains: I do not
do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do, and this because of sin which dwells in me [Rom. 7: 19, 20]. Augustine says about
quicklime: Limestone at first appears the best stone, hard and beautiful.
But when it is brought into contact with water it ignites. Why? Because
that is the nature of limestone, to burn when brought into contact with
water. So it is with us, since we are under sin, born in sins and corrupt
through original sin, the law, which is good and holy per se, cannot be
anything but terror and trembling.
Luther agrees with the argument as such: Lex Dei est sermo vivus.
Ergo lex Dei vivificat. Likewise the same method of argumentation can be
used with Deus and Spiritus. However, while this argumentum is aptum, it
is nevertheless misleading [ feit]. For if this argument were applied to the
impii, it would mean that they are justified on the basis that lex Dei bonificat,
iustificat et sanctificat. But clearly the good and living law does not simply
make good and alive, and the reason for that is sin. In fact, as Paul says, even
the pii end up doing the very opposite of what they want to do on account of
sin dwellling in their members (Rom. 7: 19-23). Hence Luther concludes:
Itaque non iustificat [scil. lex] neque vivificat me, quia materia est mala et corrupta peccato originis, divendita sub peccatum (449, 1-11). So the fault does
not lie with the law but with us and our sinful nature.
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A second counterargument is now advanced to refute the antinomian
thesis: Deus est bonus et summa bonitas, attamen non bonificat omnes
homines. In spite of God's kindness and generosity, such as we find it expressed in Matthew 5: 45, the only response is ingratitude; indeed, it does not
make anyone better, but only worse. Again, the reason that his sapientia et
bonitas is inefficax in us is not to be found in God, but in us and our sin:
Natura mala est et corrupta (449, 11-450, 1). This necessitated a remedy on
God's part [Hague coactus dominus Deus pater aliquod nobis remedium dispensare et afferre] which he brought us us in the person of his Son, in quo
omnes, quotquot sunt, sanctificantur, vivificantur et bonificantur, boni, viva
ac sancti fiunt.
God now deals with us in two different ways, through the law and
through the gospel. It is in this light that we are to understand the words of
the psalmist: Cum bona bonus eris, cum perverso perversus (Ps. 18: 26. 27).
Likewise, the words of St. Paul: Huic vita est, illi mors, illi prodest, huic obest
(cf. 2 Cor. 2: 15-16 where Paul, speaking of the apostolic ministry, says: Ott
Xpiatoii mica oiaIEV ToT eioT iv Tag aagoilivoc Kat iv Tag cbroltkugivolc, Oic
piev 6(40 ix eavarov zic eavarov, oic a ciapil ix (oric eic (caliv). The impenitent hear the law which leads to death, the penitent the gospel which leads to
life. When God judges the wicked [perversi] through his law, he is being perverse to his very nature, which is goodness and love, for here he must act in
an alien way first in the hope that afterwards he can act in his own proper
way. The good [boni], on the other hand, have no need of wrath and judgment, and so he can show his goodness. God acts according to the human
materia: and since we are sub peccato nati in peccatis et corrupti peccato origi-
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nis, the law, which is bona et sancta per se, can only produce terror et tremor
(450, 1-14). The fact that the good law has such negative effects on people
through no fault of its own is further illustrated by the use of Augustine's
similitude about quicklime.353
What Luther has effectively done, first of all, is taken the one-track way
of looking at salvation implicit in the antinomian argumentum and replaced
it with the two tracks of law and gospel. Secondly, he does not undersand the
human materia that God deals with as something neutral, but as inherently
sinful. God does not make moribund sinners alive simply because he himself
is living; what happens is not an immediate transformation, but a death and a
resurrection. The law kills people because of their sinful nature, but now God
uses the law in his service so that he now brings to life with the gospel what
the law has already killed. This law-gospel approach negates the proof of the
conclusion given with the antinomian argumentum, namely, Cui convenit
definitio nominis, eidem convenit et etymologia. There can only be an
agreement between the definitio nominis (such as lex Dei est sermo vivus)
and the etymologia (lex Dei vivificat) if the definition (in this case, of the law)
is used to transform the human materia based on its etymology. However,
Luther rejects this monistic approach in favor of the two tracks of the law and
the gospel.
353Augustine,

346-47.

De civitate Dei, bk. 21, ch. 4; Fathers of the Church, 24,
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Argument 10354
Contra 4
Whatever is established by scripture is to be clung to tenaciously.
Scripture establishes that we are justified by the law. Therefore, justification by the law is to be clung to tenaciously.
Proof of Minor Premise: Rom. 2 [: 13]: The doers of the law will be
justified [cf. James 1: 22, 23, 25].
Response: This is how the papists argue against us, but the proposition, Do this and you will live [Luke 10: 28] is hypothetical. It is true
that there ought to be doers, but where are the nine? [Luke 17: 17]. As it
is said, where are the nine, where is anyone? However, we who have received Christ by faith are such in Christ, imputatively, until finally in
eternal life we will be perfect and true doers of the law.
The argumentum brought forward posits that scripture teaches justification by the law, on the basis of a statement like: The doers of the law will be
justified. Luther rejects this as a papistic argument, just as earlier he upheld
the view that the law is impossible.355 He says that the scriptural statement:
Hoc fac et vives (Luke 10: 28) is hypothetical. No one can live, that is, be justified, on account of his works because all our works are sinful. However, there
is one way, and one way only, and that is through Christ: Verum nos, qui
Christum fide accepimus, sumus tales in Christo imputative (451, 4-5). This
side of the grave it is only through imputation that we can be the factores that
Paul speaks of when he says: Factores legis iustificabuntur (Rom. 2: 13). But
we are not justified by our doing of the law, but by another's, namely, Christ's,
and we receive his perfect fulfillment now through faith donec tandem in
vita aeterna erimus perfecti et yen factores legis (451, 4-5).
35439 I, 450, 17-451, 5.
355See 39 I, 364, 9-365, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 1).
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Argument 11356
Contra 1
Repentance is necessary for justification. The law is part of
repentance. Therefore, the law is necessary for justification.
Response: Repentance considered as a part is law because the law
is the first part of repentance. Therefore, materially, it is required for
justification. Sorrow for sin, and the law, are necessary for justification,
that is, materially. For I need to be present, materially. But we are
speaking here about the effect: whether it is necessary, effectively, and
our answer is no, as above. Materially, many things are necessary.
There is nothing in this responsio that is new. The first and fourth
thesis for the First Disputation posited that the law is the first part of repentance,357 and this has also been taken up in several arguments.358 Again, the
difference between saying that the law is necessary for justification materially,
on the one hand, and effectively, on the other, has already been discussed in
argument= 8. Luther is making the same point here: materialiter, we can
say many things are necessary (including ourselves), but effective, nothing is
necessary execpt Christ and the grace of God, for everything is a gift.
Argument 12359
Contra 26
The old law is: You shall love your neighbor as yourself [Lev. 19:
18]. But Christ says: You shall love your enemy [Matt. 5: 44]. Therefore,
Christ abolishes the law.
Response: Christ does not abolish the law, but because of the
nonsense of the Pharisees, he himself interprets the law perfectly and
spiritually. For the particularizing phrase "and your neighbor" also
embraces the enemy, which is something the Pharisees used to ignore.
35639 I, 451, 15-452, 6.
35739 I, 345, 16-17, 22-23 (Am, I, Ths. 1 and 4).
3585ee 1 AD, Args. 3, 31, 36, 37.
35939 I, 453, 7-457, 4.
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The enemy and the neighbor are each to be loved in the way ordained so
as not to confirm ungodliness or approve the evil deeds of the enemy.
Moreover, Augustine says: Christ fulfills the law either by doing what it
commands or by adding what it lacks.
The antinomian exegesis here tries to argue for the abolition of the law
by pitting Christ, the authoritative interpreter of the law, against the Old Testament. Moses commands (vetus lex): Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. But Christ says: Diliges inimicum tuum. Luther rightly points out that
proximus and inimicus are not mutually exclusive, but that in the interpretation of Jesus proximus includes inimicus (452, 11-453, 1). Here Christ holds
the two testaments together and opposes not the Old Testament per se, but the
pharisaic (or rabbinic) interpretation of the Old Testament, which is deliramenta. Christ therefore does not abolish the law, but he interprets it perfecte
et spiritualiter.360 Furthermore, Luther points out that the modus ordinatus
in which the neighbor is to be loved follows the proper distinction between
law and gospel. In the case of the proximus, on the one hand, it should not be
ad confirmandam impietatem, while in the case of the inimicus, on the other,
it should not be ad stabilienda inimici scelera (453, 1-2). For either simply to
sanction ungodly behavior on the part of the proximus or to establish the inimicus in his sins will only lead to securitas and hence impenitence.
The Augustine quotation is no doubt one of many that Luther still has
in his head from his early days when his theology was cast in an Augustinian
mold. It seems to be cited in support of the view that in the New Testament
Christ interprets the law in such a way as to include the enemy in the corn360See our discussion of 1 AD, Arg. 16 (39 I, 386, 19-388, 20) which

specifically deals with the issue of Christ as the interpreter of the scriptures.
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mand to love the neighbor. When Luther quotes Augustine as saying: Christus implet legem vel faciendo, quod praecipit, ye! addendo, quod desit,361 he
is probably taking the faciendo to refer to Christ's fulfillment of the positive
command of the Torah to love the neighbor [quod praecipit], and the addendo as a reference to his supplying what is lacking in the law [quod desit],
namely, the omission of the command to love the enemy. What Augustine
meant by these words however is another question. The interpretation we
have suggested is consistent with Luther's emphasis in other arguments on
the abunde aspect of Christ's fulfillment of the law, which emphasizes that it
goes far beyond what the law actually required.
Argument 13362
Contra 14
Whatever has been abrogated is temporary. The law has been abrogated. Therefore, the law is temporary.
Response: Christ has fulfilled the whole law. For he is the end of
the law (Rom. 10: 4), not only of the ceremonial and judicial law, but also
of the Decalogue itself, here through the forgiveness of sins, which the
361Hermelink (39 I, 453 n. 1) includes the following note: In his

argument with the Manichaean, Faustus, over Matt. 5: 17, Augustine arrives
at a formulation that is reminiscent of the one above, but does not mean
exactly the same thing: Et quia utrumque per Christum (namely, charitatis
plenitudo and prophetiarum impletio), ideo non venit solvere legem aut
prophetas, sed adimplere: non ut legi adderentur quae deerant, sed ut fierent
quae scripta erant. [And because each is through Christ (namely, the fullness
of love and the fulfillment of the prophets), he did not come to abolish the
law or the prophets, but to fulfill them: not in order that the things that were
lacking might be added to the law, but that the things that had been written
might be done.] Contra Faustum, bk. 17, ch. 6 Opera (MPL 42, 344). Cf. also bk.
19, ch. 7 (ebd. col. 352) and De Sermone Domini, bk. 1, ch. 8 (MPL 34, 1239):
Nam qui dicit; Non veni . . ., aut addendo dicit, quod minus habet, aut
faciendo quad habet. [For he says: I have not come . . ., either by adding he
says that it has less, or by doing what it has.]
36239 I, 453, 7-457, 4.
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gospel bestows on all who believe in him; in eternal life this will be true
also formaliter. However, the end of the Mosaic law is [signaled] in that
text in Deut. 18 [: 18]: I will raise up for you a prophet from among your
brethren etc., and I will appear as an avenger to any who do not listen to
him. Here he disparages Moses because it is said: You, Israel, have heard
this Moses, and you have done well, but his end will finally come and I
will send to you another, and unless you listen to him I will be an
avenger. And yet Moses was not the author of the Decalogue, but from
the foundation of the world it has been inscribed on the minds of all
people, as we have said above. For there has never been a nation under
the sun that has been so crude or barbarous and inhuman that it has not
been aware that God is to be worshipped and loved and his name borne
in praise, even if it has gone astray in how and why God is to be worshipped. Thus also in regard to honor and obedience toward parents and
superiors, they also denounced vices, as we see from the first chapter of
Romans. But later, because people finally reached the point where they
cared neither for God nor for their fellow men, God had to renew those
laws through Moses, and, after having written them down on tablets
with his finger, to set them before our eyes that we might be reminded of
what we once were before Adam's fall and what one day we will be in
Christ. Thus Moses was only a sort of interpreter and explainer of the
laws written on the minds of all people in whatever part of the world
they might be.
Master Responder, how is this sentence to be understood: The law
and the prophets are until John (Matt. 11: 13; Luke 16: 16).
Response: Simply as it says, in the interim, until Christ, the end of
the law, comes, people must hear the law and the prophets, until the one
who has been promised comes. Truly this sentence is full of comfort, indeed because of this name [John], because it means that that exaction, terror and condemnation of the law is not going to last for ever just as we
have said earlier in connection with the law as pedagogue. All this time,
says Christ, the law must terrify you and disturb your consciences until
John comes, the pointer to the Lamb, who takes away the sins of the
world. Once he is present, recognized and received, I am at last to bid
farewell to all the laws that accuse and damn me, even the Decalogue itself. For where I have Christ through faith, I have that which the law requires and demands from me. However, it does not follow from this
that the law is therefore to be driven out of churches and sermons. For
also the saints, who have received Christ here, still have flesh and blood
and sin in their flesh that fights against God's law, and most people are
too stubborn to want to acknowledge Christ, as we have said above.
There the law is necessary.
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Furthermore, the law in this whole disputation must not be understood TEXVI Koic, either materially or grammatically, as we have often said
already, but as it is and speaks in your heart, urging and pricking your
heart and conscience that you do not know where to turn. For the law is
that sensation or power or, as Paul says, that written code impressed on
our heart (Col. 2: 14), which chastises and terrifies, so that, if John does
not come, we would already have to despair and cry out: 0 woe, 0 woe,
it is all over with me, I am finished, God does not want me, he has forgotten me, he hates me, he is my judge and condemner, where can I flee
from the face of his anger? etc (Ps. 90: 7-11). These words and sensations
of the law are empty sounds or syllables, but this one L occupies and fills
the whole world, and indeed is so great that the world can hardly contain
it. Grammatically, law is of the feminine gender, belongs to the third declension, and is written with small letters. But theologically speaking,
the law is of all genders, brings the whole world to trial, and it is not so
quickly disposed of, especially when it begins to discharge its office.
Therefore, the law is to be urged, inculcated, and sharpened because of
the hard, stubborn and untaught people that they might be mortified and
terrified and finally learn to yearn for grace and to seek and thirst after
Christ, the Lamb of God. For the doctrine of the law is such that, if it
truly strikes the heart, the whole world becomes too small for a person,
and there will be no remaining help there besides Christ, who is to be offered to anxious and troubled consciences in order that they might know
this: the law and the prophets are until John. It is indeed yours, law, to
compel, crucify, and to terrify, but only for a time, until the offspring
comes (Gal. 3: 19). Look, here Christ is already present without me. For I
have that Christ who gives me life, saves and justifies me, and gives me
eternal life, and this freely, even though I am unworthy; therefore, he
does it without me, and not because of anything I have said. For Christ is
there already, that is, peace and forgiveness of sins on account of his
blood. Indeed, the saints and good people, like David, Jeremiah and others are also terrified, but this happens for the sake of faith, which is to be
exercised, or at least, in order that they might be roused to call on God
lest, intoxicated by too great a misfortune, they begin to murmur against
God, as Moses says (Exod. 15: 24 passim). Therefore, the law cannot be
removed in general. For even if you remove these letters LEX, which
can easily be erased, the written code still remains branded on our hearts
which damns and harasses us. However, those who are harassed and
terrified by the law will, if they neglect Christ and John, be unable to conclude anything but the worst about themselves, like Saul, Judas, and others, for whoever wants to desert Christ stands imperilled.
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The antinomian case for the abolition of the law is here based on a syllogistic argument that proves that the law is only temporary [temporalis], for
if it had been eternal it would not have been abolished. The responsio falls
into two parts: In the first Luther deals with the relation between the Mosaic
law or Decalogue and the natural law. In the second and longer part he deals
again with the interpretation of the verse, "the law and the prophets are until
John." Both arguments try to show that the antinomian assertion that the
law is fulfilled and finished (and hence to be abolished), while true for Christians qua saints, is not true for Christians qua sinners who are still terrified by
the law and need the law in two important ways, as we shall see.
Luther begins with the statement that Christ is the fulfillment of the
whole Old Testament law [tota lex]. Therefore, he can assert with Paul that
Christ is finis legis,363 and he interprets that in the most comprehensive
sense: non tantum caeremoniarum et iudicialium, sed etiam ipsius decalogi
(453, 9-10). While it is no surprise to hear that Christ is the end of the
ceremonial and judicial law, we need to underscore that here it is said that he
is also the end of the Decalogue. However, such a statement would be wrong
if left unqualified. It is precisely at this point that Luther parts company with
the antinomians. Both can affirm that Christ is finis legis, but Luther cannot
stop there but must go on to explain how that is true in a twofold way. Here
in this life the law (and specifically the Decalogue) is finished for all believers
in Christ per remissionem peccatorum, but only in aeterna vita will it also be
v gov Xpiarbc both temporally and telically (in the sense of the goal or purpose of the law) and makes
no attempt to distinguish them.
363Luther it seems understands the TiXog
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finished formaliter. This coresponds to the two ways in which Luther speaks
about the impletio legis (as we have seen above): here, imputative, and in
heaven, formaliter.
The clear inference then is that the law has been fulfilled and hence
abolished for Christians qua saints, but insofar as they are still sinful and
fleshly, the law has not been and cannot be abolished until the sinful flesh is
finally destroyed in the resurrection of the dead. However, at this point in the
argument, the emphasis is not on the continuance of the law propter carnem,
but on the finis Mosaicae legis, which Luther sees heralded by the promise of
the coming prophet in Deuteronomy 18: 18. This anti-Mosaic thrust is further
confirmed in the following sentence: Da setzt er Mosen herunter, quod dicitur: Tu, o Israel, audivisti hunc Mosen et benefecisti, sed aliquando erit eius
finis et mittam tibi alium, quem nisi audiveris, ego ultor ero. (453, 9-454, 4).
The point of emphasizing this is not to strengthen the antinomian argument= that the law is finished for Christians, but rather to attack it at its weakest
point. The antinomians constantly identify the law, in the sense of the Decalogue, with Moses, so that for them, to say that Christ as fulfilled, and hence
abolished, the law of Moses means that he has fulfilled and abolished the
Decalogue. Luther makes the important point, however, that Moses is not
the author of the Decalogue [Neque tamenMoses autor fuit decalogi], but that
it has been inscribed on our minds since the time creation: Sed a condito
mundo decalogus fuit inscriptus omnium hominum mentibus (454, 4_5).364
364Luther

says in a number of places that the law is inscribed on the
heart of every person by nature; see 39 I, 374, 1-5 (1 AD, Arg. 7); 426, 9-13 (2 AD,
Arg. 2); 549, 15-16 (3 AD, Arg. 24) etc.
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Consequently, the real author of the law is God and not Moses, and secondly,
its content, which, as we have already seen, is identical with the Decalogue,365
will continue even after Moses has gone.366 Even the most barbaric people
have naturally known that God is to be worshipped and the neighbor loved,
which is in essence a summary of the Decalogue. It was only because this
knowledge had become increasingly vague as a result of sin that God had no
alternative but to write the law down on tablets of stone that people might
have it before their eyes, externally, and would no longer have to rely simply
on their memories. Luther's formulation at point is instructive. The lex
scripta is not meant to remind [admoneri] people of what they are to do, or at
least that is not Luther's emphasis here, but of what they once were in paradise and one day will be in Christ.367 Furthermore, the Mosaic law does not
contain anything that is not already in the natural law. It was not given to replace the lex naturae, nor to supplement it, but in order to explain and interpret it [Ita Moses fuit tantum quasi interpres et illustrator legum scriptarum
365See 39 I, 478, 16-18 (2 AD, Arg. 25) where Luther makes it clear

that the Decalogue is not law of Moses.
366See 1 AD, Args. 7, 25, 34; 2 AD, Arg. 2 for the same argument,
namely, that the lex Mosaica or lex scripta is identical in content with the lex
naturae. However, the natural "preaching" of the law comes first, both in
terms of time and substance.
367Cf. 39 I, 539, 13-540, 1 (3 AD, Arg. 19) where, according to Luther,
God is compelled to set a boundary [meta] lest we forget his law completely,
that we may remember [recordaremur] at least, qui iam antea fuerimus et qui
iam simus.
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in mentibus omnium hominum, ubicunque terrarum sub sole sint] (454, 1416). We can conclude from this that, although there are times when Luther
describes Moses as a lawgiver, here he is seen as no more than an interpreter
and illustrator [interpres et illustrator] of the law, and to that extent is no different from Jesus who also interprets and explains the law. The difference between them of course is that Jesus not only interprets the law, but also fulfills
it for us vicariously.
The second part of the responsio takes up the interpretation of the
words: Lex et prophetae usque ad Ioannem (Matt. 11: 13 and pars.). Luther's
exegesis here is really no different to his earlier remarks on this text.368 First
and foremost he sees it as a word of comfort [haec sententia plenissima consolationum] because it signals that the exactionem, terrorem et damnationem
legis non perpetuo duraturam, but comes to an end in Christ, for Christ is the
fulfiller of the law, and where I have him I have quod lex requirit et exigit a
me. But this applies only to the penitent (the saints) who acknowledge their
sin, and for whom the law is a paedagogus in Chritum. But Christians, who
are simul sancti et peccatores, still carry around the sin-infested flesh and for
that reason the law is still necessary, even though it has been fulfilled for
faith. Hence, he rejects the antinomian claim, quod ideo explodenda sit lex e
templis et concionibus.
368Cf. 39 I, 366, 1-368, 1 (1 AD, Arg. 2).
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Luther has to clarify his definition of the law, because the antinomians
can also say that the law is still necessary for external discipline (usus civilis).
Consequently, he reiterates: Porro lex in hac tota disputatione non debet rsxviicaig sive materialiter sumpta aut grammatice intelligi, ut saepe iam diximus, sed ut est et sonat in corde tuo urgens, pungens cor et conscientiam
tuam, ut, quo to vertas, nescias (455, 13-16). Luther is not talking about the
word lex, which grammatice is a feminine word of the third declension, comprising the letters 1 e x in lower case. His concern is rather with the theological definition of the word, which is something altogether different and independent of its grammar, because, as Luther argues, even if the letters LEX are
removed, the effect of the law still remains, for the law has been indelibly inscribed on the human heart [Nam etiamsi tollas has literas: LEX, quae facillime deleri possunt, tamen manet chirographum inustum cordibus nostris,
quod nos damnat et exercet] (456, 19-457, 1).369 In order to emphasize how terrifying this little word370 can be, he says that, theologice loquendo lex est
3691t

seems as if the antinomians, in Luther's opinion, had the
strange notion that if they were successful in removing the the word LEX
from the church, they had actually removed the law; see 39 I, 352, 3-4 (Am,
III, Th. 39); 50, 473, 475 (Wider die Antinomer) etc. The truth however is that
we can never escape the law because wherever we flee the law is already
there, and the sensus legis always threatens us.
has the diametrically opposite effect to that
other "one little word" of Luther's great Reformation hymn, which fells the
devil. Unlike the proverbial dog, whose bark is worse than its bite, the soni
aut syllaba of the law are very ordinary, but the bite or effect of the law is such
that hic unum L occupat et adimplet totum orbem terrarum, atque tam magnum est, ut vix mundus illud possit capere (455, 21-23).
370This little word "lex"
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generis omnis, atque reum agit totum orbem terrarum, and it is so tenacious
that once it takes hold of the sinner, it is very hard to shake it off: neque ita
breviter absolvitur, praesertim cum incipit suum officium praestare (456, 2-4).
Indeed, if people tyrannized by the law are not pointed to Christ, they will despair of hope and suffer the same fate as Saul and Judas [. . . non poterit (scil.
qui exercetur lege et perterrefit) non pessima quaeque de se consulere, ut Saul,
ludas et alii, wer da will vor dem Christo uberlauffen, der stehe sein fhar]
(457,1-4).371
Luther in the course of his argumentation states that the law is necessary for two reasons; these are not stated formally, but culled from the responsio as a whole: First, as we have already noted, he says that the saints need the
law because they still have flesh and blood and sin in their flesh that fights
against God's law (455, 10-11); secondly, the law needs to be taught in all its
sharpness on account of the stubborn and impenitent [Est itaque lex urgenda,
371Just how dire the tyranny of the law can be is well illustrated by
Luther's remark that where John as the monstrator agni (in other words, the
preaching office) is not present, people can only cry out: 0 we, 0 we, actum
est, perii, disperii, non vult me Deus, oblitus est mei, odit me, iudex et condemnator meus est, quo fugiam a facie irae eius? etc (455, 17-21). This is a
classic description of the effectus legis, and shows why Luther is so insistent
elsewhere that neither the law nor the gospel should be discarded, for if the
gospel does not intervene and pluck the Angefochtene out of clutches of the
law, he will be lost.
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inculcanda et acuenda propter duros, praefractos et insensatos, ut mortificentur ac perterrefiant ac discant tandem aspirare ad gratiam et Christum agnum
Dei quaerere et sitire] (456, 4-6). These two reasons for the retention of the law
constitute the two aspects of the usus legis theologicus, which Luther consistently stresses as the proper use of the law.372
Toward the end of the argument Luther suggests that also the sancti et
boni, like David and Jeremiah, are terrified by the law (on account of the sinful flesh), but now this situation can even be seen positively, for it provides
an opportunity to exercise their faith by again and again seeking refuge in
Christ, or at least it rouses them to pray to God in their misfortune373 lest it
prove too much for them and their heart turn against God, as Israel did when
it murmured against him in the wilderness (456, 15-18).
372These

two reasons for the law are related in that in neither case is
Luther speaking about a use of the law for Christians qua saints, but either for
the duri, praefracti, et insensati (the unregenerated; cf. 39 I, 374, 20-21 [1 AD,
Arg. 7]), or for Christians insofar as they still have the flesh which needs to be
restrained and compelled by the law.
373"Fortuna" here could also be understood in the sense of Anfechtung or any grave temptation that threatens to destroy faith.
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Argument 14374
Dr. M. Luther: Can it be that Master Isleben is really present?375
Master Isleben: Although376 these opinions are true and godly, so
much so that anyone who thought otherwise or contradicted them is
37439 I, 457, 6-461, 18 (left col.).
375Hermelink (39 I, 457, n. 2) notes that the following should be
compared with the report ex literis Vencelai Arpinatis ad Vitum [Dietericum],
14 January 1538 (CR 3, 482-3).

It is now the third day of the second disputation presided over by D.
Martin, on which he has summoned Agricola, in a clear voice, to come
forward and present his proofs. The man was terrified because he had to
go up to the rostrum. First, he gave a brief speech where he says that he
is not going to dispute in such a way as if he disapproves the topic
[themata] that he acknowledges to be godly and true, but that he will
submit to the authority of the president. He also said he will give two
reasons for this: first, that he might glean some knowledge to take away
with him from this friendly exchange of views; secondly, that he may
make it known to everyone that if he once seemed to some to think a
little too cleverly about law and gospel, he now thinks in a godly and
Christian way, and subscribes to our opinion. However, he presented
these two arguments:
It is necessary for the righteousness of the law to be exposed and
condemned, but the righteousness of the law cannot expose and
condemn itself. Therefore, it is necessary that there is another different
doctrine by which it may be condemned.
The second argument was: Whatever appeared to all people so as to
teach us to reject godlessness, this itself reveals that godlessness is a great
sin. But the grace of God has appeared (as in the Epistle to Titus) to teach
people that godlessness is sin. Therefore, the grace of God reveals very
grave sin, not the law.
The doctor responded to these two arguments with finesse and
dignity, and afterwards admonished everyone that if previously Agricola
had accepted these, he was now to be freed of suspicion, since he had
publicly acknowledged that he was of the same opinion as us; he also
earnestly exhorted him to preserve faith and steadfastness (= to continue
steadfast in faith), and not to act cunningly and insincerely, but honestly
and openly.
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seen as disturbing the peace of the church, nevertheless, because I am ordered to speak I will not shun the authority of so great a man. Moreover,
I will converse with the master responder with all due respect, first of all
that some of his erudition might rub off on me and secondly, also to satisfy those to whom it has seemed at times that I have spoken about the
law in ways that are inappropriate and different. I will publicly testify
here that I am no stranger to this doctrine.
This is my Argument: The righteousness of the law must be exposed and condemned. The law does not condemn nor does it expose
the righteousness of the law. Therefore, a different doctrine is needed to
condemn the righteousness of the law.
Proof of Minor Premise: If the law condemned the righteousness of
the law, it would destroy itself. However, whatever is destroyed is destroyed by its opposite.
D. Martin Luther: It is a good argument. The righteousness of the
law cannot condemn itself, and the law would condemn itself if it con376The parallel text in the right hand column (457, 8-458, 29) is set

out below. Hermelink (39 I, 457, n. 3) observes that this is based on Agricola's
handwritten notes in his Hebrew Bible in Wernigerode (cf. ThStKr 80 [1907]:
259-60).
Argument 14
Although these opinions about law and gospel are godly, so much
so that whoever has taught a different opinion is seen to destroy holy
scripture and disturb the public peace of the church, nevertheless because
I am ordered to speak here, and since I esteem the authority of the person
so ordering me, no occasion should ever be shunned. I will converse
amicably and with all due respect with the Dr. master responder. First, in
order to learn something from his erudition. Secondly, in order to show
publicly all those who perhaps think that at times what I say about law
and gospel is inappropriate, that I do not dissent from these opinions
which have instructed me the most.
Argument 1
The righteousness of the law must be exposed and condemned. The
law does not condemn the righteousness of the law. Therefore, it is
necessary for something else to expose and condemn the righteousness
of the law; this is done by the gospel and the word of grace.
The minor premise is clear: because otherwise the law would
condemn itself. And nothing is destroyed except by its opposite.
Luther's Refutation: The minor premise needs to be qualified: the
spiritual law condemns the carnal law.
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demned the righteous of the law, and yet it is necessary that this righteousness of the law be condemned. For God wants this lest we appear
righteous and wise to ourselves, as scripture says about Abraham: Indeed, he has something to boast about, but not before God [Rom. 4: 2].
Therefore, a different teaching is needed to drive this beast from the law,
this beast being the righteousness of the law and pride.
What do you say to that?377
Response: Again, stick to the univocal sense not the equivocal.
When we speak of the righteousness of the law we are not talking about
that righteousness which will be in the future life, but that which arises
from our human capacities when they are pressured or assisted by the
law or the effect of the law, such as that political righteousness of the
lawyers which is extracted either by threats or promises, or even by enticements and benefits. This must be condemned, but not in itself, for
this political righteousness is good and worthy of praise, even if it cannot
stand in the sight of God. And because it is mostly accompanied by such
great trust in one's own righteousness and pride, scripture everywhere
inveighs against it, especially Paul: Lest I be found in him having a righteousness of my own based on law etc. [Phil. 3: 9]; again, If righteousness
were through the law, then Christ died to no purpose [Gal. 2: 21]; also:
We are justified freely apart from the works of the law [Rom. 3: 28]; and
again: Every person is a liar [Rom. 3: 4].
Therefore, here I answer with Paul that the law condemns itself for
it is spiritual, as Paul says to the Romans [Rom. 7: 14]. And understood
spiritually it condemns that carnal and external righteousness of the law,
which we also have produced while pursuing the righteousness of the
law in hypocrisy with an impure and rebellious heart. Actually, contrary
to what we seem to have been striving for, we have in fact done what a
person does who acts unwillingly and is coerced, either from fear of punishment or love of praise and glory. And if those others are accustomed
to the limits imposed by that righteousness, you, at least outwardly, restrain your hand from theft and from doing some great shameful crime,
such as murder or robbery, and you refrain from adultery and [giving] a
bad appearance. But meanwhile, your heart seethes with dreadful and
innumerable passions and desires, against God and other humans, and if
the chains and bars of laws and the gravest punishments had not been
added [as restraints], you would do anything and would be worse than
any robber, fornicator and adulterer. Here therefore that spiritual law
37 'Hermelink (39 I, 459, n. 1) notes that this is either a question
from Agricola (Drews), or, more likely, the question of some other opponent
in the audience, at what was an extremely tense moment.
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comes in, as Paul says [Gal. 3: 19; Rom. 5: 20], and judges that carnal or external righteousness which the law extorts by force. You indeed are a
good man, a responsible citizen, virtuous, you cheat no one, love your
wife and flee from any other etc., but to what end do you do this? Is it really through love of the law or praise, or through fear of punishment
and shame? It is as if the law says: I am spiritual, that is, I require a heart
that is pure and spiritual and I will not be satisfied except with a merry
heart and a spirit renewed by the Holy Spirit. Indeed, you do splendid
works, which are great and useful, but because you do them with an impure heart and spirit, or out of self-love and fear of punishment, you
have not satisfied me. Therefore, the law is duplex and is understood in
a twofold way, [whereas] they have understood Matt. 5: [20] in the first
sense. For Christ also means these two senses when he says: Unless your
righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees. For they say "you
shall not kill," and think that they have nobly fulfilled the law if they
have not killed with their hands. But Christ goes on to say: my dear fellows, the law is spiritual and wants to be fulfilled by the spirit. Therefore, I tell you: He who is angry with his brother will be liable to judgment. The same goes for Racha and all that follows in the same passage
in Matthew where Christ interprets the law spiritually [Math 5: 21-48].
That then is how you refute this argument that the law condemns
and convicts itself, by saying that carnal righteousness is condemned and
judged through the spiritual law because before God it is impure, unclean, hypocritical and a lie. And thus the law evacuates the law. That
indeed we have to say, even if it is not a proper way of speaking, but yet it
would be even better to say that human pride, both the opinion of oneself and of carnal righteousness, is disobedience and is without trust and
fear of God. These are condemned by the spiritual law. For although
you abound with the noblest of virtues, you will hear the other: If Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about, but not before God [Rom. 4: 2]. Therefore, the law can condemn itself, that is, understood spiritually, as interpreted by Paul and Christ. And there is no
need for a different kind of teaching to be advocated by which to condemn that righteousness of the law.
This and the following two argumenta are the only ones in which
Agricola himself participates and for which he is actually present. This is
clear already from Luther's sarcastic remark when, as presider, he calls Agricola to come forward: Numquid adest dominus Magister Isleben? The histor-
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ical significance of this moment has already been discussed in the previous
chapter so that here we shall concentrate solely on the theology.
The importance of this argumentum lies in the fact that it is Agricola's
own direct articulation of his position, and since it is only here and in argumenturn 15 that he chooses to participate in the disputation, one would expect that what he says here should be central to his concern. The issue at stake
here involves the relation between the two uses of the law, the civil and the
theological. After his short introductory apologia for presenting his case
(ostensibly ever eager to seize the opportunity to show his orthodoxy and respect for Luther) Agricola presents his Argument: Necesse est argui et
damnari iustitiam legis. Lex non damnat nec arguit legis iustitiam. Ergo
opus est alia doctrina, quae iustitiam legis damnet. As proof he adduces the
axiom: si lex damnaret iustitiam legis, destrueret seipsam. Quicquid autem
corrumpitur, a contrario corrumpitur (458, 18-26). Luther commends the Argument: Est bonum argumentum. All the same, it is clear from Luther's responsio that he does not agree with Agricola's line of argumentation because
ultimately he rejects his conclusion: Ergo opus est alia re arguente et
damnante iustitiam legis. Hoc est Evangelio et verbo gratiae (458, 20-23; right
col.).
His argument is logical, but not theological: since the law itself cannot
condemn the righteousness based on the law (iustitia seu civilis legis) without bringing about its own demise (just as a house divided against itself cannot stand), Agricola holds that it falls to the gospel to condemn workrighteousness, which is just another way of talking about the iustitia legis,
coram Deo. Although Luther is diplomatic in the way he handles Agricola
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here, his opening words of caution: Manete iterum in univoca significatione,
non in aequivoca (459, 11), spoken in response to the tense question addressed

to him as respondent: Quid respondetis?, already signals his unease with
Agricola's argumentum. Luther proceeds to make a clear distinction between
the two righteousnesses, the one in the political sphere, coram hominibus,
the other in the theological sphere, coram Deo.378 The former, the politica
iustitia, arises viribus humanis, and arises out of the pressure law of reward

and punishment.379 In other words, it is extorted vel minis ye! promissis or
even blanditiis seu beneficiis. This righteousness, which per se is good and
should be cultivated, is only a iustitia, coram hominibus, not coram Deo, that
is, it in no way merits grace or justification, as Paul already says in connection
with father Abraham: Habet quidem gloriam, sed non apud Deum. It is also
called carnalis seu externa iustitia. The other righteousness, which avails
coram Deo, cannot be earned, but only received as a gift through faith in

Christ (iustitia passiva). This is the righteousness that we will have finaliter
in futura vita. The problem is that these two righteousnesses often become

confused to the extent that people, through their sin and pride, often attempt
to claim credit for their civil righteousness, coram Deo, and may even attempt
to justify themselves on the basis of their own active (= civil) righteousness,
378Luther,

in the 1535 Preface to his Galatervorlesung (1531), distinguishes carefully between these two righteousnesses, calling the one iustitia
activa and the other iustitia passiva (see 40 I, 40, 15-51, 34).
Luther the iustitia civilis of the natural man is also the
morality of reward and work, where good and virtuous works, coram
hominibus, are rewarded, while conversely wicked deeds are punished. In
the usus civilis the Strafamt of the natural law drives people in the world to
do externally good works (459, 12-460, 22).
379In
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instead of receiving the iustitia Dei passively as a gift through faith (458, 27459, 22).
Luther now turns the tables on Agricola and cites Paul to make it clear
that lex seipsam damnet, est enim spiritualis (Rom. 7: 14: oRiagEv y6p On 6
v6p.oc irveup.articac Eattv). The reason that the lex, spiritualiter intellecta, condemns our carnalis et externa iustitia legis is because we are acipicivac, and all
our striving for righteousness, no matter how noble coram hominibus, is
hypocrisis because the heart is impurum et repugnans. No matter how righteous or virtuous your behavior is outwardly Voris], inwardly your heart is
seething with lust and passion [cor tuum aestuat horribilibus et innumeris
cupiditatibus et libidinibus adversus Deum et homines] and were it not for
the restraint and penalties of the law [vincula et claustra legum et gravissimarum poenarum], you would be worse than the coarsest sinner. This is the
first or political use of the law, which Christians qua sinners need to restrain
and coerce the flesh. However, on top of that the law in its chief and theological use is like a surgeon's knife which cuts through the veneer of our respectability and lays bares our diseased heart and all our impurities. We fall
under judgment because, as sinners, the law, which is spiritualis, requires cor
purum et spirituale, has to extract from us what we should do hilari corde et
spiritu per Spiritum sanctum renovato. God does not only look at the action,
he looks to the heart, and if the heart is unclean, so is the deed: to quidem
speciosa opera, magna et utilia fads, sed quia impuro corde et spiritu vel
amore tui timore poenarum facis, non es ille, qui mihi satisfecerit (460, 1-21).
The law is duplex et dupliciter intelligitur, as Luther further illustrates from
the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount, where Christus spiritualiter
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legem interpretatur, that is, where he uses the law in its spiritual or theological sense to expose sin.
Thus Luther shows how one refutes the antinomian argument that the
law condemns and convicts itself when it condemns the iustitia legis. That is
to say, he points out that this righteousness of the law is in fact a carnal righteousness, impure and hypocritical, and therefore it falls under the judgment
of the spiritual law: iustitia carnalis damnatur et iudicatur per legem spiritualem, quod coram Deo sit impura, immunda, hypocrisis et mendacium.
Luther characterizes this, contra Agricola, as a legitimate instance of where
the lex legem evacuat. But this formulation, which in its negative form was
introduced by Agricola, is not precise enough theologically. For strictly speaking, it is not the spiritual law as gospel that evacuates or even overcomes the
carnal law, for Luther does not use that sort of antithesis in his mature theology, but rather the law, which is spiritual, condemns the sinful flesh and,
hence, all carnal righteousness. Therefore, while holding to the essence of the
statement lex legem evacuat, he reformulates his objection to Agricola's argument= in a way that properly distinguishes between law and gospel: Ita
quidem est loquendum nobis, etsi sit impropria locutio, sed tamen magis ita
diceremus—when he says: quod praesumptio humana et opinio propriae et
carnalis iustitiae, inobedientia, vacare fiducia, timore Dei. This then is what
is condemned by the "spiritual law," or the law understood in its theological
use: pride, self-righteousness, disobedience, and a lack of fear and confidence
toward God. No matter how noble the outward deed, there law exposes and
condemns our sinful heart and thereby robs us of any ground of confidence in
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ourselves by which we might stand before God.380 Our only hope is in him
whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood, which we receive in
faith (Rom. 3: 25).
We have seen that Luther holds to the unity of the law381 even to the
extent that he expressly agrees with Agricola's argument that the law would
destroy itself if it condemns the iustitia legis. However, Luther will only
grant that on the condition that the two iustitiae, political and theological, are
carefully distinguished. But if they are distinguished, it becomes apparent
that the law is not condemning itself if it condemns the iustitia legis, because
this is not the righteousness demanded by the law, but the very opposite,
namely, carnal self-righteousness. For the true righteousness demanded by
the law can only be given by God himself propter Christum per fidem. There380When Christians see themselves in the mirror of the civil law
they think they are righteous and respectable: Tu quidem es vir bonus, politicus, castus, neminem defraudas, amas tuam coniugem, fugis alterius etc.
When then the "spiritual" law interrogates us: quo fine hoc facis? numquid
amore legum aut laudum, aut timore poenarum, dedecoris? It is as if--the
quasi here refers to the apostrophe of the law, not to the substance of its demands-- the law says: Ego spiritualis sum, hoc est, cor purum et spirituale requiro, non satisfit mihi nisi hilari corde et spiritu per Spiritum sanctum renovato; to quidem speciosa opera, magna et utilia facis, sed quia impuro corde
et spiritu vel amore tui et timore poenarum facis, non es ille, qui mihi satisfecerit (460, 14-21). The implication here is clear, the merry heart and Spirit-

renewed spirit that the "spiritual" law requires can only be given by Christ;
only his impletio legis achieves the satisfacere of the law (cf. also 436, 13-1315).
381See ch. 1 for a discussion of Schloemann's thesis on the unity of
the law in Luther; for his refutation of Heckel's thesis that in Luther we have
a twofold Naturrecht and a double Naturgesetz, see Schloemann, 10-31, esp.
23-31, where he shows that the unity of the law is a presupposition of the doctrine of the duplex usus legis.
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fore, when law and gospel are properly distinguished, lex legem evacuat is not
proper statement for it suggests that the gospel is the new lex spiritualis which
overcomes the old lex carnalis. This way of speaking about the gospel under
the Oberbegriff "lex," belongs to Luther's early period when he was still doing
his theology within an Augustinian schema.382 However, once he learned
properly to distinguish between law and gospel, he abandoned that monistic
way of speaking in favor of an antithetical way of speaking about human sin
and divine grace. This law-gospel approach is reflected in his concluding
statement that the lex spiritualis condemns all carnalis iustitia.
In summary, Luther does three things in his responsio: first, he rejects
Agricola's logical argument on theological grounds; secondly, although at first
he stays within Agricola's conceptual framework and simply reverses his own
thesis (lex legem evacuat) he abandons it in favor of a proper distinction between law and gospel. When the law does its proper work, it condemns sin,
and when at length it has served its purpose and drives the penitent to the
mercy of Christ, then the law itself is overcome by the gospel, so that for
Luther ultimately it is not a case of the (spiritual) law overcoming the (carnal)
law, but the law itself being overcome by the gospe1.383 Thirdly, rather than
attempting to understanding the gospel as a new law (lex spiritualis), Luther
teaches two uses within the one law, for the law is duplex and is to be under382Schloemann,

28 n. 77, is correct when he notes that the antithesis
of the lex spiritualis is not lex carnalis, but an intellectus (=usus) spiritualis
that condemns the carnalis et externa iustitia legis.
383Although

this final sentence goes beyond Luther's own statements in the present argument, we believe our interpretation is justified in
view of his total understanding of law and gospel as it is unfolding in the
disputations.
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stood in a twofold way, coram Deo (theological use) and coram hominibus
(civil or political use).
Argument 15384
Isleben: 385 Whatever appears to all people and teaches all people so
that they learn to renounce ungodliness and lusts etc., this very thing
38439 I, 461, 20-468, 2 (left col.).
385WA editors note that Goth. 264 fol. 84b gives a brief, independent

version of this argument of Agricola's [Aliud M. Agricolae]. This is printed in
the right column, 461, 20-463, 11. Immediately after this, also in the right column, they have given the same argument based on Agricola's own notes
[argument= 2] (463, 13-464, 12). Both of these appear below.
Argument 15
Another of Agricola's
Titus [2: 11]: the grace of God has appeared. From this passage I
deduce that whatever appears to all people, and trains them to renounce
all passions and impurities, also shows that ungodliness is the greatest
sin.
In this passage Paul has established that grace does this. Therefore,
grace teaches that the greatest ungodliness is the greatest sin. And there
is no need for the law.
Response: Paul connects redemption and example because he has
redeemed us in such a way that we become imitators of Christ's steps.
Therefore, the law is not necessary because everything is there without
the law: forgiveness and example. However, the conclusion is not valid
because law means the same as example. If two teach the same thing,
one author is not to be rejected as a witness. Secondly, each part includes
the teaching of the law and the forgiveness of sins. The knowledge of sin
comes first and shows the footprint of the law that has been fulfilled and
which, by that example, is also to be fulfilled among us. Therefore,
Christ's example does not remove the law that is to be taught but upholds it. Christ is our example, in order that we might follow in his footsteps, and also our sacrament. The convergence of these is alone in him,
in whom alone we believe.
Argument 2
Whatever appears to all people and indeed teaches them to
renounce ungodliness and worldly passions and to live self-controlled,
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shows that ungodliness is also the chief sin and that impure lusts are the
way to death. The grace of God and of our Savior has appeared, teaching
all people so that, although ungodliness has been renounced, this is the
chief sin (Titus 2: 11-12). Therefore, the grace of God appearing to all
people shows them their sin and death and judgment; consequently the
law is not to be taught.
Brief Response: You know that Paul for the most part is accustomed
to joining those two things together, as Peter also does: first, that Christ
died for us and has redeemed us through his blood in order to purify for
himself a holy people (Titus 2: 14). And so first Christ is offered to us as a
gift or a sacrament. Secondly, they offer us Christ as an example that, as a
upright and godly lives in this world [Titus 2: 11]; this itself teaches that
ungodliness is the greatest sin, and that worldly passions lead to death.
That is, it teaches sin and death. The grace of God and of our savior has
appeared to all people, teaching them to renounce ungodliness and
worldly passions and to live self-controlled, upright, and godly lives in
this world. Therefore, the grace of God and of our savior etc. It reveals
sin and death. Therefore, no law.
Response: All apostles have the sacrament and example of Christ
Jesus. The sacrament is apprehended by faith. The example pertains to
conduct in order that we might show him, who has regenerated and
justified us out of his gratuitous kindness, that we are worthy. For his
grace should summon us to do good to others. The word of God must be
rightly divided. Those who have been terrified, if they are inclining to
despair, should not be aggravated further, but the law must be taught to
the ungodly. The gospel is for the poor, the strong have no need of a
doctor [Matt. 9: 12].
The following is another version of Luther's words of reconciliation
(466, 23-467, 17). See also the next footnote.
D. Martin Luther: Next, after I had said that I was thoroughly
satisfied and was thankful to those men for such teaching, Luther
replied: I will also say this publicly. You have been under suspicion. But
now that I have heard you speaking I, for my part, am satisfied. And I
ask all of you teachers and students to lay aside any suspicions that you
might have harbored, for we need to extend our hand to one another.
We still have enough to do as it is. If we do go at one another, let it be
done without the deceit, without hypocrisy. It is true that there are
people here, sent by others, as spies, who would like us to disagree. But
more are with us than with them. Thanks be to God.
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consequence, we may become emulators of good works. He himself redeemed us from all ungodliness and death in order that we might then
proclaim and glorify him by the emulation of his good works. Thus Peter says: Christ suffered for us that we may follow in his steps (1 Peter 2:
21). Augustine also speaks of these two things: sacramentum and exemplum. Therefore, you will say: The law is not necessary because it is
enough that we have Christ as a gift, and then as an example that we
may imitate him in all good works, since examples are more effective
than laws themselves. We have everything without the law: forgiveness of sins, eternal life and then also an example, such as cannot be excelled, and such as would naturally move me.
Response: Although the argument is true, nevertheless this conclusion does not hold: I have Christ's example or footsteps, I can follow
this, likewise I can be taught by the example of Christ. Therefore, the law
is not necessary, nor is it to be taught, nor does it hold. In actual fact,
however, the law is to be taught all the more, because since it teaches the
same, namely, the example of Christ, I am moved by the testimony of
two witnesses in order that I may obey more readily and willingly. It is
the same as if I were to argue as follows: Here are two witnesses who say
and testify to the same thing. Therefore, the testimony of one is to be rejected and not accepted. What do you say to that? Surely this, that what
is spoken by the mouth of two witnesses is the whole truth.
Secondly, when we say that Christ has been set before us as an example, as redeemer, this itself amounts to teaching the law. And it is a
true preaching of the law. For if the redeemer and savior comes to you,
it means that you must have sin and that redemption itself includes sin.
However, sin is such that it is not recognized unless we are told through
the law, but through Christ given to us, thus it is made evident that we
have sin. Likewise he also gives another example. For to set forth Christ
as an example is nothing other than to show how life is to be lived in
obedience to God as well as to parents and superiors, and how a follower
is marked by all good works and virtues, as recounted by Paul and Peter
at the end of almost all their letters. In each case we are given an example of the law that has been fulfilled and the law that is to be fulfilled.
Therefore, the law has not been abolished through Christ but more
strongly confirmed (Rom. 3: 31). Should I not then rather teach like this:
My man, Christ, has fulfilled the law, and now it is only fitting that we
follow in his steps by living a godly and holy life, and not as an adulterer,
thief, or robber, for Christ says to the Pharisee: Go and do likewise (Luke
10: 37). I speak in the same way in connection with Christ set forth as gift
or redeemer. For since this benefit is, or at least may be, so great that nobody can express it, it is therefore also impossible for it to be known and
understood without the law, as we have said several times above. For
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when I say that Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law (Gal. 3:
13) somebody will immediately think: what is the law? If we want to satisfy others or ourselves here, it is necessary to say what the law is. Christ
is set forth to us, either as gift or as sacrament and example, so that we
might follow his steps. Insofar as he is an example we can indeed follow
and imitate him; however, insofar as he is a sacrament and mystery that
is not the case.
Here Augustine, who loves to play with such mathematical matters,
uses the term "diapason" to indicate that Christ is the one who does
(sounds) both: not only did he himself fulfill the law, but he also fulfilled
it for us. Christ is sacrament for me because he redeemed me from sin,
death and the devil, something which is not possible through my righteousness, nor can it be grasped by works, but solely by faith. Here Christ
says to me and all believers: Do not fear the wrath of the Father or death,
for I have made satisfaction for you and you are saved already and have
now been set with me in heavenly places [Eph. 2: 6], nor do you lack anything except what has not yet been revealed. But now it remains, as this
sacrament signifies, that it is all mine, not John the Baptist's, not Peter's,
not Paul's, not the Virgin Mary's, nor any saint's. For Christ himself remains here as Thomas himself and also as his twin, that you might follow my steps by doing well, by suffering, and by confessing. Thus he
came to us as first himself, but that Christ has a double, who rings in to
us who are the lower note, so that we ring out in harmony with the
higher.
Peter and Paul teach these two things almost everywhere: He gave
himself for us to free us from our iniquity [Titus 2: 14]. And so the doctrine of the law ought always remain in the discussion of redemption except that it also must be taught in such a way that the terrified and afflicted are not led to despair, for they must be considered. However, all
the examples of God's wrath put together will not move the ungodly,
and those who are stubborn or obdurate--neither the example of the
flood, nor the Sodomites, nor the Jews, because those blind people rush
to their pleasures, if they have any. On the other hand, the troubled and
anxious souls are terrified even at the sight of some fly buzzing or flying
in front of their faces in an unusual way. In fact they feel terror and
dread even at the very thought of these things. Therefore, Christ does
not want these people and others like them to be troubled or neglected:
Encourage the faint-hearted [1 Thess. 5: 14].
Therefore, the mark of the skilled minister is to be able to rightly
divide the word of God. The stubborn and ungodly need a hammer, and
they must not be told that the law is unnecessary and that Christ has fulfilled it. But this is the bread of the troubled and afflicted. Therefore,
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Paul, teaching the forgiveness of sins and how we ought to follow him,
does not exclude the law, but rather upholds it [Rom. 3: 31].
D. Martin Luther: 386 And now Master Isleben, lest I brand you with
any of these things, it is true that I was suspicious of you. However the
fact that I hear your confession is enough. I am content with you; as far
as I am concerned you are in the clear. And I also believe that the rest of
our masters and brothers will be content. For I want it said publicly in
this place that we are friends and there is no difference of opinion between us. There is no need for us to bite, devour, and consume one another. The devil causes us enough vexations outside, and there is
enough danger from external things. No doubt there are many people
here who are keen to search out and observe our disagreement, and who
would probably derive great joy if there were something like that between us. Therefore, I want to admonish all of you also to be of one
mind in doctrine, and each to extend a hand to the other, without deceit
and pretense, in honesty and sincerity. Otherwise the pretense will be
carried on and will one day break out, for it can never last long. Believe
me, even though we are of the same mind, we will still have troubles
enough, for the devil never rests etc.
This is the second of the two argumenta advanced by Agricola, both of
which lie at the heart of his theology. It is based on Titus 2: 11-12 and seeks to
show that it is precisely the gratia Dei et servatoris nostri, which has appeared
386These

final remarks are Luther's words of reconciliation to Agricola. The historical background is discussed in ch. 2. Hermelink (39 I, 466, n.
3) notes that these words are attested by two other sources besides the MSS
containing the entire disputation: one is Agricola's papers, namely, his own
handwritten account from Agricola's Bible in Wernigerode (see 457 n. 2); this
is printed in the preceeding footnote and is a translation of 466, 23-467, 17,
which follows the Solutio beginning at 464, 5; the other source is a transcript
with the remark, "M. Lobbitzes eigne pant der Wort Lutheri ad Islebium post
habitam disputationem Anno 38" in the Sammelkodex der Erlanger llniversittitsbibliothek, Agricolana enthaltend, Cod. Erlang. 1665 fol. 19b-20a (see ZKG
4 (1881): 309. The editors further note that the account (on its author, cf.
Drews, 335-6) agrees almost entirely with the main group of our MSS and is
taken in account in the text beginning 466, 23 (left col.). Goth. 264 fol. 84b is
also taken into account there, which, with the words: Et nunc, mi domine
Islebi, again joins the text recension of the main group of MSS.
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to all people, teaching387 them to renounce impietas et concupiscentiae,
which has also revealed to them their peccatum et mors et iudicium, and that
consequently: lex non est docenda. What Agricola has in fact done here is
made a subtle change in the meaning of the text. The apostle says that the
grace which saves us also trains us to renounce sin and live godly lives
rExickivn yOtp A xdpic nob- Eliot') abyrripioc reiaiv avepoinoic ratbetiovaa 41.tEic,
iva apvnacii.tevoi Thv aagpetav mit .thc icoatuick inievgiac motinxivwc Koh
Six aica c Kth il!)ait3Gic cilaco µEy iv T62 viiv aiGivi, .. .1, whereas Agricola says that
the grace of God (and of Christ), which has trained us in godly living, shows
us that ungodliness is the chief sin. This is consistent with Agricola's position which teaches that God's grace in the gospel or in Christ reveals to us our
sin, not the law.
Luther agrees with the argument as such, but disallows the conclusion:
Ego habeo exemplum seu vestigium Christi, ego possum hoc sequi, item ego
possum erudiri exemplo Christi. Ergo lex non est necessaria nec docenda nec
valet (463, 23-464, 1). He resists the antinomian attempt to drive a wedge between the lex and the exemplum Christi, for there is a coherence between the
two. Christ's example confirms the law for it teaches the same as the law
teaches. That in fact is a strong argument in favor of keeping the Decalogue,
for not only does the exemplum Christi show that Christ himself kept the
law, but also the apostolic injunction to emulate the example of Christ in paIf pioc, and also inserts a copulative between it xciplc -rocs eeoii and aorrripioc, so that the subject
of the n meet i ov c ra [erudiens] is both the grace of God and of our Savior. The
variant certainly is supported by the end of v. 10 as well as v. 13 where eza;
and aontip are found in juxtaposition.
387Agricola chooses to read aca Trip instead of

CROT
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tient suffering (Eic toino ybcp iKX1-10t1TE, OT1 Kth Xpi at eic graeEv ineeple4tav
•Up.-Tv .67roitit7rcivcov incoypaiiiisbv iva incocoXoveriante TOic (Xvccnv al:n0ii; 1 Peter 2: 21) presupposes the abiding validity of the law. Luther sets the example
of Christ clearly on the side of the law and therefore sees it as further confirmation that the law is to be retained and taught. Besides that, he sees the exemplum Christi as lending weight to the voice of the law so that this twofold
testimony may move me all the more to free and willing obedience [moveor
duorum testimonio, ut propensius ac liberius obediam]388 (464, 2-5).
The example of Christ, of course, although belonging to the law, can
also, like the law, be received through faith as a gift, and thus become an encouragement to serve the neighbor in love. However, Luther does not dwell
on the exemplum Christi in the sense of a tertium usus legis, but goes on at
once to discuss how the example of Christ, or even the fact that he is our redeemer, is a proclamation of the law [Secundo hoc ipsum, quod dicimus,
Christum esse nobis propositum ut exemplum, ut redemptorem, est docere
legem. Et est vera praedicatio legis] (464, 12-15). The fact that Christ is our redeemer implies that we are sinners. However, our corruption due to sin is so
profound that we would never grasp that if the law did not tell us. But this is
also the message conveyed by the exemplum Christi insofar as it is law. Not
only does it exhort us to serve others as Christ served us, but it also mirrors to
us our failure to follow the example of Christ in our vocation and stations in
life because of sin. Therefore, in bringing us to a knowledge of sin, the exam3881n addition the testimonium duorum has a greater claim to

setting forth the whole counsel of God: Numquid hoc, quod in ore duorum
consistit omne verum? (464, 10-12).
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ple of Christ (as well as the simple fact that Christ is our redeemer), takes on
the role of the law in its second and chief use. Seen in the way we have been
describing it, the exemplum Christi is nothing else than the exemplum implendae legis.
However, there is another way of looking at Christ as exemplar, and
that is from the standpoint of the the gospel, which tells us that the exemplum Christi is not a demand but a gift. The very goodness, holiness, love
etcetra that characterizes the life and example of Christ, and that many New
Testament writers hold up to us to emulate, is no longer merely demanded
from us, but is now given to us through the gospel. Seen in this light the exemplum Christi is nothing more than the exemplum impletae legis. Here
Luther carefully distinguishes between law and gospel: to the impenitent—and
here we also need to include the old Adam in Christians--the example of
Christ can never be anything other than law: the demand to follow in his
footsteps. To faith, on the other hand, the exemplum Christi is what Christ
did for us and what he offers us freely through faith, which is the fulfillment
of the law. What we could not do because of sin Christ has done for us and
for our salvation. In both cases the lex is presupposed, either as implenda or
impleta, and so the example of Christ does not abolish the doctrine of the law,
but rather confirms it.
Luther gives an excellent example of how the exemplum can be used in
a gospel way in our preaching: Mi homo, Christus implevit legem, et nunc
certe decet, ut eius vestigia sequamur pie et sancte vivendo, non sis adulter,
fur, latro, ut Christus dicit pharisaeo: Vade, fac to similiter (464, 25-465, 1).
Here the imperative, "Go and do likewise," is firmly grounded in the gospel
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statement, "Christ has fulfilled the law for you"--Luther would surely not object to our adding the "for you." It is not a gospel imperative because the
gospel is never an imperative but always and only a gift. Nevertheless, it
flows out of the gospel and demands nothing more than the gospel itself
gives. In that sense the imperative is always based on the indicative.389
Moreover, faith now eagerly embraces the example of Christ, the Decalogue,
and all the directives of scripture in order to learn how best to give expression
to the new life that it has been given in Christ. Its final goal is the praise of
God (cf. Titus 2: 10: ... siva Thy Sioacricaitiav Thy toi5 actyrripog twitiv Oec15
Koapoialv iv ndatv).390 Luther again stresses a point that he made in the First

Disputation: the gospel is such that it cannot be fully comprehended without
the law, for the law needs to shows us the magnitude of our sin and our utter
corruption before we can appreciate the gospel as the great treasure that it is
[Nam hoc beneficium cum tantum est vel cum tantum sit, ut nemo eloqui
possit, ita etiam cognosci, intelligi impossibile est sine lege, ut iam aliquoties
supra diximus] (465, 2-5).391
Luther now makes a further distinction within the exemplum Christi.
Not all that Christ does may be imitated, for where he acts vicariously for us
as our redeemer he acts alone. In order to distinguish this unique part of his
use of the exemplum Christi is a good way of preaching the
law to those who have Angst, because it can easily be shown to be the lex impleta in the light of the gospel.
389The

390Cf. 464, 28-29 (B):

Christus dilexit Deum et proximum suum etc.,

quod sequi debemus.
391See our discussion of 1 AD, Arg. 16.
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work as the fulfiller of the law from that where we are called to follow his example, Luther introduces the Begriffspaar sacramentum and exemplum. Insofar as he is an example we can indeed follow and imitate him; but insofar as
he is a sacrament and a mystery we cannot [quoad exemplum quidem sequi et
imitari eum possumus, verum quoad sacramentum et mysterium non item]
(465, 9-10). Although in the earlier part of his career Luther used these terms
within the framework of the Augustinian theology of humility, where law
and gospel were not distinguished and exemplum was interpreted paradigmatically within the context of a progressive, transformative view of justification, here they no longer carry that freight but are used rather to make a
proper distinction between justification and sanctifiction.392 Christ then is
Augustine's correlation of exemplum and sacrament=
with reference to Christ, see: De consensu evangelistrarum I, 53 & 54 in Opera
3 (MPL, 34, 1069-70); further: De Trinitate IV, 3 in Opera 8 (MPL, 42, 889-892).
Note reference to Augustine's terms sacramentum et exemplum in the Fifth
Thesenreihe (356, 35-38). For a helpful analysis of how these terms were used
and understood in Luther's early theology, see Norman Nagel, "Sacrament= et exemplum in Luther's Understanding of Christ," in Luther for an Ecumenical Age: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary of the Reformation, ed. Carl S. Meyer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967),
172-199. He points out that in early Luther, Christ's death is not seen as that
which he, and he alone, does for us, but is rather looked upon as an example
(hence understood paradigmatically) for Christians to follow as they learn to
die to sins and evil lusts like Christ. Justification then is not something that
God effects in Christ but in us, and this process is lifelong. In conceiving it in
this way Luther is simply following Augustine who, in understanding the
gospel as nova lex, is unable to separate what God does from what we do. The
result is that justification for Augustine is not God's declaration and bestowal
of Christ's righteousness, imputative, through faith, but the process by which
God gradually conforms us to the image of Christ and we grow in love, all the
while mortifying the flesh through penance and discipline until we are finally transformed and God has made us acceptable to himself. Nagel puts it
well when he writes on p. 190:
392For
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given to us first as donum or sacramentum and then as exemplum. To further emphasize the point Luther makes use of another Augustinian term diapason, which comes from the world of mathematics and music, and which is

used here as a correlative of exemplum. The primary emphasis is always on
what Christ alone has done for us and for our salvation; here we do nothing
but receive his gifts. The accent falls clearly on the pro me: he is my sacramentUM,393 he has redeemed me from sin, death, and the devil, he has ful-

filled the law for me. Because this is sure and certain I have nothing to fear:
God's wrath has been stilled and I am now seated with Christ in the heavenly
places. But Christ as sacramentum also fulfilled the exemplum, through the
diapason. His sacramentum, which forms the cantus firmus of our life, reverberates in the exemplum so that our following him is pulled into his fulfillment of the law. His redemptive work for us as sacrament= flows into
and undergirds the exemplum, just as the foundational stop on an organ, the
diapason, encompasses the entire range of musical tones. Luther makes the
connection between sacramentum and exemplum clear when he says: Nam
Under sacramentum et exemplum attention was drawn to what
happened in me. My soul died to sin and my body was offered to death and
sufferings. This is reversed when attention centers on what Christ did
uniquely. Then it is sin, devil, and death that die. They have power and a
role only so long as the Law does. They are crucified in that sublime
crucifixion. If we look to where sacrament= used to be, we find only Christ
and what He did. "In Christ, not in me," is the whole crux of the matter.
See also E. Iserloh, "Sacramentum et exemplum. Ein augustinisches Thema
lutherischer Theologie," in, Reformata Reformanda, Festgabe fur H. Jadin, ed.
E. Iserloh and K. Repgen (Munster: Aschendorf, 1965), I, 247-264.
393See also 465, 18-20: Nunc autem reliquum est, ut, cum hoc sacramentum significat, solum meum sit, non Ioannis Baptistae, non Petri, non
Pauli, non Mariae virginis, neque ullius sancti.
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ipse [scil. Christus] non twit= implevit legem, sed pro nobis implevit (465,
12). Christ not only sounded the diapason on Calvary in fulfilling the law
(sacramentum), he also fulfilled it for us so that this fulfillment now reverberate throughout our life as we follow his exemplum.
Luther's formulation at this point is a marvelous instance of how he
anchors his parenesis in the indicative of the gospel; Christ does what only he
can do as our sacramenturn. Here he remains the solus Thomista; but at the
same time he is a gemellus (cf. Thomas the twin in John 20: 24) so that we can
follow in his footsteps by working well, suffering, and confessing. He came to
us as only a single one [simplum unum tantum], for his redemptive work
permits no imitation, however that Christ is a double [illi autem Christo duplum] and in the life of sanctification he overtakes us [et superat nos per diapason] and walks ahead of us as our exemplar [exemplum] so that we may follow in his vestigia (405, 20-24). In his sacramentum work Christ is behind us
and alone (Calvary), but as exemplum he is ahead of us and bids us follow
him.
Luther says that these are the two things that Peter and Paul are constantly saying: Ipse dedit se pro nobis, ut liberaret nos ab iniquitate nostra (465,
23-466, 1). It is important that we note carefully what Luther is not saying
here. He is not saying that Christ is simplus unus tantum in justification, and
then in sanctification he becomes only duplus and exemplum. Rather he says
that whereas in justification he is only sacramentum, in sanctification he is
also exemplum. In other words, the Christ who stands in front of us as a
duplus beckoning us to follow in his steps, is the same Christ who as a
simplus forgives us and now also dwells in us to strengthen us and to live
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out his life within us.394 While his exemplum may be the goal and guide of
our new life, his cross, where he acts for us "sacramentally" (simplus pro
nobis), provides the motivation for all our good works and the only ground
of our confidence coram Deo.
What Luther wants to emphasize to Agricola is that teaching Christ as
exemplar does not eliminate the law, indeed it upholds it. Thus he says that
the doctrina legis must always remain within the context of the discussion
about salvation. The caveat that he sounds however is that it must be taught
in such a way as causes the perterrefacti et afflicti to despair. This is why
Luther elsewhere insists that the gospel must never be separated from the
proper office of the law. Here he suggests that the way of preaching the law to
Christians should be different from that to the undurati seu feroces. The latter will not be moved to repentance even by all the exempla irae divinae in
unum collecta, whereas the miserae et angustiatae animae are even terrified
at the sight of something unusual [vel ad conspectum muscae alicuius ante
ora praeter morem strepitantis aut volitantis] or even at the mere thought of
such things [Imo etiam ad suas ipsorum cogitationes expavescunt et formidant] (466, 4-9). Christ does not want such people to be troubled or neglected,
but rather comforted with the gospel.
Luther concludes the responsio proper with a general exhortation to
recte secare verbum Dei, for this is the mark of the prudens minister. The fe394The

priority of Christ's role, not only in justification but also in
our sanctification is beautifully illustrated by another passage from Augustine, which Luther cites in his Fifth Thesenreihe: Qua dicit [scil. Augustinus],
Christum suo simplo concinere nostro duplo et facere perfectum numerum
(39 I, 357, 1-2, ATh, V, Th. 52).
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races et impii need a malleus (which includes the exempla irae divinae mentioned above), while the afflicti are to be told Christum implesse legem. In
this argument then he has consistently said two things: for the penitent the
the forgiveness of sins abolishes the law, but this is given only to faith, for the
impenitent, on the other hand, and the Christian qua sinner, the law is not
abolished but rather upheld. Luther says the same thing using the terms
sacramentum et exemplum: insofar as Christ is sacramentum he cannot be
imitated and he frees us from the law: our redemption is pure gift; however,
insofar as we are still sinners, the law remains, and not as lex impleta (as in
the case of the saints), but as lex implenda and it is this then that we meet in
the exemplum Christi. But even then, to the extent that we look away from
our own imperfect fulfillment of the law and put our faith in Christ's perfect
fulfillment on our behalf, the command to follow in Christ's footsteps will no
longer be heard as the voice of the lex accusans, but as an invitation to follow
him who fulfiiled the law for us and who now shows faith the very works
that it itself is eager to do.
The final part of the responsio is a summary of Luther's speech of reconciliation following Agricola's pledge to conform his teaching to Luther's
doctrine of the law (cf. 2 Tim. 1: 13: imort.ino) ow gxe lir ctivOvicav ?Low v
(Sy nape igoi5 !Yowl) crac).395 Luther exhorts Agricola and the students of
theology to mutual love, concord and consensus in doctrine, and warns them
against duplicity and deception, the very thing of which Agricola was later
accused. Luther candidly admits his own previous suspicion but, on the
395See ch. 2 for a discussion of the background of this reconciliation
and its subsequent collapse when Agricola failed to honor his pledge.
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strength of Agricola's confession, he is now ready to put that behind him and
to extend the hand of friendship. As we have already seen in the previous
chapter, Luther was perhaps too quick to trust Agricola, especially given the
reasonable grounds for suspicion that he had, based on Agricola's prior
conduct. On the other hand, it also shows how eager Luther was to do all he
could to prevent a schism among the evangelicals, even if he secretly doubted
Agricola's intention to desist from his false teaching, for he was well aware of
how Satan can exploit such divisions for his own purposes.
Argument 16396
Isleben: Christ says: Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the
scribes and Pharisees [Matt. 5: 20]. Also Eph. 5 [: 5] says: Those who do
such things will not possess the kingdom of God. Therefore, some part
of the law is necessary.
Response: Indeed, not a part, but the whole law is needed. But the
dispute is about keeping it: whether, that is, we keep the law by our human powers? No, we do not. Then who does? Christ. He keeps it all
and then afterwards we keep it in part, though not by our own powers
but by the power of the Holy Spirit who has been given in our hearts in
whom we cry, Abba Father [Rom. 8: 15].397
39639 I, 468, 4-469, 3 (left col.).
397Another argument is given in the right col. (468, 4-12):

Argument 16
Isleben: If you wish to enter life [Matt. 19: 17]. Therefore, the law is
necessary for salvation. Unless your righteousness exceeds etc [Matt. 5:
20]. Likewise, those who do such things [Eph. 5: 5]. Therefore, at least
some part of the law is necessary, that is, inchoate obedience, for
righteousness.
Response: On the contrary, the whole law is required, but the dispute is not about requiring but about keeping.
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Even though this argument= is ascribed to Agricola in the heading, it
is very unlikely that it was given by him in person, since, as we saw earlier,
his own personal records indicate that when he was called forward by Luther
to present his proofs, he offered the two arguments which we have just discussed.398 Therefore, this present argument was most likely presented by one
of the Wittenberg faculty on Agricola's behalf. It posits that at least aliqua pars
legis is necessary for salvation. We know already from our background study
that this has to refer to the civil law for that is the only pars legis that Agricola
was willing to concede.
Luther in his responsio argues that non pars, sed Iota lex requiritur, but
points out that what is at issue is not whether the law is required, but whether
we can keep it by our own strength [Sed disputatur de praestando: An, id est,
legem praestant vires humanae?]. Luther's answer to this question is already
known to us from earlier arguments: Christ alone keeps the law fully, then
we keep it in part [et postea nos ex parte praestamus], but even then we do not
do this nostris viribus, but virtute Spiritus sancti (468, 14-469, 1). This corresponds to what Luther has said earlier when he argues that first Christ keeps
the law perfectly himself and grants us his fulfillment by faith, and then
(where postea=deinde, insuper) we begin to keep it ourselves formally and
expurgatively. The imputed righteousness is not our own but Christ's aliena
iustitia. Although Luther does not use that terminology here that clearly is
what is meant by the totum praestare. However, as we have seen before,
Luther never stops here with justification but goes on to link it inseparably to
sanctification, where the law is begun to be fulfilled in us, not by ourselves
398See above n. 111.
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but by the power of the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, and by whom
we cry Abba Father. Whether we say it is the Spirit or Christ dwelling in us
who enables us to begin [ex parte = incipere] to keep the law is immaterial, for
it is Christ who works through the Spirit.
Luther's main stress here is that Christ and the Spirit have fulfilled the
law for us so that our salvation in no way depends on our fulfillment of it,
not even aliqua pars legis. That alone is to be our ground of confidence coram
Deo, not the work that Christ and the Spirit work within us, which in this
life, always remains incomplete.
Argument 17399
Contra 1
Whatever is one of the proper causes of things cannot be said to be
useless. The law is one of the proper causes of justification. Therefore,
the law cannot be useless for justification.
Proof of Minor Premise: The law is the first way to justification.
Response: The law is one of the efficient causes of righteousness.
This we deny. For justification is not among those things caused by the
law, but death, condemnation, fear and trembling, and the knowledge of
sin, as we have said above in connection with what is required materialiter. Furthermore, those things that may be caused by the law are nothing, and all things are our Lord God's material. For he turns everything
into nothing and he makes everything from nothing. These works are
the creator's, not ours. However, to say that nothing is necessary for justification is silly. But God destroys everything and makes human beings
from nothing, and then justifies them. We are speaking here about the
efficient cause, and as it turns out there is no cause of justification except
God alone.400
39939 I, 469, 6-470, 12 (left col.).
400The alternative argument (469, 7-470, 8; right col.) is printed

below:
Argument 17
Another Contra
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Luther has already come upon this argument= twice: The first time
was in First Disputation (Arg. 14) where he offered three reasons why the law
is inutilis et impossibilis for justification: 1) quia non aufert peccata, sed
ostendit ea, 2) non iustificat, sed nos peccatores constituit, 3) non vivificat, sed
mortificat et occidit (382, 2-4).401 Then secondly in argumentum 8 of this
present disputation Luther refutes the idea that the law is useful for justification because it causes a kind of salutary despair and makes us realize our
own lack of righteousness (445, 1-4). The reason why the law cannot effect
justification, he says, lies in the very nature of the law which, according to its
principal definition, can do nothing else than kill and damn. It is only a ministerium mortis et operatur iram so that without the ministerium Spiritus,
namely, the Evangelium seu digitus loannis which says: Ecce agnus Dei, non
morieris, we would be dead and not justified (447, 4-8).402 He goes on then to
Whatever is derived from the proper causes of things cannot be said
to be unnecessary for justification. The law is one of the causes of
justification. Therefore, etc.
Response: This we deny. The thing that the law does cause is death
and despair. If the argument concerns things material, it is not germane
to the thesis. The law produces contrition which is required for justification, but that is only natural. If I am to be justified I must be a human
being, and if a human being I must eat and drink and have a home. The
law builds nothing and destroys everything, but it is the mercy of God to
make all things from nothing and nothing from all things. They are the
works of the creator. We are not speaking here about the efficient cause
which is put into action or operation. But surely it is possible to do
something? Response: No, because the sole cause of justification is
through grace.
401He promised there (39 I, 381, 18-382, 2) that question of whether
the law was useful or necessary for justification would be taken up in the Second Disputation (although strictly it belongs to the locus on justification)
That promise was made good already in 2 AD, Arg. 8 and now again here.
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make the same point there as he does here: The law is not una de causis rerum efficientium iustitiam, for what the law causes is not justification but
mors, damnatio, terror et tremor, cognitio peccati (469, 13-18). And even these
things, Luther points out, are in the final analysis not produced by the law but
omnia sunt unsers herrgots materia. For God disposes over all things, to create and to destroy. Therefore, even if the law does produce something God
destroys it that in his grace he may create everything ex nihilo. Luther's Latin
here is very pithy: Nam ipse ex omnibus facit nihil et ex nihil facit omnia
(470, 2-3). That of course does not mean that nothing is necessary for justification,403 for as he has already shown in argumentum 8 certain material things
are a prerequisite, but these things are in no way the efficient cause of justification. In another epigrammatic statement Luther drives home the point
that God justifies sinner from nothing: Attamen Deus destruit omnia et ex
nihilo facit hominem et deinde iustificat (470, 7-9). Luther concludes that if
we are going to talk about the cause of justification at all, we should only talk
about the causa efficiens, which is done by none other than God alone.
When the antinomians make the law one of the propriae causae of justification, they err in two ways: first, they fail to understand that the proper effect of the law is terror and despair, and second, they think that because the
law comes first, as indeed they argue in the proof [probatio minoris: Quia lex
est prima via ad iustificationem], that must mean that it causes justifica402In addition to the foregoing, Luther also refutes the thesis that
the law is necessary for justification in 2 AD, Args. 10 and 11.
403The indirect formulation: Nihil est necessarium ad iustificationem, ineptum est (470, 5-6) allows Luther to avoid saying that the law is
necessary.
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tion.404 Luther, on the other hand, when it comes to the causa efficiens iustificationis, confesses the solus of God and in so doing gives him the glory.
Argument 18405
Contra 1
Repentance justifies. Therefore, the law also justifies.
Proof of Conclusion: The law is necessary as an efficient cause of repentance.
M. Luther responded [offering this formulation of the argument,
and then giving his response]: The law is part of repentance and that total repentance justifies. Therefore, the law also justifies.
Response: There is agreement that an argument by synecdoche,
from the whole to the part, is not valid. It is the same as if I were to argue: A human being uses reason. Therefore, the nose, the body, the eyes
and the feet use reason. A tree produces fruit. Therefore, the bark produces fruit. Or again: A tree produces fruit. The leaves are part of the
tree. Therefore, the leaves produce fruit.
Objection: But the law is the principal part and has to do with the
integral parts.
Response: 0 no, the devil! For sorrow leads to hell. Christ however is both the first and principal part. Sorrow can be first but not the
principal part; the efficient cause of is the best and first of all.406
404The best way to understand the prima via of the probatio would
be in the sense at that law is the first part of repentance (see 451, 15-452, 2; 2
AD, Arg. 11), where repentance itself is held to be necessary for justification.
In the next argumentum however Luther will argue that Christ is both the
first and principal part of repentance (471, 16-17; 2 AD, Arg. 18, left col.).
4°539 I, 470, 15-472, 2 (left col.).
406The alternative argument (470, 16-472, 2; right col.) is printed be-

low:
Argument 18
Another
Repentance justifies. Therefore, the law also justifies. The law is
necessary. Repentance is an essential part of justification. Repentance is
a part, the law is a part of repentance and total repentance justifies.
Therefore, the law also justifies because the part is the same as the whole.
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This and the following argumentum are difficult to reconcile with antinomian teaching. The argument here states: Poenitentia iustificat. Ergo
etiam lex iustificat. Not only does this conclusion run into conflict with the
antinomian dictum: lex est abrogata et abolenda or lex non est docenda, it is
also in flat contradiction to Luther's thesis in the second Thesenreihe:
Summa, quantum coelum a terra distat, tantum debet lex a iustificatone separari.407 In support of the conclusion it is argued that the law is necessaria
tamquam efficiens causa poenitentiae. The problem with this is that it runs
counter to the first antinomian thesis which states that repentance arises, not
from the law, but ex violatione fillii per Evangelium.408 If this argumentum
faithfully reflects the teaching of the antinomians, it tells us that they hold
that the law is part of repentance, indeed the most important part, and hence
per synecdochen also justifies.
Luther on the other hand disallows an argument based on synecdoche
where what is unique to one part is ascribed to the whole, and therefore
Response: A conclusion that argues from the part to the whole is
not to be conceded. A builder builds a house. Therefore, the soul, for its
part, also builds. A person uses reason. Therefore, the body also is
rational because the body is part of the person. If the whole person is
rational, he believes in God. Therefore, the body also believes in God. In
the same way it does not follow that since a human being is rational,
therefore the nose also is rational. A tree produces fruit. Therefore, the
bark also produces fruit because it is part of the tree. Faith justifies, and
faith is part of repentance. Hence, repentance justifies. Sorrow is part of
repentance, not the principal part. Sorrow leads to hell, faith to heaven.
Christ is the principal part. The law prepares the wretched heart for
justification. Christ is really the proper cause.
40739

I, 348, 5-6 (ATh II, Th. 8).

408See

39 I, 342, 9-10 (Pos. Th. 1). This thesis has also been taken up
and discussed in 384, 4-386,16 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
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throws the argumentum out of court on the basis of a logical fallacy. To argue
a toto ad partem409 means holding that the statement, a tree produces fruit, is
the same as saying that the leaves produce fruit, because the leaves are part of
the tree. With the same logic the antinomians hold that the law justifies because tota poenitentia justifies and lex est pars poenitentiae (471, 1-4). However, Luther rejects this not only on logical grounds, but now also on theological grounds. The law is not pars principalis of repentance, it is the prior part
(in the sense that the law produces contrition), but by itself it can only lead to
hell. On the other hand, Christ is both prima and principalis pars of repentance,41° for he alone is the efficiens causa of justification (471, 13-472, 2).
However, all this does not answer the question why the antinomians
propound an argument that seems contrary to their own stated position. The
first thing we need to bear in mind, as we hinted above, is that this argument= may not come from antinomian circles but may have been included because it was an issue that still needed to be clarified and settled. On the other
hand, perhaps it is an argument that the antinomians were using in order to
409Arg.

B (471, 1-2, right col.) switches this round: Non concedenda
consequentia a parte ad totum. Although the argument by synecdoche can
run both ways, logically the a toto ad partem of Arg. A (471, 5, left col.) is
more corect here as the example show.
410k the First Thesenreihe (39 I, 345, 16-17, Th. 1) Luther defined re-

pentance as comprising two parts, first dolor and then propositum melioris
vitae (=bonum propositum). There of course dolor has temporal priority.
This is not negated when he says here that Christ is both prima and principalis pars of repentance, for here he is stressing that Christ is the most important part. Th. 1 does not mention Christ, nor even faith, but speaking simply
of the two parts of repentance; Th. 4 (345, 22-23) implies that the bonum
propositum is the more important and that it arises only from the gospel. See
our discussion of 1 AD, Args. 3, 31, 36, 37.
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try to trap Luther. If they knew that he would not accept the argument: Lex
est necessaria tamquam efficiens causa poenitentiae (470, 17-18), they may
have hoped at least to have gained some ground from hearing him assert that
the law is not necessary as the efficient cause of repentance, even if they could
not expect him to agree with them in holding that it is not needed at all for
repentance. Hence, the argument= may not be intended so much to defend
their own position as to create confusion over Luther's.
Interestingly, Luther does not quote Thesis 8 (cited above) against them,
but rather tackles the proposition more positively by stating that Christ, not
the law, is the first and principal part of repentance. Although he does not say
it in so many words, the implication is that the premise, poenitentia iustificat,
can stand per synecdochen, provided it is understood that Christ (not dolor or
lex) is the prima et principalis pars, since the efficiens causa est omnium optima et prima (471, 16-472, 2). If this were the case, it would be further testimony to Luther's conciliatory approach, preferring to work with his oppo
nent's arguments where possible in order to clarify and correct them rather
than immediately to replace them with his own.
Argument 19411
Contra the Same
Total repentance justifies. Therefore, works justify.
Response: I concede the whole argument. People who believe in
Christ have eternal life and are righteous. Thereafter, righteous and
godly people, having received the forgiveness of sins, do good works and
have a good resolve. But is it necessary that people are first justified by
faith alone. For faith is the principal good resolve, from which the rest
of the good works later flow as fruit, and it endures for the whole of life.
Therefore, after I believe in Christ it is my resolve to want to believe in
God and to love and magnify his word. Thereafter, I also resolve that I
41139 I, 472, 5-15.
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do not want to be an adulterer, a fornicator, or a drunkard etc. For when
faith is posited the Holy Spirit is given, and as he is received, good fruits
of every kind follow as from a true and good tree.
This argument= is similar to the preceding. There the conclusion
was, lex iustificat, here it is opera iustificant. Both are based on the premise
(tota) poenitentia iustificat. Whereas in the previous argument= Luther
objected on the grounds of the misuse of synecdoche, here he is in total
agreement [concedo totum]. While it might sound strange at first that Luther
would say that works justify, he is prepared to accept this provided it is
understood that first of all people must be justified by faith alone [oportet, ut
prius iustificatus sit per solam fidem] for faith is the principal good resolve
and hence the source of all the subsequent good works [Nam fides est
principale bonum propositum, unde postea reliqua bona opera fluunt
tamquam fructus, et durat per omnem vitam] (472, 6-11) .412 Again, the proper
sequence is critical: First comes faith in Christ, when the Holy Spirit is given,
then afterwards [postea] comes the bona opera and bonum propositum.
Indeed, the opera are bona only because of the remissio peccatorum (472, 7-8).
First the credo in Christum, then the resolve to love and esteem God's word,
and only then the resolve to lead an chaste and decent life [Postea etiam
propono, me nolle moechari, scotari, crapulari etc.]. The good works are
412The statement that faith is the chief good resolve will be a good
hermeneutical guide in helping us to read Luther's definition of repentance
(dolor + bonum propositum; ATh I, Th. 1) in the light of the gospel, which is
how Luther himself intended it to be read (cf. ATh I, Th. 4). On the other
hand, it is possible the Luther is using the term propositum here as a term in
logic (the first premise). In that case, he would be asserting that faith is the
principal good proposition, from which all manner of good works flow.
However, in our opinion, Luther's use of the term bonum propositum in his
definition of repentance is vital to understanding how he uses it here.
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nothing else than the works of the Spirit and the fruit of faith; the fructus are
boni only because the tree is vera bona arbor (472, 11-15).
Again, Luther has chosen to adopt an irenical approach. Rather than
rejecting the proposition tota poenitentia iustificat on the grounds that it is
ambiguous at best, he prefers to work with it by carefully defining how such a
statement must be understood if it is to remain scriptural and evangelical.
And that means understanding repentance first and foremost as faith and
anchoring the bonum propositum firmly in the gospel.
Argument 20413
Contra 1
Whatever causes us to come closer to justification justifies. The
manifestation of sin or contrition leads to justification. Therefore, the
manifestation of sin or the law justifies.
Response: The major premise is false. Whether it comes close or
leads away [makes no difference], it still does not justify, because justification is the work of another power, and not of the law. The law and justification are opposite and contradictory and cannot belong to the same
genus. The proud person is as far away [from justification] as the despairing. The law can do nothing except produce despair in the heart, as our
thesis 27 of the First Disputation says. Fill their faces with shame etc.,
that is, the shame that comes from the law, and they will seek your
name, Lord [Ps. 83: 17]. This does not belong to the essence and power of
the law, but to another power, namely, the gospel, because it proclaims
the forgiveness of sins on account of Christ.414
41339

I, 473, 3-24 (left col.).

414The

alternative argument (473, 4-16; right col.) is printed below:

Argument 20
Contra 1
Whatever leads closer to justification justifies. The revelation of
sin leads us nearer to justification. Therefore, the law justifies.
Response: Whether it comes close or leads away [is immaterial],
it does not justify because justification is the work, neither of the law
nor of contrition, but of God. For despair is really pride. The effect of the
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The conclusion to the argumentum is identical to that of argumentum
18: lex (or: ostensio peccati) iustificat, although the premises are different. The
thesis is not new, but this is the last time it will be debated. The reader should
turn back to our discussion of argument= 17 to review the chief arguments
marshalled by Luther in his refutation. In our present argument Luther identifies the major premise as fallacious: Quod facit, ut propius accedamus ad iustificationem, id iustificat. For that way of viewing justification is clearly quantitative and so incomplete, putting it squarely within the arena of human action and the measurement of the law, whereas in fact justification and the
law are opposites and cannot be subsumed under the same head [non possunt
in idem (scil. genus) cadere lex et iustificatio]. God alone justifies. Nor is the
law to be given any credit in justification because it leads people to justification. The latter is not a question of degree. God does it all. In fact the law of
itself does not lead a person closer to God or to justification. The effect of the
law is precisely the opposite. It incites people to sin, drives them away from
God and makes them hate and blaspheme him.415
Luther reiterates Psalm 83: 17, which he cited in Thesis 27 of the First
Disputation, to emphasize that the chief function of the law is to reveal sin
and wrath and drive to despair. Here he interpolates an explanatory phrase to
make it clear that the shame that fills their faces is the law: Reple facies eorum
ignominia etc, hoc est, legis. However, the remainder of the Psalm verse: et
law is not to seek the name of God, but to fill the face with shame [Ps. 83:
17]. Without faith it is impossible to please God or to seek the divine
name [Heb. 11: 6].
415Cf. 39 I, 445, 8 (2 AD, Arg. 8): The law cannot make me a better,
more loving peson; 554, 16-555, 5 (3 AD, 28/1): The law stirs people up and incites them to sin.
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quaerent nomen tuum, Domine, cannot be predicated on the law, for the law
only drives people away, but the turning toward God in faith clearly presupposes the work of the gospel: Haec non sunt de essentia aut virtute leg-is, sed
alterius viri, scilicet Evangelii, quod praedicat remissionem peccatorum
propter Christum (473, 21-24).416 The law does not justify, nor does it by itself
lead people to justification, for if the gospel did not snatch people out of the
hands of the law, the latter would lead them to despair. Only through Christ
and the gospel can the law be a good paedagogus (to use the language of earlier arguments); this needs to be remembered when we say that the law prepares for the gospe1.417
Argument 21418
The law terrifies those whom it ought not. Therefore, the law is not
to be taught because, when the law is taught, those people are saddened
and feel the power of the law who ought rather to rejoice. On the other
hand, the obstinate, to whom the law [really] applies, do not care at all.
Response: The law has already been considerably softened through
justification, which we have on account of Christ, so that it ought not
terrify the justified. Nevertheless, however, Satan himself often comes
and sharpens the law beyond the limit among the justified. Thus, it often happens that those people are terrified who ought not be, through
the fault of the devil. But even so, the law should not, for that reason, be
removed from our churches and not be taught because even the saints
have sin remaining in the flesh, which is to be purged by the law until it
has been completely expelled. For that struggle goes on in the saints for
as long as they live on earth. Here they fight day and night until at last
416ATh I, Th. 27 (39 I, 346, 38-39) does not make it as clear as the
above citation that it is only through the gospel that people can seek the name
of the Lord; cf. 473, 14-16, right col. (B): Sine fide impossiblie est placere Deo
seu quaerere nomen divinum.
a full discussion of what it means that the law is paedagogus
in Christum, see our analysis of 2 AD, Args. 6, 8, 13.
417For

41839 I, 474, 2-475, 6 (left col.).
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they conquer through Christ. Prior to justification the law rules and terrifies everyone whom it strikes. But the law is not to be taught to the
godly in such a way that it convicts and condemns, but that it may spur
them on to do good. For I ought not say or preach: you are not under the
forgiveness of sins, or again: You will be condemned, God hates you etc.
For these words do not apply to those who have received Christ, but
have in view the stubborn and obstinate. Therefore, the law is to be softened for them and is to be taught as in the exhortation: Once you were
heathen, but now you have been sprinkled and washed with the blood of
Christ [1 Cor. 6: 11; 1 Peter 1: 2]. Now, therefore, offer your bodies for
obedience to righteousness, put off the desires of the flesh, and do not be
fashioned after yourself [cf. Rom. 6: 12-19; 12: 1-2]. Be emulators of the
good works of righteousness, you are not unrighteous, you are not condemned, like Cain etc., you have Christ.419
Luther recognizes that the argumentum makes a valid point even if he
cannot agree that the major premise, and its corollary, constitutes ground for
the abolition of the law. Together these two assertions pinpoint the dilemma
of preaching the law: On the one hand, lex terret eos, quos non debet, on the
other, duri ad quos pertinet lex, nihil morantur (474, 1, 6-7). Together they describe the twin dangers that can arise from the law, namely, despair and pride.
However, the solution to the problem is not to remove the law but carefully
to distinguish it from the gospel without discarding it. It is especially the second of these that is to be given special emphasis if the justified are not to be
419The alternative argument (474, 3-14, right col.) is printed below:

Argument 21
Another
The law terrifies those whom it ought not. Therefore, it is not to be
taught. The secure are not terrified but the justified are.
Response: The law is considerably weakened through justification,
it cannot terrify because it is fulfilled through the forgiveness of sins and
the Holy Spirit. Therefore, its wrath has been removed, but because
there remain remnants of sin in the flesh, it ought to terrify the heart
insofar as it does not believe.
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terrified, and that surely is Luther's chief concern in his responsio. Although
the law can cause the obstinate to become indifferent or proud, it is even
more important that those who have been humbled and chastened by the law
are not driven to despair.
Luther's opening statement in his responsio is not immediately transparent inasmuch as it seems at first as if Luther is saying that the law is considerably softer [valde mitigata] on Christians per se than on non-Christians.
On the face of it this seems to be a plausible interpretation of the words: Lex
est iam valde mitigata per iustificationem, however, there is no evidence in
the disputations that Luther ever makes a distinction between the pii and
impii in that way.420 On the contrary, as we have often seen, he will say that
the law must continue to be preached also to Christians on account of the sinful flesh. In such instances Luther never suggests that the law should be
preached more mildly to the Christian qua sinner. Justification does not
change the law as such, but the justified person now hears the law with faith.
Prior to justification the flesh ruled unhindered, but after justification the
420This is basically the position of Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers (Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1962), 235. He
cites several passages from the Antinomian Disputations which we will examine shortly (a couple have already been discussed earlier). The problem
with his view is that he wants to posit a change in the law itself after justification so that it becomes more gentle and helpful (as in parenesis) rather than
being only accusatory. It is true of course that in Christians sin is no longer
peccatum regnans and that quoad novos homines they really do desire to
walk in the way of the Spirit and to serve the neighbor in love. However, we
are not talking about Christians qua saints here, but qua sinners, and that
which both the pii and the impii have in common is the sinful flesh, and the
only medicine, or better, language (medicine might suggest that the flesh it to
be rehabilitated) appropriate for the recalcitrant flesh is full strength, undiluted law.
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flesh no longer rules but is now ruled by the Spirit. Therefore, Luther concedes that the preaching of the law among Christians is to be milder because
the flesh has been overcome, and they even begin to delight in the law.
Furthermore, Luther is always concerned for the conscience of the
Christian. Even though the law must still be preached to the pii on account of
the sin that still clings to the flesh, he does not want it done in such a way that
their consciences are thereby terrified. He says, for instance, that preachers
should not tell their people that God hates them and that they are under condemnation. In view of this then the mitigata refers to a particular way of
preaching the law that is appropriate to Christians because it is "cushioned" by
the gospel. We will return to that shortly.
Luther knows, on the other hand, that Satan is the one who keeps
sharpening the law [supra modum exasperat] for the saints in order to accuse
their consciences and rob them of peace. That however is no reason to remove it from the churches [templis], he argues, for the law must remain for
as long as there is sin in the saints, for this sin must be purged away by the law
until it has been completely expelled. And because the desires of the flesh are
against the spirit this gives rise to an unabating struggle in the saints until at
length they conquer through Christ [donec tandem vincant per Christum].
What exactly does this phrase, "until they conquer through Christ"
mean? Has not Christ already conquered sin through his cross? First of all, it
is true that "the mother of all wars" has been won by Christ, and death has
been overcome and vanquished.421 But as in all large scale wars, there is still
fortissimi gigantes lock
in mortal combat, the duae mortes, mors ipsa et mars Christi. But immedi421See 39 I, 427, 4-11 (2 AD, Arg. 2) where the
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some "mopping up" to be done, smaller battles to be fought and enemies to be
taken captive. So too in the Christian life. And that battle in the saints being
waged between flesh and spirit is part of the mopping up operations following
the decisive V-day on Mount Calvary. Although the battle is still being
fought the outcome is assured. It must continue until every pocket of resistance has been outcome, the enemy completely routed, and the territory reclaimed for its rightful sovereign.
Now in terms of this military image, the law is an important weapon
to be used by the saints (more correctly, by Christ and the Spirit) in the "mopping up" campaign. This belongs to the discussion of sanctification. The goal
is to eradicate all the remnants of sin that still inhere in the flesh and that
fight against the novus homo. This "purging operation" however will never
be completed until the resurrection of the dead, because not until then will
the sinful flesh be utterly destroyed: quad lege purgandum est, donec expurgaturn fuerit totum (474, 18-20).422 This then is how we understand the imporately the battle begins the sound of victory goes up: Mors mortis, infernus inferni, diabolus diaboli ego sum, noli timere, fill mi, ego vici. Whenever
Christians are terrified by the law through the preaching of Christ's death-and the intensity of this will vary according to the person [acuiter etiam prout
persona est]--, they soon hear (or should hear!) proclaimed the reassuring
voice of the victor over the law and all its terror: Confide filii, ego veni salvare, quod perieras, non morieris. There is a similarity here to the problem of
how the law is softened per iustificationem. In the passage cited above Luther
suggests how the miser can be comforted when the message of the cross itself
(gospel in the broad sense) becomes a source of terror [si quando ei evangelice
et Christi more terror incuditur]: the gospel, stricte dictum, should be
preached without too much delay [mox quoque auditur ab altera parte]. The
significance of this for our present discussion will become clear shortly.
422This phrase recalls Luther's remarks on the twofold cessation of
sin in Christians, first imputative, then also formaliter or expurgative, this
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tant phrase lege purgandum est. It is not strictly the law by itself that expels
the sin, but the law as it is used by the Spirit and the new self (=faith) to restrain, coerce, and finally kill the sinful flesh. And what else is the killing of
the old self (=flesh) than repentance. Therefore, sanctification has everything
to do with repentance, for repentance is finally nothing else than turning
one's back on the old sinful self that makes an idol of itself and serves itself
instead of the neighbor. Again, in repentance the Holy Spirit through the law
kills the vetus homo which is always blocking the flow of God's good gifts
through us to others. That in turn brings us full circle, for we most honor
and revere God when we let him be who he is: the God of grace who wants
nothing than to give gifts to his children for them to give away to others.
We are now in a position to answer the question what it means that
the law is considerably softened through justification. It is not that the law
per se is ameliorated, but its effect on the believer is softened when the gospel
is preached immediately after the law423 When the gospel is not preached, or
not soon enough, some people with very tender consciences may despair of
God's mercy. To say it again, the law (or better, its effect) is really only softensecond never being complete until the final destruction of the flesh with the
resurrection of the body. For more on this, see the discussion on 2 AD, Arg. 3.
423Cf. 39 I, 11-14 (1 AD, Arg. 21), where Luther, after stressing that
because of the duri examples of God's wrath must be preached, also says that
for the sake of those who are beginning to repent, the exempla irae Dei should
always be mixed together with the consolation of the gospel that they may receive Christ by faith as the victor over sin [Et tamen semper commiscenda est
consolatio ex Evangelio, quod Deus non velit mortem impii convertentis se,
hoc est, incipientis odisse et detestari peccatum .]. The commiscenda here
surely means that the law is always to be followed by the gospel, even in the
case of the duri.
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ed [mitigare/mollire] when it is followed by the preaching of the gospe1.424
Our interpretation is confirmed when we read that the law is not to be taught
to the godly in such a way that it convicts and condemns them, but that it may
spur them on or encourage them to do good [Sed non sic docenda est lex piis,
ut arguat, damnet, sed ut hortetur ad bonum] (474, 21-22). Before justification,
the law rules like a tyrant and terrifies all whom it strikes [regnat lex et terret
omnes, quos tangit]. But after justification the story is different: Now the
preacher must not preach the law in terms of wrath and judgment [tu
damnaberis, Deus to odit], for such words are meant for the praefracti ac feroces. Rather the law is to be softened, Luther says, and taught as in the exhortation: Once you were heathen but now you have been sprinkled and washed
with the blood of Christ. Now therefore, offer your bodies to obey righteousness, . . . do not let yourself be molded to this world. Emulate the good works
of righteousness . . . you have Christ [Itaque lex illis mollienda est et quasi exhortationis loco docenda: Vos aliquando fuistis gentes, nunc autem asperi et
abluti sanguine Christi. Itaque praebete nunc corpora vestra obedire iustitiae
. . .1 (475, 1-6). This statement incidentally is one of the most important
Luther makes. For it not only gives us an insight into how he envisages the
law being preached to Christians, but he makes it clear that the preaching of
parenesis is still law, even though it is now a lex mitigata on account of
justification. This is a theme that will be taken up again in the next chapter in
our discussion of parenesis and the third use of the law.
424Th.

45 says virtually the same thing when it states that the law
has been soothed through forgiveness (39 I, 349, 39-40; ATh, II, Th. 45): Lex
enim ut fuit ante Christum, nos quidem accusans, sub Christo autem per
remissionem peccatorum placata, et deinceps spiritu implenda.
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Luther proceeds to cites several passages of parenesis from Paul to illustrate what he means when he says that the law should be preached to the pii
in the form of exhortation. First comes the gospel statement of what God has
done for us in Christ, and then how we are to order our lives so that they are
in conformity with the gospel (cf. Phil. 1: 27: Movov gicoc TOV eiSayyEAfou
Xpl GTO'15

To U

/co XiTEISE cFez). This retrospective way of preaching the law is particu-

larly appropriate for the pii because they are first reminded of what they are in
Christ by faith, and then on the basis of that a conclusion is drawn and applied
to their life. This of course corresponds to the Pauline method of first preaching the indicative (the gospel) and then the imperative (the law in the service
of the gospel).425 Because Christians are both simul iusti et simul peccatores,
the indicative—imperative pattern of parenesis best serves to illustrate the
proper relationship between justification and sanctification.426

remarks on the iugum Christi in 39 I, 381, 3-10 (1 AD,
Arg. 13) could also be considered in this context. The law remains, but its
burden or yoke no longer presses on the necks of those on whom Christ's
burden has been placed, since for faith it is sweet and light, because it is the
"burden" of the lex impleta. Since we have Christ's own fulfillment as a gift
per fidem, the law is no longer burdensome, but it is that for the flesh inasmuch as for it the law remains lex implenda. But even this is tolerabilis in
the saints, for in the iustificati the gospel always accompanies the law to point
them away from themselves to Christ's perfect fulfillment for them (412, 5-8;
1 AD, Arg. 32). Again, it is the Holy Spirit who makes the otherwise loathsome law delightful (388, 5-6; 1 AD, Arg. 16). Cf. also 374, 15 (1 AD, Arg. 7);
381, 3-10 (1 AD, Arg. 13). Also pertinent here is the use of the sacramentum—
exemplum motif in preaching, which we discussed connection with 2 AD,
Arg. 15.
425Luther's

426Although

it is not mentioned in the text, it is worth noting that
the indicative-imperative pattern of preaching at the same time keeps Christians mindful of the fact that in this life we can never get beyond repenting of
our sins.
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Argument 22427
Contra 1
The law is a shadow [Col. 2: 17]. Therefore, it is not to be taught.
Response: You remember the rule that anything written is to be understood according to its immediate context, and I make a distinction regarding the law: if it is talking about ceremonies and tabernacles, as in
that passage, I concede the argument since the things of which they were
shadows are now present. But if it says that the Decalogue is the shadow
of Christ, the shadow is indeed a very serious shadow, as Paul says: As in
Adam we all die so also in Christ etc [Rom. 5: 15; 1 Cor. 15: 22]. But I understand it to be speaking about tabernacles and ceremonies.
Luther has already responded in much the same way to a similar argument earlier.428 He prefaces his remarks here by drawing attention to a basic
hermeneutical rule that statements needs to be understood according their
context429 [Meministis regulam, scripta omnia intelligenda esse secundum
materiam subiectam], and secondly he highlights the need to distinguish between the ceremonial law [caeremonia et tabernacula] and the Decalogue.
The passage in question, though not cited, is no doubt Col. 2: 17430 [6i (scil. ceremonies) i am am& 'ray I.LeXXOvrco v], where the umbra refers to the ceremonial observances mentioned in the preceeding verse. The antinomians, on
the other hand, claim that umbra refers to the Decalogue, or more precisely, to
the whole law including the Decalogue, and that this is now abolished in
Christ and hence not to be taught. Even assuming for a moment that they are
42739 I, 475, 9-16.
428See 39 I, 407,18-408, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 29).
429Lit.:

neighboring subject-matter [secundum materiam subiectam].

430Heb. 8: 5 and 10: 1 could also qualify for consideration, but Col. 2:

17 is more likely because of the preceeding verse (the context) which talks
about things pertaining to the ceremonial law.
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correct in correlaing lex (as a totality) and umbra, the text itself does not compel the conclusion that the law is to be abolished or not taught. It simply
makes the contrast between the law, which we know from verse 16 refers to
specific ceremonies of the cultic law, and Christ (v. 17 concludes: TO S'e ao5 µa
toii X pi crroii). The contrast is surely meant to throw Christ into relief and to
picture him as the sum and substance of God's revelation, in comparison to
which all that preceeded him and pointed to him, is but a dim shadow.
However, Christ himself makes a distinction between the ceremonial and
juridical law, on the one hand, the moral law or Decalogue, on the other (e.g.
Mark 2: 23-28), and when he is asked the greatest commandment he sums up
the whole law in terms of the two tables of the Decalogue (Matt. 22: 34-40).
Luther, for the sake of the argument, also ponders the implications of
assuming that lex=decalogus. He concludes that, since the law condemns
Adamic man to death [Rom. 5: 15: Ut in Adam omnes morimur, ita et in
Christo etc.], it is far too serious a thing to be called a shadow [Sin loquitur de
decalogo, quod iste sit umbra Christi, est profecto umbra nimis serial (475, 1315). Furthermore, a shadow pales into insignificance in comparison to the object to which it belongs; it is empty, lacking substance. That however is hardly
an apt description of the lex as decalogus. It is no empty shadow but a terrifying power which damns sinners to hell and which only Christ can overcome.
Therefore, Luther is correct, both theologically and exegetically, when he takes
Paul in Col. 2: 17 to be referring to tabernacula et caeremonia and not the decalogus (475, 15-16).
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Argument 23431
Contra the Same
An impossible law is set down in vain. But the law is impossible.
Therefore, it has been written in vain.
Proof of Major Premise: It is customary for all laws to be proposed in
order they might be useful.
Response: This is a juridical argument and proves nothing other
than that laws are useful, something that we also say. For this weak nature regards nothing more splendid, nothing more excellent, nothing
more antique than laws. What would this life be like, and what would
we be without them? Bears, cruel and inhuman beasts. Therefore, when
we speak about laws politically, they cannot be praised enough, so great is
their splendor and dignity in their realm. But we are speaking about the
law that justifies us. Here and in the future life we find no such law. For
the office of the law is to reveal sins, cause sorrow, and lead to hell.432
The thesis, lex est impossibilis, was first propound in the opening argument of the First Disputation.433 In his responsio Luther maintained that in
Eden the law was not only possibilis, but also iucunda, and that it was not God
who made the law impossible but sin and Satan. Here Luther's counter argument is somewhat different, taking its point of departure from the proof of
the major premise, that it is customary for laws to be useful [omnes leges ideo
43139 I, 476,
432Ari

alternative argument (476, 4-14; right col.) is printed below:

Argument 23
Contra 1
An impossible law is decreed in vain. The divine law is impossible.
Therefore, it is decreed in vain.
Response: Laws are useful. Nothing is more excellent in human
nature than laws and sworn contracts; without them we would be bears
and wild boars. Therefore, we cannot speak too highly of laws.
However, we are speaking about the law that justifies before God. But
that is not to condemn other laws.
433See 39 I, 364, 7-365, 6 (1 AD, Arg. 1).
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fern solent, ut sint utiles] (476, 6-7). As in the case of the previous argumentum, Luther is again called to make a distinction, this time between the civil
law and God's law, or more precisely (for God also stands behind the civil
law), between the usus politicus and the usus theologicus. Luther himself
does not use this terminology, but rather makes a distinction between speaking de legibus politice and de lege iustificatione nos (476, 17-19). Politically, he
has nothing but the highest praise for law: Nihil enim pulchrius, nihil praestantius, nihil antiquius habet haec infirma natura legibus, sine quibus quidnam esset harc vita et nos quid essemus? Without them the rule of the jungle would prevail. But Luther rejects the attempt to use the argument that
laws by definition must be useful, that is, practicable or possible, in order to
invalidate the Decalogue on the basis of its impossibility. Here, rather than
arguing that it is sin that makes the law impossible for Adamic mankind, he
points out that it is an argumentum iuridicium to hold that leges esse utiles
(476, 8-10). To argue that the law should be possible would be tantamount to
assuming that it may be possible to be justified by the law. But there is no law
that justifies us, either in this life or in the life to come. For the officium legis
is ostendere peccata, affere dolorem et deducere ad inferos (477, 1-2). It is not
Luther's intention here to refute the antinomians by arguing that the law is
possible, rather he shows that their error lies in their failure to realize that the
point of contention between themselves and him is located in the theological
use of the law and not its political use.
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Argument 24434
Contra 8
The law is required, imputatively, for righteousness. Therefore, the
law is required.
Response: These are improper and inappropriate words and neither
are they true. For the law is already present. The law in fact is present
first. But now we are asking how we can be freed from the law.
The premise is certainly a very muddled sentence, theologically, and
Luther does not hesitate to criticize it. It is unlikely that it really represents
the antinomian position, rather it is probably an attempt to push Luther's
position ad absurdum to show that it is untenable. If the opponents are
talking about justification, then what is required is not the law (which Luther
earlier has expressly rejected as being in any way necessary for justification),
but the fulfillment of the law, or more precisely, Christ fulfillment of the law
for us. It is this impletio legis or lex impleta that is imputed to us, or given to
us imputative, through faith. As Luther says, the law can hardly be required
for it is already present: Nam lex iam adest, ist schon da. Lex prius adest in
facto (477, 7).435 However, his concern here is how we can be free from the
43439 I, 477, 5-8.

Lex enim nulla nostra
necessitate, sed de facto iam invitis nobis adest, ante et in principio, medio,
fine et post iustificationem. Already in the Promotionsdisputation of Palladius and Tilemann (1 June 1537) Luther stresses in a similar kind of discusion
when he cites Augustine's dictum: Qui creavit te sine te, non salvabit te sine
te. Oportet nos adesse, sed illud non iustificat (209, 14-15; PT, Arg. 4). The
parallel with the law breaks down in that the law is schon da. Notwithstanding that, it is wrong to deduce that, because the law is present, it justifies or is
necessary for justification. This becomes clear later in the argument just cited:
Lex et cognitio legis est necessaria. Ergo illa iustificat? Respondeo: quod non.
Quia hoc non dicit Paulus, sed contrarium. Nam lex tercet et conterit corda
(210, 13-15). The law is an a priori, a given, but a negative given in that it is
the law that we are freed from through justification.
435See also 39 I, 353, 37-38 (A Th, IV, Th. 33):
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law. The answer to this is the same as the answer to the question: How does
the exaction of the law cease? And that, he has already told us, happens expurgative, or through forgiveness, and then on top of that, formaliter or expurgative.436 However, insofar as Christians constantly still have to battle the
sinful flesh, the law does not vanish after justification. It is true that propter
Christ= per fidem we are free, but quoad peccatores we are still subject to the
law.437
Argument 25438
In Jeremiah 31 [: 31-34] a new covenant is promised. Therefore, the
law has been abolished. For it distinguishes between the old and the new
testament and says: God is going to reveal a new covenant since the old
has been set aside. I will make a new covenant, he says, and, what is
more, no one whatsoever will teach his neighbor.
D. M. Luther: Indeed, the text clearly says, not like this covenant [Jer.
31: 32]. Therefore, admittedly it seems to exclude, just as that text: The
kings of the Gentiles rule, but you do not rule like that [Matt. 20: 25-26],
especially also since it says, the new covenant will be for the forgiveness
of all sins, and indeed this, let no one teach another.
Response: It is certainly a good argument and also difficult enough,
and when the text adds: All will know me from the least to the greatest,
it even seems to restrain the proclamation or teaching of the gospel. It is
436See 1 AD, Arg. 12; 2 AD, Arg. 3 etc.
437This

is reminiscent of the well-known phrase Luther uses in
places, conscientia in evangelio--caro in lege (eg 40 I, 213, 28-214, 24; Galaterbriefvorlesung, 1531/35). He will not permit the law to enter the conscience,
but relegates it to the domain of the flesh, for he knows that if it were permitted entry the conscience would be robbed of the certainty of knowing that
Christ has fulfilled the law for us. See Joest, 101-109, for other passages where
this or a similar phrase is used in Luther. However, we cannot agree entirely
with his analysis chiefly because he fuses faith and love after justification.
While they obviously belong closely together in sanctification (Gal. 5: 6), nevertheless they must be carefully distinguished whenever the article of justification is at stake.
43839 I, 477, 10-480, 9.
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certainly an amazing text. But nevertheless my answer is the same as before: If the text is properly understood to be about the ceremonial and judicial law of Moses, likewise about circumcision--something the text itself seems to prove and, as it were, interpret itself when it says: not like
the covenant I made with your fathers when I led them out of the land
of Egypt--it contains nothing inappropriate and is without difficulty and I
concede the argument, because we no longer teach the law concerning
sacrifices, burnt offerings, and libations etc. Therefore, the text, understood in that way as referring to the law of Moses and not the Decalogue,
is not against our theses. For you know that even if the law is interpreted most widely, it has a standing only among that people, and the
law of Moses belongs only to this people. If then it is taken in this way, it
is true to say that the law is no longer to be taught.
But you will say: It itself embraces the whole law of Moses and is
one with the Decalogue.
Response: The Decalogue is not the law of Moses, neither is he the
first to give it, but the Decalogue belongs to the whole world, inscribed
and engraved on the minds of all people from the foundation of the
world. But if you simply understand it as referring to the Decalogue, my
response here is that again it is also correct to say that the law is not to be
preached to the justified, that is, the law that is to be fulfilled or that has
not yet been fulfilled. For the law that is to be fulfilled must not be imposed on and preached to the justified, but rather the law that has been
fulfilled, because the justified already have what the law requires, in
Christ. This is also Paul's answer to the argument: The law has not been
made for the righteous [1 Tim. 1: 9]; again, there is no condemnation for
those who are in Christ Jesus [Rom. 8: 1]; also: Christ is the end of the law
[Rom. 10: 4]. Therefore, among the godly the exaction and accusation of
the law ceases because what can it demand when Christ is present who
says: Behold, it is I, I do for them what you demand, leave off! But this
text is much more serious because it says that there will no longer be the
ministry in the church. What do we say to that?
Response: Christ answers this in John when he says: They will all be
taught by God [John 6: 45]. The Jews have many laws since they were
taken from the traditions of all peoples, but there was not yet a collection
in Shiloh, or in Jerusalem, or in Gibeon. Therefore, one person was sent
here, another there, and running up and down they shouted: know the
Lord, know the Lord--no different to what happened under the pope
when, as you know, one taught that salvation was to be sought with this
saint, another with that saint. Now Christ says: It will not be like this in
the future, but all will know me from the least to the greatest. That is, I
will give you a teaching that is so great, that, although the rest of the
teachings have been neglected, my people will follow this one, and no
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matter how many believers there may be in world, the same will also
teach the same doctrine. For they all will be 0Eoto. oci KaAoi, and it will
happpen that I will make my own pupils and give the Holy Spirit, but
only through the word. Thus he wants to be, and to be designated,
doctor, and indeed the only teacher in his church. Through the Holy
Spirit in the word we will all have the one and the same Christ, whom
each of us in turn will teach the other. And there will be no more: Know
the Lord, know the Lord, because all will know him from the least to the
greatest. However, when Christ is missing, one says that the Lord is to be
known in this way while another teaches differently, one is sent to St.
James, another to Rome, and still another to St. Anne, each has his own
way.
The main theme of Luther's responsio has already been touched on
earlier but no where else in the antinomian disputations does he thus elaborate the relation between the law and the new covenant. In the new covenant there is no analogous role for the law to play as in the old. But first we
need to consider the antinomian argument. On the basis of the prophecy of
the novum foedus in Jeremiah 31: 31-34, it asserts that the law has been
abolished. The assumption is that if God promises a new covenant than the
old must be all but finished (cf. Heb. 8: 13) and with it the law. Furthermore,
unlike the Mosaic covenant, which was closely associated with the law (we
leave this deliberately ambiguous for the moment) the new covenant makes
no provision for the teaching of the law. In fact just the reverse, God says that
there will be no need for everyone to teach their neighbors about the Lord
saying, know the Lord, for everyone in the land will know the Lord from the
highest to the lowest. Indeed, Luther, in rehearsing the argument, admits
that the text seems to exclude the law [videtur omnino prohibere] just as
Matthew 20: 25-26 [reges gentium dominantur, vos autem non sic] indicates
that there is no place among Christ's people (the church) for the rule of law
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[dominari] analogous to that found outside the church.439 More persuasive is
the argument that the distinguishing feature of the new testamental covenant
will be, not the law, but the forgiveness of sins, which is also its basis.
Luther commends the argument and notes that the text of Jeremiah is
certainly difficult especially when it adds: Omnes cognoscent me a minimo
usque ad maximum, for it seems as if such words even make the preaching of
the gospel superfluous [videtur etiam prohibere praedicationem aut doctrinam Evangelii]. Nonetheless, for all its virtues as a serious argument, it is
fatally flawed because it identifies the Decalogue with the law of Moses. We
will return to that problem later. Luther argues that if one understands the
text proprie to be referring to the ceremonial and judicial law of Moses [de
lege Mosi caeremoniali et iudiciali, item de circumcisione] it agrees perfectly
with his own thesis, namely, that the law, which has been abolished along
with the old covenant, is not the Decalogue but the law of Moses. He believes
his exegesis is confirmed by the context (Jer. 31: 32), that is, the remark that the
new covenant will not be like the one God made with the fathers when he led
them out of Egypt, the covenant which they broke.440 However, we must
frankly admit our difficulty in following the logic of Luther's exegesis. While
we have no difficulty with the theology, namely, that the Decalogue is prior to
439Here we are reminded of Luther's distinction between the two
kingdoms. However, not enough is said here in this brief rehearsal of the
argument for us to draw any conclusions, although it seems most likely that
Matt. 20: 25-26 was a text used in the discussion by the antinomians in support
of their claim that the law was to be abolished from the church.
440According to his interpretation, the content of the law that will

no longer need to be taught under the new covenant concerns sacrifices,
whole burnt offerings, libations etcetera.
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the Mosaic covenant, it seems as if his refutation of antinomianism here has
led him into rather tortuous exegesis. It seems to us that the contrast made by
the text is between the old covenant with the law written on tablets of stone,
and the new covenant in which the law is written on the heart. In both cases
the referent is the Decalogue (although strictly Jer. 31: 33 speaks of the Torah).
It is not the ceremonial and judicial law (= the Mosaic law) that is in question
here but the Decalogue, for it seems that the reason the new testament will
not be broken is because the law will no longer be external but written on the
heart and because God has promised to forgive the sins of those who break it.
Luther, on the other hand, afraid perhaps that such an interpretation could
strengthen the hand of the antinomians who insist on a nexus between the
Decalogue and the law of Moses, stresses that the law that is no longer to be
taught is the ceremonial and judicial law because that has been abolished.
While this is perfectly correct theologically, we are not convinced that that is
the main thrust of the text. It seems rather that it is precisely the Decalogue
which will no longer have to be taught because it will be inscribed on the
hearts of the pii by God so that all of them will know it.441
"lit is specifically the people of God who are in view here,
although, of course, we know from earlier arguments and will see again, that
the natural law is written on the hearts of all people (see 2 AD, Args. 2 and 13;
also 3 AD, Arg. 19), so that the inscription or writing on the heart under the
new covenant is strictly a "rewriting," just as the issuing of the law
(Decalogue) on Sinai was not the propagation of a new life but the reissuing of
the lex naturae, which is as old as the human race. What was new was not
the content of the law but the form of its propagation. Not only did the
people of Israel have it in palpable form to hear and read every year, but they
were also commanded to keep it before them in a literal way, by binding it as a
sign on their hand, wearing it as frontlets between their eyes, and writing it
on the doorposts and gates of their house (Deut. 6: 7-9). Under the new
covenant, on the other hand, the law will be written on the heart of credentes
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Although we may disagree with Luther's exegesis, we do agree that,
theologically, the law of Moses is not to be equated with the Decalogue but
refers rather to the ceremonial, judicial and cultic laws of the Old Testament
that came to an end with Christ, who fulfilled the whole law, the Mosaic law
as well as the Decalogue.442 The Decalogue antedates the law of Moses, so that
it is not first given through Moses, but has been inscribed and engraved on
the hearts of all people from the foundation of the world.443 Luther makes
by the Spirit in sanctification. In an instructive comment Francis Pieper,
Christiche Dogmatik, vol. 3 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1920), 2021, says that the law assists in the work of sanctification only by continually
preparing for the gospel. The gospel itself is the only source of sanctification.
He also teaches that the law is inscribed by the preaching of the gospel. In an
informative note (p. 18, n. 18) Pieper rejects Baier's exegesis of Gal. 5: 16, in
which the latter attributes the suppression of the flesh to the law, and ascribes
it instead to the Spirit. He cites Carpzov approvingly as a corrective to Baier:
"The law indeed is said 'to be inscribed in the heart' (Jer. 31: 33), but it does
not inscribe itself. The inscription takes place solely through the gospel.
Solely that which regenerates us renews us; now, we are reborn solely by the
gospel; ergo, we are also renewed solely by the gospel. This statement does
not deny that the law performs some service in the work of sanctification."
When the law is taken over by faith and controlled by the gospel, then it is no
longer lex accusans, because there is no sin to accuse, and the law has been
fulfilled by Christ. So too when the law assists in the mortification of the old
Adam, it is doing nothing other than what faith most desires.
442However, as Luther has already explained on numerous
occasions, the Decalogue, while fulfilled for faith in Christ, still remains valid
for the flesh.
443This is the clearest, fullest and most precise statement on the difference between the Decalogue and the law of Moses in the disputations:
Decalogus non est Mosi lex, neque primus ipse eam dedit, sed decalogus est
totius mundi, inscriptus et insculptus mentibus omnium hominum a condito mundo (478, 16-18). Important here is the point that the Decalogue does
not belong to any one people but to the whole world, whereas the law of
Moses has no standing outside Israel, even though some parts of it may have
been borrowed and found useful by other nations [Scitis enim, etiamsi largis-
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this statement in response to a hypothetical question in which he anticipates
the objection of his opponents: At inquies: Ipse [scil. the law that will no
longer be taught] complectitur totam legem Mosi una cum decalogo (478, 15).
We find it curious that here he concedes (albeit indirectly) that the Decalogue
was given through Moses (his point is that Moses was not the first to give it),
yet he was not prepared to consider that in his exegesis above. Now however
he does consider it, for the sake of the argument, and concludes that even if
the prohibition to teach the law were applied to the new covenant, that would
still not invalidate his argument for indeed the law is not to be preached to
the justified, that is, [legemj implendam vel nondum impletam (478, 20).
Luther here uses a very important pair of terms in clarifying the relation of
the iustificati to the lex. The lex implenda is not to be preached or imposed
on the justified, but only the lex impleta, for the justified already have what
the law demands since they have Christ's perfect fulfillment, by imputation,
per fidem. According to Luther, this is exactly what Paul means in 1 Timothy
1: 9 when he says: Lex non est iustis posita [olicaifiT vOlioc oti Karat] (but for
the lawless and disobedient etc.—here Paul continues with a catalog of sinners).444 Therefore, apud pios the exactio legis et accusatio cease because the
sime accipiatur lex, tamen tantum consistit in illo populo, et huius populi
tantum est lex Mosi] (478, 11-13).
4441 Tim. 1: 9 is another key text in the arsenal of the antinomians.
It will reappear on several occasions in the Third Disputation; see 39 I, 502, 1921 (3 AD, Arg. 2 (cited in a different form); 504, 5 (3 AD, Arg. Arg. 3); 575, 7 (3
AD, Arg. 37/10); in the following passages the text is not used by Luther but is
cited as part of the antinomian argument: 528, 12 (3 AD, Arg. Arg. 15); 552, 6 (3
AD, Arg. 26). When Luther himself uses the passages he distinguishes between law and gospel, that is, he understands the Christian as simul iustus et
peccator, whereas the antinomians use it only to prove that the law has not
been given to Christians, pure and simple. See ch. 2 for more on this text.
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law is stopped when it comes face to face with Christ who says: Ecce me, qui
facio pro illis, quad exigis, desine (479, 4-6).
In the final part of the responsio Luther continues to work with the assumption (for the sake of the argument) that the lex Mosi=decalogus and now
poses the question, would the end of the law also mean the end of the preaching ministry in the church? [. . . amplius non futurum ministerium in
Ecclesial. In other words, does the new covenant with the law written on the
mind of people spell the end to the preaching of the law in the church?445 In
other words, what implications does the new covenant, with the hr:wOT
inscribed on people's hearts, have for the ministry of the law? Luther
contrasts the situation under the new covenant with that of the early days of
Israel when the law codes had not yet been compiled and the knowledge of
God in the land was dependent on people (he does not say priests) disseminating it to each other.446 But when God makes the new covenant he
will write his ►71131 here probably best translated by "word" rather than by
"law") on their hearts so that the knowledge of the Lord will not be dependent on human beings for its transmission, but will be known to all his
people without intermediary. This doctrina will be so great that, irrespective
of how many credentes there are, all will teach the same doctrine, because all
will be 8Eo Sib cia xaXoi."7 God will first teach his people himself and give
445Cf. 39 I, 403, 2-3 (1 AD, Arg. 25). The preaching of the law in the

church through the ministerium publicum stands in continuity with the
preaching of the law through the ministerium publicum instituted at Sinai.
"6According to Jer. 5: 5 even the leaders of Israel did not know the
way of the Lord; cf. also Hosea 4: 4-6.
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them the Spirit, but only through the word [das sol angehen, ich will selben
schuler machen et Spiritum sanctum dare, sed tamen per verbum]. And yet,
strictly speaking, the Holy Spirit will be the sole teacher in his church [Ita ipse
vult esse et constitui doctor, et quidem solus in sua Ecclesia] for the teaching is
his. Luther concludes: Per Spiritum sanctum in verbo omnes habebimus
unum et eundem Christum, quem invicem alter alterum docebimus (480, 45).
Therefore, we have seen again that Luther can assume the antinomian
premise that Jeremiah 31 teaches the abolition of the law for Christians, and
yet by drawing on John 6: 45 he can still beat them at their own game, so to
speak, by proving that even though there will no longer be need for each to
teach the other the knowledge of the Lord, that will not be the end of the
preaching of the law (the public ministry) in the church, because God himself
will be the teacher of his people, and thus they will become °eau eta axaX oi
and teachers of others.448 The only reason things go wrong and people go
their own way, as happened under the pope with the cult of the saints, is
because Christ is missing or his place is usurped [Absente autem Christo alius
sic, alius aliter cognoscendum dominum dicit . . .1 (480, 7-9). Indeed, all the
Oeobit•ciaxahot, which are all credentes, are not simply teachers of the law ,
447This is not a NT word but is the Vulgate equivalent of John 6: 45:
kai; e[sontai pavnte" didaktoi; qeou'. This is Luther's key text in this section
(479, 8-9).
448 Luther makes no attempt to exlain the apparent non sequitur

here: under the new covenant there will no longer be any need for neighbor
to teach neighbor for they will all be taught by God, but then they will teach
each other about Christ. Perhaps the answer to the problem lies in the fact
that Luther is going from Torah to Christ.
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but preminently teachers of Christ, but yet under him who is solus doctor in
his church.
It has been instructive to see how Luther, in the second and third parts
of the Responsio assumes the antinomian argument that lex Mosi=decalogus
(after first stating very emphatically lex Mosi*clecalogus) to see where it will
lead. As we have seen, he can still properly interpret it within the context of
the New Testament without falling into the antinomian error of dismissing
the law absolutely, by applying the lex impleta (that is, the end of the exactio
legis et accusatio) to the iustificati. Then, as we have just seen, he asks the
hypothetical question, if the law were abolished, would that imply the end of
the ministerium in Ecclesia, to which he answers no, because God himself
will be the teacher of his people, and we will all be eeoSiticia-Kahoi. Through
the Spirit and the word we will have the one and same Christ whom each in
turn will teach the other. Even though Luther is battling antinomianism he
does not simply talk about the law, but in his characteristic way talks about
Christ. His answer here is indicative of that. He is not afraid to give ground
to his opponents. He admits that the law is abolished for faith, but that does
not mean the end of teaching in the church, for there is the ministry of the
baptized as they speak the gospel to each other in their daily vocation. One
puzzle that Luther has left unsolved is how all this relates to the ministerium
publicum in Ecclesia of the New Testament. It seems clear enough that what
Luther has been describing is not the Amt of the holy ministry but the
priesthood of the baptized."9 However, that is a problem for itself and cannot
4491t seems that in order to get around this problem Luther appeals

to John 6: 45 and applies it to Christ. He holds that his teaching will be so
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be taken up here. It simply reminds us that Luther was not a systematic
theologian, as we use the term nowadays since Schleiermacher, and that on
top of that, we may see problems where Luther saw none, not only because of
the 450 years of church history between us, but also because he will allow no
doctrine to be unrelated to Christ.
The second part of Luther's responsio together with the one from the
previous argumenturn, form one of the most powerful refutations of the
antinomian contention that the law in the sense of Decalogue has been abolished with the new covenant. The two principal arguments are these: first,
lex Mosi is not to be equated with decalogus because the Decalogue, which in
content is the same as the lex naturae, antedates the law of Moses; secondly,
the law is always present, is schon da, for it was inscribed on the hearts of all
people from the beginning of the world. Therefore, the fulfillment and
abolition of the law of Moses in Christ does not automatically mean the
abolition of the Decalogue.
Luther's use of Jeremiah 31: 33-34, which the antinomians adduce in
support of their position, is instructive. He never uses it as a proof-text himgreat that all Christ's people will follow it. He is talking here surely of the
gospel--the gospel which each of the baptized teaches his neighbor. Two
things may be observed here. First, it is different to pre-Mosaic OT times in
that no longer are special teachers of the law needed. Secondly, Luther applies
the knowledge of God, which will be given to all under the new covenant, to
the knowledge of Christ, and hence to the gospel. And the reason why all
people will know Christ is because the doctrina evangelica is so great that all
Christians will tell it to their neighbors. In all of this Luther is still being
faithful to the sense of Jeremiah. 31 because he says that in the final analysis it
is not the individual Christian who is doing the teaching, it is Christ. He is
the sole teacher in his church, but he always teaches through his word and
through instruments. It is only when Christ is forgotten that each person
becomes his own teacher and goes his own way.
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self. At first sight it might appear to further reinforce the fact that since the
law is inscribed in the hearts of the credentes (under the new covenant) it is
not limited to the sphere of the old testament. However, Luther never uses
this text to undergird the doctrine of the lex naturae or the lex insculpta.450
Argument 26451
Contra 2
All who teach the law tempt God. You teach the law. Therefore,
you tempt God.
Proof of major premise: Acts 15 [: 10].
Response: It is a good argument and one to be noted. For it proves
that the papists, the Turks, and all who teach the law with the belief that
it makes righteous are tempters of God. All of them put burdens around
the necks of the disciples with this sort of opinion and superstition that
through it they might be justified before God. But it is not true. For the
law has not been given for that purpose. Moreover, in this they imitate
those very magicians and sorcerers who hang the gospel of John and
other characters or words around their neck in order thereby to protect
themselves from dangers, missiles, and cannon balls and be saved from
harm. Thus monks and minorities seek and identify some place and cult
reason is not hard to see. The word lex is not the equivalent
of r1111 because the words do not share all the components of meaning.
While triin may include all that lex denotes, it is much wider, for it contains
not only instruction in the law, in the sense of God's will, but also the gospel.
Therefore, it is often preferable to translate it as "word of God" rather than as
"law." It follows then that because the Decalogue cannot be equated with the
Torah, and because Jeremiah 31: 33 promises that God will put the rnin in his
people and write it on their hearts, this text cannot serve to prove the
Decalogue will be inscribed in the hearts of God's new testament people. On
the other hand, this fact in itself does not weaken the doctrine of the lex
inscripta, for that is not limited to the old covenant. That is the significance
of the fact that the lex naturae is not equivalent to the lex Mosi, it does not
cease with the end of the Mosaic covenant, but continues a reality also for
Christians, as we have often said, insofar as they remain sinners and have to
daily battle the flesh. See 39 I, 374, 2-5 (1 AD, Arg. 7): the Decalogue adheres in
the conscience and would still be known even without the law of Moses.
450The

45139

I, 480, 12-481, 19.
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beyond and outside the word of God in which they think that they will
find God. And indeed, it must be that he will have regard for them in
this or that work. No doubt about that! In this way, that is, since you lay
hold of him. The opinion of the Jews was the same: no-one could be
saved except through the law. Peter's reply to them was: what are you
doing? Do you really want to put God to the test? Do you think that you
will find God in your testing and superstition? It will not happen. He
himself wants to be worshipped, laid hold of, and found in that righteousness and in that way which he himself has established, and by way
of him he would be sought, him whom he has put there, none other
than his Christ, our Lord. Therefore, it is necessary to remain and stand
[firm] in this righteousness which is given to us in Christ, and you ought
not depart from this way so much as a hand's breadth, either forward or
backwards, otherwise you will perish, and in this alone will you be
saved. Indeed he himself has said: He who believes in the Son has
eternal life [John 3: 36], and: Outside of him there is no salvation [Acts 4:
12].
Luther considers the argument worthy of note [bonurn argumenturn et
notandum] but does not agree with it. For the antinomians the teaching of
the law per se is bad because it tempts God [tentare Deum] by imposing on
Christians a yoke which he himself has removed. They base this idea on
Peter's speech at the council at Jerusalem: vim/ oi3v T1 7CElingETE TOV eeew in-tOeivai tvyiiv kit TON, trncixtiXov TfiTV twerrav ay oiite of rorripec iii.t6iv oiSte
lig% i axiS a a Rev 13as:3TC/taw_ (Acts 15: 10). However, Luther locates the
tentare Deum, not in the teaching of the law (=Decalogue) per se, but in
teaching it as an opinio iustitiae, that is, as a means by which one can become
righteous coram Deo. In other words, he rejects any attempt to use the law as
a basis of works-righteousness. To do that is to put God to the test. He lumps
this opinio togther with superstitio and holds that the papistae and Turcae are
guilty of it, as well as the magi and venefici, who wear the Gospel of John or
other characteres aut vocabula as amulets around their neck to ward off pericula, tela, and bombardae and to protect them from harm (481, 1-6). He finds
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the same basic eror in monasticism when monachi et minoritae attempt to
find God in their piety and cultus supra et extra verbum Dei. On the other
hand, God only wants coli, apprehendi et quaeri in that place where he has
revealed himself and allowed himself to be found; he wants to be sought only
by way of him whom he has appointed [ab eo peti, den ehr gestelt hat], his
Christ, our Lord. The only iustitia that avails coram Deo is the iustitia Christi,
which is only there where Christ is located. Therefore, we must remain firm
[manendum et standum est] in Christ and his righteousness for extra hunc
non est salus (cf. Acts 4: 12).
In Luther's first encounter this argument= his responsio was somewhat different.452 There he recognized that the fundamental problem with
the antinomian argumentum was its failure to distinguish between the
ceremonial, judicial, and cultic law, on the one hand, and the Decalogue on
the other. As Luther has argued before, the former constitutes the Mosaic law
and belongs only to Israel and passes away with the passing of the Mosaic
covenant, whereas the latter belongs to the whole world because it has been
inscribed in the hearts of all from its foundation. With this distinction
Luther can say that what Peter and the first council of the church in Jerusalem
reject as binding on Christians (including Jewish Christians) is not the law as
Decalogue, but the law of Moses, which was strictly circumscribed and limited
only to the people Israel. We know from preceeding arguments that Luther
also makes another important distinction: that between the lex impleta and
the lex implenda, the former having been given to us by imputation through
452See 39 I, 380, 11-381, 10 (1 AD, Arg. 13). This argument based on
Acts 15 comes up once again later, see 499, 5-503, 3 (3 AD, Arg. 2).

398
faith, the latter applying still to the flesh. Therefore, when he is speaking
about the law he consistently makes these two distinctions.
Argument 27453
Contra the Refutation
Faith alone fulfills the law. Faith differs from the rest of the virtues
or it is not alone. Therefore, the law and the rest of the virtues are nothing.
Response: The argument is this: If faith alone fulfills the law, then
the rest of the virtues in what remains, that is, the commandments, are
nothing, and so faith is brought in like some beast that devours itself,
like a Julian. As if there might be faith in the first commandment.
Therefore, faith, by fulfilling the law, does not fulfill it.
M. Georgius: I do not understand how he comes to this conclusion.
In my opinion it should be this: To fulfill the law is to complete all the
virtues, for there is no virtue not contained in the Decalogue. The rest of
the virtues are nothing and [yet] to neglect them, to differ from them, to
be alone, is not to fulfill the law Therefore, if faith fulfills the law, and
again, if the rest of the virtues are nothing and faith differs from them
and is alone, as the argument proposes, it follows that faith fulfills the
law and does not fulfill it, or it does not fulfill it by fulfilling it.
Objection: But I have proposed this argument on account of the
word "alone."
Response: Faith alone fulfills [the law] and so all sins are forgiven
us, and this whole Decalogue is fulfilled through faith because only faith
(for Christ can be grasped by this alone) gives me Christ who is the
fulfillment and end of the law [Rom. 10: 4], and under the shelter of this
Christ we seek refuge and are protected like chicks under the wings of a
hen. What else does faith give? With faith there comes the Holy Spirit,
from whom then flow all kinds of good works. Therefore, the first part
belongs to redemption which we have through faith alone, and through
this sacrament the Ten Commandments are fulfilled and redemption is
given to us freely. Next is the example by which we follow Christ and do
good works. Thus, everything depends on faith, whatever happens.
Therefore, it is a good dictum: faith alone does everything.
The argumentum is subtle. It wants to exclude the law on the basis of
the sofa fide criterion. If faith alone fulfills the law, nothing else is necessary
45339 I, 481, 22-483, 6.
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and the law and the rest of the virtues are nothing. At bottom it assumes that
if salvation is sola fide, without works, then works are not necessary and are
nothing.454 It is clear from the responsio455 that Luther locates the problem
in a failure to distinguish between justification and sanctification. In the article of justification, there can be nothing but the grace of God's redemption
and the faith that receives; here the sola fide is critical. However, in sanctification, we follow the example of Christ and do good works; here the fides is
not sola. He stresses that faith gives me Christ, who is the impletio et finis
legis, and who graciously shelters and protects us like chicks under the wings
of a hen [sub cuius Christi umbraculis delitescimus et tuti sumus veluti pulli
sub ails gallinae] (482, 15-17). At the same time to have faith also means to
have the Holy Spirit who then becomes the source of the bona opera. Thus
even our good works are not really ours, but the works that the Holy Spirit
produces within us, and even then they are only good on account of faith, or
more precisely, because they have been forgiven.456 Thus, ultimately everyremarks at the beginning of the responsio that the way
the antinomians picture faith in this argument is such that they make it like
some beast who devours a Julian. Hermelink (39 I, 482, n. 1) notes here that
Luther is probably thinking of the uncle of emperor Julian the Apostate, who
is said to have polluted the sacred vessels of the church of Antioch. For that
he died the death of a heretic in a form that makes the above comparison
possible (cf. Sozomenos V, 5; Philostorgios VII, 10; Theodoret III, 12, 13; see
Drews, 412).
454Luther

will not concern ourselves with the responsio of the student
M. Georgius, who does not properly distinguish law and gospel with his dialectical conclusion, quod fides impleat legem et non impleat sive quod implendo non impleat (482, 10-11). His responsio is more subtle than than
a rg umentum!
455We
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thing depends on faith, or as the closing dictum has it: Sola fides facit omnia,
which is really only an application of Paul's assertion that whatever does not
proceed from faith is sin (Rom. 14: 23).457 With so much faith-talk one might
think that Luther finally is really agreeing with the antinomian proposition.
However, that is clearly not the case, for although the sola fides is central for
justification, in sanctification faith does not exclude works but gives rise to
them by its very nature, and on top of that, God also commands that we do
good works. Therefore, faith should never be played off against good works
except in the article of justification where fides is sola, and secondly, as long as
Christians are still peccatores the law will never be nothing.
Argument 28458
Contra the Refutation
The law is common to all people. Not all people are convicted and
terrified. Therefore, terrors are not caused by the law, but by some other
teaching, that is, the gospel.
Proof of minor premise: Few are completely terrified, and Paul himself, though he lived in the law, did not feel it for a long time [Rom. 7: 9;
Phil. 3: 61.
Response: I make a distinction in the law. From the standpoint of
grammar and civil life the law is indeed common to all people, but that
is not the case if understood theologically and spiritually, because it terrifies only very few. For the law cannot be experienced except with trembling and death. Indeed, it is as we say in our third thesis of the First
456Luther pulls in the old sacramentum-exemplum terminology as
a means of further elaborating the contrast between what Christ does for us,
alone and outside us (sacramenturn, redemptio), and what he then does in us
through the Holy Spirit (exemplum, bona opera). For a discussion of these
terms, see our analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 15.
457Note that Rom. 14: 23 is used by the antinomians to disqualify

the law because, according to their "equivocal" argument, the law is not ex
fide; see 39 I, 376, 20-377, 6 (1 AD, Arg. 9).
45839 I, 483, 9-19.
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Disputation: Many indeed hear the law, but do not feel its sensation or
power in their hearts.
The antinomian argumentum is familiar from earlier arguments. It
claims that the law, although it is common to all people (as the lex inscripta
or lex naturae) is not always capable of producing contrition or the terrores
conscientiae. Therefore, the gospel must be used for this purpose instead of
the law. This is consistent with the antinomian thesis that repentance arises
not ex lege but ex violatione filii.459 Luther, of course, agrees that the law is
common to all, but not all repent because not all feel the power or effect of the
law.460 The antinomians cite the example of Paul who, looking back on his
pre-conversion days says that although he lived in the law (vivens in lege in
the sense of being thoroughly immersed in it) he did not feel it for a long time
(diu non sensit legem) (cf. Rom. 7: 9: iy6 8'e gc.ov xco pig vogov noti, iXecq>ang
8'e Trig EVToXfj n apapti a aviCncev). While Luther does not respond to that
here he has touched on it earlier, but then really only to acknowledge that this
simply confirms his own position and that it was only later in Paul's life,
when he was confronted with the risen Lord on the Damascus Road, that the
law became effectus for him.461 In the argumentum before us Luther distin459See 39 I, 342, 9-10 (Pos., Th. 1); 384, 4-386,16 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
460See 39 I, 368, 14 (1 AD, Arg. 3); 404, 16-17 (1 AD, Arg. 27); 406, 1 (1
AD, Arg. 28). (The same argument, mutatis mutandis, applies to the gospel.)
Luther makes a similar statement in his first Thesenreihe: Multi enim audiunt quidem legem, sed quia sensum seu vim legis non sentiunt, nihil dolent
neque poenitent (345, 20-21; Th. 3).
461See 39 I, 405, 6-11 (1 AD, Arg. 27); 406, 17-407, 15 (1 AD, Arg. 28).

Luther will say in a later responsio that Paul was secure in the law in his days
as a Pharisee until it suddenly struck him and revealed to him his sin; see 529,
3-530, 3 (3 AD, Arg. 16); 530, 5-17 (3 AD, Arg. 17).
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guishes two sides of the law: the first corresponds to the usus politicus; the
law here is common to all [Grammatice et civiliter est quidem omnium]; the
other side corresponds to the usus theologicus; here the law, or better, the experientia or effectus of the law, is not common to all for the law only strikes a
very few [sed theologice et spiritualiter accepta non est omnium, quia paucissimos terret] (483, 14-16).462 This latter constitutes the proper use of the law,
for lex non potest experiri, nisi cum tremore et morte; whether it produces
this effect in the hearer or not is beyond our control. We can only preach it
and pray that God would apply it to the heart.463
Argument 29464
Surely therefore the Holy Spirit causes both terror and comfort in
the human heart since Paul calls the gospel alone the ministry of the
Spirit [2 Cor. 3: 6]?
Response: We have also said above that the naked God cannot be
grasped without some specific means, and whoever searches out God in
his majesty and divinity will be overwhelmed by his glory. But only after he has emptied himself [Phil. 2: 7] and has been made a delight and a
marvel, a child placed in the lap of a virgin and in a stable, are we able to
distinction between two aspects of the one law [duplex usus
legis] stands in marked contrast to Luther's thinking about the law in the
early stages of his career, when under Augustinian influence, he spoke of two
laws, the lex spiritualis (=lex nova) and the lex litterae (lex vetus). Attention
then centered on the question of how to use the law legitimately so that the
pii did not fall into the sin of superbia or hypocrisy. It was only after Luther
understood the gospel as the complete antithesis of the law that he came to
realize that it could never be understood with concepts such as nova lex, lex
Christi or lex spiritualis, all of which predicate the gospel under the Oberbegriff "lex." See ch. 2 for further discussion; also Schloemann, 26-30.
462This

Sed Deus vult, ut legem doceamus.
Hoc ubi fecerimus, videbit ipse, qui per earn convertantur, certe convertit per
eam ad poenitentiam, quos et quando vult.
463Cf. 39 I, 369, 1-3 (1 AD, Arg. 3):

46439 I, 484, 1-22.
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bear him; only then can we handle him. Otherwise, no one will see him
and live [Exod. 33: 20]. Truly clothed and dressed in human flesh, born of
the virgin and incarnate in our flesh, made a brother and our flesh, I cannot then dread him. So too the Holy Spirit in his majesty is incomprehensible, and when in his majesty as God he reveals the law he cannot
but kill and terribly frighten. Therefore, in order to be a comforter and
sanctifer, he was also finally made a gift. However, when it is the case
with us that we are in sins, we are guilty of eternal death and wrath, we
cannot at once perceive him, nor recognize his comfort. Therefore, it is
necessary at some point in time for God to appear, to search the heart
and pierce the marrow of the bones through the sensation or power of
the law [Heb. 4: 12], to cut us down and shake us so violently that we
realize we are bereft of help and learn to take refuge in Christ. Therefore,
the Holy Spirit as God terrifies through the law, but as gift, in the form of
a dove and with a burning tongue, he comforts, sanctifies and gives life.
Luther's responsio provides us with a magnificent statement of the
theology of the Deus incarnatus within the framework of law and gospel.
What he says here is not new. Most of it has already been said in the First
Disputation.465 The argument= runs law and gospel together by asserting
that the gospel alone, as the ministerium Spiritus (2 Cor. 3: 8: n otaxo via Toi5
nvelip.atoc), causes both terrores et consolationes in cordibus hominum. In
his refutation Luther makes a distinction between God in his unveiled glory,
[Deus nudus] whom no human can see and live, and God in his incarnation
where he veils his glory in human flesh so that we can bear him. After his
self-emptying [exinanivit se ipsum] he becomes a delight and a marvel rather
than causing fear: a child put in the lap of the virgin and in a stable [puer
positus in gremio virginis et praesepi] (484, 7-9). God in his majesty is our
enemy, but when he takes on our flesh and becomes our brother he no longer
frightens us. Luther now applies the same arguments to the Holy Spirit. The
465See 39 I, 370, 12-371, 3 (1 AD, Arg. 4); 389, 2-18 (1 AD, Arg. 17).
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Spirit in his majesty is incomprehensibilis, and when he works through the
law he works as God in his majesty, killing and destroying us. As the author
of the law the Holy Spirit is one with the Deus nudus, who cannot be grasped
without some specific means [sine certis quibusdam signis non potest comprehendi] (484, 5-6). But when he does work through specific external means
[certis signis] such as the gospel, he comes as gift. However, in order that we
might receive this gift it is necessary for him from time to time to shake us
violently [concutere] so that we realize our helplessness before him and learn
to take refuge in Christ. So, in his majesty the Spirit as author of the law only
kills and destroys, but in the form of a dove and the tongue of fire,466 he comforts, sanctifies and gives life. Significantly, these are the certa quaedam signa
in which God revealed himself at Pentecost.
Argument 30467
Contra 10
The dividing wall has been destroyed through Christ [Eph. 2: 14].
Therefore, the law has been abolished.
Response: Here also Paul is speaking about the law of Moses in the
proper sense, not about the Decalogue since it was for all people. For the
nations do not hate the Jews on account of the Decalogue, but because
they used to separate themselves from the other nations through their
unique cultus and ceremonies, and said that they alone are the people of
God, all the rest being ajqeou'" and ungodly. There was controversy
over the temple and the ceremonies. But in the end Christ came and
abolished that dividing wall and the Jews and Gentiles were made one.
But if he is speaking about the Decalogue, that is good, [for] this has been
abolished and destroyed and thereby damnation, through Jesus Christ
our Lord. Amen.
in specie columbae, in lingua ignea, see our note on the parallel words in 1 AD, Arg. 4.
466Re

46739 I, 484, 25-485, 7.
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The antinomian argumentum for the abolition of the law is based on
an idiosyncratic exegesis of Ephesians 2: 14, where the "maceries" [TO 1.1e06-ro1X0V VAS. 4)p antobl which has been broken down is interpreted as the Decalogue. Luther rightly rejects this on the grounds that the decalogus never belonged exclusively to Israel in the first place but was for all peoples. Rather,
Paul is speaking here about the the lex Mosi in the strict sense. In an incisive
remark about the history of Israel he observes that it was not the Decalogue
that caused her to be hated and despised among the gentes, but the singularis
cultus et caeremoniae (484, 26-485, 3), which she used to separate herself from
the nations, whom she looked on as deeoiic and impii. This narrow particularism and exclusivity, symbolized above all by the cultic and ceremonial law,
is what Christ broke down when he destroyed TO ucaerrotjcov Toil cOpaygov by
abolishing tbv vOuov -ray ixtroX6iv iv 66yttaalv, thus creating in himself 'iv
xawbv dvAponrov (the church) in the place of two (v. 15). And now Luther's
irenical spirit once again comes to the fore. After having shown that the exegesis of his opponents is in error, he turns around and concedes that even if
one does take Ephesians 2: 14 as referring to the Decalogue, it is not wrong
theologically, for in Christ the decalogus too has been abolished and destroyed
[sublatus et destructus], and so damnatio also [quoad damnationeml for where
there is no law there can be no judgment.468

468Luther fails here to make his customary qualifications, for as we
know well, he does not accept the antinomian argument that the Decalogue
as lex condemnatrix has been abolished absolutely, but only for faith. The
impii remain subject to the lex accusans et condemnans, and indeed Christians too, quoad peccatores, are still subject to the lex accusans, but at the same
time we can rejoice with Paul that there is now no katavkrima for those who
are in Christ Jesus (Rom. 8: 1). Cf. 39 I, 367, 11-13 (1 AD, Arg. 2).
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[Concluion]
D. Martin Luther
We thank you etc. Repentance is to be taught from the law because this is
what Christ, Paul, and Peter did and all who taught Christ, as we see in
Matthew 5, Romans 1 and 2, and this is also what the rest of the apostles did
as we see in Acts and in their own writings. Secondly, if there had been
another and better way Christ would have seen it. But you say that it is
written: In my name [Luke 24: 471. My response is, true; unless repentance is
preached in the name of Christ it becomes the repentance of Cain and Judas.
That is how the pope taught repentance, but not in the name of Jesus.
Therefore, it was inevitable that many people despaired, as we know from
experience. Why is the law is to be taught? The law is to be taught for the
sake of discipline according to that saying of Paul's in 1 Timothy 1 [: 9]: The
law has been laid down for the unrighteous, and in order that through this
teaching people might come to Christ, as Paul says in Galatians 3 [: 241: The
law is a pedagogue toward Christ. Secondly, the law is to be taught in order
that it might expose sin, accuse, terrify and damn consciences, as it says in
Romans 3 [: 20]: Through the law we have the knowledge of sin; also in
chapter 4 [: 15]: The law works wrath. Thirdly, the law is to be retained in
order that the saints may know what works God requires, in which they can
practice obedience toward him.
TiXoc
The conclusion touches on a few chief points concerning the relation
between the law and repentance, which has been the topic of this disputation.
He reiterates that repentance arises ex lege, in accordance with dominical and
apostolic doctrine. When Christ commissions the apostles to preach repentance "in nomine meo," that should not be understood to mean that repentance arises ex evangelio, but as an indicator that the law is incapable of producing repentance if not in Christ's name. For without the gospel, the
penitent may well be driven to despair like Cain and Judas, or like those who
have suffered under the legalism of the papacy (485, 14-15).469
469See our discussion of 1 AD, Args. 19, 35, 36.
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However, the conclusion is important especially because it contains a
summary of the uses of the law, purportedly given by Luther, which has created some discussion among Luther scholars. This is the only passage in the
antinomian disputations (and, to the best of our knowledge, any where in the
Luther corpus) where three uses of the law are expressly listed, although the
nomenclature usus legis is not employed. Werner Elert, after a careful study
of this passage in the light of similar Reformation statements on the law by
Melanchthon and Calvin, declared it to be a forgery and this judgment has
been generally accepted by the majority of scholars.470 However, before we
consider Elert's criticism we need to analyze the text ourselves to see if there
is anything that appears inconsistent with what Luther has been saying thus
far.
In answer to the rhetorical question: Quare lex est docenda? he gives
three reasons. Whether these reasons should be equated with the three usus
legis of Melanchthon and later Lutheran theology is a question that will need
to be answered. The first reason given is that it is to be taught for the sake of
discipline [Lex docenda est propter disciplinam]. The scriptural warrant cited
470Werner Elert, "Eine Theologische Falschung zur Lehre vom Tertius Usus Legis," in Zeitschrift filr Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 1 (1948):
168-170; this is largely reproduced in his essay, "Gesetz und Evangelium," in
Zwischen Gnade und Ungnade: Abwandlungen des Themas Gesetz und
Evangelium (Munich: Evangelischer Presserverband fur Bayern, 1948), 161163. Before Elert's work, ever since the publication of the later disputations by
Drews (1895), almost all scholars had agreed, on the basis of this conclusion to
the Second Antinomian Disputation, that Luther taught a triplex usus legis.
Elert also argues that the passage in Luther's Kirchenpostille of 1522 (10 I, 1,
456, 9ff), which ever since Frank (Theologie der Konkordienformel II, 389) has
always been used to prove that Luther taught a threefold use of the law, does
not hold up under close scrutiny and hence cannot be understood in the way
in which Melanchthon and the Konkordienformel understand it.
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for this is 1 Timothy 1: 9: Lex est iniustis posita, as well as Galatians 3: 24: Lex
est paedagogia [sic] in Christum. Here clearly disciplina is equated with paedagogia. Secondly, the law is to be taught in order to expose sin, and accuse and
terrify the conscience [Lex docenda est, ut ostendat peccatum, accuset, perterrefaciat et damnet conscientias]. The scriptural basis given for this is Romans 3:
20: Per legem cognitio peccati, and Romans 4: 15: Lex iram operatur. Thirdly,
the law is to be retained that the saints may know what works God requires,
which they can then use to exercise obedience toward him [Lex est retinenda,
ut sciant sancti, quaenam opera requirat Deus, in quibus obedientiam exercere
erga Deum possint] (485, 22-24). No scriptural proof is adduced for this third
point. Now there are several things that are striking about this list. First and
most obviously, it is certainly a radical departure from Luther's customary
way of speaking about the duplex usus legis.471 Secondly, the way in which
disciplina is connected with paedagogia ad Christum is strange and uncharacteristic. Here it is linked with the usus civilis (represented by disciplina)
whereas usually it is coordinated with the usus theologicus.472 Finally, the
471The term duplex usus legis as such only occurs twice in the antinomian disputations (39 I, 441, 2-3; 2 AD, Arg. 6) although Luther also says
once that the lex is duplex (460, 21; 2 AD, Arg. 14) which amounts to the same
thing. Yet the idea of a twofold use of the law is common, e. g. 483, 14-16; 2
AD, Arg. 28; 209, 11-15; 210, 21-23 (PT, Arg. 4). For a full discussion of this matter, see Gerhard Ebeling, "Die Lehre vom triplex usus legis in der reformatorischen Theologie," in Wort und Glaube, vol. 1, 3d ed. (Tubingen: J. C. B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960), 50-68 (note: Ebeling corrects some errors in Elert's
work); Lauri Haikola, Usus legis, No. A 20 in Schriften der Luther-AgricolaGesellschaft (Uppsala: n. p., 1958; reprinted Helsinki, 1981), 85-152; Martin
Schloemann, 22-31; Albrecht Peters, Gesetz und Evangelium (HST 2), ed. Carl
Heinz Ratschow (Giitersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1981), 38-41.
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formulation of the third reason for the law is without parallel. That in itself
of course does not disqualify it from being authentic, but it does at least raise a
question. Luther certainly knows that the vita christiana is not just about
combating sin, but also doing good works as commanded by the God. The law
not only curbs and disciplines the Christian and exposes his sin, but the
commandments also serve to show him the God-pleasing works in which he
can exercise his faith. In a passage in one of the Promotionsdisputations
Luther remarks that although the law must no longer accuse, coerce or
condemn the pii, yet it must be retained in order to give them a pattern for
doing good works [Ideo autem retinenda est piis, ut habeant formam
exercendi bona opera].473 Thus the law instructs them in the good works that
they are to do. Furthermore, Luther says that Christ's mission was to restore
joyful obedience to the law (375, 4-6); he also says that to speak of Christ as our
exemplum is nothing else than to say that he shows us how life is to be lived
in obedience to God, parents, and superiors (464, 19-21). On the other hand,
all of this needs to be offset by a statement in the Third Disputation where
Luther is decidedly cautious of talking about the law as a guide or admonition
to good works. In fact he chides Melanchthon for conceding too much to the
antinomians by saying that the law exercises some kind of external discipline,
by which the godly may be admonished to lead a godly life.474 Therefore,
when all of these considerations are taken together, it is difficult to conclude
472See the following responsiones and our analysis 39 I, 441, 2-443, 4
(2 AD, Arg. 6), 445, 5-448, 7 (2 AD, Arg. 8).
47339 II, 274, 20-22; FR, Arg. 16). In the opinion of Paul Althaus, The
Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1966),271, n. 123, this passage guarantee the authenticity of 485, 22-24.
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with any certainty that the passage under discussion is not authentic. For our
part, the most problematic thing about it is the fact that the paedagogia is
connected with the disciplina or usus civilis rather than with the usus
theologicus. In view of our foregoing analysis, the least problematic part of
the passage is 485, 22-24 which has been sometimes seen as evidence that
Luther taught a tertius usus legis.
We now turn to Elert's arguments for calling 485, 16-24 a forgery. He
begins by showing from Luther's Galaterbriefvorlesung (1531) that the usus
proprius (=usus theologicus seu spiritualis) can quite rightly be designated the
usus paedagogus for in revealing our sins it fulfills the function of a paedagogus in Christum jErzieher fur Christus], which Paul attributes to the law
(Gal. 3: 24). Melanchthon changes Luther's ranking of the usus and shifts the
usus politicus to first place, however that is only of secondary importance because he still keeps the usus theologicus as the usus praecipuus. More important is the fact that he now ascribes the pedagogical function of the law to the
usus politicus and no longer sees it as as revelation of sin. Consequently, he
interprets paedagogia (preparation for Christ) in terms of disciplina (his
favorite term).475 Calvin takes over the triplex usus legis and relates the
47439 I, 578, 5-8 (3 AD, Arg. 40/13). This significance of this passage
will be discussed when we deal with the argumentum. It is more characteristic of the way in which Luther thinks about the law in the vita christiana
when he says that the law does not bind the saints in anything insofar as they
are and remain in Christ, because they have through imputation what the
law requires from them, and secondly, that they do spontaneously by themselves the things of the law. But if they should fail to do them, they still have
the fulfillment by faith, by virtue of which God imputes righteousness to
them or the fulfillment of the law freely through Christ (249, 20-250, 10; PT,
Arg. 28).
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pedagogical function of the law to both to the usus theologicus, as in Luther,
and to the usus politicus, as in Melanchthon.476 But more importantly, the
decisive change that comes with Calvin is that he designates the usus tertius
as the proper goal of the law, and hence views it as the praecipuus usus legis.
Elert sees in this a direct polemic against Luther. Whereas Luther sees the
function of the law as being chiefly to expose sin and thus prepare sinners for
the gospel, Calvin sees its chief function as that of providing the believer with
a rule and norm for the Christian life.
The reasons for retaining the law (485, 16-24) are suspect in Elert's eyes
not only theologically, but also because they are very poorly attested in the
manuscripts. While the disputation itself has been preserved in nine manuscripts,477 only two of them (Cod. lat. 722 Helmst. and Cod. lat. 67, 2, Aug, both
in Wolfenbiittel) contain the sentences in question.478 The author of one of
the manuscripts is unknown. Hermelink says only: "im 16. Jahrhundert von
einer Hand hergestellt . . . jedoch in einer sehr fehlerhaften and fliichtigen
475 Loci, CR, 21, 405ff.; 716ff. Hollaz (Examen, 1021), one of the later
classical Lutheran dogmaticians, expands the triplex usus taught by the
Formula of Concord into a quadruplex and splits off the usus elenchticus--the
revelation of sin—from the usus paedagogicus as understood by Luther. As
Elert points out, this distinction may be possible in theory but in actual fact it
is erroneous because the preparation for Christ (usus paedagogicus) is bound
up precisely with the revelation of sin (usus elenchticus).

476frist. II, 7, 11.
477See the introduction by Hermelink (39 I, 418).
478Noted by the editor in the textual apparatus, 39 I, 485, 16/25.
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Nachschrift."479 Drews480 has shown that the other author is one Israel Alectriander (Hahnmann), who matriculated in Wittenberg in 1550 (!), and so
could not possibly have been present to hear the disputations. In Elert's opinion this man or his source is nothing but an insolent forger. His conclusion is
that the real source for the locus classicus of Luther's alleged doctrine of the
triplex usus legis is Melanchthon's intermediate Loci (CR 21, 406), which it
reproduces almost word for word.481
As we have already indicated, we think that the way the passage in
question understands the usus politicus (propter disciplinam) as the usus
paedagogicus raises serious questions as to its authenticity because such an
equation is certainly "un-Lutheran." However, there is more riding on this
for Elert than a Melanchthonian understanding of the usus paedagogicus, although he does not reveal his whole hand in this article. Later he comes out
strongly against the tertius usus legis and with this passage gone, gone too is
the only occurrence of the term triplex usus legis in the Luther corpus. In
our opinion, the fact that the final reason for the law [ut sciant sancti, quaenam opera requirat Deus, in quibus obedientiam exercere erga Deum possint]
may resemble a Melanchthonian tertius usus legis does not constitute a insurmountable problem. Luther as we have seen is not incapable of speaking
47939 II, xxvili.

48oDisputationes [Martin Luthers], XXXVI.
481Elert

notes that the differences between Melanchthon's
intermediate Loci of 1535 and his final edition of 1559 at this point are
insignificant, as can easily be seen from a comparison (cf. CR 21, 405ff. with
716ff.).
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now and then in such terms, although it remains the exception and not the
rule. The fact that Luther never saw fit to adopt Melanchthon's triplex usus
legis but continued to hold on to his characteristic duplex usus legis is surely
not without significance. More on that later.
PART 3
The Third Disputation Against the Antinomians
(Doctoral Disputation of Cyriacus Gerichius)
6 September 1538
Introduction
The theses that Luther had originally prepared for the Third Disputation were
not used because the disputation lapsed due to the reconciliation between
himself and Agricola on 12 January 1538.482 Likewise, the fourth disputation
also lapsed and so its theses were not used either.483 The Reconciliation
between Luther and Agricola was short lived. This is not surprising because
although Luther was content with the explanation that Agricola gave at the
Second Disputation, the later still hedged and failed to state publicly his
explicit agreement with Luther's doctrine of the law. After it became clear
Agricola had fallen back into his old ways and once again began publicly
teaching antinomian doctrine, Luther was determined to convene yet
another disputation to settle the matter once and for all.
482See

Hermelink's Introduction, 39 I, 486-7. For fuller discussion,
see ch. 2 on the historical background. For the theses originally prepared for
this disputation, the Disputatio tertia D. Martini Luthei (=Third Thesenreihe),
see 39 I, 350, 8-352, 6 (40 theses).
483For

the theses originally prepared for the Fourth Disputation,
Disputatio quarta D. Martini Lutheri (=Fourth Thesenreihe), see 39 I, 352, 8-354,
14 (41 Theses).
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The actual date on which the disputation was held has been a bone of contention among the experts, as we have pointed out in chapter 2. Since the matter
of dating is not of prime concern to us we will accept the opinion of the editor
without further discussion. He can see no other date possible than 6 September
1538, which is also the day of the licentiate disputation (Promotionsdisputation) of
Cyriacus Gericke. The theses he was to defend are those which Luther had originally drafted for the Fifth Disputation,484 and which go right to the heart of antinomian doctrine.
This disputation has two parts to it: the morning disputation (argumenta 127) and the afternoon disputation (argumenta 28/1-45/18). While it is perfectly
conceivable that the morning session doubled as a doctoral disputation, the afternoon session, in the opinion of the editor, right from the outset bears a different
stamp and goes well beyond the demands of a Promotionsdisputation.485 This also
seems to be confirmed by the conclusion, which merely states that this is the end
of the disputation against the blasphemous antinomians and says nothing at all
about the doctoral candidate. Again, as we have already seen in the case of the
previous academic disputations, Luther seems almost every where to be the sole
respondent.486
484This is clear already from the Luther's publication of the
announcement of the disputation in which it was customary to list the theses that
were to be debated, or in the case of a Doktordisputation, the theses to which the
Doktorand had to respond. For the Fiinfte Reihe der Disputationsthesen gegen die
Antinomer, see 39 I, 338.
485Intro., 39 I, 487.
486However, as Hermelink points out (Ibid.), the passing remark in
Argument= 3 (39 I, 503, 12-17), which is preserved in only two MSS, would tend
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Since this disputation is the last, our analysis has the benefit of the earlier
two and therefore we will, where appropriate, allude to previous discussions and
be on the look out for any new developments in Luther's approach to arguments
that he has already dealt with earlier.
Theses 487
Translation
1.The law rules people for as long as they live.
2. But they are free from the law so long as they are dead.
3. It is necessary therefore for people to die if they want to be free from
the law [cf. Rom. 6: 7].
4. And if the law rules the living, sin also rules them.
5. Therefore, it is necessary for people to die if they wish to be free from
sin.
6. For the law is the power of sin, but the sting of death is sin (1 Cor. 15:
56).
7. These three: law, sin, and death are inseparable.
8. Therefore, insofar as death is still in people, sin and the law are also in
them.
9. We receive the law outside of Christ, that is, the as-yet-unfulfilled letter, which is necessarily to be fulfilled by us.
to suggest that there was another respondent besides the chief respondent
(Dominus Respondens); cf. also argumentum 4 (509, 1-10).
48739 I, 354, 17-357, 38: Quinta disputatio D. Martini Lut.teri, contra Antinomos. These theses were originally prepared for the Fifth Disputation but used
for the Third.
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10.In Christ the law has indeed been fulfilled, sin has been blotted out,
and death has been destroyed.
11.That is, if we have been crucified and died in Christ through faith,
such things are true in us also.
12.But if we live, we are not yet in Christ, but outside Christ under the
law, and contend with sin and death.
13.However, as reality itself and experience testify, the righteous are
themselves also still being given up daily to death (cf. 2 Cor. 4: 11).
14.Therefore, it is necessary that these people, to the extent that they are
under death, are also still under the law and sin.
15.Those who wish to remove the law from the church are thoroughly
ignorant and deceived.
16.For this is not only foolish and ungodly but thoroughly impossible.
17.For if you want to remove the law, you must also remove sin and
death at the same time.
18.For death and sin are through the law, as Paul says: The law kills (2
Cor. 3: 6), and: The power of sin is the law (1 Cor. 15: 56).
19.Since you see that the righteous die daily, how foolish it is to think
that they are without the law.
20.For if there were no law, there would be neither sin nor death.
21.Therefore, they must first prove that the righteous are completely
without any sin and death.
22.Or that they no longer live in the flesh, but have been removed from
the world.
23.Then it could be rightly taught that the law also has been completely
removed from them and that it is in no way to be taught.
24.However, since they could not prove this, but experience itself shows
the exact opposite to be the case,
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25.The impudence of these teachers in wanting to remove the law from
the church is extraordinary.
26.But greater still is their impudence or more correctly their insanity in
saying that the law also ought to be removed from and not taught to the ungodly.
27.If the saints and righteous are not to have their sin and death, that is,
the law, held up to them, for whom however it was not laid down;
28.Much more rather ought it be held up to the ungodly and wicked, for
whom it has been properly and especially laid down (1 Tim. 1: 9).
29.And if they imagine that their church or hearers are simply all godly
and Christians without the law,
30.It shows that they are completely insane and do not know what they
are saying or affirming.
31.For this is nothing else than believing that all their hearers have been
removed from this life.
32.But to believe this is to make up your own games and watch them in
an empty theater.
33.For in this world first the righteous are always living in the flesh, and
secondly an even greater number of evil people are mixed in with them.
34.Therefore, the law has been laid down, and must certainly be taught
and not removed, in order that by it sin and death or God's wrath may be known.
35.Thus, the same has been laid down for the godly insofar as they are
not yet dead and still live in the flesh.
36.In the risen Christ certainly there is no sin, no death, no law to which
he had been subject while living.
37.But the same Christ is not yet perfectly risen in his faithful ones, but
indeed has begun to be raised from the dead in them, as the first fruits.
38.On the other hand, for the ungodly, the greater number of whom are
mixed in with the church, he is still totally dead, in fact nothing at all.
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39.And they are plainly under the law, and should be under the law,
even though it is possible for them to be terrified by a thunderbolt.
40.Insofar as Christ is risen in us, we are without the law, sin and death.
41.On the other hand, insofar as he is not yet risen in us, we are under
the law, sin, and death.
42.Therefore, the law is to be taught without distinction (just like the
gospel) to the godly as well as to ungodly.
43.To the ungodly, that they might be terrified and acknowledge their
sin, death and the inevitable wrath of God, through which they are humbled.
44.To the godly, that they may be admonished to crucify their flesh with
its passions and vices, lest they become secure.
45.For security removes faith and the fear of God, and makes the last
things worse than the first.
46.Clearly enough it seems that the antinomians think that sin has been
removed formally and philosophically or juridically through Christ.
47.And they do not fully realize that it has been removed from the
troubled solely through the imputation and forgiveness of God.
48.For sin has been removed, the law abolished, and death destroyed,
relatively, not formally or substantially.
49.And this wholly on account of Christ in this life, until we attain to
perfect manhood, to the fullness of Christ (Eph. 4: 13).
50.For we know, and they have learned from us, that Christ has been
made a sacrament and an example for us.
51.This most splendid thought is not ours, much less theirs, but Augustine's.
52.In which he says that Christ with his single agrees with our double
and makes a perfect number.
53.But neither Augustine the author, nor we his disciples, have added
this conclusion that the law therefore must be removed.
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54.They also added this, by means of their master the devil, to his chapter, that they might be the new authors and be famous on account of the rest.
55.Scripture gives us four ways for preaching and teaching for the salvation of all people, gathered from the four works of God.
56.For God terrifies with threats, consoles with promises, warns with
afflictions, and entices with gifts.
57.But so long as these four are taught they do not remove the law but
confirm it [Rom. 3: 31].
58.The kindness of God leads to repentance [Rom. 2: 4], that is, that you
may know that the law is the power of sin.
59.And the terrifying and killing law does that in order to drive you to
itself or to a knowledge of itself.
60.However, these fanatics do this to remove Christ himself through the
sacrament and example of Christ.
61.For if the law is removed, we do not know who Christ is or what he
has done, while in fact he has fulfilled the law for us.
62.For if I want to know the fullness of the law, that is, Christ, it is necessary to know what the law and its fullness is.
63.That cannot be taught unless it is taught that the law has not been
fulfilled in us, and that therefore we are subjected to sin and death.
64.If this is taught, we learn that we are all debtors to the law and children of wrath [Eph. 1: 3],
65.The ungodly plainly in the flesh and spirit or totally, the godly, on the
other hand, insofar as they are and live in the flesh.
66.Therefore, the doctrine of the law is necessary in the churches and is
to be altogether retained, without which Christ cannot be retained.
67.For what can you retain about Christ so long as the law has been removed, other than [to know] that he fulfilled; [but] you do not know what he has
fulfilled?
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68.Finally, the law has been fulfilled in Christ in such a way that you
cannot teach it that way unless you also teach that the law has not been fulfilled
in us.
69.In summary, to remove the law and to leave sin and death is to hide
the disease of sin and death to bring about the destruction of people.
70.When sin and death have been removed (as happened in Christ), it is
happily removed. Then indeed the law is confirmed [Rom. 3: 31].

Structure
Theme: The Law and Christ's Work
A. Law, Sin and Death (1-24)
I. Law, sin and death are inseparable (1-8)
1.only the dead are free from the law (1-3)
2.only the dead are free from sin (4-6)
3.insofar as people are still alive they have sin and the law (7-8)
II. In Christ the law is fulfilled but not outside of him (9-14)
1.those still alive are not yet in Christ but under the law (9-12)
2.as much as they are under death they are under law and sin (13-14)
III. Impossible to remove the law alone (15-25)
1.law cannot be removed without removing sin and death (15-18)
2.the righteous are not without the law for they are not wthout sin
and death (19-25)
B. Antinomian Errors (25-70)
I. The doctrine of the Law (25-45)
1. the law was given especially for the ungodly (26-28)
2. but Christians also need the law (29-33)
because:
a) the righteous are always living in the flesh (33)
b) they are surrounded by many evil people (33)
3. law is needed to reveal sin, death, and wrath to impii and pii (34)
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a) pii need law insofar as they still live in the flesh and Christ is not
yet perfectly risen in them (35-37)
b) impii are plainly under the law and are totally dead to Christ (3839)
4. Christians are without the law and under the law:
a) without the law, insofar as Christ is risen in them (40)
b) under the law, insofar as Christ is not yet risen in them (41)
5. the law is to be taught equally to the godly and the ungodly (42)
a) to the ungodly, to terrify them and drive them to repent (43)
b) to the godly, to admonish them to mortify the flesh lest they
become secure and fall into unbelief (44 45)
II. The doctrine of sin (46-49)
1.antinomians teach sin has been removed formaliter (46)
2. Luther holds sin is removed per imputation & forgiveness (47)
Hence: sin has been removed relative not formaliter (48-49)
III. Christ and the law (50-70)
1. Christ as sacrament= et exemplum (50-52)
a) antinomians add false conclusion to win fame by means of
Augustine (53-54)
b) scripture teaches God works salvation using four means:
aa) threats, promises, afflictions, gifts (55-56)
bb) these means do not remove the law but confirm it (57-60)
cc) the law teaches us:
aaa) who Christ is and what he has done (61-62)
bbb) we have not fulfilled the law and are its debtors, the
ungodly totally, the godly quatenus in came (63-65)
2. Christ cannot be retained without the law for the law shows
Christ's fulfillment and our nonfulfillment of it (66-68)
3. Summary
a) law, sin, and death are inseparable (69)
b) through Christ the law is removed and confirmed (70)
Summary
The Fifth Thesenreihen (used for the Third Disputation) has as its theme the
law and Christ's work. The theses fall into two main parts: the first shows the inseparability of the law, sin and death, the second deals with the cardinal errors of
antinomianism especially those touching on the relation between the Christ and

422
the law and the doctrine of sin. In the first parts, because of the inseparability of
sin, death, and the law (1-24), Luther argues that it is impossible for the antinomians to claim to have removed the law if they have not also removed sin and
death (15-25), for only in Christ has the law, sin and death been abolished (9-14).
In the second part, he stresses three points in particular: first, that contrary to
antinomian teaching, Christians also need the law insofar as they still live in the
flesh and are troubled by sin; on the other hand, insofar as Christ is risen in them
they are already free from the law (25-45). Secondly, Luther briefly points out
that the antinomians are in error in teaching that sin has been removed formaliter
whereas in fact it has only be removed relative (in other words, by imputation)
(46-49). In the final section (50-70) he shows that the antinomians reject the idea
of Augustine's that Christ has been given to us as sacramentum and exemplum (for
the exemplum implies that the law is still applicable to Christians), and argues
that, irrespective of whether God works through threats, promises, afflictions or
gifts, the law is not abolished but in fact confirmed (50-60) for without the law we
would not know who Christ is or what he has done (61-62). All we would know
is that he fulfilled, we would not know what he fulfilled. Luther says that the
law has been fulfilled in Christ in such a way that we cannot teach this without at
the same time teaching that it has not been fulfilled in us (67-68). His conclusion
is that the teaching of the law must be retained in the church for without it Christ
cannot be retained (66).
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Luther's Preface488
Luther states clearly at the beginning of this lengthy preface that the locus
of justification is incontrovertibly the head and sum of Christian doctrine. Just
because it is central it is also the special object of Satan's attack. In Luther's judgment the antinomians must be counted among the opponents of this doctrine
whom Satan is now using to overthrow it. He claims that their teaching, which
lulls people into a false sense of security by encouraging them to be licentious
and libertinistic, and makes them an easy prey for Satan, is actually presented to
people under the pretext of the gospel.
According to Luther, the antinomians have two basic principia. The first is
that Christ has formally [formaliter] removed all sin. To them sin is a foreign
word and should not be part of a Christian's vocabulary. The second principium
or rapcitigov (which is consequence of the first) is this: the church is as pure and
untainted as Adam was before the fall [ecclesiam sic puram et integram esse sine
omni macula et labe, ut fait Adam iamiam creatus in paradiso et perfectus ac integer].
Hence, they regard their followers, even the impii, as formaliter iustos (490, 6-13).
When Christ inveighs against the hypoctites, it is not to remove sin but to admonish them against future sin. Thus they teach a form of perfectionism: there is
no longer any sin, the church is pure and without sin, and is already risen with
Christ. Luther, on the other hand, teaches that the church is a corpus permixtum,
with saints and evil people mixed together. He, of course, also teaches that the
church is holy, pure and without sin, but only by synecdoche, by virtue of the
holy part which is there first of all by imputation, and so we say we are pure and
holy because sin is not imputed to us (491, 23-494, 1).
48839 I, 489, 1-496, 19: Praefatio D. M. Lutheri.
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Whereas the antinomians hold that sin has been removed formaliter, Luther
teaches that sin has been removed by mercy and grace, and that we are righteous
reputative seu imputative. Since the antinomians deny sin still exists, they know
nothing of the lifelong struggle between the flesh and the spirit that goes on in
Christians; they deny that a remnant of sin still adheres to the flesh. But through
faith not only is sin not condemned, it is pardoned. However, the purpose of forgiveness is not to free us to become secure and follow the ways of the old Adam
like the antinomians do, but to join the battle against sin, the world, the devil,
and the flesh. This is the truth of the Christian life: we are holy in Christ through
faith but sinful in ourselves on account of the flesh. Luther states the two ways in
which we are pure and holy (a modus loquendi well-known to us by now): first,
through imputation, because sin is not imputed to us; secondly, we are also formally righteous because, through these first fruits [istas primitias] and the Holy
Spirit, who has been given to us through faith, we begin to struggle and fight
against sin (493, 24-494, 3). It is significant that Luther claims that the antinomians were leading people away from the divina reputatio and from Christ, on account of which they are righteous and blameless before God, and taking them
across into the kingdom of darkness that they might follow that which belongs to
the homo carnalis and the old Adam. Luther certainly agrees with his opponents
that the church is pure and that sin has been removed, but he tells his listeners to
see that they properly distinguish: Quoad Christum, we are that, but quoad nos, we
struggle continually with the devil and the flesh (493,15-20).
Luther dwells on what it means that Christians are soldiers, engaged in
mortal combat with the devil. This calls for great viligance on our part so that we
are not caught offguard by the evil one who prowls round like a hungry lion (1
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Peter 5: 8; cf. Matt. 24: 43 on the householder and the thief). The teaching of the
antinomians, on the other hand, has a soporific effect on its hearers; it induces
laziness, indifference, and a false sense of security. They open the door to the
devil and let him in (494, 3-495,10).
The purpose of the disputations, Luther tells his audience, is to arm them
for lifelong battle against sin and Satan. Luther lays down his own two principia
to keep people from becoming upset by the opinions of the antinomians: The
church is wholly pure, but it is mixed with hypocrites and evil people, in fact it
also carries around its own flesh and is often wavers and errs, the saints too (496,
4). Therefore, it is necessary for them to be admonished, roused, and called to the
battlefront, so to speak, in order that they do not forget that they are surrounded
by the enemy. Luther reminds his hearers that, unlike the antinomians, we must
speak of sin in the same way for we are embroiled in a lifelong struggle against
the sin that inheres in the flesh (cf. Heb. 12: 1). In an eloquent passage he warns
them not to expect peace for they are soldiers in the Lord's army: Neque est, quod
speremus pacem, quia sumus sub domino exercituum, sub Sebaoth, neque dormientium
neque stertentium, sed militantium sub domino, qui est Christus Iesus (496, 13-15).
Therefore, the church in this life is the ecclesia militans and will only become the
ecclesia triumphans when our last enemy, death, has been finally overcome and
destroyed.
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Disputation
Translation and Analysis of Arguments
Morning Session
Argument 1489
Contra 15
AI (left col.)
The consciences of the godly are to be made certain. The law does not
do this. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Response: The argument is incomplete, and, as it were, equivocal and
confused about this making certain. Therefore, its conclusion is nothing.
Something must be added about grace. For the law in general gives certainty and even too much, namely, with regard to our sins, and not only
does it do this in the evil and ungodly, because it screeches at us of our sins
and offers invincible testimony that we have not satisfied it, that we are under death and God's wrath, for we have not ever kept the law of God. And
our heart is witness to this its own condemnation and certitude because it is
compelled to confess such things, whether it wishes to be or not. The law
also gives the righteous certainty in the sense that they know that they still
have a remnant of sin in the flesh and are not so pure. Therefore, the argument could be formulated in this way: The law does not give certainty in regard to grace or the forgiveness of sins. Therefore, the law is not to be
taught. However, the conclusion is denied because the law was not given to
make you certain about the forgiveness of sins, but only to terrify and convict you in order that you learn to seek and await the grace promised in the
gospel on account of Christ, not on account of yourself or any work, which
can spring from our own powers or human reason, as Paul argues with regard to the law in Galatians 3 and 4. But this use of the law the Antinomians reject, since they condemn as virtual sacrilege the assertion that the
godly are terrified by the law. They do not listen to what we have so often
taught and written about the law, namely, that when it comes to justification, let the whole law, the fulfillment of the law, and the doctrine of works,
however great, be silent. And let it think that its teacher, Moses, was a stammerer and not a very capable speaker. Therefore, he should neither make
me certain nor do anything else, but he is against me and is more vociferous
489 39 I, 496, 18-499, 2. For MSS used here and elsewhere, see the WA.
The majority are given as Rel. A with the inferior Rel. B printed at the bottom.
However, in several cases two independent versions of A are given, Al (left col.)
and All (right col.), the second being a brief summary of Luther's responsio
(sometimes omitting the argumentum but most times repeating it). In the interests
of economy we will omit A11.
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than a stentor himself, constantly shouting at me in thunderous tones: Here!
Do this, my good fellow, be godly, be holy, see to it that you are the best
soldier in battle, nevertheless, you have still not satisfied me, you still do not
believe, you are a great sinner, full of perverse passions and the most evil
desires, which you will have to overcome otherwise you are finished. He
tells such voices and loud thunderclaps to sit in judgment on my heart when
it is without Christ and his free imputation, in order to crush me and with
his hammer destroy any trace of perverse desires, and even to kill us, in so
far as such is found in us. Therefore, the law must remain and be carefully
sharpened in relation to the fighting side, that is, insofar as we live and
move here in the flesh and among people. For while we live in this life we
will never be so pure that the law does not find a certain number, indeed
very many, blemishes in us. For from adolescence we are prone to evil. The
law belongs to the fighting side, not to the triumphing side, that is, it has no
place when the issue is justification and the peace of conscience, because
here we are in the Lord, who is our bridegroom, and he does not allow anybody else to sleep with him in this narrow bed. Here he alone wants to rule
and be king, and finds its altogether intolerable that the flesh and outer self
of his consort can be admonished, exhorted, brought out, and led into the
battle, but he himself wants to comfort the conscience, and the Holy Spirit,
who equips his people sufficiently, has been given for this purpose.
In summary, the law gives us certainty about sin, because it still inheres in our flesh, and it admonishes us not to despair, not to hate God, and
not to rebel against his commandments and many other things. But our
antinomians do not pay any attention to these faults and diseases that still
inhere in our flesh, neither do they want to be convicted of these things; they
are truly sweet and worthy theologians for they are warmly received into
the highest heaven!
Luther calls the argumenturn semiplenum because the syllogism is incomplete and as such makes no sense.490 Additionally, he says that it is quasi aequivocum et confusum de certificatione. The equivocation comes out in the failure to
distinguish between law and gospel. The law does give the conscience certainty,
but it is the certainty of sin and guilt, that we are under wrath and have not kept
God's law. Likewise, it also gives the righteous certainty [iustos certificare] in the
490For an almost identical argumentum, see 39 I, 513, 17-19 (3 AD, Arg.
6) where at least the syllogism makes sense.
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sense that they know that they have peccatum reliquum in the flesh and are not
puri. Luther sports with the antinomians when he helps them improve their argument. If they had proposed the argumentum: Lex non certificat de gratia seu remissione peccatorum, at least it would not have suffered from any equivocation,
but he would still reject the conclusion: Igitur lex non est docenda, on theological
grounds (497, 17-19). The hypothetical argument indicates the limits of the certificatio produced by the law. The law can never give us the certainty of the forgiveness of sins, but only that we are sinners, and it does this by terrifying and convicting the conscience. This is the proper work of the law, and yet it is just this
usus legis that the antinomians condemn in principle as sacrilegium, because it asserts that lege terreri pios, and thus contravenes what we have heard already from
the Praefatio is one of the chief antinomian principia, namely, that Christ has removed all sin formaliter and that therefore Christians are pure and without any
sin. The only exception to Luther's counter-rule (not stated here but implied), lex
semper accusat is the article of justification. When it comes to that [quoad iustificationem], the law is silent and Moses a stammerer. Otherwise, wherever Christ
and his free imputation is missing, Moses thunders at me with a stentorian voice
and the law crushes me with its hammer. Indeed, the law must be carefully
sharpened for its two "polemical" functions (duplex usus): fighting sin in the flesh
(usus theologicus), and restraining evil and governing life in the world (usus
civilis).491 When Luther says that the law must be sharpened in relation to the
491This is our interpretation of the somewhat difficult sentence: Quare

lex debet manere et diligenter acui in parte militante, hoc est, quatenus hic in came et hic
inter homines vivimus et agimus (498, 10-12). The first problem is to determine the
referent of "in parte militante." The phrase is the counterpart of in parte triumphante , which is here understood. A few sentences later both phrases recur in
a different syntactical construction: Lex pertinet ad partem militantem, non autem ad
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fighting side but not the triumphing side [Ita lex pertinet ad partem militantem, non
autem ad triumphantem], he means that it must be applied to the Christian insofar
as he is and remains a sinner and lives in the world, but that it has no role insofar
as he is righteous. In other words, when it comes to justification and the certainty
of the conscience, there Christ and his consors are alone in undisturbed bliss, for
the sponsus does not allow the law to share the bridal bed. He wants to be rex and
to have sole rule over his bride (and by extension in the conscience of his saints).
So protective is he of her that he is even admodum impatiens that the carnem et
externum hominem of his consors can be admonished and led into battle by the law
[admoneri, exhortari et produci in pugnam ferre potest]. But that is not his chief concern, which is rather the comfort of the conscience through the Spirit.
In his summary, Luther makes it clear that the antinomians reject the law
because they do not believe that vitia et pestes kpeccatal haerentes in came nostra
adhuc (498, 24).492 His use of irony at the end reveals his growing impatience: he
calls the antinomians suaves theologi et digni (499, 1-2), sweet no doubt because
they do not preach the condemning law, and worthy because they are without
triumphantem, hoc est, quando agitur de iustificatione et pace conscientiarum . . . (498,
14-16). It seems that the referent could be either christianus or ecclesia. If the former, the contrast would be between the peccator and the iustus; and if the latter,
between the church militant and the church triumphant. Both of these are interrelated so that a choice of one does not exclude the truth of the other. We think
that it is best to take the referent as the Christian because the context is talking
about the fight against sin; by the same token it is for just this reason that Christians belong to the ecclesia militans and not yet the ecclesia triumphans.
492A similar argumentum to the above is put to Marlin in his Promotionsdisputation: Christiani debent habere bonam conscientiam. Lex perturbat bonam
conscientiam. Ergo non est docenda (39 II, 137, 11-12) (Arg. 22). The responsio makes
it clear that when law and gospel are properly distinguished such a conclusion
cannot be maintained: Nam quatenus habent Christum, eatenus habent tranquillam
conscientiam (138, 2-3).
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any stain of sin and thus fit for heaven. In actual fact the only one worthy to be
called dignus is the agnus Dei who takes away the sins of the world. Any claim to
be worthy that does not find its basis in the forgiveness of sin through the blood
of the Lamb is ultimately futile and baseless for it attempts to build on another
foundation other than that which has been laid in Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 3: 11).
Argument 2493
AI (left col.)
Those who burden the church with laws put God to the test, Acts 15.
You burden the church with laws. Therefore, you put God to the test.
The minor premise is true.
Response: This is a very good and complete argument and most appropriate to the matter under discussion. However, it requires an understanding and interpretation of the thesis and especially Peter's words in Acts 15,
which should not be cited in truncated form, as some do against us, but in
their entirety. Peter in this passage is arguing with those who would fight
and say: you cannot be saved unless you are circumcised and keep the law
of Moses. What else would they attempt to do with these words than bury
Christ and deny that he came in the flesh, or as it says elsewhere: If we are
justified on the basis of the law, Christ will be of no benefit to us and our
faith will be futile [cf. Gal. 5: 2]. But to say that Moses with his law can save
and liberate from death is indeed nothing else than putting God to the test,
in fact blaspheming and trampling the blood of Christ, the Lord, under foot.
Therefore, Peter is speaking only against those who, with this opinion of
righteousness, burdened the disciples with the law, because that the law
was not given for the purpose of justifying or making alive, as Paul says to
the Galatians [Gal. 3: 21]. Indeed, we will not permit any law, either ceremonial or judicial, not even the Decalogue itself, to be imposed on us with
this opinion. We do not concede this power, namely that of saving, to the
law, not even to the divine law, much less human laws, because it was for
this that the lamb of God was sent. For Moses' lamb, together with his ceremonies and sacrifices, could not do this as, the letter to the Hebrews argues,
neither could it be done with the blood of bulls and calves [Heb. 10: 4].
Therefore, look for another use of the law or stop speaking about it. Let it
be this, namely, that the church needs the law in order that not only might
the ungodly be restrained by it as with chains, but also that the godly, who
still have a remnant of sin in the flesh, can be admonished and convicted lest
49339 I, 499, 5-503, 3.
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they become secure and begin snoring. Furthermore, the church needs the
law that the godly may be aroused, as it were, to battle and warfare against
the remnants of sin and temptations, which will be great and many at any
age. It has been laid down also for the holy and righteous Paul, not insofar
as he is holy and righteous, but insofar as he is flesh and must be convicted
by the law. For example, if I am a Christian and still a robust adolescent,
and I chance upon some shapely girl or woman, unless I am completely
mutilated, I cannot but be affected by her, although I am baptized and
justified, so that I desire to caress her, if only it were permitted and there
was no disgrace or other punishment to fear. But, on the other hand, if I am
a Christian, my heart and the Holy Spirit within my heart immediately cries
out: Get behind me, Satan, say nothing; no, no, madam flesh, be silent, keep
quiet, you must not urge or rouse me to defilement, adultery, and lust or in
the hope that by means of this there are other shameful deeds against my
God that I may do, but I will wait in expectation until God has given me
someone whom I will love. For her also I will make an end, I will leave this
woman for her husband and her children. These words and those like them
are not human, but are Christ's and the Holy Spirit's who speak in the heart:
"Leave the girl in peace, I will give you someone else in due time whom you
will love." This Christian, although he is affected by sex, still obeys the
Spirit, deprecates this evil that he feels, and prays that he may not enter into
temptation [Matt. 26: 41]. This then is truly what it means to take sin
captive, although it does not happen without great trouble and difficulty.
For not only is there the intense flame of passion which at that age
vigorously consumes the strong youthful flesh, but above all there is also
the devil, who can inflame even dead coals, as we sometimes see in lovers
who are advanced in years. Nevertheless, he stands firm, obeying the word
and law of God which says: Do not covet, and the Holy Spirit, who
admonishes him regarding this will of God, and he does not succumb.
However, when the ungodly are tempted by such things, as they often are,
they plunge headlong into every vice, thinking only about how they can
gain possession of the things that have pleased them. Meanwhile, I do not
know what they are not capable of prattling on about concerning Christ and
the gospel; it is as if the Holy Spirit were living in their mouth! The same
happens with all other sins. If Christians are tempted by avarice and could
cheat and deceive others, given the right opportunity and occasion, still they
do not, because they know the law and are aware of the sin in their flesh,
which they fight against day and night. On the other hand, if the ungodly
person can make ten pieces of gold out of one, he does so and sells his goods
for as much as he can, caring nothing about whether it is fair or excessive.
For the same reason, whenever the godly are tempted by grave temptations,
such as lack of trust, despair, hatred of God, and blasphemy, or where they
begin to doubt whether they are pleasing to God or whether he cares about
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them, they immediately return to the word of Christ in the passage: Why are
you downcast, my soul? [Ps. 42: 6]; likewise, Do not fear, little flock, for it is
the Father's pleasure to give you the kingdom [Luke 12: 32]. Although Satan
is very persistent, they say: Is it not true, Satan, that you are a liar? But as in
the previous things, so also here, the ungodly yield to the devil, and do not
even try to escape, because unlike Christians they do not fight against sin,
passions and lusts. Thus, in these Satan triumphs and powerfully drives
these rebellious children into all kinds of vices. However, each age has its
own peculiar vice and sin which may trouble it: children and adolescents,
disobedience; young people, lust and indulgence; older people, ambition
and avarice; we theologians and doctors, Kev000tia, vainglory, pride in the
gifts of God, but the true saints are vexed by despair. But just as these
things are peculiar to each age, so the taking of the spear and sword of the
Spirit, which is the word of God [Eph. 6: 17], should be the mark of all of
them, and we should fight and not snore in the midst of such great evils.
This is roughly what we wanted to say in order that the Antinomians
do not deceive us. Therefore, we also say that churches and consciences
must not be burdened by any law (and Peter says the same) that teaches that
salvation and justification are obtained from it. In this way and for this
reason the law is to be abolished, as Peter recommended, and rightly so. But
because remnants of sin still remain in us Christians and since the great
majority of people are evil, the law is to be diligently taught and sharpened
so long as this corrupt nature remains. Thus, Paul says that the law was laid
down for adulterers, fornicators, immoral people, parricides and matricides
[1 Tim. 1: 9-10], but believers also often fall into these and similar things.
Therefore, the law must remain and not be removed from the churches. But
if in the opinion of the antinomians we are completely pure and blameless,
like the angels in heaven, we readily concede to them that the law is to be
removed from the world and not only from the church.
This is the third time Luther has addressed this argument and this time is
the most detailed.494 Unlike the previous argumentum, this one is bonum, plenum
and aptissimum ad hanc causam. However, the thesis as it stands is not precise
enough for it fails to distinguish between the ceremonial and juridical law, on the
one hand, and the Decalogue, on the other. What the apostolic council outlaws in
Acts 15 is the doctrine that circumcision and the observance of the lex Moisi are
494See 2 AD, Arg. 26 for other references.
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necessary for salvation. That is nothing else than tentare Deum, imo blasphemare et
conculcare pedibus sanguinem Christi domini, because it destroys the gospel by
negating the sufficiency of the solus Christus. The Decalogue, on the other, has
not been abolished like the law of Moses because it expresses God's abiding will
but it is not the way of salvation. Luther insists that we must not permit any law,
not even the Decalogue, to be imposed on us as a requirement for justification
[hac opinione]. That is an abusus legis of the same order of magnitude as that
promoted by the Judaizers.
Luther maintains that there are only two ways in which the law may
rightly be used in the church, and hence these are the two reasons why the law is
to be retained:495 First, to restrain the ungodly, and also to admonish and convict
the godly insofar as they still have a remnant of sin in the flesh. Secondly, to
admonish and convict the godly, on acount of the remnant of sin in the flesh, in
order to rouse them to do battle against it and to fight temptation, lest they
become secure and go to sleep.496 This statement is significant for the way in
which it formulates the role of the law in the life of the pii. The first reason given
for its retention, to restrain the impii tanquam vinculis, is straightforward and
corresponds to the usus civilis. The second, however, as we indicated, is signifi4951t may

be argued that Luther in effect cites three reasons for
retaining the law in the church; however, it is our conviction that there are really
only two: one for the godly and one for the ungodly, and that the latter has two
parts to it. He does not talk formally about a duplex usus, but this can be inferred
from what he says. However, as will become apparent it is not stated in the same
way as we are accustomed to hearing it.
496500, 10-13: Ecclesia opus habet lege, non tantum, ut impii ea tanquam
vinculis coercerentur, sed etiam, ut pii, qui adhuc habent peccatum reliquum in came,
possint moneri et argui, ne fiant securi et stertentes, ut excitentur, quasi in pugnam et
militiam adversus reliquias peccatorum et tentationes.
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cant because it links moneri and argui as the two functions of the law in the life of
the pii who still have peccatum reliquum in came. The moneri, which can mean to
admonish, remind, warn, advise, instruct, is really descriptive of parenesis and as
such fits the category of the tertius usus, even though Luther does not use that
nomenclature. However, it is instructive to observe that this moneri does not
function apart from the argui. This close nexus between the two is typically
"Lutheran."497 Luther can certainly say that Christians need the instruction of the
law, although he normally qualifies that and says that it is Christians qua sinners,
however, the purpose and indeed the result of this instruction and admonition is
never simply to teach them God's will or the good works that he has commanded
them to do, but also to lead them to repentance. Sanctification is really nothing
more than daily repentance, which in turn means a return to our baptism
[progressus ad baptismum] and the mortification of the flesh. Luther sees the
moneri and the argui as being especially important lest the pii become securi et stertentes (literally, snorers) and are not armed and ready to wage battle against the
old Adam and the temptations that daily beset us.
As we have already seen Luther singles out this lack of vigilance and securitas as one of the chief traits of antinomianism for they believed that sin could no
longer harm them since it had already been removed formally. He, on the other
hand, knows both from his own experience and from scripture that the temptations of Satan and the sinful flesh combine to form a formidible foe, which can
only be fought off with the sword of the gladium spiritus = verbum Dei. By using
497It is our hypothesis (although this cannot be demonstrated here)

that this close nexus was undone by the seventeenth century Lutheran
dogmaticians and that, predominately under Melanchthonian influence, the
tertius usus was isolated from the usus theologicus as the usus praecipuus legis.
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an illustration to show how temptation works in the life of a young Christian
man who happens to meet a beautiful woman, Luther shows exactly how Christ
and the Spirit work in this situation together with the law. The urge to touch the
woman is strong, and remembering that he is baptized is not enough. The thing
that finally restrains him is the law, the threat of disgrace and punishment. But at
the same time Christ and the Spirit empower him to renounce Satan and the urgings of the flesh so that the homo novus prevails and sin is kept in check, but not
without a violent struggle. Here one is reminded of Joseph's words when he rebuffed the advances of Potipar's wife. After recalling all that his master had
given him so that he was lord in his master's house, Joseph says to her: How can I
do this great wickedness, and sin against God? (Gen. 39: 9). Luther says that
these kinds of voices (and in the case of our example, that God will supply the
young man with a wife of his own in due time whom he will love with body and
soul) are not voces hominis, sed Christi et Spiritus sancti. Although the adolescens is
affected sexu, nevertheless he heeds the Spirit [obedit Spiritui], turns his back on
this evil [deprecans hoc malum], and prays that he enters not into temptation. This,
in a word, is what it means peccatum captivare: to renounce sin in the power of the
Spirit (= repentance), and from this arises the will to pray for the strength to resist
temptation. This is to watch and pray, to walk by the Spirit, and all of this is
sanctification. Luther draws an helpful comparison between the tentatio of the pii
and that of the impii. In the former case the Christian, in spite of ardor libidinis
maximus and the old evil foe, stands firm, giving heed to God's word and to the
law [Sed tamen stat firmus obediens verbo et legi Dei, quae dicit: Non concupisces], as
well as to the Holy Spirit, who admonishes and reminds him about this will of
God [et (obediens) Spiritui sancto admonenti eum de hac voluntate Dei].
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Here again we note the important conjunction of God's word/law and the
Holy Spirit. The law never acts alone in restraining sin but is always accompanied by the Spirit, for word and Spirit cannot be separated. The impii, on the other
hand, may babble words about Christ and the gospel, non aliter, ac si Spiritus
sanctus habitaret in ore eius, but the words are meaningless for they do not believe
him. Instead of heeding the law and the Spirit and renouncing sin, they willingly
succumb to it. Christians can be sorely tempted by all manner of sins but they do
not succumb because they know God's law and are aware of the sin in their flesh
[quia novit legem et intelligit peccatum in came] which they fight against day and
night. If the temptation is to sin against the Second Table, they will not only heed
the law but also remember who they are as baptizati et iustificati; if the temptation
is to sin against the First Table, such as despair, hatred of God, or if they doubt
whether they are pleasing to God and whether he cares about them, they will
immediately run, to cite Luther, ad verbum exemplo Christi: Quid tristis es, anima
mea? (Ps. 42: 6), or again: Non timere, pusillus grex, quia placitum est patri dare vobis
regnum (Luke 12: 32).498 Luther draws on wisdom and experience to characterize
the sin and temptation that is peculiar to a given generation,499 yet in every
generation the veros sanctos vexat desperatio. It is precisely the reality of this
constant struggle of the spirit against the flesh that forms that basis of Luther's
498The placitum est patri (502, 1) picks up and answers the question of
the doubting Christian: utrum placeat Deo an sit ei curae (501, 22). In a nice reversal
Luther shows how the inward looking question of whether we are pleasing to
God, which is always prompted by the law, is answered by the gospel which declares that God is pleased with us for Christ's sake.
4991t is interesting to note in passing that, according to Luther, the

special temptation facing nos theologos et doctores is icvoSoi;ia, vana gloria, superbia
in donis Dei (502, 8-9).
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call to all the saints to take up arms, especially the gladius spiritus, yet in the final
analysis it is not our battle but the Lord's, and the weapons we use are his and
not ours for they have divine power to demolish strongholds. All of which
means that while part of the strategy of fighting in the Lord's army means
knowing how to destroy arguments and every proud obstacle to the truth and
how to take every thought captive to Christ (2 Cor. 10: 4-5), yet at the end of the
day, we are not called so much to fight as to stand firm and claim the victory that
is already ours through faith in Christ.
In summing up the burden of his message, Luther reiterates that while the
churches and consciences are not to be burdened with the law if it is made a condition of salvation [opinion iustitiad, nevertheless it must be retained, taught and
even sharpened [acuenda] because Christians themselves are still burdened with
reliquiae peccatorum (usus theologicus), and because maxima pars hominum are still
mala (usus politicus). He cites again 1 Tim. 1: 9 -10 to emphasize that the law was
not given for the iusti but adulteris, moechis, scortatoribus, parricidis et matricidis,
however, insofar as the pii can also often fall into such sins, it has also been given
for them. It is important to note that when Luther speaks about the role of the
law in the vita christiana he never simply makes one statement but always two,
and this reflects his distinction between law and gospel. Not only must we distinguish between the pii and the impii, but also between the old and new natures
within the pii themselves, for although they are one person, they are radically
split and at war with themselves.0 Therefore, when Luther speaks about the
5°0Paul speaks autobiographically in Rom. 7: 20 of the dichotomy of

his own existence as saint and sinner under law and gospel: ei SE o oi) eixca [06]
TM-no TrOla, 0'610ET1 06 KaTEpyaC01J.Gt1 criyre aXX'ac n oixoisiaa iv eget agaptia.
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abiding role of the law for Christians in this life, he normally qualifies that for he
does not say that the iustus as such needs the law, but only the iustus, quoad
peccator.501
Argument 3502
Contra 3
AI (left col.)
People who are ruled by the law cannot have a good conscience. But
Christians have a good conscience. Therefore, the law does not rule in
Christians.
Response: The argument is good, considering that the theologians who
think up such things are foolish. This argument tests our thesis.
Master. Responder, what do you wish and how do you want it expressed?
Stick with that distinction that we made earlier, the law does not rule
over the Christian, that is, insofar as he is such. For laws are to be imposed,
not on the victorious Christian but the one still waging war against the flesh.
Thus, we concede the whole argument because every Christian certainly has
a good conscience, and no good conscience is to be condemned or convicted
by the law.
Why then, you will ask, do you say that the law is to be imposed on
Christians and the godly, especially since Paul says that the law was not
given for the righteous? [1 Tim. 1: 9].
Response: As you heard earlier, the Christian is a true Tom Thomas or
a twin, namely, the fighting Christian and the victorious Christian, and insofar as he is victorious and lives in the shadow of the Lord's wings [Ps. 91: 14; Matt. 23: 37], as it says: Blessed are those whose sins are covered and to
which keeps sin in check, while the
The I that speaks is the new nature [nye
sin that dwells in me is the old self that must be continually put to death [a apt].
501Luther's view as restated in the final sentence takes the argument of

the antinomians ad absurdum: Quod si Antinomorum sententia essemus toti pull et integri, ut angeli in coelo, facile eis concederemus, legem e mundo, et non tantum ex Ecclesia tollendam esse (502, 21-503, 3). The sancti minus the sinful caro equals the angeli,
which is what the antinomians are virtually claiming for themselves with their
false realized eschatology. Yet Luther, granting their claim for the sake of the argument, concedes that if that were in fact the case, there would no longer be any
need for the law in either its theological or political use.
50239 I, 503, 7-508, 9.
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whom the Lord does not impute their sins [Ps. 32: 1, 2], they are not answerable to any laws. Here let us farewell Moses, let him go to the birds with his
stammering tongue, here I hear nothing, neither heaven nor earth, here let
him be silent, nothing else is heard apart from the fact that it is said: Be of
good cheer, be of good cheer, little flock, for it has pleased your Father [to
give you the kingdom] [Luke 12: 32] again: Rejoice in the Lord [Phil. 4: 4];
again: Be courageous, stand firm, be strong etc. [1 Cor. 16: 13]; again: Why
are you downcast, my soul, why do you distress me? [Ps. 42: 6]. Therefore,
leave the Christian, insofar as he is that, unconfused and at peace. For they
cannot stand accused or convicted and at the same time be righteous or
deemed righteous. But Christians through faith in Christ are righteous,
however in themselves they still have sin clinging to them.
Here then I come to another sphere far different from the former, to the
Christian as soldier who still lives in the flesh, and I come to myself and my
own person. Alas! how great a sack of miseries I see here. This is you and I,
to the extent that we commit all such shameful deeds in our power, except
that ignorant people may possibly be unaware that we are in fact bound to
experience daily the truth of what Paul says of himself: I see another law in
my members etc. [Rom. 7: 23]. But as soon as these things happen, and also
this law or that carnal nature, which has been infected by Satan's venom in
paradise, reveals itself and solicits hapless Christians either to lust, avarice,
despair, or hatred of God, there, I say, let Christians rouse themselves and
say unperturbed: So you are still here I see, Master Sin, it is good you have
come. Where were you? Where have you been amusing yourself so long?
Surely you are not still alive? Of what use are you to us? Off with you to
the cross! Not thus, not thus will it go (as you wish). I will serve my lady
and do what is fair, however much you may be against it. And the more
you would captivate me with blandishments or entice and solicit me to
defilement and lust and despair, the more I will laugh at you, and, relying
on the help of my Christ, with a strong and brave heart, the more I will defy
you and bruise your head [Gen. 3: 15]. What am I answerable to you for? I
have another Lord, in whose camp I am now a soldier: here I will stand,
here I will die. He is that glorious soldier and brave St. George, who
wreaked great havoc on the devil's army and defeated it gloriously, as Paul
says: In all these things we are more than conquerors through Jesus Christ
[Rom. 8: 37], and he does not permit the sins in his flesh to devour him. For
each of us, whatever our age or lot in life, cannot but feel many sins and passions, yet with the Lord's help we do not permit them to rule us. I see that
my flesh tastes the same thing that the Turk, the pope and all the world
taste, but it does not assent to it, it does not let the lice make their nest in his
coat. Thus, Paul has sin but it is conquered and weak, whereas the unbeliever has sin that is alive, ruling, and triumphant. The syllogism therefore
is true and valid and is not against us because in relation to Christ we are
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saints, lords over sin and death. Here in this conscience only Christ, the
bridegroom, must sleep with the bride; here Moses is not admitted. For
Christians, while they remain under the wings of their hen, are free from all
laws, and here even if they are given occasion, place and time, they are still
the same, they are not changed, they always have in view the Lord whom
they know sees everything and kills the sin in their body. And it is of these
that Paul now says: Do not grieve the Holy Spirit [Eph. 4: 30].
Thus Cyprian writes about some martyr who, because he had willingly
laid down his life for the name of Christ, was not allowed to die, but was
bound hand and foot and locked away in a solitary place, and all the most
shapely girls you can imagine were sent in to him. Although each of them
offered every single allurement in order to incite him to defilement with the
promise of life, and although for that reason each was alone with him for a
long time tempting him, they accomplished nothing, but rather each day he
all the more laughed at them and mocked them. He spat in their faces and
sent them away. Since in the end he even considered spitting at harlots
nothing, he bit out part of his own tongue and spat it out at them with these
words: the soldier of Christ, even if bound hand and foot, fights valiantly.
Cyprian rightly calls this man a soldier of Christ, who although his flesh
raged from being all alone with the most shapely girls in a solitary place,
with the promise of life, could not be overcome and driven to desire, but
like a strong bulwark stood firm in the faith of Christ; he would rather have
perished than have displeased his Lord by being overcome by a woman.
And was that not a great victory of the Christian soldier, who overcame the
world by his faith [1 John 5: 4], and would not suffer himself to be overcome
by harlots? Christians feel themselves moved and inflamed by wrath and
hatred, consumed by passion, and burning with desire for glory, money,
power etc. Therefore you will say: Can such people be Christians? This I
deny. Whence do you know that those things in you are sins and displeasing to God? From the law: You shall not kill, you shall not covet. In this
respect certainly you are not a Christian, but in the meantime they fight and
do not suffer themselves to be conquered nor sin to rule. They are, and are
called, Christians on account of faith in Christ for whose sake the evil still
present is not imputed to them. I implore you to learn this well.
Believe me in this, when we are dead many will not teach these things,
nor will they make this distinction, even when these things are extremely
common in the whole of scripture, and is something that even Romans 7 by
itself proves sufficiently. What can be said more clearly than this in the
Psalm: Blessed are those who iniquites have been forgiven and whose sins
have been covered [Ps. 32: 1]. And immediately the prophet adds:
Regarding this iniquity, every saint will surely pray to you [Ps. 32: 6]. So
also John 3: No one born of God commits sin [1 John 3: 9]; and the same: If
we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves [1 John 1: 8]. What is this?
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How do these agree? How are these two things in harmony: being a saint
and praying regarding sin? It is utterly amazing. If any one can make
rhyme or reason of that let him try. Two opposites in the one subject and at
the same time. If you are a saint why do you cry out? Because I feel sin
clinging to me, and so I pray: Let your name be hallowed and your kingdom
come. 0 Lord, be gracious to me. But you are a saint. But are you a saint?
Certainly, insofar as I am a Christian, for to that extent I am righteous,
godly, and belong to Christ, but insofar as I look at myself and my sin, I am
wretched and the greatest sinner. So, in Christ there is no sin, and in our
flesh no peace and quiet, but continual fighting for as long as this old Adam
and this corrupt nature remain, and that will not be destroyed except by the
same death.
Luther commends the argumentum in a backhanded fashion without endorsing the conclusion. The syllogism bears a resemblance to argument= 1 insofar as both have as their concern the Christian conscientia. There the issue was
that the law does not make the conscience certain, here that it does not make for a
good conscience. The syllogism is aimed against the opening theses of the fifth
Thesenreihe,503 which assert that the law rules in people for as long as they live
and that it is only when a person dies that he is free from sin. Furthermore, as
Luther goes on to show in his theses, since the Christian has already died to sin in
Baptism, insofar as a person is a Christian, he is free from the law. However, it is
precisely this distinction between saint and sinner that the antinomians fail to
make. Hence, their assertion: Ergo christianis non dominatur lex. For Luther the
proper distinction between law and gospel leads to another distinction that is vi39 I, 354,17-19 (ATh V, Ths. 1-3). Although our argumentum
specifically indicates that it is contra 3: Necesse est igitur hominem morn, si a lege velit
liberari, this can only be taken as an approximate reference, because the theses are
closely interwoven. It could just as correctly be contra 1: Lex dominatur in homine,
quanto tempore vivit. Cf. argumentum 1, which is marked contra 15: Prorsus imperiti
et mentium deceptores sunt, qui legem ab Ecclesia tollere volunt (355, 7-8). This is really only a vague reference to Luther's polemic against the antinomians in general, rather than to anything touching specifically on the res of the syllogism.
503See
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tal for theology, and that is the distinction between the christianus triumphans and
the christianus militans. Notice that he advises his co-respondent to stay with this
distinctio. If one observes this distinction one can agree with the syllogism, as indeed the co-respondent maintains: Et sic concedimus totum argumentum, quia certe
omnis christianus habet bonam conscientiam, et nulla bona conscientia est damnanda
neque arguenda lege (504, 1-3).
Luther, in the main responsio, concentrates on the distinction between the
christianus militans and the christianus triumphans, and he does so in answer to the
specific question of an interlocutor: Why should the law be imposed on the pii
when Paul expressly says that it was not given for the iusti (1 Tim. 1: 9).504 That
question can only be properly understood when one knows that Christians, while
saints on account of justification and faith, also remain sinners in this life because
the old nature clings to them until death. Thus, Luther can call the Christian a
true Tom Thomas or twin505 [verum Thomam Thomistam seu gemellum], because he
has two natures, the old and the new. Insofar as he is still a sinner fighting the
flesh, he is a christianus militans, but insofar as he is already a saint, pure and sinless in God's sight, he is a christianus triumphans. From the standpoint of justification and imputation, Christians are saints who are already living the victorious
life under the shadow their Lord's wings; to them the Lord imputes no iniquity
(the non-imputation of sin as the correlate of justification); and because they are
504Luther mentioned this text at the end of the previous responsio (502,

19-21). There he stressed the point that while the law was indeed given for the
ungodly, it also applies to Christians for they are not yet pure and holy and often
lapse into sin. While the general thrust of what Luther says in the present responsio is not new, many of the details are.
5050bviously an allusion to Thomas the twin in John 20: 24.
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above the law, or better, have already fulfilled the law in Christ, they can tell
Moses to get lost! For, as Luther says, they cannot simul stare accusari seu argui et
iustum esse seu reputari iustum (504, 16-19). On the other hand, when we talk of
Christians as they are in themselves, as God sees them without the shelter of the
Lord's wings, they are nothing but a bag of miseries, as Luther says of himself
[Heu quantum hic miseriarum video]. Our own experience serves to confirm the
truth of what Paul says of himself when he speaks of the battle being waged
within him between the flesh and the spirit (cf. Rom. 7: 21-25). Luther interprets
the itepov 1/61.tov of Romans 7: 23 as a reference to the carnalis natura, which has
been infected by Satan's venom in paradise, and which incites us to all kinds of
sins against both tables. But Christians, unlike the impii, in whom Satan and the
old Adam enjoy unchallenged hegemony, do not capitulate to the desires of the
flesh and the enticements of Satan, but fight against them in the power of the
Spirit. Luther gives examples of the biting sarcasm that Christians can hurl at
domine peccatum, because this "master" is no longer in charge of us but we serve
under a new dominus, he who is Dominus et Deus.
In keeping with his theme of seeing the Christians as milites belonging to
the ecclesia militans, he sees his new dominus as the captain of the army who leads
the saints in battle against their arch-foe. Of course, like the holy war of the Old
Testament, it is an altogether unconventional war, not only because of the
weapons used, but above all because the captain, the Lord of hosts, fights and
conquers the foe single-handedly.506 In the final analysis, it is the Lord's battle,
506Thus Luther can say of Christ, the dominus, in

whose army he
serves: Hic est ille gloriosus miles et fortis Georgius, qui magnam stragem fecit in
exercitu diaboli et gloriose vincit (505, 14, 16).

and we are conquerors only in him through faith. The difference then between
Christians and non-Christians is that the former are victorious over sin, whereas
the latter are conquered by sin; the pii to be sure still have peccatum, but it is
victum ac languidum, whereas the impii have peccatum vivum, dominans, triumphans
(506, 1-3).
As we said at the outset, Luther agrees with the syllogism, but with qualification, and the qualification is that the statement (=conclusion), christianis non
dominatur lex, be understood ad Christum (or more completely, propter Christum
per fidem). To reinforce this he falls back on two favorite images, the bridal bed
and the hen. In the Christian conscience (which is always the critical point where
God encounters us in his word, both as law and gospel), solus Christus cubare debet
sponsus cum sponsa solus, and Moses is locked out. But when we are unfaithful to
Christ and leave the bridal bed, then Moses is given a hearing. Otherwise, he has
no right to intrude on the intimacy of our union. To change the image, so long as
Christians remain sub alis gallinae suae, they are free from all laws. It is only when
we are away from our "hen" that sin can exercize its mesmerizing power over us.
But so long as we stay under her wings (or, abide in the shadow of the Almighty;
Ps. 91: 1), sin ceases to be our second nature and becomes something foreign, so
much so that even given a favorable occasio, locus et tempus, we will not change
our mind because our mind has been renewed (Rom. 12: 2).
Luther gives two reasons (the above is ours) for this constancy: Christians
always have the Lord in view whom they know sees everything and kills the sin
in their bodies. This comment is insightful. Even though Paul can appeal to his
readers, by the mercies of God, to present their bodies as a living sacrifice holy
and acceptable to God (and we can add: because it has been made that in Christ),
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and although he can plead with them to glorify God in their body because they
have been bought with a price and the their body is temple of the Holy Spirit,
nevertheless, when we come face to face with actual temptation it may well be
the law that fortifies us more than the gospel. One would hope that Christians
resist temptation out of Christ's love for them, for indeed, as Paul says, the love
of Christ controls US.507 But if the flesh remains intractable, then it needs to be restrained out of the fear.508 Christians in temptation remember the Lord, Luther
says, quem scit videre omnia. This is the omniscient Lord of Psalm 139 who knows
our every movement and whom we can never escape. We are reminded here
that the statement that the Lord is always watching us can be heard either as law
or as gospel. He can be watching us as judge to see if we fall, or he can be watching us as savior to keep us from falling and to pick us up when we do fall. In the
Christian both are likely to be present together, although the way it is formulated
here puts more emphasis on the law.509 The other reason that Luther gives for
5072 Cor. 5: 14: fi yip dryaNn TO11 Xptatoii cruvixEi

rellleis, Kpivavtac
TOVTO, on elic iniep acivuov duriOavev, aipa of irdotrec durieavov. We take the ayann Toil' Xpiatoi5 as a subjective genitive, that is, Christ's love for us, the love of
the one for the many. That is what controls/constrains us [avvixetv], and is the
prerequisite of our love for Christ (cf. 1 John 4: 19).
508This is really the reverse of the argument in 1 AD, Arg. 24, where
Luther says that if we cannot reach the duri et impoenitentes with minae and terrores, we should resort to promissa et beneficia (401, 4-6). In other words, if the pii
are not moved to repentance by promissa et beneficia, they need to hear minae et
terrores.
509Agairt, we must take the context into consideration. Here Luther is
speaking to antinomians who deny the validity of the law and the reality of sin in
the Christian life. Naturally then, Luther, in redressing this imbalance, needs to
emphasize the role of the law in fortifying the Christian against temptation.
However, it would be wrong on the basis of Luther's remarks here to think that
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our constancy in the face of temptation is that the Lord, whom we always keep in
view, also kills the sin in our body.510 This surely refers to the mortification of
contrition, an indispensable element in repentance, and an effect of God's law.
And yet is it only God's law that kills sin? We have heard already that God can
also use the gospel (cf. Rom. 2: 4: rb xpricibv Toi5 eeoii etc pzicivoiciv

(YE

iiyit) to

lead people to repentance.511 And in Baptism already we were buried with
Christ in death, and our iraXatbc a vO3tW ncog was crucified with him so that the
(Yalta tifc a.tacyri ac might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to
sin (Rom. 6: 6). Baptism is gospel because it is gift: the gift of incorporation into
Christ's death, liberation from the ruptOrnc of sin, and the gift of new life. On the
other hand, the penitent who is struggling against sin does not want to return as
a slave to sin after having tasted the glorious (if paradoxical) freedom of the
Xpiourii boi5Xog. Therefore, he is only too happy for the law to aid and abet him
in killing the flesh and keeping it subdued so as not to hinder him in his freedom
Nvelipan irepuratare (Gal. 5; 16; cf. v. 25: CrT01XWEIV). Finally here Luther notes
he does not also see the gospel playing a role. Law and gospel belong together
and both play their part in the struggle against sin just as in repentance.
510It

is worth noting in passing that Luther could have equally said
that since through Baptism we have died with Christ to sin, sin no longer has
dominion over us. Here then the emphasis is that we are dead to sin, rather than
sin being killed. In reality both are true. However, the advantage of this way of
speaking is that it can become the basis for parenesis, as we see in Rom. 6: 11:
VEKpObc 1.11V ti auo:pria Cavrac SE ToT OEC1 iv Xptcrrcii
XoyiCeaee icrurobc
`Inaoii. When Paul writes hoyiCesaee, this is not wishful thinking on his part, but
an appeal to act on the basis on this fact, namely, that we are dead to sin and
hence that sin can no longer hold sway over us.
511See

39 I, 400,15-402, 7 ( 1 AD, Arg. 24) for a discussion of how God
can use many methods to lead the heart to repentance and to experience the vim
legis.
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that it is to people who are facing temptation that Paul is speaking when he says:
Nolite Spiritum sanctum perturbare

XIMEITE TO

nveiiiia TO Ccrov Toi.5 e€ois]

(Eph. 4: 30). This will hardly be understood by the Christian as law, for it is a call
to live as Christians, to return to our baptism and be led by the Spirit in whom
we were sealed for the day of redemption. To refrain from sinning in order not
to grieve the Spirit is of a piece with the confession of Joseph who repelled the
advances of Potiphar's wife with the words: How can I do this great wickedness
Err V-173 ] and sin against God [0';1 51 ,r.i ti b n i? (Gen. 39: 9). And so to one imbued by the gospel and led by the Spirit the exhortation not to grieve the Holy
Spirit is the language of faith, in other words, gospel. But to the impenient or
impius, who has surrended to the flesh and no longer struggles against it, such an
admonition can only be heard as law.
The story of the Christian martyr, which Luther says he got from Cyprian,
is cetainly a classical description of the miles Christi who fights valiantly against
the passions of the flesh (here deliberately inflamed by his tormentors) in order
not to deny his Lord in a moment of weakness.512 This leads Luther into a
dialogical discussion of the nature of the vita christiana as a lifelong conflict
between the old and the new nature. The fact that Christians feel themselves
moveri et accendi ira, odio, uri libidine, ardere se amore gloriae, pecuniae, potentiae etc.
(507, 5-7), does not ipso facto disqualify them from being Christians.513
512Hermelink (39 I, 506, n. 1) notes that no such report is to be found in
Cyprian and that Luther is probably thinking of Tertullian's; cf. Ad martyras, ch.
IV.
513The mark of the Christian is not the absence of fleshly desires, but
the struggle against them on the part of the new spirit-led nature. For this battle
of the spirit against the flesh is characteristic of the new life and without it there
can be no faith, for faith does not permit sin to rule.
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However, he then speaks more precisely by distinguishing between law and
gospel. From the vantage point of the law, even the inner affects and implulses
of the flesh mentioned above (as opposed to works, which are manifestly sin) are
sin, but from the standpoint of faith in Christ (which is what makes a Christian a
Christian), these sins and evils are not imputed to the Christian, but Christ's
righteousness instead. This bipolarity of the Christian life, which is taught in the
whole of scripture, comes out especially clearly in Romans 7: 15-25, where Paul
describes the contrast between the sarkic grEpoc witioc and the witioc TO76 vocic
(where vottoc probably means "principle" as in 3: 27) corresponding to the new
nature (iao) &yew roc) which takes delight in the law. In Luther's estimate, this
distinction within Christians themselves, where on the one hand they are sinners
quoad sese and coram hominibus, while on the other, propter Christum per fidem and
coram Deo, they are saints (which in the final analysis is simply the distinction
between law and gospel) will no longer be taught after his death. He further
illustrates the antithetical nature of this contrast by citing two sets of scripture
passages, where each contains two passages which stand in opposition to each
other, if not contradiction. First he cites Ps. 32: 1: Beati, quorum remissae sunt
iniquitates, et quorum tecta sunt peccata [ritscpti ,lo

ntrpt ] And then

several verses later the psalm writer says: Pro hac scilicet iniquitate orabit ad to
omnis sanctus [7 5 ? ki 1'0rj"7] 712 rr nt41-'71)] (Ps. 32: 6). On the one hand,
according to the psalmist, saints are forgiven and their sin is covered, on the
other, they are to pray for forgiveness. The contradiction is in logic not in
theology. This same dialectic is found in the First Letter of John: On the one
hand, 3: 9 says: Qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat ktic 6 yervy rutivoc ix T0i5 eem3"
attaptiav ov /rota on the other 1: 8 says: Si dixerimus, quod peccatum non
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habemus, nos ipsos fallimus EaCcv Elmo gel/ ott agaptiav oimc gxopev, iaurok
av Co' Div

Kth

n darleila ovx i6T1V EV

The Christian is characterized as

one who does not habitually or deliberately sin (this is the force of the present
rota not as one without sin altogether. This is a vital distinction and is simply
another way of saying that the Christian is one in whom sin no longer rules but is
ruled. Consequently, the hallmark of the Christian is not perfectionism or sinlessness, but rather the daily confession of sins. Again, any one who prays the
Lord's Prayer must be a Christian (except of course the hypocrite) because no one
can say "our Father" except those who know him as Father through faith in his
Son. And yet this same Christian, who already possesses forgiveness in Christ,
also prays for forgiveness.514 Being a saint and praying regarding sin is not mutually exclusive, as the antinomians think.515 Luther can only exclaim: Mira profecto res est. Es ist warlich ein fein ding. Reim da, wer reimen kan. Duo contraria in
uno subiecto et in eodem puncto temporis (507, 21-508, 2).516 Luther nicely captures
514Luther also refers to the Lord's Prayer but slopes the reference in a
slightly different way. He cites the first two petitions: Sanctificetur nomen tuum,
adveniat regnum tuum (508, 3) as a cry for mercy [Ah domine, sis mihi propitius] that
flows out of the struggle of the sinner-saint as he fights against sin. However, we
think that our application of this to the Fifth Petition makes more sense.
5151t

is surely legitimate to conclude that Luther's hypothetical partner
in dialog were the antinomians. They probably cited texts to support the one side
of the argument (e.g. Ps. 32: 1 and 1 John 3: 6, 9) and now Luther is redressing the
balance and pointing out that saints are still sinners by their fallen nature. The
words of 1 John 1: 8: iicv ETTCO) PEV IST1 agaptiav (rim( gxogiv, ictutobc 7rXavagev
Kth rj aX4eet a oim gutty iv nµiv could not better fit the antinomians if they had
been written specifically with Agricola in mind. When Luther writes: Quid hoc?
Quomodo haec consentiunt? Quomodo concordant, sanctum esse et orare pro peccato?
(507, 20-21), he is no doubt anticipating their objection.
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the paradoxical position of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator in the question
and answer that arises and must arise whether the saints look at themselves to
find some evidence of their new life: Attamen es sanctus. Attamen es sanctus? (508).
As point and counterpoint, the difference between the two statements is merely a
comma, yet existentially they represent two vastly different standpoints. The one
a statement of faith; the other a statement of reason based on experience.
However, in this life faith must continue to live with contradictions for it will
continually be called into question by experience as it seeks empirical verification
for faith's claims. Faith is separated from experientia (in the sense of what we
know to be true based on observation or feeling) by a yawning abyss, and simply
reflects the Christian's own divided self. Although one person he has two natures, the novus homo and the vetus homo, saint and sinner, not in alternation but
semel et simul. It is this unresoluble tension, which is itself a result of the equally
unresolvable tension between law and gospel, that virtually "splits" Christians to
the core of their being, and drives Paul to exclaim: TaXaincopoc Eyw alvepconoc•
tic 1.1E f515CFETal ElC T0i3

aoIlaT0c Toi

eaVaT01) totitot); only to answer his own

question with gloriously defiant "nevertheless" of faith: Xciptc SE T6i (3E6: Sax
Xpiaroii toU impiov fumy (Rom. 7: 2425).517 In line with all of this,
516This latter remark about two opposites being in the one subject at
one and the same time was first cited as an axiomatic proof of the main premise
of 1 AD, Arg. 8 (39 I, 375, 18-19).
517We need to be careful how we describe the inner dividedness of the

saint-sinner lest we convey the impression that the person is split in two. "Split"
may capture the effectus but it misses the res. Saint and sinner, like the anthropological terms nvetiga and ac'cpt, are not two separate parts of the person, but two
aspects of the one person, the former, corresponding to the Kcavbc aivei.a nog,
sees the person in conspectu fidei, while the latter, corresponding to the naXaik
c'ivepco iroc, sees the Christian in conspectu peccati vel legis.
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Luther gives a double answer to his question: Attamen es sanctus?, for from the
standpoint of law and gospel the Christian is always two things at the same time.
And so he uses the phrase "in quantum . . eatenus . .," not in a quantative but in
a qualitative sense to describe the two aspects of the vita christiana. On the one
hand, he answers affirmatively [Ita]. From the vantage point of Christ and the
gospel, that is, in quantum christianus, I am righteous, godly and belong to Christ
[eatenus enim sum iustus, pius et Christi]. On the other hand, from the perspective
of the law [sed quatenus respicio ad me et ad meum peccatum], I am the world's worst
sinner [sum miser et peccator maximus] .518 So then, as we have already observed,
the antinomians are half right, the law does not rule in Christians--but only so far
as they are in Christ and forgiven [Ita in Christo non est peccatum]. However, to be
half right here is to be completely wrong for theology is not mathematics. The
law must and will remain until the vetus Adam atque haec natura corrupta is finally
destroyed in death, and the pugna perpetua, which marks the Christian life this
side of the grave, gives way to the pax et quies of heaven.
518The superlative "maximus" is significant. When the law reveals sin,
faith, unlike the old nature, accepts the verdict of the law, and does not quibble,
make excuses or attempt to justify itself, but gladly sees itself as the "foremost
sinner" (cf. Paul's self-description in 1 Tim. 1: 15 as npoivzic el µi eyoi) and simply
pleads like the sinner in the parable: o ee6c, iAciae ttri gm Toy agapro) (Luke
18: 13), where the presence of the article suggests that the tax collector does not
see himself in comparison with anybody, but at that moment coram Deo sees himself as the only sinner in the world. Comparison with others, and always in one's
own favor, is characteristic of the ways of the a rig, whereas faith magnifies sin
(hence the use of the superlative) in order to magnify the grace and mercy of
God: The greater the sin, the greater the forgiveness (although strictly speaking
these terms are not quantifiable).
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Argument 4519
Contra 3
AI (left col.)
If when people die they are freed from the law, the ungodly are also
then freed from the law. But yet the ungodly are not freed from the law
when they die. Therefore, the godly are not freed from the law when they
die.
Response: This is also a good argument and very much to the point. If
I understand it, your point is this: the ungodly die without freedom from
the law, in fact the law immediately increases more and more and is revealed to them more because after death they feel the law even more than in
life. Therefore, your thesis, that they are freed from the law through death,
is false.
Response: Our thesis is Paul's and is true because a dead person, who
has been justified, is freed from the law of sin. But dying to sin and dying to
nature are two quite different things. On that day unbelievers might well
wish that they had never been born or that they could die completely and
become nothing, but they cannot, as Christ says: Then they will say, Come,
hills, and bury us, but it will not happen [Luke 23: 30]. We die to sin or
mortify the sin that still inheres in our flesh, and also die to nature. The ungodly, on the other hand, at least die to nature, as those who take pleasure
in sins and in whom sin rules. But since that [dying to sin] cannot happen
with the ungodly without this death, the law must be taught until such time
as this body of sin [Rom. 6: 6], that is, this depraved and corrupted nature, is
destroyed completely. For sin is so mixed with nature that it cannot be separated. For although the old man is destroyed day after day and the new
rises again [2 Cor. 4: 16], we cannot die to sin perfectly and completely unless we also die naturally and are buried. Here indeed we begin to die, but
only in the grave is it completed, and sin does not cease without natural
death. The ungodly however are not troubled by these things; they neither
cleanse out the old leaven, nor do they die to sin, nor do they fight against
sins, but they continue doing what anyone worried about sin never does.
Therefore, they die only to nature, and then indeed in eternal death. There
is a Pauline phrase, to die to sin or be dead to sin [Rom. 6: 2]; for that which
is free from sin and death, can no longer be accused by sin and death, neither does it continue to indulge sin or perverse affections, and to yield to our
passions and desires [Rom. 6: 7-11]. If therefore we are free from sin and
dead to sin, we are also free from the law. For you know that in Paul the
law simply and properly means that law which is not yet fulfilled but must
be fulfilled. However, in the future life we will not have the law but will be
51939

I, 508, 13-510, 17.
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righteous and holy like the angels. But since in the present life we are not
perfect and commit sin, the law must be taught and inculcated in order that
we might be summoned to the battle, lest we become lazy and sluggish, and
we perish.
This argument= bears similarity to the previous one insofar as it is about
freedom from the law, and is more obviously "contra 3." Luther is generous in
calling it bonum, even though it is ad rem. The major premise ascribes freedom
from the law to all people (including the ungodly) when they die, whereas the
minor premise denies this in the case of the impii, and so ends up in a flat contradiction. On top of that, we fail to follow the logic of the conclusion. If condition
A is true of the impii, it does not necessarily follow that it is true also for the pii.
The sheer illogicality of the argument becomes apparent when Luther tries to
rehearse it (note his polite: Ego vero sic intelligo). Luther's representation of the
argument at least makes sense. It would seem that this is one instance at least
where the need to cast one's argument in syllogistic form (or at least to have the
semblance of a syllogism) imposes an unnecessary hindrance and does nothing to
serve the interests of clarity or logic. The core of the antinomian argumentum
represents a refutation of Luther's third thesis: Necesse est igitur hominem mori, si a
lege velit liberari.520 They conclude: Ergo vestra propositio falsa est, quod per mortem
liberantur a lege (509, 8-10). Nevertheless, Luther's thesis is correct as it stands,
although later he makes it more precise by distinguishing between the godly and
the ungodly521 just as he will do in this argument too with his distinction
between mori peccato and mori naturae. Before we begin our analysis we need to
ask what is the purpose of this argument. At first sight it may appear somewhat
52039 I, 354, 19 (ATh, V, Th. 3).
521See esp. Ths. 35-45 (356, 5-26).
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absurd and even against the antinomians' own position, for they have argued
that the law is only ternporalis and ceases completely with the coming of Christ.522
However, on closer inspection, we are convinced that it is intended as a serious
argument and that the crucial word is morientes. In our opinion, the reason why
the antinomians conclude that the godly are not freed from the law when they
die is because they are free already. The antinomians teach that the law has
already been abolished. Hence, strictly speaking, their consequentia is not logical,
for if the pii are already free from the law in life they are also free from it after
death. However, if we are correct in our interpretation, it seems that emphasis
here is more important than logic. And the emphasis that they want to make is
that the pii are already free from the law so that they are not strictly freed from it
when they die.523 At this rate, the major premise: Si homines morientes liberantur a
lege, would not reflect the true thinking of the antinomians, but would rather be a
deliberate attempt to reduce ad absurdum Luther's second propositio: Liberatur [scil.
homo] autem a lege, dum moritur,524 by concluding: etiam impii liberantur a lege (508,
13-14). Enough said about the argumentum. Luther's responsio will give him the
chance to clarify his thesis by distinguishing the law from the gospel.
Luther does not claim the propositio: Necesse est igitur hominem mori, si a lege
velit liberari, as his own but attributes it to Paul, and for that reasons insists on its
veracity. He restates the gist of his thesis in different words, and this time makes
522See 39 I, 453, 7-457, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 13).
523This interpretation is supported by 3 AD, Arg. 14: Christani [sic]

liberantur a peccato viventes, ergo non post mortem (528, 5); cf. 3 AD, Arg. 11: Nos
sumus mortui peccato. Ergo non dominatur nobis viventibus (522, 6).
52439 I, 354, 18 (ATh, V, Th. 2).
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it clear that it is the justified person who is free from the law through death: mortuus iustificatus est a lege peccati liberatus (509, 11-13). The death to sin that occurs
in baptism is of a different order than physical death (or death to nature) at the
end of life: Sed longe aliud est mori peccato et mori naturae (509, 13-14) Those who
have not died to sin in life must face the consequences of sin in death (that is, post
mortem). The Christian dies twice: first, to sin [Nos morimur peccato sett mortificamus peccatum haerens adhuc in came nostra], and then to nature: [et morimur naturae
etiam] (509,18-19).525 The unbelievers die only the physical death; and unlike the
baptized who have died to sin, they are ruled by sin. And yet even Christians are
still troubled by the sin that inheres in the flesh, so that the law must continue to
be preached until hoc corpus peccati, that is, haec vitiosa et corrupta natura, is completely destroyed. Although we die daily to sin, as Luther says in his Small Catechism, by drowning the old self through repentance that the new may again
rise,526 we cannot die perfecte et omnino to sin until we die physically. The death
to sin that is begun in life is brought to completion in the grave, for there can be
no cessation of sin sine naturali morte (510, 3-5). But this death spells life, and
Christians die to live. The impii, on the other hand, are the living dead; they are
not troubled by sin but are gladly driven by it. Their life lacks the marks of
repentance: the expurgare vetus fermentum, the mori peccato, and the pugnare cum
peccatis. Because the impii do not die to sin, the law remains unfilled in life and so
525Luther makes the same distinction in 39 I, 551, 9-10 (3 AD, Arg. 25).
526 Kleiner Katechismus, Das Sakrament der heiligen Taufe, Zum vierden.
Was bedeut denn solch Wassertaufen? Antwort. Es bedeut, daf3 der alte Adam in uns
durch agliche Reu und Bufk soil ersiiust werden und sterben mit alien Sunden und
bosen Liisten, und wiederumb tdglich erauskommen und auferstehen ein newer Mensch,
der in Gerechtigkeit und Reinigkeit fur Gott ewiglich lebe (BSLK, 516, 30-38).
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demands its fulfillment in death. Hence, the death of the ungodly is not a passage from life (=the paradoxical death of the mors peccato) to life, but from death
to death (cf. 2 Cor. 2: 15-16,where the XpICIFT0i5 eixo ofa [kerygma or herald] is
Oo.th ix eavarov ziG eavarov [the smell of death] to the impii, but 601.0 ix (,) Fig
eic Cu) riv [fragrance of life] to the ph), for their bodily death is not merely a mori
naturae, but also a mori aeterna morte (510, 7-8). Christians, however, who have
died to sin iv Xpt crt6y already in this life, have also died to the law so that the lex
condemnatrix no longer has any hold on us, for its demands have been met by
Christ, who fulfilled it i)ieep ritiCiv in his own body.
This very important nexus between freedom from sin and freedom from
the law is developed by Paul in Romans 6 and 7 and is noted by Luther. In
Romans 6 the preachment: 6 y6p earoeav6v beEnxaiar ai [=released or declared
free from] durei Trig ap.aptfac, is the basis of Paul's baptismal parenesis. Hence, in
answer to the antinomian question, should we go on sinning so that grace many
increase (triggered by 5: 20) Paul says: iiii yavoito. offnvec Comedy ottev TII &gapcfq, lac gt1 rriaoµEv iv ainit (6: 2). Through baptism we are dead to sin, which
means that sin now has as much power over us as it has over a corpse. Sin of
course is not dead; it still has power, but not over us because we are dead to it.
This is gospel because it means that sin no longer controls our life. Furthermore,
Paul goes on to connect this idea with that of the law in chapter 7, so that he can
say: iv.eic ke av at a e tin to-i weip.o? sic( Toi-)- ouiporroc tob- Xptoroii, e'tc TO yevgaeat
initic itipq .. . (7: 4), or again: vvvi a xcernpytiOnp.ev dote Tog vop.ov duroeavOrrec iv '

Kant vige0a, a a're kruXetietv rigoic eV KalVOTTIC1 TCVE1511.17T0c Kith 01:)

Ircaaterrnit ypthwaroc (7: 6). Luther observes this connection also when he
points out that the phrasis Paulina: mori peccato, mortuum esse peccato means liberum
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esse a peccato et morte, non posse amplius accusari a peccato et morte . . . Si igitur liberi
et mortui sumus peccato, sumus etiam liberi a lege (510, 8-12).
But freedom from the law for Paul does not mean that the law ceases to
exist for the Christian, as the antinomians urge. Luther says that in Paul law
simpliciter et proprie means that law which is not yet fulfilled but which must be
fulfilled [ea lex, quae nondum impleta est, sed implenda] (510, 13-14). Even for the
Christian the law is first and foremost lex accusans, the law that demands fulfillment [lex implenda] or has not yet been fulfilled [lex nondum impleta]. However,
through faith in Christ the law is fulfilled for us imputative, so that so long as we
remain united with him or under the wings of our hen (to use the image from the
last argumentum), we are free from its demands.527 Luther says that in heaven
there will be no law at all: In futura autem vita non habebimus legem, sed erimns [sic]
iusti et sancti, sicut angeli (510, 14-15). However, elsewhere, as we have already
seen, he holds that the law will continue to exist even in heaven, but no longer as
lex but as res, in other words only as lex impleta.528 On the other hand, in praesenti
vita, the law must still be taught because we are still sinners and not yet perfect.
That is Luther's standard way of speaking about the law. But more instructive is
the way he ampflies the reason for the law in the Christian life. It is to be inculcated that we might be summoned to fight, lest we become lazy and sluggish and
we perish [docenda et inculcanda est lex, ut excitemur ad pugnam, ne fiamus oscitantes
527For more on the the lex implenda and lex impleta, and their relation to

justification and sanctification, see our discussion of 2 AD, Arg. 3.
528Cf. 39 I, 413, 17-18 (1 AD, Arg. 34), where Luther says that the deca-

logue is eternal, ut res scilicet, non ut lex, quia in futura vita erit id ipsum, quod hic
exigebat; see also 435, 2-8 (2 AD, Arg. 3), where the lex vacua = lex impleta is contrasted with the lex efficax = lex exigens et arguens.
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et segnescentes, ne pereamus] (510, 16-17). It is clear from this that for Luther the
law in the Christian life cannot be divorced from the struggle between the flesh
and the spirit that characterizes the life of the saints. The law does not simply
instruct the pii in how to live or in what good works they should be doing, as an
end in itself, but in so doing it prepares them for the great pugna against sin,
Satan and the flesh, which really means holding onto the victory that Christ has
already won for us. This requires vigilence on our part, and a knowledge of the
enemy's strategy, lest we be caught off guard or asleep at our post.
We may digress here and ask how is this use of the law to be classified?
Luther only operates with a duplex usus, but the usus in question is not the usus
politicus, with its idea of disciplina, nor is it the usus theologicus, with its emphasis
on the lex accusans. We are not suggesting that these apects cannot be present,
because after all it is the one and the same law in each case. But these usus do not
appear to be at the forefront. Although Luther does not use the category usus tertius, that is where they would probably fall by default. However, if that is the
case, then the way it is used needs to be understood from the way in which
Luther talks about the law in the Christian life, and not in the light of some later
usage which is then read back into Luther.
For the moment then we will leave the question of the usus aside and
concentrate on what Luther says. Here the law as admonition or parenesis is
addressed to Christians who know themselves to be milites, constantly fighting
against the sinful flesh, exposed to temptation, and often doing the very opposite
to what they want to do. In this situation, where Christians are always struggling
against sin, faith does not hear the law as a threat, because Christ has already
fulfilled the law. And since the law has nothing to destroy except the flesh
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(which faith takes not as a threat but as a promise), it works to consolidate
Christians in the faith, to keep them vigilant against the onslaughts of the enemy,
and helps and guides them by giving positive and concrete directives in how
faith can express itself in loving service to the nighbor and in a life of praise to
God. And all of this is to be done lest we should perish [ne pereamus]. The gospel
has given us life in the first place, and God sent his Son for this very purpose: iva
laic o inatexicov eic ainbv

am:Antal aXX` in Co) hv aidviov (John 3: 16). The

gospel both gives life and preserves it, and so anything that assists in the preserving of life either is the gospel or is working in the service of the gospel. The law
of itself only kills and destroys, but if it is working for the gospel it works pro vita.
Let us consider a few passages in Paul that are evoked by what Luther
says here: After urging his readers to live as children of light and not to take part
in the unfruitful works of darkness, Paul addresses them with the words of a
hymnic fragment: gyei FIE, 6 imeetiocovixiii avaara ix Tay vexp6i-v/ Koh
ath 6 Xpiaroc (Eph. 5: 14). Here Christians have gone to sleep, whereas
they should be awake and alert (cf. Eph. 6: 18 where, after exhorting them to pray
at all times he says: iccit Eic ccUTO aypwrvoiivng iv xclarj rpooxavrephaei). If
Paul can tell them to arise from the dead, it is only because they have already
been raised with Christ (cf. Col. 3: 1), just as in 1 Corinthians 5: 7 the exhortation
to cast out the old leaven of sin that they may be a new lump [bacaecipare tnv
Iraxathv Clighv, iva i tE viov 4nipaga] is based on the prior action of God in
baptism and absolution where he has cleansed them of their sins and made them
a new lump [xaeofc eau gvgoi].529 All this indicates that the parenesis of the
529Pau1's admonition to the Christians in Rome to wake from sleep follows the same lines. In this case "waking up" means casting off the works of
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New Testament (and here we can only generalize on the basis of our examples)
seems not only to presuppose the gospel but also to point back to the gospel.
Here when the law is being used by the gospel it is a servant of the gospel. It
warns us of imminent danger if we go to sleep on our watch or leave our flank
exposed. It warns us, not in a threatening tone but out of anxious sollicitude for
our well being. And when we do become sluggish and our love grows cold, the
Lord uses his law to discipline and scold us, but so long as we continue in faith
even this may be received with thanks because it is for our good and not for our
harm (cf. 1 Cor. 11: 32). However, if one wickedly departs from the faith and rejects the gift of the gospel out of hand, the Lord condemns that person through
the law without mercy. For only in Christ is the law impleta, outside of him it always and every where remains implenda, also in hell.
Finally, to return to our question. How are parenetic statements like these
to be understood? First, we will avoid using the term tertius usus legis because it
is not Luther's term. Secondly, the term itself, from a formal point of view, is unfortunate because, by categorizing its content as a use of the law, it links the
darkness and putting on the armor of light Voroecageea ovv is i'pya Tot") aK6T014, ivemaoitteea [SE] Tbc OnXa ti:y5 4orroc (14: 12)]. The language has baptismal
allusions. They can put off the works of darkness because they have already
been taken off in baptism and buried with Christ in the grave. And just as the
call to repentance involves a putting off (mortification) and a putting on
(renewal), so here too Paul exhorts his readers to put on the armor of light. This
stands in parallel with the call to put on Christ [avoticrairsee ibv rUplov 'Maori5v
Xptcrrbv] and make no provision for the cr apt to gratify its desires (13: 14). This
latter verse shows that putting on Christ (=being clothed with Christ), that is, returning to one's baptism, is the way to resist the flesh and its desires. Therefore,
in this case the evoliaaa0e 'rbv nipiov
Ximatew interprets the iv tiv °ohm° a [6e] ra Onita Tab- (1)cords, and reminds us Xplavic is our Olaa (cf. Eph. 6:
11-17 where the Christian's armor is really the navorafav
Oeoili because God
finally is the warrior and the battle is his as well. He is our "brave George" and
we simply stand together with him.
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parenesis and admonitions of scripture with the law, rather than with the gospel,
which, as we have seen, is where they belong. On the other hand, the term "gospel imperative," while it has the advantage of making it clear that the imperative
is linked to the gospel, may be misunderstood as suggesting that the gospel itself
is an imperative. To be sure, there are imperatives rooted in the gospel which
deliver as gifts what they say and so to that extent are gospel. Yet they are not
strictly gospel per se but may be heard as gospel by faith. Thirdly, we should
note that while the parenesis of the New Testament is born of the gospel and
actually serves the gospel, if rejected it quickly becomes the lex accusans of the
second and chief use of the law. However, when this happens, it is only a
"disciplinary" use of the law, where the law is acting as our paedagogus to bring us
back to Christ so that we can find mercy in him. Fourthly, the struggle between
the flesh and the spirit, or the old and the new natures, is not a sign of weak faith,
but on the contrary is evidence of faith in this life. So long as the struggle continues, sin remains ruled and Christ and the Spirit are regnant per fidem. These
are some important observations that we can make already on the basis of our
study. Others will be added as we continue to reflect on the role of the law in the
Christian life.
Argument 5530
Contra 14
The principal end of the law, and the reason that it is taught, is to call
to repentance and obedience to God. But the godly have already repented
and obey God. Therefore, it is not to be taught.
Response: This argument asks whether Christians, who already obey
God spontaneously, are to be led to repentance, just as above it inquired
about the Christian repenting and not repenting, as that soldier of Cyprian's,
who although he felt the flame of passion even when he was bound and by
53039 I, 511, 3-513, 14.
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yielding to it could indeed be free and be given life, nevertheless preferred
to resist this flame and to curb it rather than yield. Here he repented and
did not repent. For he had repented only to the extent that he curbed his
passions, but to the extent that he was inflamed or affected by lust for the
girl, he had not yet repented. Therefore, insofar as Christ rules in us as the
risen one, and the old Adam has been mortified, to that extent we do not
have need of repentance, neither ought it be taught to Christians and godly
people. For a person does not repent to the extent that he is a Christian. But
because he is led by sins and feelings, and is even seized and consumed by
them, it is necessary for repentance to be preached to him again and again
until he begins to hate and utterly detest the sin clinging in his body, and
even invokes a tenfold death upon himself that he may thus finally be free
from it. So also St. Paul, after going back and forth on the matter and
pondering it from various angles, exclaimed: Who will deliver me from the
body of this death? [Rom. 7: 24]. Actually he says this life should be
defended that finally we may be freed from our sins. For before we are
buried we cannot not sin, even the saints. Indeed, would that we all desired
to live according to God's law and obey it in a most holy manner, but alas,
how often does our flesh not get in the way? How often is our heart not
drawn and dragged away in a direction it does not want to go? Paul
complains about himself in the same way in Romans 7: I do not do what I
want, but what I do not want, and he says many other things in the same
train of thought; it is in this passage that he pictures that huge battle or
struggle in the saints between the Spirit of God and the flesh [Rom. 7: 19-23].
No doubt there are many adolescents and young people who never cease
earnestly to plead and pray for the same thing, asking God that they might
be able to lead as holy and devout a life as they would wish. For what
godly persons would not choose to be free from those troubles and difficulties which here they are compelled to contend with, and never to be seized
and driven to those things which are displeasing to God the Father? But
that will not happen in this life. We are flesh; to the extent that it is in us,
what we undertake of ourselves is no different than those things that are of
the flesh and please it. Thus, also the ungodly know nothing about this
battle but take what is given and indulge their desires to the full when and
where they can. Therefore, the ungodly must be battered by the light of the
law in order that in their terror they finally learn to seek Christ, and the law
is also to be taught to the godly in order to admonish and encourage them to
stay in the fight and contest, so that they do not allow themselves to be conquered however much their flesh may afflict and scoff at them. Thus Micah
6 [: 8]: Walk attentively with your God. Therefore, the law is indeed taught
to Christians, but with some privilege, because they triumph over these
things, and do not yield, either to sins, if ever they are put before them, or to
the law. In summary: Our antinomians are so blind that they cannot recog-
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nize the doctrine of the law in Paul, even in words like these which are so
clear: whatever is pure, just etc. pursue [Phil. 4: 8]. But they do everything
to make us secure and to open a window for the devil that we might
suddenly be taken by surprise.
In summing up the argumentum set out in the syllogism, Luther observes
that it asks the question when Christians who already obey God sponte still need
to be called to repentance. Implicit in the antinomian proposition is the
assumption that Christians have already repented and so do not need the law,
while non-Christians do need it to bring them to repentance. Again, we see that
the theology driving the antinomians has no understanding of the nature of sin in
the Christian life and the ongoing conflict between the saint and the sinner.
Luther finds the twofoidness of the Christian's life exemplified in Cyprian's
soldier: Hic poenituit et non poenituit (511, 10-11). Luther knows of course that,
coram Deo, this man is saved and forgiven through the imputation of Christ's
righteousness, propter Christum per fidem. But that is not his concern here. Rather
he wants to clarify the incompleteness of his repentance, in the sense of his repenting and not repenting, the latter coram hominibus, or in se. He resorts to the
quantum . . . quantum or rather the quatenus . . . eatenus way of speaking. Thus, to
the extent that he curbs sin he repents, but to the extent that he is roused by
passion he does not. Again, insofar as Christ rules in us and the vetus homo Adam
has been mortified, to that extent we do not need to be called to repentance.
There was no difference between Luther and the antinomians on the matter of
justification by imputation, only on the application of this to Christians realiter
where the iustitia aliena for them becomes the iustitia propria. Here as we have
seen the antinomians were guilty of teaching a perfectionism. Luther, on the
other hand, clung to the doctrine and exemplar of Paul. He sees his inner
struggle between the flesh and the Spirit (Rom. 7: 15-25) as paradigmatic of every
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Christian as he seeks to walk by the Spirit and put to death the deeds of the flesh.
Paul's great exclamation, coming as it does after despairing over his own inability
to do the will of God, Ach, quis me liberabit a corpore mortis huius? is the cry of all
Christians who know themselves to be simul iusti et peccatores. Until we die and
the body is finally buried, non possumus non peccare, etiam sancti (512, 9-10).
Having sin, being seized by it, and struggling against it is characteristic of the
Christian life this side of the grave: Quis enim pius non optaret, ab its se molestiis ac
difficultatibus, quas hic exsorbere cogitur, liberum esse et nunquam ad ea, quae Deum
patrem offenderent, rapi et sollicitari? Before the grave it can be said: Caro sumus;
and that to the extent that the flesh is in us our deeds are marked by the flesh
[quantum in nobis est (scil. caro), non est, quod aliud de nobis ipsis promittimus, quam
quae carnis sunt et ei placent] (512, 18-513, 2). However, unlike the impii, who
know nothing about the struggle with sin, and who just live for the moment to
gratify their desires, Christians, while they have the flesh, do not succumb to it,
but rather fight against it and identify with the Spirit (513, 10). The struggle in
the saints is between the Spirit of God and the flesh.
Luther brings his responsio to a close by again reaffirming, contra antinomos,
that the law is necessary both for non-Christians and Christians. In the case of
the impii it serves a pedagogical function which belongs to its chief usage; they
are to be dazzled and terrified by the light of the law (the light here reminds us of
Paul's own conversion) that they learn to seek Christ [Quare impii obtundendi sunt
legis lumine, ut tandem perterrefacti discant Christ= quaerere]. In the case of the pii,
on the other hand, the law is to serve a hortatory function with the aim of encouraging Christians to stand their ground in the battle against sin, and not to let
themselves be conquered by the slings and arrows of the unruly flesh [et piis est
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etiam docenda lex monendi et cohortandi causa, ut in pugna et concertatione permaneant,
nec patiantur se vinci oblatratu et insultationibus carnis suae] (513, 4-7). The formulation is instructive. The two words that characterize the use of the law for Christians here is monere and cohortari. The two words are very closely related, the
former meaning more: to remind, to admonish, to warn and hence to instruct;
and the latter: to animate, to encourage, to incite, to exhort. As in the previous
Argumenturn, so also here the object of this admonition and encouragement is
closely connected with the matter of Christian warfare and the struggle against
the flesh.531 Christians are not just taught by the law how to lead a God-pleasing
life, even Luther, we are sure, would not deny that the law does that. However,
the goal of this didactic or instructional use of the law is to prevent us from
deserting the front line of the battle, perhaps through lassitude, laxity, or plain
indifference, and thereby surrendering to the enemy without a fight. Luther does
not explain the modus operandi or the connection between teaching the law and
fighting the battle against sin. The key is probably to be found in the way in
which we explicated Luther's understanding of parenesis in the previous
argument. Scriptural exhortation addressed to the saints is based on the gospel
and is first of all meant to remind them who and whose they are as the baptized
people of God, and then to call them to repentance and to be the new creation
they are in the Spirit. We are called to join battle against sin, but we do not
conquer it by ourselves (513: 1-2). It has already been overcome by Christ, and
when we acknowledge that the verdict of the law is correct, that we are sinners,
and plead for mercy, then God conquers the sin in our life by forgiving it. When
we are forgiven the law has nothing more to accuse us of and so it can teach us
531See

39 I, 510,15-17 (3 AD, Arg. 4).
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the works of faith. But whenever we become proud of our achievements, put our
confidence in them, think that we no longer have anything to repent of, or that
good works are not "necessary" anyway, we are in danger of becoming secure,
opening a window to the devil, and putting our lives in jeopardy. Then the law
needs to take us aside, so to speak, and talk sweet reason to us. Luther cites
Michah 6: 8 within this context: Ambulate in sollicitudine cum Deo vestro (where
Luther translates n]5 v3 i71 with ambulate in sollicitudine), probably to illustrate
how he understands the tone of the law as it speaks to the Christian. When the
law is under the control of the gospel it says to us: Remember, you have died to
sin; therefore, do not let sin reign in your body; you have been bought with a
price, therefore glorify God in your body. It is the gentle admonition of a loving
Father, whose kindness is meant to lead us to repentance.
Luther says that the law is indeed taught to Christians, but with some prerogative [sed cum aliqua praerogativa] because they triumph over sin and the flesh,
and do not yield, either to sins, if ever they are put before them, or to the law
[quia triumphant de his, non succumbunt, neque peccatis, si quando opponuntur, neque
legi] (513, 9-10). It would seem as though the second half of the sentence interprets the first. The praerogativa or privilege that we have in teaching the law to
Christians is that we preach it as exhortation and encouragement rather than as
accusation or condemnation. The reason is clear: sin no longer has control over
them for they are dead to sin and alive to God; therefore, they are not living under the law but under grace (Rom. 6: 11-14); they triumph over the desires of the
flesh that war against the spirit and do yield to the sin that lies crouching at the
door (cf. Gen. 4: 7). Luther says because [quia]—we could also add, insofar as
[quatenus1--the pii live secundum spiritum and not secundum carnem (if we may use
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these Pauline terms to sum up the Christian life, since Luther has been citing
Paul), the law is to be preached to them cum aliqua praerogativa.532 However, the
situation would change very quickly if the pii gave into sin and ceased to struggle against it. Then the tenor of the law would change from that of monere et
cohortari to that of accusare, arguere, and perterrefacere. If Christians are living by
faith and walking in the Spirit, they should need no more than the tap of the
Father's hand on their shoulder and a gentle warning to wake them up or alert
them to the danger of sin that is waiting to trip them up. But where the child
becomes rebellious and does not listen to the warning voice of the Father, there
the latter must resort to sterner measures (in other words exhortation becomes
accusation, and encouragement is turned into judgment) in order to bring the
child to repentance. The final thing that we want to call attention to here is the
fact that Luther calls the parenesis spoken to the pii law, even though it does not
have the character of the lex accusans or the lex arguens, but rather that of
encouragement and exhortation. The parenetic example that he offers is Paul's
words in Philippians 4: 8: 60a &city aXnel, ova aegvci, ova 61K am, Oa a ayvci,
ova

Ocra

tic «perilKth T1C gnalvoc, Taiita hoyiCEci0e.

Luther criticizes the antinomians for refusing to recognize the doctrine of the law
in words such as those [Nostri Antinomi ita coeci sunt, ut non possint cognoscere
532There is a close parallel here with what Luther says in 2 AD, Arg.

21: Lex est iam valde mitigata per iustificationem, quam habemus propter Christum, nec
deberet ita terrere iustificatos (474, 8-11). The reason that the law is greatly
appeased is justification. In justification we have the fulfillment of the law given
to us as a gift. So long as we live in Christ's fulfillment (=under grace) we do not
live under the lex accusans. Therefore, the law is taught to Christians more in the
form of encouragement and exhortation: Itaque lex illis mollienda est et quasi exhortationis loco docenda: Vos aliquando fuistis gentes, nunc autem aspersi et abluti sanguine
Christi (475, 1-3). More will be said on this in ch. 4.
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doctrinam legis in Paulo vel in his verbis tam manifestis: Quuaecunque pudica, iusta etc.
sectamini] (513, 11-13). The verses cited are a clear example of the of usus
didacticus, which has usually been associated with the usus tertius. As we have
observed before, Luther certainly says that the law is to be taught to Christians,
and in the above example he does not even qualify it as being Christians, quoad
peccatores or carnem. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Luther brackets this
use of parenesis under the heading lex (which is where it belongs, formally),
when the gospel takes the law into its use, then it is no longer a legalis usus legis,
but a evangelicus usus legis, for the law is now being used by the gospel and its
operative tone is in harmony with the gospel. That this is necessary when
addressing Christians we have seen already from previous arguments. For
instance, when exercizing its chief office as lex arguens, the law acts as a
paedagogus in Christum. However, we heard Luther say that if it was left up to the
law, it would not take its charges safely to Christ but would end kidnapping and
destroying them.533 And when the law does instruct Christians so as to spur
them on to good works,534 it must always be carefully run by the gospel, lest it
frighten Christians unduly at the slightest provocation (caused by the remnant of
sin). But over and above that, the gospel also needs to be constantly at hand
because, according to Luther, Satan is continually sharpening [exasperare] the law
supra modum for the justified.535 On the other hand, the law also needs to prick
the conscience of the justified whenever they think or do anything counter to the
533See our discussion of 2 AD, Arg. 6.
5MCf. 39 I, 474, 21-22 (2 AD, Arg. 21).
535Ibid., 11. 11-14
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gospel that would bring them back under the servitude of the law. When they
live by faith under Christ as Dominus, they are free from the law and are served
by the law as the ancilla evangelii, but once sin gets the upper hand, the tables are
turned and they forfeit their freedom and find themselves in bondage to the law.
Luther sees this as the grave danger of antinomianism, not because it is av o
so much in the sense of 1 John 3: 4, but particularly because it fosters an attitude
of securitas coram Deo, and thus opens a window to the devil who could pounce
on the pii at any moment and take them captive.
Argument 6536
Contra 5
Every doctrine that is to be taught in the church ought to make consciences certain. But the doctrine of the law does not make consciences certain but rather confuses them. Therefore, the doctrine of the law should not
to be taught in the church.
Response: We said earlier in regard to this argument: law and gospel
do make consciences certain, but each in its own way. It does not follow
however that since the law does not make one certain of grace that it should
therefore be removed, for it surely belongs to preaching to say that passions,
wantonness, greed, and the defrauding of others is sin, which God will
punish with eternal death. In fact just the sensation of sins is sin, indeed the
greatest sin, and I am often driven to the worse sins, even those against my
will. The saints also have complained bitterly about this. But here is your
remedy: pray these words, either while standing or kneeling: Be with us and
help us, 0 Christ. Then wait in hope until God gives you a girl of your own.
The rest of the crowd that laughs at nocturnal pollutions and other such
things, and dismisses them as nothing goes wrong, for sin should not be so
diminished as if it were nothing. They imagine that Christians are perfectly
holy who cannot do anything against God, which is not true. We, on the
other hand, teach that the church is indeed holy and yet has many hypocrites mixed in with it, in fact even the saints themselves who are in the
church still have sin, as we have said earlier, but this is not imputed to them,
but they are regarded as righteous. How come? Because God does not
recognize this sin. Why? Because their sins are covered by the mantle of
Christ under whose wings we take refuge and are safe, not because we are
53639

I, 513, 17-515, 11.
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really such righteous people and without sin, but we are reckoned as such
on account of Christ the Lord, our Savior and Priest. However, because,
from our side, we are not such as we were supposed to be, it is necessary for
the law to be retained in the church by which we are warned of this evil or
sin that still inheres in our flesh, lest we become secure and sleepy and are
seized by it beforehand, as happens also in the saints, or in those who do not
take notice of it until after they have already committed a grave sin. This is
how Satan stealthily and insidiously circumvents us. Therefore, the law
must not cease nor be silent in the church because the church is never
without the ungodly and hypocrites for sin does not cease, not to mention
the fact that God, although he purifies his saints, constantly mingles things
in the church in such a way that the church is holy and yet not holy, one is
righteous and yet not righteous, another blessed and yet not blessed. And
this should to be noted well: that although it cannot be proved by reason,
which everywhere wants to be wise in the things and works of God, two
opposites exist in one and the same subject. But nevertheless, that is how it
is, and that is how it is spoken of in this kingdom and in scripture, as the
Psalm says: Blessed are those who sins are forgiven [Ps. 32: 1]. This person
is holy and blessed, and yet the Psalm immediately goes on to say: Every
one who is holy will pray to you for this [Ps. 32: 6]. Here you see the sinner.
We see the same in Romans 7: Be holy and pray for your sin. See to it that
you have these running together.
The substance of this antinomian syllogism has already been dealt with in
our discussion of the first argumentum.537 Luther's basic thesis is stated already
in the first two lines of the responsio: Lex et Evangelium certificant conscientias, sed
unumquodque suo modo (514, 1-2). Not only is he making the same point here that
he made in argumentum 1 regarding certificatio, but he is also picking up thoughts
from argumentum 2 where he cited the example of the baptized and justified robustus adolescens who is aflame with passion for the formosa puella aut mulier
537See 39 I, 496, 18-20 (3 AD, Arg. 1). A comparison of the two

"contra's" will reveal that these designations are somewhat arbitrary and not very
useful. Arg. 1 is designated contra 15: Prorsus imperiti et mentium deceptores sunt,
qui legem ab Ecclesia tollere volunt (39, I, 355, 7-8; ATh, V, Th. 15), yet our present
argumentum, Arg. 6 is contra 5: Quare hominem mori oportet, si a peccato liberari velit
(354, 22; ATh, V, Th. 5). It is always possible that "5" was meant to be "15"; the
numbering occurs only in three MSS.
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whom he mets. And again, we also have hovering in the background the story of
Cyprian's martyr, who, on the one hand, spat out the tip of his tongue at the harlot who was sent to tempt him, and yet on the other, was burning with passion:
the classical example of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator, who sins and yet
does not sin. Luther does not play down sin by measuring its seriousness by
degrees. Lusting after someone may "only" be a sin in thought which has not yet
passed into action to become a sin in deed, but yet it is altogether sin. Luther,
speaking of his own struggle with sin, says: Et profecto talis sensus peccatorum est
peccatum et quidem maximum, et saepe rapior ad pessima quaeque etiam invitus (514, 57). He prescribes only one remedy for the terrible anguish of this saint-sinner
conflict which Paul describes so realistically in Romans 7, and that is to avail oneself of the remedy that God himslf has provided in Christ. Thus he says: Sed hoc
tibi remedii est, ut vel stans vel prolapsus in genua ores: Adsis, adiuva nos, Christe (514,
7-9). It was only by the grace of God that the adolescens was able to let the woman
go back to her family unharmed and to wait until God gives him another. The
antinomians understand nothing of this inner struggle, nor do they accept that a
Christian can sin: Et fingunt, homines christianos perfecte esse sanctos neque posse contra Deum facere (514, 12-13). Since, according to them, Christians are already perfect, the church too is holy and without sinners. While Luther teaches that the
church is a mixture of saints and hypocrites, it is not only the hypocrites who are
sinners; Christians too are sinners but hoc non imputari eis, sed haberi pro iustis; or
alternatively, sumus revera iusti et sine peccato, sed quia sic reputamur propter Christ= . . . (514, 16-19). Or to use a metaphor to describe justification, christiani have
their sins covered by the mantel of Christ, under whose wings they take refuge
[sunt tecta pallio Christi, sub cuius alis delitescimus et tuti sumusl (514, 17-18).
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It is precisely because we are still sinners in ourselves [quoad nos] and are
thus hindered from being in se the people we were redeemed to be, that the law
must be retained in the church. As in the previous argumenta, the law plays an
important role in warning [admonere] us of this mali seu delicti haerentis adhuc in
came nostra lest Satan sneak up on us clam et insidiose while we are blissfully unaware [securi et oscitantes] and press his advantage by taking us before we know it
[praeoccupare]. Here again, when the law functions in the service of the gospel, it
is not against us but for us. Its purpose in warning us against the danger of securitas is to forestall the possibility of our being captured by the enemy in a surprise attack. Here the law offers good counsel when it summons us to vigilence
for the strategm of Satan is so insidious, as Luther says, that many do not even
realize that they are in his grip before they commit a grave sin [multum deliquerunt] (514, 20-25). He concludes by reasserting an axiom that he first put forward, contra antinomos, in the First Disputation: duo contraria esse in uno eodemque
subiecto (515, 6-7).538 There the issue was repentance, and Luther argued that
dolor and fides can coexist in the one person at the same time. Here the simul
iustus et peccator is at stake so that when the antinomians deny the axiom it is
because they deny this central doctrine of Pauline anthropology. Without that
one will make no sense of the otherwise contradictory statement that one finds in
scripture. He cites again verses one and six of Psalm 32, as he did at the end of
argumentum 3, to show that there is no inconsistency, except to the unregenerate
ratio, between being sanctus and praying for one's peccatum. The reason of course
lies in that fact that the saint is not sanctus because he has no sin, but only because
538See 39 I, 375, 15-376, 17 (1 AD, Arg. 8) where Luther cites the philosophical axiom that he rejects.
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his sin is forgiven. Therefore, praying for forgiveness is a mark of the saint, not a
question mark over the saint.
Argument 7539
Contra 5
Whoever commands impossible things appears to be unjust. God
commands impossible things. Therefore, God appears to be unjust and unfair.
Response: God does not command human beings to do impossible
things. But human beings themselves run into impossible things because of
sin. Thus fallen human beings themselves have reached that state where,
whether they want to or not, they cannot fulfill the law even with much effort. They gradually became so ruined that, no matter where or in what
position they were, they were blinded by the malice or poison of the serpent
and of their own flesh, and could not see because they yielded to the devil.
Therefore, God was constrained to give us the law to show or reveal us to
ourselves, who and what sort of people we are, that, having no confidence
in our own powers, we may despair of salvation and begin to hasten to him
who is able to save our soul. Thus, the law came and would show us that
we are not what we were in paradise, where Adam was a most splendid
man, great and sound in his powers. And now what are we? Pitiful specimens, and desperately corrupted by that vice of origin. You ask then what
in the world is the office of the law? I will tell you: The law shows that we
are not the people either that the law requires us to be or that we were
before the fall. Therefore, if there are any people silly, or rather insane,
enough to think that they live in the midst of paradise or in a golden palace
(as also St. Augustine argues), when in fact they are in the midst of thorns or
lions' dens from which there is no escape, and if someone now warns them
of this so that in the end they consider that they are not so blessed as they
had falsely supposed, surely they could not accuse him of having commanded the impossible? I think not. Rather, the person to be held culpable
is the one who complains that he was obligated to go beyond his powers
when he did not do it, because the point is not that the law was given that
you might fulfill those things that are of the law, but rather that you might
recognize your wretchedness, and go forth and seek salvation and freedom
from another source than through your own powers, that is, in the gift of
another. It is as if a jailer should go to an adulterer in prison who has
forgotten the crime which he had committed and ask him why he wished to
be these chains or in prison and he should say: But it was you who threw
53939 I, 515, 14-517, 11.
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me in here. No, the jailer would reply, it was not I, but your lust, your
crimes, they have done this, not I. This is how God deals with us, for it is
certainly a great gift that he reveals sin and disease and does not let you
perish in your sins or in this evil. But once that disease has been shown he
also adds the remedy by which people are to be freed, namely, that God
desires and is able to heal this great evil and disease. The learned and
experienced doctor does the same. For what has he is to heal where nobody
accepts that he is sick? God therefore shows us our disease by means of the
law, not to kill us or that we might waste away in the law, not to make the
disease, but that we humbly learn to seek the word of grace after the disease
has been recognized.
Luther already in the argumentum 1 of the First Disputation responded to
the antinomian claim that God has commanded impossibilia. There he argued that
it is not God's fault that the legem possibilem et iucundissimam of paradise became
impossible and burdensome, but rather that sin and Satan are to blame 540 Here
too, blame for the fact that homines lapsi have reached the state where, volens nolens, they are incapable of fulfilling the law, is put on the venenum serpentis et
carnis suae obsequentis diabolo (515, 19-516, 1). Because the depth of our corruption blinded us to the truth about ourselves, God was constrained to give us the
law [coactus est Deus nobis dare legem], which, acting like a mirror, showed us our
sin that we might despair of any attempt to save ourselves and hasten to Christ
who alone is able to save. By comparison to Adam, whom Luther describes as
pulcherrimus and magnus et integer viribus, we are a mere shadow and utterly
corrupt through original sin [sumus homunciones et corruptissimi illo vitio originis]
(516, 6-7). The purpose of the law, which Luther now unfolds within this post
lapsum perspective, is to remind us of what we once were in paradise: Ostendit
lex, quod non tales sumus, quales vel lex requirit ye! eramus ante lapsum (516, 9-10).
540See 39 I, 364, 7-365, 6 (1 AD, Arg. 1).
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He alludes to an analogy in Augustine541 to underscore the point that if the law
cannot be blamed for commanding the impossible when it merely confronts us
with the facts about ourselves. Significantly, Luther says that law was not given
primarily for us to keep (not that we could anyway) or stay in, but to show us our
wretchedness in order that we might find our salvation not in ourselves but in
Christ [. . cum non id agatur, ut lege lata praestes ea, quae legis sunt, sed magis, ut
agnoscas tuam miseriam, et aliunde, quam per tuas vires, alieno beneficio evadas et
salutem et liberationem quaeras] (516, 16-19). But like a good doctor, God does not
give us the diagnosis without also supplying the remedy. His purpose in revealing disease is only to make alive, yet, on the other hand, he cannot heal "patients"
where nobody is willing to acknowledge that he is sick (Matt. 9: 12).542
Although there is nothing really essntially new in this responsio, there are a
few things worth highlighting. First, Luther stresses that the primary purpose of
the law is to mirror to us our sins that we might hasten to him who is able to save
us. Although this is clearly a case of the usus theologicus, it is interesting to observe that the way we come to a realization of our sin here is by being reminded
of the icpcZta, what we once were in paradise in Adam and what we are today.
But, mutatis mutandis, this is the same thing that baptismal parenesis tries to do.
It reminds Christians, struggling with sin, of their new personhood in Christ, the
new Adam, and of what they are as children of God. The purpose of this kind of
exhortation is to bring them to the point where they recognize for themselves the
541The WA editor notes that these images, which sound thoroughly

Augustinian, could not be found in Augustine's works.
542See 39 I, 424, 9-425, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 1) for a further comparison

between God's work of healing through law and gospel and the procedure of the
physician.
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inconsistency between who they are and what they are doing in order that they
might repent. For repentance is the only way back to baptism and a reappropriation of its gifts. The parallel has its limitations: there can be no return to Adam
and paradise, but we are called through repentance to return to the Christ, the
second Adam in whom the new paradise is already proleptically present. The
significance of this parallel reminds us that, although Luther is stressing the second use of the law in his comparion between Adam and the human race,543
nevertheless, this usage is also present in the parenesis of the New Testament
(which always presupposes Baptism) inasmuch as its aim is not only to give
positive teaching but at the same time to lead to repentance. It would seem that
this use of exhortation, which we call the gospel's or faith's use of the law,
corresponds to the fact that the law has been appeased for the justified, which fits
with Luther's advise that they are to be taught the law with some praerogativa.
The second point to note is relatively minor: we have seen from other
discussions that the law, though a prerequisite for repentance, does not eo ipso
lead to repentance. The gospel alone can do that. The law can only initiate the
act of repentance which is brought to completion by the gospel.
Argument 8544
Contra 13
It is necessary to be justified by grace and mercy. The law has neither
grace nor mercy. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Response: This conclusion is nothing because the law is to be taught for
the very reason that it does not justify, and because people need to be taught
5431n answer

to the question: quodnam legis officium sit? (516, 8-9),
which if not actually posed in the disputation, was certainly on everyone's lips,
Luther singles out only the praecipuus usus legis.
54439 I, 517, 14-19.
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to acknowledge their disease and the evil breathed by the serpent in paradise in order that finally, humbled, they might seek help and the remedy.
The conclusion to the syllogism is a non sequitur. The proper consequentia
would be that the law cannot justify. Luther's brief responsio picks up this idea
when it rejects the conclusion [Haec consequentia est nulia] and argues instead that
the law must be taught precisely because it does not justify and because people
cannot seek the auxilium et remedium given in Christ unless they are first brought,
through the diagnosis of the law, to the point where they recognize their morbus
et malum, which stems ultimately from the poisonous breath of the serpent in
paradise.
Argument 9545
Contra 13
In order for an effect to be removed the cause must be removed. But
the law is the cause of sin [Rom. 6: 20]. Therefore, the law is to be removed.
Proof of minor premise: Because the law works wrath [Rom. 4: 15].
Response: This argument may be conceded because it is true that the
law is a cause of sin, but not in the sense that it causes or compels sin to
occur, nor is God the cause of sin because he certainly does not will iniquity.
For to think that would be sacrilege. But [it is true] the law works wrath or
is a cause of sin, that is, reveals the sin that it is already present in our
nature; it does not directly cause sin, nor does it compel us to sin, but it
shows us the sin that has already been committed and, as I said above, the
law already present shows this to us who have been blinded by the devil in
order that we might not know ourselves, the very thing that the law reveals.
In the same way he is not the one who throws the wretched man into the
bear's pit who comes along and informs that man that he is there sitting in a
dangerous place, in danger of life having fallen in there. Thus, the law is a
cause of sin, but in the sense that it is the means by which our ruin is recognized and understood, it is not the efficient cause of our fall, because just
when we thought that we were the best Christians, and truly saints and
righteous, the law came along and said: Not so, my dear fellow, you are not
a saint and righteous person, but a sinner because you act and live contrary
to God. And so this argument is not against us but for us.
54539 I, 518, 3-19.
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While Luther concedes the truth of this argumentum, he takes great pains
in the responsio to clarify exactly how lex est causa peccati in order to differentiate
his position vis-à-vis the antinomians. This is not the first time he has responded
to an argument like this. Already in the First Disputation he argued that he is
willing to accept the proposition lex auget peccatum provided that the lex auget is
understood in the sense of ostendat peccatum, and not facit peccatum.546 Here he
argues along similar lines, being scrupulously careful to avoid giving any impression that lex est causa peccati because that would lead to the unthinkable conclusion that God himself is the author of sin. Yet, on the other hand, Paul maintains
that lex iram operatur (Rom. 4: 15: 6 Op vci floc a pyhv Kccrepygetal). How is this
to be understood? Luther makes it clear, as he did earlier, that lex iram operatur =
lex est causa peccati only in the limited sense of lex ostendit peccatum, which he then
qualifies further to make it crystal clear that the law itself does not create sin [non
facit, ut fiat] but only exposes the sin that already exists [quad iam est in natura
praesens, that is, peccatum iam factus] in order that we might know ourselves as we
really are, that is, as God sees us, for we have been deprived of this selfknowledge through the blindness induced by the devil (518, 8-12). Luther
defines succinctly what he means by the phrase lex est causa peccati by equating it
with cognoscendae et intelligendae ruinae et lapsus non efficiendi and then illustrates
this by stressing that while our pious self may think nos optime et christianos esse et
vere sanctos et iustus, the law comes along and tells us how we stand, not in our
own eyes or in the eyes of the world, but coram Deo: Her Junckherr, vos non estis ita
sanctus et iustus, sed peccator quia facis et vives contra Deum (518, 14-18). By showing that Paul's words in Romans 4: 15 are straight second use of the law [peccatum
546See 39 I, 377, 9-378, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 10).
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aguere et accusare], he has wrested the argument from the hand of the antinomians
and demonstrated its coherence with his own position.
Argument 10547
Contra 1
Christians are free. Therefore, they are not ruled by the law. An argument from the nature of opposites is valid.
Response: To be free and to be a slave are opposites, which cannot be
in the same subject at one and the same time. And it is a good argument.
How then is a Christian, who is righteous and free, under the rule of the
law?
Response: Christians are not under the dominion of the law, that is,
insofar as they are such, but sin is lurking there in them and they suffer its
dominion. The Christian is a person who has already been buried with
Christ in his death, and is dead to sin [Rom. 6: 2-4, 7-11], the law [Rom. 7: 4],
and death [Rom. 8: 2, 10, 11], and whatever belongs to those things. However, this itself is not perceived but is hidden from the world, it is not
apparent and is not seen by our eyes, as Peter says: Our life is hidden in
Christ [Col. 3: 3]. Likewise, John 3 [: 8]: You do not know whence it comes
or whither it goes. For Christians are not in this present age, they do not
live, they have died, and belong to a different life, a heavenly life, far above
from this one [cf. Phil. 3: 20]. But alas, what great toils, difficulties and
troubles will exhaust us here before we go there! For here the devil, the
world and our flesh will not cease; they can and will devise such great
snares for us until finally they overthrow us, and we will not be able to
escape without great and serious harm, unless we keep fully awake by
praying. But the remedy for this is to have our eyes and mind fixed on
Christ himself and his word through faith [Heb. 12: 2; cf. Col. 3: 2], for
through this one the saints have conquered kingdoms [Heb. 11: 33]. And
John says: This is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith [1 John 5:
4], and Paul himself exults: In Christ we burst forth finally and thus begin
to become saints, Christians, and lords of the law and of death [Rom. 7: 25-8:
2]. And where is such a person, you will say, show me one? Response: I
cannot, for they are hidden and have died [Col. 3: 3; cf. 1 John 3: 2]. Here
there is neither male nor female, neither free nor slave [Gal. 3: 28]. So then,
here Christians live as righteous by imputation, as saints under the wings of
their hen. But on the other hand, to the extent that Christians are soldiers
and engaged in battle, here they are also still under the law and under sin,
because they are still in this life, daily experience and expect the attack of
54739 I, 519, 3-522, 3.
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their flesh, and only as thus placed can they be said to live, as Paul laments
in Romans 7: In the flesh I live to the law of sin [Rom. 7: 25]; again, I see
another law in my members at war with the law of my mind [Rom. 7: 23].
Thus the Christian is dead and alive, but from different viewpoints. But
these two things cannot be understood by either the world or the pope, and
yet that is the way things are, and scripture says, as we noted earlier, that
those who believe in Christ are holy and righteous by divine imputation,
and are considered to be, and already are, in heaven, surrounded by mercy.
But while we are held here in the Father's lap, clothed in the best robe, our
feet stick out from beneath our cloak and Satan bites them as much as he
can. That makes the little child wriggle, cry out, and realize that he still has
flesh and blood and that the devil is still here, who continues to trouble him
until the whole person becomes holy and is snatched out of this vile and evil
world. So then we are holy and free, but in the spirit, not in the flesh [Rom.
8: 9; Gal. 5: 1, 16-18; 1 Cor. 1: 2; 5: 11], but under the shadow of the wings,
that is, since we live in the gracious lap of our hen. But our feet still remain
in need of being washed, and whenever they are unclean, they are bitten
and troubled by Satan until they are cleansed. Therefore, you must tuck
your little feet up under the cloak otherwise you will have no peace.
The key question at issue in this argumenturn, which is picked up by the
first respondent (who may have been a student) and left to Luther to answer is
this: Quomodo igitur christianus, qui est iustus et liber, est sub domino legis? (519, 7).
We have heard Luther enough by now to know that the answer to this paradox
will lie in making the proper distinction between law and gospel. However, he
always surprises us. While we might expect him, after having reaffirmed that
Christians are indeed free, to have then concentrated on developing the proposition that the antinomians denied, namely, that Christians are still under the law,
he in fact does just the opposite. The bulk of his responsio deals with an exposition of what it means that Christians are free. And, as we will see, while he
does later state in what way Christians are indeed under the law (under the law
and sin, to be precise), it is not the lex didacticus that he speaks of, but that law
that always allies itself with sin and death and will remain our opponent as long
as the flesh remains. Clearly, Luther will not let himself be drawn into the trap of
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emphasizing that Christians are under the law merely to redress the onesided
assertions of the antinomians. That not only would be failing to distinguish
properly between law and gospel, but it would even jeopardize the gospel.
Luther, as always, is very careful with his formulations. He agrees with
the antinomian proposition: Christianus non est sub dominio legis, but only with the
qualification: in quantum talis et eiusmodi. In fact he almost turns the statement
round and puts it into the positive by saying that Christians are lords of the law,
but instead of law he chooses sin, and thus at the very outset stresses one of the
major themes of his counter-argument, and that is the indisolvable connection between the law and sin: sed peccatum est sub ipso [scil. christianusj et dominatur peccato (519, 8-9). Following Paul he characterizes the Christian as sepulta cum
Christ° in morte eius, mortuus peccato, legi, morti et quicquid illorum est. But these are
hidden realities, just as Paul says in Col. 3: 3: Vita nostra abscondita est in Christo
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gin of the new birth is as mysterious as the blowing of the wind (John 3: 8). The
Christian, paradoxically, has died, not alive, is not of this world but has his roXiTEvila (Phil. 3: 20) in heaven. But we are still in via, and before we arrive we must
endure quantum laborum et dijficultatum et molestiarum (520, 1-2). Our principal
enemies, diabolus, mundus, and caro nostra, are constantly trying to ensnare us and
548Luther wrongly

attributes this passage to Peter. The WA editor (or
his assistant), in a marginal reference, cites 1 Peter 3: 4 as the likely passage
Luther has in mind, however, the only connection with Paul's words in this
passage, which deals with the deportment of Christian women, is the word
KpincrOc. We might mention in passing that many times we have found errors in
the marginal references; sometimes they are obviously typographical, other times
factual. The biblical references, which we include in the translation in
parentheses, represent a significant increase in number over those suggested in
the margin of the WA.
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will only be repelled by prayer and vigilence. In other places, the reader will recall, Luther said that the law was given precisely for this reason, to keep us alert
to danger and to keep summoning us to join the fight against the flesh. But here
Luther says the remedium is this: ut habeamus oculos et mentem intuentern in ipsum
Christum et verbum eius per fidem. The emphasis here is not on fighting to win the
victory but on receiving it by faith (1 John 5: 4) [xdi avtn iaT1V n vixri
vtx ricrac a Te/ x6

v,

tj

sang 40'4 The juxtaposition of this verse and the

preceding statement based on Hebrews 12: 2 makes it clear that for Luther it is
not faith by itself that wins the victory but him in whom faith trusts. In Christo
we overcome sin and the flesh and become saints and Christians. This theme of
"becoming" is important to Luther when he wants to emphasize the already-now
but not-yet tension of the Christian life which underlies Paul's discussion of the
simu/ iustus et peccator struggle in Romans 7. Our victory over sin, death, and the
law is ours now by faith, but it cannot yet be empirically demonstrated, for as an
eschatological reality it will remain hidden until the eschaton when Satan will be
annihilated and our victory over all the powers of evil made manifest. Hence,
while it is true that we are already now Christians and saints through baptism
and faith it is also true that, seen eschatologically, we will only become Christians
and saints after the resurrection. What we have now we have by faith and not by
sight (2 Cor. 5: 7), and yet the fact that our victory is now by faith (notice that
faith is both the victory and the means of receiving the victory) makes it no less
real. Hence, Paul can thank God already for the victory over death (Romans 7:
25). But while we already have that victory complete coram Deo, it will remain incomplete coram hominibus until the last day. For the latter standpoint, every victory over sin and the flesh in this life is a manifestation of the fact that we are
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more and more becoming the saints that we already are by faith and will be by
sight after the resurrection. Thus, following Paul, Luther says: Nos in Christo prorumpimus tandem, et ita incipimus fieri sancti, christiani et domini legis et mortis (520,
9-11). However, when we look at ourselves it is hard to find any sign even of the
beginning of this victory let alone its completion; rather we see sin, we hear the
accusing voice of the law, and we feel the fear of death. The real Christians, the
real saints cannot be seen but only believed, for as Luther says, they are absconditi
and mortui (520, 12). The paradox of God's justification of the ungodly (Rom. 4: 5)
and the hiddenness of the righteousness that he imputes for Christ's sake can also
be a source of Anfechtung for the credentes since even the godly must believe contra rationem and contra experientiam that the sinner is justified. The righteousness
and holiness of Christians is not open to verification because they are that only
imputative (which is equivalent to saying "by faith") or because they are sub alis
gallinae suae (520, 13-14). The gallina-image is appropriate, not only because it is
consistent with the fact that vita nostra abscondita est in Christo, but also because it
means that so long as we remain sub alis gallinae we are shielded from the accusation of the law on account of the remnant of sin in our flesh. But since our existence as Christians is twofold we are also milites engaged in battle and to that extent we are still under the law and its accusation [Sed e contra christianus in quantum miles . . . hic etiam est sub lege adhuc et sub peccato 1. The christianus is caught
up in the daily militia of the flesh against the spirit and feels the same frustration
that Paul gives vent to in Romans 7: 23 and 25.549 In line with the twofoldness of
the Christian life as holy propter Christum per fidem and sinful in re ipsa, Luther
549Cf. 39 I, 507, 14-15 (3 AD, Arg. 3).
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states: Ita christianus est mortuus et vivit, diverso tamen respectu (521, 3).550
Although he does not expressly reiterate what these two are, we know that they
correspond to the twofoldness mentioned above, which is not understood either
by the world or the pope but can only be recognized by faith. However, he does
mention that those who believe in Christ are iustus et sanctus by means of divine
imputation [reputatione] and, although still on earth, are beneficiently surrounded
in heaven by misericordia. In balancing this with a law statement, quantum nos
peccatores, Luther comes up with a very instructive image. He says that as Christians we are held in sinu patris vestiti veste optima (that is our position as baptizati),
yet our feet protrude from beneath this pallium of Christ making us an easy prey
for the mordacious attacks of Satan. And he will keep on biting and troubling us
(Luther changes the subject to Kindelein) until our heavenly Father finally calls us
out of this vale of tears; meanwhile these attacks make us wriggle and complain,
reminding us that we are vulnerable to Satan's onslaughts so long as we are in
the flesh [dar zappelt das Kindelein et clamat et sentit, se adhuc carnem et sanguinem
habere et diabolum adhuc adesse, qui iam exercet, donec totus homo sanctus fiat et
eripiatur ex hoc saeculo nequam et malo] (521, 9-11). When Luther says that Satan
will keep harassing us until the whole person becomes holy [donec totus homo
sanctus fiat] this should not be taken as suggesting that he sees a causal nexus
between Satan's biting us and our final sanctification. Rather, it should be taken
550Luther also spoke of two viewpoints in his Preface (492, 20-23-493,

2):
Sed diverso respectu sumus enim iusti, quod ad reputationem seu
misericordiam Dei in Christo promissam, hoc est propter Christum, . . . sed
secundum formam aut substantiam, set secundum nos, sumus peccatores iniusti
et damnati, quia certe nihil est in tota natura hominis, quod opponi possit iudicio
Dei.
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with the phrase immediately following: et eripiatur ex hoc saeculo nequam et malo,
in which case he is saying no more than that a Christian becomes totus homo
sanctus only after death when he is in heaven. Luther sums up his position with
taking us back to the twin perspectives of law and gospel, sinner and saint: Sic
itaque sumus sancti et liberi, sed in spiritu, non in came, sub umbra alarum, id est,
gallinae nostrae versantibus nobis in sinu gratiae (521, 11-13). We are holy and
free,551 not in ourselves, but only in Christ by faith and under the shelter of his
wings. If we look at ourselves we will see only our dirty feet, and until they are
clean Satan (or alternatively the law, for these two work in tandem) will give us
no peace [. . . sed pedes restant adhuc lavandi, qui, cum immundi sunt, mordendi et
exercendi sunt a sathana, donec mundenturl (521, 13-522, 2). Again, as we said
before, we will not have clean feet until we arrive home. Yet Jesus has already
made us clean: On i)peic icaeapoi at 816 Tim/

X6yov

by

XeXciitruca 1>giv

(John

15: 3), and Luther knows that that happens preeminently in the washing of Holy
Baptism, which, although not explicitly mentioned in the text can be inferred,
even as Luther too presupposes Baptism when he says that we are dead to sin.
Here again we have an expression of the bipolarity of the Christian life: clean and
yet unclean, dead and alive, holy and sinful.552 Hence, in almost parenetic style
551This is the first time Luther uses the word liber in his response to the
antinomian thesis: christiani sunt liberi. Not that he denies it, as we can see here,
provided it is understood in spiritu. However, most of the responsio has rather
pictured the vita christiana in terms of a battle against sin and the flesh. Perhaps
because it is just this truth that the antinomians forget in their eager affirmation
of Christian freedom that Luther chooses to use the term very sparingly.
552These

terms are not descriptive of qualities which Christians have in
themselves ontologically, but apply to them only "in relatione." Luther stresses
this in Marlin's Promotionsdisputation (1540):
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Luther can exhort us Kinderlein to keep our feet tucked up under that robe: Denn
du must das fufilein mit unntter den mannttel ziehen, sonst hastu kein friedt (522, 2-3).
This, in our opinion, is a prime example of what Luther meant previously when
he said that the law should be preached to Christians with some praerogativa.
Argument 11553
Contra 4
We are dead to sin. Therefore, it does not rule us who are living. The
conclusion, based on the nature of correlatives, is valid because if people are
living they are not dead, and if they are dead they are not living, but your
thesis says that the law rules the living.
Response: Our thesis has been set forth in relation to a class: the law
rules the living, that is, to the extent that they are such. For as we have often
said already, Christians are both living and dead, are both saints and sinners. But the godly are dead to the law and do not serve the law, in so far as
they are such in the lap of grace and by divine imputation. But in so far as
they are in the flesh, these people serve the law of what? Of sin, as St. Paul
says: Ah, how utterly shameful it is that a holy person should serve the law
of sin. Who has ever heard of such a thing? And yet that is precisely what
happens, as Paul indeed shows from his own example. With my mind, he
says, I serve the law of God, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin [Rom. 7:
25], that is, Christians are free by faith, but to the extent that they are flesh,
they are servants of sin. But these things, although they are opposites, yet
are brought together in the Christian, because the same Christian is saint
Christianus est dupliciter considerandus, in praedicamento relationis et
qualitatis. Si consideratur in relatione, tam sanctus est, quam angelus, id est
imputation per Christum, quia Deus dicit, se non videre peccatum propter
filium suum unigenitum, qui est velamen Mosi, id est legis. Sed christianus
consideratus in qualitate est plenus peccato (39 II, 141, 1-6).
In this passage, which employs the categories of Aristotelian logic, there is
mention of two categories of predication: relation and quality. Therefore, if we
take holiness as an example, the phrase in praedicamento relationis is equivalent to
attribute of holiness understood imputative, so that in relatione the Christian is
holy,whereas if we speak about it in terms of the praedicamentum qualitatis, the
phrase in qualitate is equivalent to saying that righteousness is understood as an
inherent quality or property of the Christian, although in actual fact considered in
qualitative the Christian is plenus peccato.
55339 I, 522, 6-523, 9.
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and sinner, dead and alive.554 All sin and no sin, hell and heaven are correlatives. Christians remain in the flesh by synecdoche so that sin does not
rule. But the ungodly are unrighteous, pure and simple; they have sin, they
have hell, and they remain totally in the flesh and perish.
This argumenturn is a variation of the previous one. There it was argued
that Christians are free from the law and hence are not ruled by it. Here, the
same is said about sin: we are dead to sin, therefore sin does not rule us who are
living. Predictably therefore Luther's responsio concentrates on calling attention
to the twofold character of the Christian as dead and alive, sinner and saint,
much as he did in the previous argument. Therefore, he will not let himself be
bound by his opponents logical definition of correlatives any more than he will
allow Aristotle to be the final arbiter in theology. The antinomians claim their
argument is valid ex correlativorum natura since the contrasting pair vivus and
mortuus is mutually exclusive and both cannot be present in the same person at
the same time: one is either dead or alive. Luther is again compelled to remind
his antinomian friends that it is not sufficient merely to make the distinction between vivus and mortuus for, properly understood Christians are both: christianum
et vivere et mortuum esse, peccatorem et sanctum (522, 11-12). Rather, the distinction
needs to be made between Christians quoad in Christo and Christians quoad in se.
From the standpoint of divine imputation, a plus is mortuus legi neque servit legi,
that is, in quantum talis in sinu gratiae est et reputatione divina (the conjunction of
God's sinus gratiae and reputatio is carried over from the previous responsio). In
other words, quoad in Christo the Christian is totus sanctus. But from the standpoint of the old nature [quantum est in came] he serves the lex (in the sense of
554Note variant reading: Bresl. MSS: these are opposites and yet they
have been brought together in Christ because the person who believes is a sinner
and righteous.

488
principle) peccati. In other words, quoad in se, the Christian is totus peccator. What
a paradox: that a homo sanctus should serve the lex peccti (522, 12-523, 1). And it is
precisely on account of this distinction that Luther counters the antinomian rejection of his thesis: quod lex dominatur viventibus, with the further qualification:
videlicet in quantum eiusmodi (522, 8-11). That is, his propositio is not a general assertion applying to Christians as viventes homines, but only insofar as they are still
in came and struggle against sin. Conversely, it does not apply to the pii insofar
as they are mortui peccato. This distinction was not understood or accepted by the
antinomians because they subscribed to the Aristotelian axiom: contraria non posse
simul et semel esse in eodem subiecto.555 On the other hand, Luther holds that
liberum esse (fide) and servus peccati (quod ad carnem), while they are contraria, are
not mutually exclusive but coexist in the one Christian person, quod idem
christianus sit sanctus et peccator, mortuus et vivus (523, 3-6). The impius is
simpliciter iniustus, habet peccatum, habet infernum and remains in came totus and
perishes, whereas the Christian is not totally in the flesh but only per synecdochen.
What does this mean? Luther cannot mean that the Christan is not totus peccator
because he has been saying that all along the way. What it means surely is that
the Christian is not simpliciter in came (and hence sub lege); that is, he is in came
only to the extent that sin still inheres in the flesh. Surely the decisive thing here
is that, unlike the impii, Christians do not let sin rule, but are themselves ruled by
the Spirit of God. This then is what Luther means when he says: Ita christianus
manet in came per synedochen, ne dominetur peccatum, where the per synedochen
means as much as non totaliter (523, 7-8). It means that the Christian is not halffree and half-bound, but slave and free at the same time, not semi-sanctus, but
555See 39 I, 375,18-19 (1 AD, Arg. 8).
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sanctus and peccator at the same time, not semivivus, but mortuus and vivus at the
same time. In other words, the "simul" of the simul peccator-simul iustus is not
partial but total, even though it defies both logic and psychology.
Argument 12556
Contra the Same
Sin has been destroyed. Therefore, it does not rule the living.
Response: It has been destroyed, that is, imputatively, not formally,
otherwise saints would not be complaining about sin the way they are.
The argument= is virtually a restatement of the previous one. Luther
makes the same distinction as he did earlier, except that here he is more concise.
Christians are free from sin imputative, that it, by faith, but they are not yet
demonstrably (that is, essentialiter or formaliter) free, on account of the sin that still
inheres in the flesh.
Argument 13557
Contra 9
Christ has fulfilled the law. Therefore, it does not have to be fulfilled
by us.
Response: This argument is characteristic of the antinomians; indeed, if
only this were the case and they could prove this argument of theirs. But
the conclusion must be denied. It would be better to draw this conclusion:
Christ has fulfilled the law. Therefore, we too will fulfill it. But they argue
for a far different conclusion with the result that they abolish Christ, the law
and all instruction. Christ, they say, has fulfilled the law for us, and they
add: therefore, we do not have to fulfill it also, that is, to fight against death
and sin, indeed, these have already been conquered by Christ so that no evil
can befall us from there. There is nothing I would sooner prefer. And who
would not wish to be free from all these evils and those troubles that come
from those manifold desires and passions? I know what crosses desires can
cause adolescents and how annoying it is when my anger and other plagues
from which I would rather be free torment me as much as possible. But
Christ, they say, has borne your sin, so why are you sad? Thus, they con55639 I, 523, 12-14.
55739 I, 524, 3-528, 2.
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tinue most securely to do what they are doing, and carry the merit of
Christ's passion and of the forgiveness of sins over into riotous living. If
these things are not in the godly, why is it that Paul cries out: Wretched man
that I am, who will deliver me etc [Rom. 7: 24]. I should gladly wish more
than anything—and it is good for me to confess this before you all—to be able
to believe in God just like that, even as I wish I could give thanks in all circumstances and sing: We praise you, 0 God etc. But I cannot. Now I am
angry, now I glare at someone angerly, this person I hate, that person I pander to, and I cannot be the same to everyone, which is what I sincerely want
to be. I can indeed teach this matter quite splendidly, and before these fellows held any office, I taught these things, but not what they mistakenly
think. That also is a clear sign that they have quite fallen from grace. But if
nothing else can shake them, at least they should learn from experience that
there is no youth or adolescent who is not moved more by the sight of some
beautiful girl than an old fool, even though this is a godly man struggling
day and night. However, the ungodly person follows all leaders without
giving any thought to whether it is right or wrong. Christ has fulfilled the
law. But it has been added: Afterwards, see to it that you live a life that is
holy, godly and pure, as is becoming of Christians. The thing is this, that up
to this point you have heard: You are forgiven, but, lest you complain of
having been abandoned altogether, I will give you my Holy Spirit, who will
make you a soldier; he also utters great and indescribable groans in your
heart against sin that in the end you become what you desire. You say, I
cannot? Pray, that I may hear you, and I will see to it that you can. The
heathen have also written down remedies for love, which they thought
would work against passion, namely, if you consider the vices of sex, its
filthiness and baseness, as Ovid tells us:
Recall often the deeds of your wicked mistress,
and set all your losses before your eyes.558
But believe me, neither these nor any other godless things effect a cure from
outside, but it must come from within, from the heart and by means of
God's law which reveals the magnitude of his wrath against the sins and
vices of nature, as when Paul--not like the antinomian, who always speaks
with flattering words and showers people with compliments—says, and indeed as we read in almost all of his letters: Neither fornicators nor adulterers nor the covetous nor the effeminate559 will inherit the kingdom of God
558Ovid,

Remedia amoris, 299-300.
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[Eph. 5: 5]. If this hammer blow, this peal of thunder, has truly struck your
heart, then finally you will sing with Paul: Wretched person that I am, who
will deliver me etc. [Rom. 7: 25], and again: I do not do what I want etc.
[Rom. 7: 19] in order that in this way you learn to pray for sanctification and
not to be secure like the antinomians. You say that the law has been abolished? Yes, insofar as you are overshadowed by mercy and deemed righteous, but give me one person who does not still feel a great many afflictions
and evils in his flesh. Give me an adolescent who, as soon as he was all
alone with a beautiful girl, would not say: 0 my darling! Here, when we are
alone, my advise is that we should pray, lest we fall into temptation. I am
sure that they should pray and go on and on doing that even though it
might have to be for more than a year. The godly feel such things as these
and fight against them as much as they can, they believe in Christ, who has
fulfilled the law for them, and from that they fight with sins, and should not
be so lazy and secure as if they had sailed into port already. I certainly do
not believe that these antinomians are such saints that I would dare entrust
my wife Katie or my daughter to them. I will leave it at that. I do not fight
against the antinomians out of hatred or envy, but out of great necessity, because I see what will happen some day as a result of their doctrine, namely,
those last times, which Christ and St. Peter lament over [Matt. 24: 2; 2 Peter
2]
The argumentum: Christus implevit legem. Ergo non est nobis implenda lex, is
probably the central tenet of antinomianism, and this not only elicits from Luther
a sound refutation but also provides the occasion for several minature profiles of
antinomian theology as he saw it and assessed it. Right at the outset he states his
strong opposition to the consequentia drawn by the antinomians and in turn puts
forward his own argumentum: Christ implevit legem. Ergo et nos implebimus (524, 67). Significant here is Luther's formulation. His conclusion is not simply the opposite to that of the antinomians: Ergo est nobis implenda lex. As an absolute
statement that would be just as wrong in the opposite direction. In fact Luther
conspicuously avoids the gerundive construction implenda lex (the law must be
fulfilled) altogether and instead uses the future indicative implebimus. Since this
559Luther,

no doubt quoting from memory, adds the word"molles," a
reference to homosexuals, which he no doubt got from 1 Cor. 6: 9.

492
presupposes [ergo] and flows out of the lex impleta Christi, it means that the implebimus takes on more the character of a promise: Christ has fulfilled the law for
you already and now by faith you will fulfill it also in him.560 It is very important to note the difference in the way the law is addressed to the pii compared
with that of the impii: to the latter it is straight demand: vobis implenda lex,
whereas to the former, because Christ has already fulfilled the law for faith, it has
more the tone of encouragement and promise: vos implebimus. This difference
will be discussed further in the next chapter. The antinomian conclusion is far
different from that of Luther's and so much so that, according to him, they end
up abolishing Christ, the law and all instruction [Sed ipsi longe aliud disputant ita,
ut et Christum, legem et disciplinam omnem tollant] (524, 7-8). This is the first time
Luther has ventured the bold assertion that with their abolition of the law the
antinomians end up abolishing Christ, but it will not be the last. Before this he
has simply posed the question: Would not the abolition of the lex accusans et
condemnans render Christ and his work superfluous?561 In attempting to
understand what he means when he says that if you abolish the law you abolish
Christ, it is helpful to remember that Luther has elsewhere argued that even if the
antinomians remove the letters LEX they cannot remove the content of the law
because the law has been inscribed on our hearts.562 Moreover, we do not have
560This is the direct opposite of the view: Christ has fulfilled the law
and now you must too [implenda]. That would correspond to a view of the imitatio Christi where the imperative is cut adrift from its gospel foundation and
Christ's exemplum is nothing more than exemplar.
561See 39 I, 371, 9-10:

Nam si non est lex accusans et condemnans, quorsum
opus habeo Christo, qui se pro peccatis meis tradit? (1 AD, Arg. 4).
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the power to dispose over Christ or to decide where he will or will not be; we
cannot abolish him who is Lord of al1.563 Certainly, we can reject him in his
lowliness as he comes to us in the gospel, but we cannot reject him, any more
than we can escape God, when he confronts us in the law as judge, even though
that is not his proper work. Nevertheless, apart from its rhetorical effect, Luther's
statement has profound theological meaning. We have already seen that Luther
follows Paul in maintaining that where there is no law there is no sin, or better,
sin is not reckoned as sin (Rom. 5: 13), so that the office of Christ as savior and
mediator is rendered superfluous. However, it cannot be asserted as a universal
statement that to abolish the law is to abolish Christ for that suggests that sinful
human beings have the power to manipulate and dispose of God at will whereas
we know from scripture that any rejection of Christ (contingent on the rejection
of the law) will itself be subject to judgment on the Last Day. On the other hand,
it can properly be understood in the particular concrete case of where the
antinomians reject the law and yet still claim Christ as their savior. Here,
Luther's remarks become a word of law to such people because Christ by his
own admission came to save sinners, and saved sinners are people who willingly
acknowledge the just verdict of the law in pronouncing them guilty, but who at
the same time say with Paul: Thanks be to God for giving us the victory through
562See 39 I, 456, 19-457, 1: Nam etiamsi tollas has literal: LEX, quae
facillime deleri possunt, tamen manet chirographum inustum cordibus nostris, quod nos
damnat et exercet (2 AD, Arg, 13); cf. 415, 18-20 (1 AD, Arg. 36).
563We only have "power over him" in the gospel because in the

freedom of his gracious condescension he puts himself at our disposal. Of course
he can be resisted here, but what he really wants is for us to prevail over him
and, like Jacob wrestling with the stranger at the brook Jabbok (Gen. 32: 22-30), to
demand from him a blessing, because that is the very thing that Christ has
promised to give, and faith can do no other than hold him to his word.
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our Lord Jesus Christ. Antinomians need to hear the law because in rejecting the
law they are really saying that they are beyond the law and have no further need
of repentance for they are free from sin and hence free from the law.564 But
Luther argues, as we have already seen, we can only say that we are free from sin
and the law propter Christum per fidem, that is, from the standpoint of imputation,
or quoad nos in Christo, not quoad nos in se.
Also instructive is Luther's remark that the antinomians not only abolish
Christ, but also lex and omnia disciplina. Naturally, they abolish (or better, claim
to abolish) the law, but what exactly is meant by disciplina? We saw that in the
controversial conclusion to the Second Disputation Luther purportedly posits the
equation disciplina=paedagogia, but we noted that this is uncharacteristic of his
way of speaking. However, it is too premature to draw any conclusions yet since
we have not yet considered all the material. The question that we will try to find
an answer for is this: If disciplina#paedagogia, does discipline refer to the usus
civilis or to the work of the law in the Christian life which has usually been put
under the head usus tertius? From what we know so far it would seem to be the
latter. If this is the case, Luther is saying that the antinomians abolish both the lex
in the sense of the usus theologicus and disciplina in the sense of the parenesis and
exhortation of the New Testament. This would agree with the fact that, as we
saw in the law chapter on the background of the controversy, the only use of the
564To be fair, they claim that repentance comes ex evangelio not ex lege,

whereas Luther argues that even if the xpnatertric, the av oxii, and the !lax poi:314).1a of God (all of which ultimately crystallizes in Christ) is the ground of repentance, in the final analysis this is still the munus legis because here God is doing his opus aliena in preparation for his proper work of redemption.
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law that the antinomians acknowledge as being valid for Christians is the usus
politicus .565
According to the antinomians, the fact that Christ has fulfilled the law
means that we do not need to. That is true ex fide. However, when faith speaks
that way, it is always uttered from the stance of repentance, which always prays
for the daily mortification of the homo vetus and the renewal of the homo novus.
But that is not the case with the antinomians. For them the implication of the lex
impleta is that there is no longer any need to fight against sin: hoc est, non pugnare
contra mortem et peccatum, et quidem iam a Christo superata sunt, ita ut nobis inde nihil
mali possit esse (524, 10-11). But it is precisely this securitas of theirs, which deludes them into thinking that they have already safely docked at the heavenly
port whereas the truth is that none of us has arrived yet in reality (at least apart
from faith) but we are still out on the open seas battling the gales of libidines et
concupiscentia that war against the flesh.566 It is not only the false doctrine but
also its grave ethical implications for faith and the church, which Luther sees
paralleling the illa tempora extrema spoken about by Christ and the apostles, that
565See also two

propositiones in the Promotionsdisputation of Joachim
Marlin: 39 II, 133, 30-31 (B) (Arg. 13): Lex est tantum politica doctrina. Ergo non est
doctrina damnans; again 139, 18-19 (AI) (Arg. 27), this time put forward by
Melanchthon: Lex est tantum politica doctrina. Ergo tantum politice damnat. In both
cases an appeal is made to the veil of Moses in 2 Corinthians. 3. Luther replies
that the velamina must be removed that the law condemning the conscience may
be seen.
566The attitude of the antinomians flies in the face of Paul's warning

not to use our freedom as eig aopgiiv ri aapxi (Gal. 5: 13). Their libertinistic
outlook is typified in the following: At Christus, inquiunt, sustulit peccatum tuum,
quid tristis es? Ita securissime pergunt facere, quod faciunt, et transferunt meritum
passionis Christi et remissionis peccatorum in luxuriam (525, 2-4).
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finally draws Luther into the fray and sustains him in his bitter and unrelenting
battle against the antinomians.567 He cannot understand how they can deny the
agonizing pugna contra carnem in which all Christians struggle and groan and
which Paul articulates so eloquently in the latter half of Romans 7. In a candid
remark, which at the same time contains more than a hint of irony, Luther confesses his own weakness and wishes he could believe without further ado like the
antinomians or be able to sing the Te Deum laudamus in all circumstances of life;
but the flesh in him is too strong for that.568 He provides us with an important
historical marker when he boasts that he can teach hac de re splendidly (Rel. B
adds: as splendidly as they can), a reference no doubt to the fact that Christ has
abolished sin569 and Christians are holy, and that in fact he did teach that before
the antinomians even came on the scene, but as he points out the big difference
between them is that he is still aware of the sin in his life and therefore cannot do
what he teaches, at least not to the same extent as the antinomians can (!) who
567He specifically says that his motives are not ex odio aut invidia, but ex

summa necessitate. If the battle against the antinomians is for Luther summa necessitas, that can only mean that he sees nothing less than the gospel itself at stake.
In other words, the way he sees it, if antinomianism is allowed to go unchecked,
its results [ex eorum dogmate aliquando] will inevitably lead to wholesale apostasy
(527, 18-528, 2).
568Thus he complains: Iam enim irascor, iam hunc torve aspicio, hunc odio,
ilium amore prosequor, neque possum omnibus idem esse, quod ex animo cupio (525, 810). A little later he says that if nothing else, the antinomians should at least
know about this inner conflict from experientia, in testimony of which he cites the
example of the lust of ein alter Narr for a pulchra puella (525, 13-526, 1).
569At 525, 2 he uses these words to characterize antinomian preaching;
see earlier note for the text.
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claim to be free from sin.570 This is not the same as Luther's acknowledgment,
made elsewhere, that at the beginning of the Reformation he preached only the
gospel in order to comfort consciences that had been oppressed by the law, and
that only later, at the time of the Visitation of 1528, he began to see the need also
for the preaching of the law.571 Rather, the emphasis in this passage is on the
teaching of the simul iustus et peccator and the lifelong struggle against the flesh as
the mark of the Christian life as exemplified by Pau1.572 This is so vital to faith
that since it is missing in the antinomians it is a clear sign to Luther that they
have fallen from grace j. eos (scil. antinomos) penitus gratia excidisse] (525, 13).
Luther reiterates, vis-à-vis the antinomians, that it is not enough to state
that Christ has fulfilled the law, for there is also [Sed additum est] the exhortations
of the New Testament: Hernach fac, ut sancte, pie, et integre vivas, ut decet christianum (526, 2-3). Here no doubt he is thinking of passages such as: Movov gicac
tov elicxyr2tiov iov Xpi acoi5 gold-m.6E00e (Phil 1: 27; cf. 1 Thess. 2: 12). We will
return to the question of the distinction here between law and gospel in a moment; for now let us consider how Luther understands the nature and role of the
"additum est," that is, of the parenesis. He explains it like this: First comes the
message of the gospel: Sit tibi ignotum, but then God graciously sends his Spirit in
order that we need never complain that we have been left destitute. Although
570Th.is is our interpretation of the difficult passage which we here cite:
Docere quidem hac de re magnifice possum, et priusquam illi in aliquo munere essent, ilia
docui, sed praestare eadem non ita, quod tamen isti falso sentiunt (525, 10-12).
571For
572Cf.

sit an iniquum.

more on the historical background, see ch. 2.

526, 1-2: Impius autem sequitur omnem ductum nihil putans, aequum
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the work of the Spirit is manifold, Luther focuses here on two things in particular: making us soldiers for the militia christiana, and causing ingentes et inenarrabiles clamores adversus peccatum573 that in the end we may become what we desire
[ut sic tandem fias, quod cupias], which is the same as saying that we may become
what we are in Christ for that is what we desire Kara rev gaw etv0poi rov (cf.
Rom. 7: 21-22). Within the context of this argument, what we desire, quoad sanctos, is expressed in the parenesis: sancte, pie, et integre vivere, ut decet christianum.
If we should protest that this is beyond us, Luther does not point us inward or
tell us to muster inner strength. Rather, he says: Ora, ut audiam te, et faciam, ut
possis (526, 7-8). This is significant for it again underscores the fact that sanctification is the work of the Spirit and living as God's holy people means praying
that God would keep us holy, free from sin, that he would make us good soldiers
so that we can fend off the temptations of the flesh. And if we cannot, it is because we have not prayed. Now, if we take Luther's statement that it is not
enough to say that Christ has fulfilled the law, for the New Testament also gives
us admonition and parenesis, and consider it from the standpoint of law and
gospel, then we would have to say that this remark is intended especially for
573Luther

no doubt has Paul's words in mind about the Spirit's
intercession on our behalf OTEV aygoic daaXritoic (Rom. 8: 26). Although Paul
here simply connects the Spirit's work with intercession generally, Luther links it
with the struggle against sin. It should be noted that we have translated clamores
with "groans" even though strictly speaking the word means "cries." In particular
contexts this could be a war-cry or a cry of lamentation, both of which could have
application to the fight against sin. However, we have chosen "groans," even
though Latin has the word "gemitus," because we are convinced Luther is thinking of the atevayttoi mentioned above. Another translation problem occurs with
the verb ciere. While it could mean that the Spirit "causes" the clamores, we have
been guided by Rom. 8: 26 in translating it as the Spirit "utters," for which there is
a precedent.
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those who are not struggling with sin and who are in grave danger of succumbing to the temptations of the flesh. Such people need to be strengthened in their
resolve to stand firm by being told that Christ has not only saved us from sin and
delivered us from its power, but also warns us to resist it. And yet even this
warning is meant to point us back to Christ, to drive us back under the shelter of
his wings, for we can only resist sin so long as we remain firm in faith and in the
strength of his might. On the other hand, those who are already pricked in conscience and troubled by accusations of the law need only be told: Christ has fulfilled the law for you; fear not, only believe.
Luther will permit no self-help remedies for sin, such as Ovid's remedia
amoris. When he says that any cure, if it is going to be effective, must come, not
ab extra, but ab intus ex corde, is he now pointing us to our own resources after all?
Clearly, that is not the case. Here the ab extra does not refer to divine help extra
nos but to human remedia which are bound to fail. The remedy prescribed by
God, on the other hand, while it is ab intus does nor originate ex corde ipsa, but
from the lex Dei inscribed on the heart. This is what shows those who are enmeshed in sin the magnitudo irae Dei adversus peccata et vita naturae. To those engaging in all manner of immoral practices Paul pulls no punches. In decidedly
un-antinomian fashion he says (and we need to remember that he is addressing
this to Christians): Neque scortatores neque adulteri neque avari neque molles etc.
regnum Dei possidebunt (Eph. 5: 5). Luther criticizes the antinomians for not being
able to speak like this, and perhaps more to the point, for not taking such words
to heart themselves. In the first argumentum, with tongue in cheek, he called
them suaves theologi (499, 1-2); here he describes an antinomian as omnia blande
loquens et benigne faciens hominibus (527, 2-3). Paul speaks the lex condemnatrix
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(Luther calls it a malleus feriens and a tonitrus) not to condemn them, but to bring
those guilty to the point where they can say with Paul: Infelix ego, quis liberabit me
etc, and again: Quod nolo, facio etc. This of course is the usus theologicus legis and
its purpose is to bring sin under check in those who have allowed it free course
so that they learn to pray for sanctification and renounce securitas (527, 7).
In summary, we have now observed two ways in which Luther preaches
the law to Christians: The first is the milder parenetic appeal to live a life worthy
of the gospel of Christ. It encourages them to be good soldiers in the fight against
sin and to pray for sanctification. And here Luther reminds them that for this
very purpose God has given them his Holy Spirit; he does not let them fight the
battle alone but fights it for them and with them. In other arguments we have
seen that Luther stresses first of all that we are free from sin and have fulfilled the
law imputative; then he says God gives us the Spirit so that he might begin to fulfill it in us formaliter and expurgative. Although he does not use this terminology
here, what Luther says in this section in connection with the Holy Spirit is consistent with the latter emphasis. In both cases he teaches that sanctification is the
work of the Spirit, and here especially that prayer is one of his ways. Thus, this
first way of using the law corresponds to the gospel use because its purpose is
not to condemn but to encourage and comfort. On the other hand, the second
way that Luther uses the law here is stringent by comparison because it is addressed to those living impenitently. While the text he chose does not tell them
that God hates them, it does warn them that if they continue unrepentant on their
present course they will forfeit the kingdom of God. This is definitely preaching
aimed at bringing the baptized back to repentance rather than exhorting and
guiding the penitent.
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Luther concludes by subjecting the statement lex est ablata to scrutiny on
the basis of law and gospel. It is true, quoad misericordiam adumbrantem et reputantem to iustum (527, 8-9). But Luther concentrates on the other side, namely, that
the law has not been abolished on account of the sin inhering in our flesh: sed da
mihi unum, qui non sentiat adhuc in came sua plurimas of lictiones et malas. The
weapon to be used to fight temptation is prayer. This is exactly what the adolescens is to remember when he is alone with a pulchra puella: Hic, quando soli sumus,
orandum censeo, ne in tentationem incidamus (527, 9-13). Luther again makes it very
clear that precisely because the pii will always feel such things, the Christian life
is never only a matter of believing, but also of fighting against sin. Yet the order
is important, first comes faith, which then [postea] lives on in the struggle against
sin and security. Faith in Christ, the fulfiller of the law, leads to and undergirds
the pugna cum peccatis, but by the same token where securitas is cultivated and not
opposed, faith itself is threatened, for faith that does not bear fruit (and the pugna
cum peccatis is part of the fruit) is not faith. As we saw earlier, in Luther's opinion, the antinomians had already fallen from grace and were secure in sin while
under the delusion of being holy. Such is their otium and securitas that it is as if
they were no longer in via but had already sailed in the heavenly harbor.574 This
574Securitas it seems is always associated with lawlessness, libertinism,

and immorality. Thus, Luther says that, in spite of their claims to holiness, he
would never trust them with his Katie or his daughter (527, 16-18). Schloemann,
45 n. 129, observes that Luther does not criticize what he calls eine "praktischen
Anti-nomismus" (in the sense of libertinism), but only emphasizes the consequences of false doctrine for the Kirchenvolk (397-8). As we will see later in Arg.
18, Luther even acknowledges that the antinomians with their repentance (ex
evangelio) and parenesis want to improve people morally (534-5). Schloemann is
right in the sense that Luther is not interested merely in morals, but what he
needs to emphasize more strongly is that the reason Luther also criticizes their
libertinistic practises is precisely because he sees these as opening the door to Sa-
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is a clear indication that in Luther's mind one of the chief hallmarks of the antinomianism that he was battling was its false realized eschatology. It would seem
that the reason Luther so vigorously opposes the antinomians575 is that by
putting all the emphasis on salvation as an accomplished fact (faith in Christ, qui
pro se legem implevit), they are in danger of losing the gift of salvation precisely by
presuming, in their securitas, that it can never be lost. Hence, his constant stress
on the need to keep sanctification tied to justification j... credit (scil. pius) in Christurn, qui pro se legem implevit, et postea pugnat cum peccatis, neque sit ita otiosus et securus . . .1 (527, 14-16).576
A few concluding observations. From what we have seen in this argument, and indeed so far in this disputation, the charge that is sometimes made
that Luther did not preach anything but the usus elenchticus to Christians cannot
be supported. Nevertheless, that does remain primary when he specifically addreses the antinomians as we have seen above. But he is also constantly encouraging, warning, and exhorting his dear Christian friends to keep their eyes wide
open, not to let themselves be duped by the wiles of the devil or overcome in a
tan and hence threatening the very gospel itself by inculating the attitude that
salvation once gained can never be lost. Such is securitas.
575See 527, 18-528, 2: Non pugno adversus Antinomos ex odio aut invidia,

sed ex summa necessitate, quia video, quid futurum sit et secuturum ex eorum dogmate
aliquando, videlicet illa tempora extrema, de quibus Christus et divus Petrus
conqueruntur. Schloemann, 45 n. 129 notes that Luther's strong polemical
utterances (especially as we have them in his open letter of 1539, Wider die Antinomer, see discussion in ch. 2) are not to be explained psychologically as simply
outbursts of rage (which he himself confesses as sin in his brief autobiographical
remarks in 525, 8-10) but are of systematic relevance to his thinking.
576See our analysis of 3 AD, Arg. 18 (and in particular Luther's words
in 533, 15-534, 11) for Luther's understanding of the way in which antinomian
doctrine endangers christology.
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moment of weakness by temptation. The exhortations are not instructions on
how to live the Christian life, but rather reminding them of whose they now are,
for as he is so are we in the world, that is, the exhortation is baptismal parenesis.
Secondly (and these two go together), exhortations are always intended to call
the saints to the battlefront where the war in them rages between th flesh and the
spirit. The parenesis therefore is always uttered from the standpoint of the great
battle against Satan, sin, and the flesh in which all the baptized are engaged, insofar as they are also still sinners. Here the key emphases of the parenesis will be:
hold fast to Christ in faith as the victor over sin, remain in your baptismal grave
where you died with him to sin, pray for strength to overcome temptation, keep
alert, be a good soldier of Christ, and fight against sin in the power of the Holy
Spirit.
Argument 14577
Contra 5
Christians are freed from sin while alive, therefore not after death.
Response: Christians, to the extent that they are such, do not sin and
are not ruled by the law, nor do they die, and even if they die, they will live,
as Christ says: I live and you will live [John 14: 19]. Likewise: He will not
taste death in eternity [John 8: 52].
This argument= has already been dealt with in our discussion of Argumentum 11, of which it provides a concise summary. As we have seen time and
again, the antinomian are not so much wrong as only half right. Therefore, the solution is not to reject their thesis altogether but to correct it on the basis of law
and gospel. So too, the proposition: Christiani liberantur a peccato viventes is correct, so long as one understands that we are talking about Christiani here, not
quoad in se but quod in Christum. With this distinction the rest can stand.
57739 I, 528, 5-8.
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Argument 15578
Contra 26 and 27
You are freed from the law, and the law is not to be recalled. The
church has been freed from the law. Therefore, the law is not to be
preached.
Paul says: The law was not laid down for the righteous [1 Tim. 1: 9].
Response: To the extent that we are such.
Luther's responsio here is extraordinarily brief because the substance of this
argumentum has already been dealt with in most of the arguments of this disputation. However, we will take it up in discussion a final time, also in connection
with First Timothy 1: 9, in our analysis of argumenum 37/10.579
Argument 16580
The effect of the law is not to be taught. Therefore, neither its cause.
Response: It was said above that the law is not the efficient cause of sin
but the ostensive. For it is not the law that makes you sin, neither is the law
the cause and producer of despair or anger against God, nor of evil deeds
against human beings, rather it is you and the sin in you even before the
preaching of the law. For the law was given and came for this purpose: to
show you your lack of trust, despair, anger, hatred, and malice. What then
is the cause of this, who produces it? You and I. What reveals it? The law.
Therefore, before the law comes we are ignorant of all this. And it is a most
wretched thing that such great evil dwells in us, as Paul says: Once I was
living without the law [Rom. 7: 9]. It is true that with Paul here I am a good
Antinomian, but for how long? Until the law or death comes along and
shows me that I myself am its cause. Here finally it will become apparent
that I am brim full of deceit, malice, anger, hatred, impatience and weakness. Ah, how much better then to learn this in life when the mind and
body are sound than there in extremis! It is not for nothing that the psalm
says: I will appoint lawgivers for them so that the other nations may know
that they are but human [Ps. 9: 21], otherwise they will be secure and think
that they dwell in the midst of heaven and sit at God's right hand playing
with the stars. But I say nothing to them about the law that reveals their
57839 I, 528, 11-13.
579See 39 I, 575, 4-576, 4.

58039 I, 529, 2-530, 3.

505
unbelief. They do not believe in God. Therefore, it is said that the law
works wrath.
This argument= is similar to a supplementary question, based on Rom. 7:
9, put to Luther in a previous disputation, but his answer there takes as its point
of departure the account of Paul's conversion in Acts 9.581 Here in his responsio
he rather concentrates on the distinction between the causa effectiva peccati and the
causa ostensiva peccati. Sin is the efficient cause of sin, not the law; however, the
law is its ostensive cause in that the law makes sin manifest. This is the only reason for the law that Luther cites. Before the law we are ignorant of this; sin is still
there but it lies dormant. Hence Paul, looking back to his pre-conversion days,
can say: I was once alive apart from the law but when the law came I died: iy6 tie
act) v

chc vcip.au ring, iMicytia Tic Sg Tifc ivroXlic n apaptia avanaev, 46
durgeavov icch viva n
ivtotit Eig WO, aihn dig eavarov (Rom. 7: 9-10).

Luther makes an interesting remark: Esto, quod cum Paulo hic sim bonus Antinomos,
sed quamdiu? usque donec veniat lex aut mors et ostendat, me ipsum causam esse (529,
1143).582 Just as Paul was an antinomian before his conversion (loosely socalled, because even though he was in medio legis he did not know the sensum aut
effectus legis), so too, in a different sense, Luther can call himself an antinomian, in
conspectu evangelii (because iv Xpiotol" he is dead to the law), yet he knows that
that is only half the story. It is true only usque donec veniat lex aut mors et ostendat,
me ipsum causam esse. In other words even the baptized, in quantum se peccatores,
581See 39 I, 405, 4-6 (1 AD, Arg. 27); on the other hand, in 483, 12-13 (2
AD, Arg. 28) the key text, Rom. 7: 9 appears as the proof of an argumentum.
582There is of course a paradox here: only the Christian can confess

that all life lived apart from faith is death, that is, that the impii, though alive, are
dead.
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must reckon with the law for, secundum veterem hominem, they still have remnants
of sin inhering in the flesh. However, it is only in the light of the law that I know
that I am brim full of sin. Although God gave Israel the law through Moses, he
also gave legislatores to the aliae genies so that in their hybris they do not think that
they are gods.583 But, because they are non credentes Deo, he did not give them a
law to reveal their impietas (529, 16-530, 3). Luther concludes from that: Lex iram
operatur (Rom. 4: 15).
Here then he has come full circle. The antinomian propositio asserted: Effectus legis non est docendus. Ergo nec causa ipsius. He in turn has argued that that is
true only from the standpoint of faith in him who is the impletor legis. Therefore,
insofar as Christians are also peccatores, the causa effectiva legis has not been
abolished, neither has the causa ostensiva, for the Pauline axiom holds good: Lex
iram operatur. Consequently, the effectus legis has not been abolished; ergo: lex est
docenda.
Argument 17584
Anything that causes despair and (false) security is not to be taught.
The law is such. Therefore, it is not to be taught.
Response (10): The law causes neither despair nor security, as Paul
says: Once I used to live without the law [Rom. 7: 9], that is, I was secure in
hypocrisy. And whoever is secure does not have the law. Certainly security
is without and prior to the law, but when the law comes security ceases and
it leads us to a knowledge of ourselves. There then we begin to argue and
work out who and what sort of people we were before. There sin, which
God's law finds in our flesh, begins to revive [Rom. 7: 9]. The law does not
583Here Luther cites Ps. 9: 21: Mr WM M' 11 T' 137.1?

rriin rom

rartg. However, Luther follows the Vulgate and renders rnin r1 31'O with constituam eis legislatores. However, the end result is the same. The psalmist asks
God to rule over the nations and strike fear into them.
58439 I, 530, 5-532, 7.
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compel us to despair, as Paul says to the Romans: It is not the law, which is
good and holy, that kills me but sin [Rom. 7: 12-13]. Certainly, the law
shouts: You shall have no other gods, because I am the Lord your God who
wants and is able to save all who call on me. Although the law tries to do
this, we run in the opposite direction because we are by nature evil and corrupt. You see, the law works in us, as in evil matter, something other than
should be the case so that, although people ought to trust God, that is, be
roused by this voice of God to faith, they despair, especially when they see
that they are not the sort of people the law wants them to be: You shall love
the Lord your God with all your heart etc. [Matt. 22: 37-39]. It is as if indeed
the law was given so that I may be such a one, and not rather that I may
know that I am not such a one who then needs the help of some one else. In
this way the law crushes me from the right and from the left. If the law is
present, I despair, but if it is absent I become secure. However, although
each is false I deny that the law is given for either, but rather in order that I
might fear God and hope in him.
Therefore, that thesis, that the law causes despair and security in the
church, should not be propounded because actually it does neither, nor is
that its office, as its intention was what we have already said. But it is we
ourselves and our inherent sin that makes this such a great and insuperable
evil in us. It does that with our bodies even though the law seeks to do no
such thing, but only to show you that you ought to hope in him and love
God. And because you know that you do not and cannot do these things,
and you begin to despair and prior to the law are secure, that certainly is not
the fault of the law, which is good and holy, but it is the fault of your
perverse nature and sin. For where there is no law there is no transgression
[Rom. 5: 13], nor is there any death because sin and death are revealed
through the law but not inflicted. Sin and death were in the world from
Adam until the law but it was dead and asleep, that is, it was not known,
but when the law came it revived, that is, it was revealed and heard (Rom. 5:
13; 7: 9). These present evils were made known to the sons of Adam
through the law.
This argumentum is related to the previous one in that both attempt to lay
the blame for the effectus of the law, whether desperatio or securitas, at the door of
the law itself, whereas Luther in the responsio makes it clear that the law is not to
blame, but that we are and the sin that clings to us. He demonstrates this from
Paul. First, the law cannot be the cause of security because the apostle plainly
says: Vivebam sine lege aliquando (Rom. 7: 9), but instead of just citing the text as he
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did in his previous argument he goes one step further and interprets it: hoc est, fui
securus hypocrita (530, 9-10), thus making it clear that even without585 the law
Paul was secure, albeit in hypocrisy. Therefore, securitas is not caused by the law
but exists absque et ante legem. Secondly, the law cannot be the cause of despair
for Paul himself says that it is not the lex [[vroXii], which is bona et sancta,586 that
kills me, but sin (Rom. 7: 9).587
Following on from the above, Luther now makes some important remarks
about the purpose of the law. The law wants us to do what it prescribes (= the
will of God) but by itself cannot effect it because we run in the opposite direction
on account of our corrupt nature. The way that Luther describes the law here
reminds us of the language of faith: The First Commandment is not that uttered
by a tyrant who wishes merely to enslave us, but by our loving God who wishes,
and is indeed able, to save all who call on him. But because of our sin, instead of
working faith in us, the law ends up working something quite different, namely,
despair. We should note carefully what Luther says here. The law should rouse
us to faith [. . . cum fidere Deo deberent, id est hac voce Dei excitari ad fidem] (531, 5-8).
But when people see, in the light of the law, that they are not the people that God
wants them to be, they end up in despair. Furthermore, the law buffets them
585For the proper understanding of this "sine lege" see our analysis of
the previous argument.
586Strictly, Paul says that the vcip.oc is Cc roc and that the evv:Ari is aria

xth taxccia icon ayaeri (Rom. 7: 12), but the difference between %/agog and irroAti
is purely formal, the latter being a subset of the former.
587Paul takes it a step further when he says of this sin that it is ti ex-

parria dc4:piiiiv XafSoiticra Sax t tic Evro7.fc itrpreariaiv 11£ Kth Si crinfic a2cixTE1VEv (Rom. 7: 11).
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from every side as if its task were to make them into what God desires and the
law demands, instead of rather showing them that they are not like that, and
therefore need the help of another, namely, Christ.588 What makes Luther's
thinking here somewhat complex is that, if we have interpreted him correctly, he
is saying that, on the one hand, the law should rouse us to faith, and would if we
were not crippled by sin, but on the other, the law was not given to make us what
we should be, but rather to make it clear to us that we are not that, and therefore
need the help of another. In other words, the difference between the law's intention and its negative effect is our sin. Furthermore, it would seem to follow,
though Luther does not say it, that the law, only when under the control of the
gospel (and hence in the justified) can really do what it originally wanted to do,
namely, rouse to faith and encourage. But, on account of sin, it only leads to despair, or alternatively, where the law is absent, to security [Si adest lex, despero, sin
abest, securus fio] (531, 11).589 Nevertheless, Luther reiterates that the law was not
588This is our interpretation of Luther's rather complex sentence (531,

5-11):
Videtis legem in nobis, ut in materia mala, diversum quid operari, ut, cum fidere
Deo deberent, id est hac voce Dei excitari ad fidem, desperent, praesertim cum viderent, se
non esse tales, gullies lex velit: Diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde etc., et quasi
vero lex ideo data esset, ut talis sim, et non potius, ut sciam, me talem non esse, ut opus
haberem alieno auxilio, ita a dextris et sinistris impingitur.
We refer the reader to our translation above for a precise rendering.
589Luther is obviously following Paul in saying that securitas is present
without and prior to the law (Rom. 7: 9), and conversely that desperatio is a result
of the law, whereas on previous occasions he has said that the law can lead either
to despair or to security. So too a little later in his responsio he says that despair
comes when, confronted by the law, you feel your inability to do what the law
demands [. incipis desperare et ante legem securus esse . . . (531, 19-532, 1).
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given for the purpose of causing desperatio590 or securitas, nor is this its officium,
but rather it was given with the intention that ut timeas Deum et speres in eum (531,
12-13).591 To this end he rejects the antinomian propositio: Lex parit desperationem
et securitatem in Ecclesia (531, 14). However, the good and holy law, because of
natura prava et peccatum, is unable to achieve its consilium, but instead is turned
into hoc tantum malum et insuperabile nobis (531, 15-532, 2). Nevertheless, strictly
speaking, it does not cause this evil but only stirs it up and shows that it is there.
Thus following Paul, Luther affirms: Peccatum et mors fait in mundo ab Adam usque
ad legem, sed fait mortuum et cubabat, hoc est, ignorabatur, sed veniente lege revixit, hoc
est, revelabatur et audiebatur (532, 4-6). Even without the law, sin and death are
present, but where there is no law sin is not taken into account (Rom. 5: 13:

a-

Aapria SE 01)K eXit.oyeltai ith Ovtoc vOgov), that is, it is as if they are dead and
asleep. Consequently, sin and death are revealed [ostendere] through the law but
not inflicted [infligere] (532, 3-7).
590Luther can of course say elsewhere that the law can only create despair: km experimur omnes, earn aliud nihil posse efficere, quam desperationem (445, 7;
2 AD, Arg. 8). However, Luther makes it clear there that in talking about the proprius effectus legis, we can only speak about what the law does in this corrupt nature. He also says in the same argument that if we can say that despair is good
and useful (which we can in faith), this we owe not to the law but to the Holy
Spirit, qui ex lege non facit latronem nec diabolum, sed paedagogum (445, 12-13).
Therefore, in both places Luther says that despair is not caused by the law, as
such, but of our sinful nature, yet the gospel can use this despair (= desperatio sui)
to achieve that which was impossible for the law, although Satan, on the other
hand, wants to exploit the law for his purposes and create total despair (= desperatio Dei).
591He repeats this a little later. The good law does not seek any malum,
but it wishes only to show: to debere sperare in eum, diligere Deum (531, 18).
However, there is a slight difference in emphasis. In the former (531, 12-13) the
law is seen more as the instrument by which God's will is to be effected, in the
latter (531, 18) it rather stresses what God's will requires [debere].
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Argument 18592
Christ preaches repentance from the gospel, for which he was especially sent. Therefore, the gospel is to be taught, not the law.
The conclusion is valid because we have been sent to preach and announce the kingdom of God and the forgiveness of sins, which is the proper
voice of the gospel.
Response: Certainly that is true. But both Christ and John the Baptist
preach repentance, unless you want to say that these words in Luke 13 [: 3]
belong to the gospel: "Unless you repent, you will perish together and what
follows." This is to preach the law, to reveal sin. Likewise, in Matthew 5 he
expounds the law and sharpens it as much as possible. Not to mention
what he does in Matt 23, where he shouts woe, woe, woe so often that the
heart shrinks from reading it. Likewise, the question to the scribe: What do
you read in the law? What is written? [Luke 10: 26]. And there are many
other passages which show that Christ taught or at least interpreted the law,
as did John also, in order thus to prepare for himself a people who would be
receptive to this new teaching. It was to preach this that was the proper reason for Christ's being sent, namely, to preach the gospel to the poor, that is,
to announce the forgiveness of sins and to heal the contrite in heart, because
this is his proper office [Luke 4: 18]. But meanwhile he does not reject the
other part, indeed he himself makes people contrite and poor, and again
also heals the contrite in heart. For he himself teaches both: Repent, he says,
and believe the gospel. But if Christ had wanted to teach [what the antinomians teach], and not teach repentance, he would not have said: Repent,
[but] repent according to the gospel. Thus there would be two repentances,
[one with] and [the other] without Christ. Our antinomians are so dense
that they do not see what they are doing. For those who reject the law are
no less the crucifiers of Christ than those who cry out violently in the psalm:
Let us break their chains and cast off their yoke [Ps. 2: 3], and they hang
Christ. For just as the Pharisees and scribes did not want to put up with
Christ's teaching: Woe to you, woe to you, in Matthew 23 [: 13-15], likewise,
in Matthew 5 [: 20]: Unless your righteousness exceeds etc., and at many
other times, and on account of this teaching, carry Christ off to the cross, so
also these antinomians are no better than those people who want to drive
Christ out of the church with his teaching and word, and crucify and bury
him again, so that we cannot see what great gifts we have received through
Christ. Thus Christ's principal office is to teach grace and the forgiveness of
sins and to preach good news to the poor. But yet not only this, because he
also preached the law as we saw above.
59239 I, 532, 9-539, 2.
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Therefore, it is asked whether Christ is also a preacher of the law?
Response: that he is, but not only of the law. Again, is Christ a preacher of
the gospel? Response: he is. But not of the gospel only. For although it is
his principal office, for which he was especially sent, to preach the gospel to
the poor [Luke 4: 18] and to heal those contrite in heart, in the mean time he
preaches the law, which even our antinomians do, even though they especially rail against those who teach the law. For certainly they admonish
people and teach them to live chaste, pious, and holy lives, and to be gentle,
kind, mild, humble, and sincere. Although these things belong to the divine
law and are taught from the law, they nevertheless abhor the law itself even
though, I believe, having regard for the actual voice of the law. Since however the law really is whatever performs the office of the law, whatever terrifies, whatever accuses consciences, whatever exposes ingratitude, lusts,
and sins, whether it is in the gospel or in Moses, it makes no difference finally where any of these things are taken from that convict sins. Therefore, I
can almost say the same about our antinomians that he did about the Athenians593 who said: Fools indeed they are not, but they do foolish things.
Meanwhile, see that you do not make Christ some lawgiver, like Mohammed, which is not his proper office, but rather that you look at him and receive him as mediator and savior, who came to fulfill the law, but not abolish it [Matt. 5: 17] so that he is not what certain people make him out to be.
He remains the preacher of the gospel to the poor and afflicted. But whence
come to us the poor? The antinomians answer: grace is to be preached to
them and they become better. Not true. That is not the way Christ taught,
for those who are well have no need of a physician but those who are sick
[Matt. 9: 12], and they cannot be sick with a knowledge of sin. But sin is revealed through the preaching of the law. From this they see that lack of
trust, false security, despair, disobedience and lust is sin. And it is possible
that this also could have happened through a revelation of the gifts of
Christ, who suffered so much for you and your sins. It is the same: whether
this happens through the preaching of the gifts of Christ or the law makes
no difference; in either case it is law. Thus Paul says: The kindness of God
also calls and invites us to repentance [Rom. 2: 4]. And when I hear what
great benefits he has given me from my mother's womb until now, that he
has supported and preserved me in so many great dangers, I am compelled
to say: Since I have so great a Father in heaven, who nurtures me, a wicked
sinner, as if in his own bosom, protects and defends me and is favorable to
me, how will I in turn obey him and do what he commands. 0 wretch that I
593The

WA editors note that Luther means Demodocus in Aristotle's
Nicomachian Ethics, VII, 9. Yet this word is not spoken by the Athenians, but by
the Milesians.
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am that I have not until now recognized him as so kind a Father, and that I
have not loved and heeded him as a father. Woe is me, poor wretch, where
will I turn? What will I begin [to do] first? What is this, if not preaching the
law from divine kindness. And I do not know whether any law could torment the mind and drive the heart into more desperate straits than this view
of God's kindness. For our hearts are not so affected by the recognition of
some offense against God and neighbor, the First and Second Table, as they
are by that, if they see that they have despised the grace of God which is
promised or given, and which is so helpful and kind. To overcome this disdain of God is by far the most difficult thing. This ingratitude, if ever it is
recognized, often causes death and despair. Therefore, what place is there
for a remedy? How are people to be healed who have been made poor?
Not indeed from the law, but from the kindness of God, which for those
people has become even more painful than the law itself. How then do we
heal these people, since neither the law or the kindness of God can save
them but only terrify them more and more? For the more you impress upon
them the kindness of God the more they despair because it is just that great
kindness that they have neglected or despised. What is to be done? Here it
is time for them to follow the finger of John the Baptist, the pointer to the
lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world. For here Christ comes
with his proper office as the preacher of the gospel to the poor. My brother,
do not despair but hasten to this Christ who came into this world not to destroy but that the world might be saved through him [John 3:17]. Again: He
will not break a bruised and contrite594 reed nor quench a smoldering wick
[Matt. 12: 20; cf. Is. 42: 3]. Here he comes to save souls and not to condemn.
But now the antinomians understand nothing of these things, nor can they,
if they want to be consistent, comfort consciences in grave temptations. This
is what happened to the man Krause of Halle, who could not think of Christ
in any other way than as his accuser before the Father in heaven. For when
Christ is set before such people, [and they are told] that he came and shed
his blood for them, you will hardly move them. For immediately they contradict it, then this itself is such a great sin because I do not recognize the
magnitude of the gifts of Christ who suffered for me: Alas! wretched me!
That is why some people do violence to themselves and take their life by
means of weapons or rope, as the man from Halle did. Thus the devil,
transforming himself into Christ [cf. 2 Cor. 11: 14], tricks and robs us
through the image of a false Christ. For that vile adversary cannot teach or
show any other Christ, if indeed he does present him, than that of lawgiver,
accuser, and judge, just as the pope did. But in such struggles and when we
speak about Christ, we are to look to and present him who is called the
594Luther's

addition.
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preacher of the gospel to the poor, who is the savior, the mediator, and the
comforter of the afflicted and distressed, who came to save those who were
perishing. Therefore, we must distinguish properly between Christ, insofar
as he expounds and preaches the law, which does not belong to his proper
office, and insofar as he is presented to us as savior and fulfiller of the law,
as Paul says: He whom God made our wisdom, our righteousness, our sanctification, and our redemption [1 Cor. 1: 30]. Amen. But the world is evil
and each day becomes worse, and it suffers neither to be taught nor admonished, as you will one day see for yourselves after we have died.
The antinomian proposition: Christus praedicat poenitentiam ex Evangelio, is
really a variation on the thesis that repentance is to be preached ex violation
filii,595 or alternatively: Christus praecepit apostolis, in nomine suo praedicare poeni-

tentiam, ergo non per legem est agnitio peccati, sed per Evangelium.596 In the Argumentum before us, the Consequentia: Igitur Evangelium docendurn, non lex, is said to
be based on the proprium of Christ' own mission and the church's commission to
preach the gospel (532, 9-12).
Luther does not comment on the antinomian argument other than to say:
Ja warlich das war's (532, 13). However, while agreeing that Christ preaches repentance ex Evangelio, he spends the rest of his time showing that this is not the
whole truth. For if it were, it would mean that Jesus' words in Luke 13 and Matthew 5 (where he exponit legem et acuit eam, quantum potest), not to mention Matthew 23 with its condemnation of the Pharisees, and his reply in Luke 10: 26 ad
scribam (actually the question was asked by a voinic6c), as well as similar sayings,
would all have to come under the heading Evangelium, which they are clearly not.
Although Christ can indeed preach the law in all severity, as well as interpret it,
that is not his propriissimum officium, but rather evangelizare pauperibus, hoc est, an595See 39 I, 399, 8-9 (1 AD, Arg. 22); 400, 2-3 (1 AD, Arg. 23).
596See 39 I, 392, 17-20 (1 AD, Arg. 19); cf. 414, 2-5 (1 AD, Arg. 35).
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nunciare remissionem peccatorum et sanare contritos corde (533, 8-9). In other words,
Christ preachs both law and gospel, although the preaching of the law is always
done in view of the preaching of the gospel, as Luther says: . . . ut sic pararet sibi
populum capacem istius novae doctrinae, et ad quam praedicandam Christus proprie missus est . . . (533, 6-8)1.597 The former he calls preaching repentance in contradistinction to the gospel. When he uses the word poenitentia therefore he understands it as proceeding ex lege, whereas, on the other hand, when he refers to the
antinomian understanding of repentance he normally distinguishes it as poenitentia ex Evangelio. Unless this distinction in terminology is carefully noted, the
reader of Luther's responsio may in places become confused. Consequently, he
sees Jesus' words in Mark 1: 15: Agite poenitentiam et credite Evangelio as reflecting
the proper distinction between law and gospel, whereas if he had wanted to
teach like the antinomians that repentance springs ex Evangelio, Jesus would have
said: Poenitemini, poenitemini secundum Evangelium598 (533, 12-14). That would
mean, Luther objects, that there are two repentances (although the antinomians
themselves would claim there is only one): one with Christ, the other without
Christ [Ita fierent duae poenitentiae, et sine Christo] (533, 14).599 Luther refuses to let
597The complementarity of law and gospel, that Christ does both,

without in any way weakening their antithesis, can be seen in Luther statement:
Sed interim non reiicit (scil. Christus) alteram partem (scil lex), imo ipse facit contritos et
pauperes, et rursus etiam medetur contritis corde (533, 9-11).
598Sense requires the addition of the adversative "sed." That this is a
correct reading of the text is confirmed by Rel. B which has: Poenitemini, sed
poenitemini secundum Evangelium (533, 27-28).
599Again Rel. B expands and thus interprets this terse statement: Ita

fierent duae poenitentiae altera secundum Christum, altera sine Christo (533, 28-534,
20).
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law and gospel he pulled apart as the antinomians do when they reject the law,
and accuses them of being crucifixores Christi no less than the kings of the heathen
nations who cry out: Disrumpamus vincula eorum et proiiciamus a nobis iugum ipsorum, et suspendunt Christum (Ps. 2: 3).600 Again, by rejecting the law, the antirtomians drive Christ out of the church and thus show themselves as the true children
of the Pharisees who rejected Christ's interpretation of the law and carried him
off to the cross.601 Luther, in underscoring the importance of the gospel, repeats
an observation he made in an earlier disputation, and that is that without the law
we cannot appreciate the greatness of the gifts that we have received through
Christ.602
Luther now attempts to clarify further his position by declaring that even
though Christ's principale officium is docere gratiam et remissionem peccatorum et
6°0In this

Royal Psalm, originally composed for Israel's kings, the term
christus has its technical meaning "anointed one" (r_r'top), and thus refers in the
first instance to the earthly king as the Lord's anointed, but at the same time also
prefigures the coming of Jesus, the ultimate messianic king and messiah.
601Unless

one understands Jesus' interpretation of the law to be the
pivotal point of comparison, the analogy makes no sense because the Pharisees
were very keen teachers of the law. Luther here is a little vague and mentions
only Christ's doctrina (534, 2-5). Nonetheless, his comparison does serve to
emphasize the close nexus between the law and Christ. It seems that he wants to
make the point that law and gospel cannot be separated without finally losing the
gospel and hence losing Christ.
602He draws

a parallel between the antinomians' rejection of the law
and the Pharisees' expulsion of Christ from the church along with his doctrina and
verbum in order to show that the result of the antinomians' doing what they have
done is that: ne possimus videre, quae et quanta beneficia per Christ= acceperimus
(534, 8). This parallel also shows the close connection Luther sees existing between the rejection of the law and the rejection of Christ. Cf. also what Luther
says in 1 AD, Arg. 16, that in order for us to understand what Christ has done as
impletor legis, he needs to expound and interpret the law.
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evangelizare pauperibus, nevertheless, he still preaches the law as auxiliary to the
gospel. But now he pushes the discussion a step further when he claims that the
antinomians themselves preach the law although they especially rail against the
doctores legis (534, 14-18). He exempflies this by pointing out that they too teach
people to lead a chaste and godly life: Nam certe admonent populum et docent, ut
caste, pie, et sancte vivant, ut sint mites, benigni, mansueti, humiles et sinceri (534, 1819).603 But it is precisely here that Luther uncovers a contradiction. The items
just listed, all of which belong to the parenetic tradition of the New Testament,
ipso facto stem ex lege (although, to be fair, that would not be axiomatic for the
antinomians), yet the Antinomi abominate the law. Luther seems to conclude
from this that while, on the one hand, they hate the lex, on the other, they pay attention to the vox legis.604 However, Luther argues, the antinomian protestations
notwithstanding, that whatever performs the function of the law, that is, produces the effects of the law, is itself law irrespective of whether it has its source in
the law or the gospel. He formulates this as follows:
Cum tamen revera lex sit, quod legis officio fungitur, quod tenet, quod
accusat conscientias, quod ingratitudines, libidines et peccata ostendit, sive
603Although judging from Luther's polemics and from the antinomian

profile in ch. 2, it could be more a matter of "do what they say but not what they
do" (cf. Matt. 23: 3 where Jesus tells his disciples to observe the doctrine of the
Pharisees but not their practise).
604The sentence reads: Haec (scil. catalog of "virtues") cum sint legis div-

inae et ex lege doceantur, tamen ipsam legem abominantur, intuentes credo ipsam vocem
legis (534, 19-535, 2). It seems that Luther needs this distinction between lex and
vox legis (a distinction somewhat akin to the Aristotelian distinction between the
formal and material principle) to account for how the antinomians can reject the
law and yet teach the adhortatives of the NT, which of course Luther argues are
the vox legis but which they no doubt would claim are the vox Evangelii.
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sit in Evangelio, sive in Mose, nihil refert, ubicunque tandem legatur aliquid
eorum, quae arguunt peccata (535, 2-5).
This insight of Luther's is of such moment that it was also taken up into
the Formula of Concord some four decades later.605 However, this does not turn
Christ into some legiferus like Mohammed. He remains first and foremost
evangelizator pauper= et miserorum (535, 11-12). That the antinomians could tell
Luther! But they come to a serious parting of the ways when it comes to the
question of how Christ does do his evangelical work. The antinomians' solution
is the application of the gospel ohne weiteres: Respondent ipsi (scil. Antinomi to the
question: At unde nobis sunt pauperes?), praedicari eis gratiam, et meliores fiunt.
Luther: No sic. Nam Christus sic non docuit (535, 12-14). He objects that people
cannot be healed unless they are first brought to acknowledge that they are sick,
and here he has recourse to our Lord's own words in Matthew 9: 12 where he
says that those who are well (or think they are well!) have no need of a physician
but those who are sick. Therefore, unless the scalpel of the law first does its
probing work in exposing the sin, showing that such things as diffidentia, securitas,
desperatio, inobedientia et libidines are sin, the "patient" will not know he is sick and
consequently will not look for the healing of the gospel.
In spite of what he has just said, Luther grants the possibility that this
knowledge of sin could come through the revelation of the beneficia Chisti, for
605See FC SD V, 11-13 (BSLK, 956). The Bekenntnisschriften editors note
that the passage actually cited to substantiate this point is excerpted from a sermon of Luther's on the gospel for the Fifth Sunday after Trinity, (John 16: 8) (WA
15, 228). The last part of the quote is given double spaced for emphasis (but unfortunately not italicized in Tappert's translation). After reciting the first part of
the text: Der Heilige Geist wird die Welt strafen umb die Siinde; he continues a little
later (with emphasis): wolchs mag nicht geschehen ohn durchs Gesetz Erkliirung. To.
2. Ien. fol. 455.
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God is free to work in whichever way he chooses.606 However, be that as it may,
the crucial thing is not just that whether you come to repentance by means of the
law or the rhetoric of the gospel you will be one and the same, which was his
earlier conclusion,607 but that it makes no difference precisely because in either
case it is the law that is at work. However, Luther now proceeds to show that
there may be a difference after all if one begins with the gospel as opposed to the
law, not theologically but pastorally. First, he reaffirms that the proclamation of
the goodness and kindness of God may indeed bring people to their knees in contrition and compel them to confess their utter wretchedness, unworthiness, and
confusion in not knowing where to tUrn.6°8 Then he explains the classical
dilemma of preaching the law ex benignitate divina. So powerful is the effect that
Luther knows of no law that could ever drive the heart into more desperate
straits than this conspectus Dei benignitatis (536, 13-15). The heart is affected far
more deeply by the realization that one has despised the promised and proffered
606ALready in 1 AD, Arg. 28 he not only said that repentance can arise

ex cognitione legis et ex cognitione crucis Christi seu salutis , but that it ought to arise
from the passion of Christ [Est quidem ex cruce seu passione Christi homo ducendus
ad poenitentiam] (407, 1-4). On the other hand in 1 AD, Arg. 24 Luther says that
where the duri et impoenitenties cannot be reached with minae and terrores, we
should resort to promissa et beneficia (401, 4-6).
607Thus 39 I, 407, 12-13 (1 AD, Arg. 28): Sive iam lege sive Evangelii

rhetorica veneris ad poenitentiem (sic), unum et idem eri s. Here the importance thing
is that the repentance in each case is the same and not, as here, that it is always
the law that in effect leads to repentance even if the preachment [res] is gospel.
608Luther illustrates the kind of devastation that the gospel, acting as
law, can wreak in a person so that they end up bordering on despair: 0 me
miserum, qui hunc tam benignum patrem hactenus non agnoverim, non ut patrem dilexerim et observaverim. Ach unnd wehe mir Armen, quo me vertam? quid primum incipiam? Num quid hoc est? (536, 10-13).
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grace of God than by the knowledge that one has transgressed some commandment of the Decalogue. As Luther perceptively observes: Hunc despectum Dei vincere est longe gravissimum. Haec ingratitudo, si quando agnoscitur, saepe parit mortem
et desperationem (537, 3-5). The dilemma of course is that the very place where
troubled consciences should be directed to receive comfort is itself the source of
greatest distress.609 Neither the law nor the kindness of God can save them but
only terrify them more and more. Ordinarily, this would be the point at which a
pastor, like John the Baptizer, would direct the penitent to the Christ the evangelizator pauperum. However, as Luther points out, that is impossible in the case of
the antinomians because they have already played their trump card, so to speak.
If they have already used the gospel to bring people to repentance, they can
hardly turn around now and use that same message as a source of comfort.
Hence, Luther says that the antinomians, if they want to be consistent, can never
console consciences in gravissimis tentationibus (537, 17-19). It is here that he
makes mention of the tragic suicide of the Dr. Krause of Halle, the blame for
whose death he lays at the door of the antinomians.610 This man became so terror stricken by the image of Christ that he ended up taking his life in despair 611
609537, 9-10: Quo enim magis inculcas benignitatem Dei, eo magis iste desperat, quad tantam benignitatem neglexerit aut contempserit.
610The suicide happened on All Saints Day 1527. Cf. Enders 6, 147, n.
9; CR I, 922-3; WATR 1, 277, 329; 4, 498. On Krause, see Rudolf Hermann, Zum
Streit um die Clbenvindung des Gesetzes: Erorterungen zu Luthers Antinomerthesen
(Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1958), 23ff. For a general assessment of
his work work, see ch. 4.
611People like this get trapped in a vicious circle: they are driven to

contrition in the first place through the proclamation of God's kindness, then out
of a sense of shame and unworthiness they refuse to believe that Christ shed his
blood for them, and then finally they become burdened with even greater guilt
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He could think of Christ in no other way than that of accusator coram patre in coelis
(537, 20-538,1). The death of Krause is the consequence not only of a systematic
separation of law and gospel, which, as we have seen from our discussion, can
arise when repentance is made to depend on the preaching of the gospel, but also
the general failure to distinguish between law and gospel. It is not enough to distinguish between Christ and the law but we also need to distinguish between the
opus proprium and the opus alienurn of Christ himself.612 In other words, we must
distinguish inter Christum, quatenus legem exponit et praedicat, quod non est proprii
eius officii, et quatenus nobis proponitur salvator et impletor legis (538, 13-16).
This was a lengthy responsio but an important one. Two facts emerged
here that are new. First, that the law can be identified as whatever performs the
function of the law, that is, accuses consciences, even if it be the gospel. Therefore, law and gospel must be distinguished not merely on the level of grammar
but on the basis of effect. Secondly, although repentance can be brought about by
both the law and the gospel, Luther has shown that there are seelsorgerlich reasons
why it is hazardous to make it a practice to preach repentance on the basis of the
gospel of God's kindness and love in Christ.
Argument 19613
The law was given to a specific nation, that is, to the Jews. We are not
Jews. Therefore, the law does not apply to us.
Proof of Minor Premise: Romans 2 [: 12]: Those who have sinned without the law will perish without the law.
when they recognize their culpability in not accepting the gifts of Christ who
died for their sin (cf. 538, 1-5). Luther blames the devil for the despair that people
feel when told about the love of Christ, for Satan can transform himself into an
angel of light (2 Cor. 11: 14).
612CF.
61339

BSLK, 955, 27-28.

I, 539, 4-541, 5.
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Response: Considered from the standpoint of race, the law was not
given and laid down for a specific nation but for the whole human race, for
in fact most of the laws useful for this life, together with the whole Decalogue, were written and inscribed on the hearts of all people, unless they
were sheer brutes, already from the birth or creation of mankind with Adam
himself. But because man fell into sin, and because people gradually deserted God and more and more turned away from him, and since they fell
into a worse state through having neglected him, until finally memory of
him614 was almost completely blotted out and obscured, God was compelled anew to set before us a boundary, lest we should forget his law altogether, in order that we might thereby at least remember who we once were
and who we are now. Therefore, the law was renewed and indeed written
and handed on to a specific people, to the extent that it was written, but not
to the extent that it was spoken, because these ideas were common to all nations as experience itself testifies. For if this were not the case, we would set
no store by it at all if the law said: you do not trust God, you do not fear
him, you misuse his name, even as now I regard it as nothing if ever it says:
you have not been circumcised, you do not offer a bullock, heifer, and ram.
For when I hear this I do not care one iota, nor do I not begin to tremble, but
even consider it a game and joke. But when it says: you are an unbeliever,
you do not believe in God, you do not fear God, you are an adulterer and
fornicator, disobedient and whatever else, here at once I begin to tremble
and quake and recognize in my heart that I certainly owe God this, not because the Decalogue may have been written and handed on to us, but because we know that we have brought these laws into the world with us and
indeed by means of this preaching the veil is immediately removed and I
am shown to be a sinner. For although the Decalogue was given in a unique
way, both as to place and solemnity, nevertheless all the Gentiles acknowledge that godlessness, disobedience, contempt of God, theft, adultery, and
defilements are sins and iniquities, as Paul says in Romans 2 [: 15]: each in
turn excusing and accusing. Therefore, they are natural laws, not political
or Mosaic, otherwise we would speak of these things there just as we do of
the offering of cattle, circumcision, and the Sabbath. God does not wish this
to be observed by us, but when we have heard this commandment: You
shall not steal, there we become dumb and may be more silent than fish.
614The

words "memory of him" are our interpolation. The text at this
point has a lacuna. The WA editors suggest that the sentence should be completed with mens. Apart from "memoria," another possibility could be "lex," although that seems slightly tautologous. The syntax requires a femine noun.
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This argumentum has already been refuted earlier although the approach
here is different.615 The antinomians adduce Romans 2: 12 to support their argument for the historical particularity of the law insofar as it was given only to one
specific nation, that is, the Israelites.616 In his responsio however, Luther brings
some precision to the term lex and distinguishes between the lex scripta of Moses
(although he does not use the term) and the universal law of nature, which approximates the content of the Decalogue.617 All the naturales leges are in the Decalogue, but not all the Decalogue is in the naturales leges. Therefore, one can say
that the law, in genere dicta, was not given certo populo but universo generi humano
(539, 7-9). This law is identical to the law written on the heart, but Luther includes here not only the Decalogue but also pleraeque leges ad hanc vitam utiles—all
these together scriptae sunt et insculptae mentibus omnium hominum. This inscription of the law reaches back to the creation of humankind: ab ipsa nativitate seu
creatione hominis cum ipso Adam (539, 8-11). However, the ever increasing apostasy which followed the fall resulted in a gradual corrosion of the human mind
615See 39 I,

380, 11-381, 10 (1 AD, Arg. 13). There Luther's point of departure is the decision of the apostolic council reported in Acts 15: 10. He stresses
that the iugum legis (=lex condemnatrix) has been removed in Christ so that for
faith it becomes the lex impleta; on the other, insofar as we remain sinners, it remains the lex implenda, which demands that it be fulfilled by us.
616The

later distinction between Israelites (pre-exlic) and Jews (post-exilic) is still unknown to Luther. He simply uses the term Iudaei.
617Luther

does not use the term lex naturae here but it is implied by
naturales leges (541, 1). In 1 AD, Arg. 25 he virtually equates the lex naturae
(insculpta cordi) with the content of the Decalogue (402, 14-403, 3). Moreover, in 1
AD, Arg. 7 he contrasts circumcisio et aliae ceremoniae (limited by time and place)
with that Decalogue, which still inheres in the conscience (374, 1-3).
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and the erasure of virtually all memory of God and his law. This forced God618
anew to set before us a boundary lest we should forget his law altogether [.
coactus est Deus a novo nobis, ne prorsus suam legem oblivisceremur, metam proponere].
However, contrary to what we might have expected, in calling the Decalogue a
meta, Luther is not thinking of it here primarly as a curb to human sinfulness in
the sense of the usus politicus, but, as the rest of the sentence shows, he is rather
viewing it from the standpoint of faith so that it becomes the instrument by
which we remember (but not in any ethereal Platonic sense) what we once were
in paradise and what we one day will be in the paradise of heaven [ut sic recordaremur saltem, qui antea fuerimus et qui tam simus] (539, 15-540, 1).619 This is
surely another marvelous example of how Luther understands the use of the law
among the saints. Here we see an important connection between admonition and
anamnesis,620 which coheres with our emphasis on admonition as baptismal
618The

same phrase "coactus est Deus" (539, 13-14) was used earlier in 2
AD, Arg. 2 (426, 11). There are no grounds at all in the text for interpreting this in
terms of Aristotelian logic. In other words, there is no suggestion that the coactus
points to a logical necessity which must necessarily follow from a prior conclusion and to which God would have to be subject. Luther rejected this line of
thinking when he rejected scholastic theology.
619a. 39 I, 454, 10-14 (2 AD, Arg. 13). In that argumentum Luther
stresses that God is the real author of the law not Moses. Therefore, although
Luther at times will describe Moses as a lawgiver, he is more a interpres et illustrator legum scriptarum in mentibus omnium hominum. Moreover, the lex Mosaica was
not given to replace the lex naturae nor to supplement it but to explain and interpret it (454, 14-16).
6201t

is useful to note that in 2 AD, Arg. 13 Luther uses admonere (454,
13) and here he uses recordare (539, 15). The two words are close and their
semantic fields overlap. Admonere can mean both "to admonish" or "to
remember." The fact that these two meanings belong to the one word strengthens
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parenesis or paraclesis. Luther does not use the present tense here but the past
and future. The Decalogue, which refreshes our memory of God's will that was
first implanted in us in the form of the lex insculpta, is meant to do two things:
First, to keep before us the gulf that separates us from Adam so that we remain
mindful of our sin and our need for Christ, in whom sins are forgiven and the
gulf is bridged. Secondly, the Decalogue is meant to make us homesick for paradise, but since we cannot return to Eden, it rather points us to our home in
heaven where we will be perfectly recreated in the image of Christ, the second
Adam (cf. 1 John 3: 2). The Decalogue then, insofar as it is understood spiritualiter
as parenesis in the life of the justified, stands firmly on the side of the gospel and
under its conrol. Since for faith it is lex impleta, it holds no fear but is rather to be
treasured with delight because it announces to us, indeed promises us, what we
one day will be in the flesh, when he who has begun his good work in us in Baptism brings it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ (Phil. 1: 6).621
Luther is at pains to emphasize that the law (Decalogue) did not come into
being for the first time at Sinai, but was there written down for the first time. In
that sense one can talk about a renewal of the law [renovata], and even its transthe tie between admonition and anamnesis. Admonition then, understood in this
way, calls people to remember who and what they are.
621The difference in tone between the law as parenesis used in the service of the gospel and addressed to the pii, and that in the form of the usus theologicus and usus politicus, directed at the impii, can readily be seen from a Luther
quote from another work where he again says that the law had to be given to remind people of the natural law in their heart (17 11, 102; cited by Bornkamm, Theology, 252, n. 6):
But evil desire and love darken this light [of reason] and blind people so
that they do not look at such a book in their heart and do not follow such a clear
commandment of reason. One must therefore curb and drive them back with
external commands, books, with the sword and by force, and remind them of
their natural light and put their own heart before their eyes.
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mission to a specific nation, but only to the extent that we are talking about the
written law and not the law that was first spoken622 or preached by God at the
beginning of the world [in quantum scripta, sed non in quantum dicta], for the law is
the common possession of all peoples, as experientia testifies (540,1-3).623 Luther
now makes a very important deduction from the fact of the universality of the
law. He says that if he had not first known the will of God from the lex inscripta,
he would have set no store by the accusations: Tu es incredulus Deo, non credis Deo,
non times Deum, es adulter, moechus, inobediens et quicquid tale est (notice again that

622The

terminology Luther uses in connection with the lex renovata
needs to be carefully noted. We can speak about a renewal of the law in quantum
scripta, where lex scripta refers to the law promulgated at Sinai, but not in quantum
dicta, where lex dicta means the same as lex naturae. Schloemann, 99 n. 305, observes that all too often it has been forgotten that Luther understands the law of
Moses not only as worldly legislation [usus politicus] but also especially as the
preaching of the law [usus theologicus]. H. Gerdes, Luthers Streit mit den
Schwiirmern, 42ff, must be critiqued along these lines. (Nor can we agree with his
view that there is a change in Luther's understanding of the Mosaic law in his
later life compared with the position he adopted during the controversy with the
Schwiirmer. This can be quickly confirmed by a reading of his 1538 letter Wider die
Sabbather.) We agree with Schloemann's criticism that he considers the lex Mosi
too one-sidedly as lex civilis and fails to understand its theological significance.
For the preaching of the law of Moses functions, as it were, as a prototype of all
public proclamation of the law.
623Cf. 540, 13-16: Although the Decalogue was given singulari modo et
loco et pompa, nevertheless, omnes gentes recognize that impietas, inobedientia, contemtum Dei, furta, adulteria, pollutiones etc. are peccata et iniquitates, for these are all
naturales leges. Incidentally, we note in passing that Luther understands the lex
naturae as embracing not only the Second Table but also the First (see the first

three items above). We cannot go into the question of how the natural knowledge of God with its recognition of the deum esse colendum coheres with the
recognition that the God who demands: "Thou shalt have no other gods before
me," is the same God who first revealed himself to Israel as their God by rescuing
them from their slavery in Egypt. Of course this question also has enormous
implications for the Lutheran law-gospel sequence as opposed to its Reformed
reversal.
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both Tables are represented). They would have meant no more to him than the
charge: Tu non es circumcisus, to non affers bovem, vitulum, pecudes. But since in fact
the words of the Decalogue do not fall on a tabula rasa, so to speak, but on a mens
that has already been impregnated with the lex Dei, even though much has now
been forgotten, they immediately ring true and cause the heart to tremble and
shake. The important point that deserves emphasis here is the law's modus
operandi in the sinner (which includes the Christian quoad peccatorem). According
to Luther, when we stand before the bar coram Deo and hear the verdict of the
law, we agree with its judgment finally, not in the first instance because es steht
geschrieben in decalogo, but because we recognize that it agrees with the lex insculpta which we brought with us into the world. This innate knowledge of the
law has been drastically diminished due to the corruptive and corrosive effects of
sin and by itself it is hardly enough to restrain us from evil. However, when the
law is preached on the basis of the Decalogue, the veil is immediately removed
and I recognize that I am sinner [. . et hac quidem praedicatione statim velamen tollitur et ostenditur mihi, quod facio peccatum] (540, 12-13). Again, the emphasis is on
the priority of the lex insculpta, which the lex praedicata does not replace, supplement or correct, but simply revitalizes by removing the veil of forgetfulness and
confirming what the conscience already knows.624 This does not now mean that
624The

following passage from Luther's Unterrichtung, wie sick die
Christen in Mose sollen schicken (1525), shows that what he is saying here about the
inner coherence between the lex naturae and the lex scripta (Decalogue) and the
priority of the former is nothing new: "Thus I now keep the commandments that
Moses gave, not because Moses gave them, but because they have been implanted in me by nature; and here Moses is in agreement with nature" (24, 10, 3).
Werner Elert, Structure, 36, remarking on this passage says that the correspondence of the written or proclaimed to the implanted law is not accidental. The
former would leave us untouched if the latter did not exist. When it is pro-
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Luther is speaking like a Platonist and saying that sin is ignorance of God. Sin is
not lack of knowledge but a lack of faith in God. Conversely, the notitia that is
mediated or rekindled by the revelation of the lex scripta of the Decalogue is not
the remedy for sin, does not remove sin, but on the contrary, exacerbates sin and
shows it to be sin beyond measure so that one can only cry out with the publican:
6 eEeic iXciaeruri p.m t agaptcoXcii (Luke 18: 13) or with Paul: apaptco May
irpcZTOG Eiµi kyof (1 Tim. 1: 15). But that is already a confession faith born of the
gospel, which can never be wrung out of us by the threats and coercion of the
law.
If Luther gives priority to the lex inscripta or lex inscultpa over the lex
praedicata, it would be wrong for us, and unfair to him, to push this difference of
emphasis to the point of a false antithesis, for Luther knows that the law as God's
law is a unity. Nevertheless, it is important for his argument to show that the
antinornian position is called into question already by the universality of the law
for it is written on the hearts of all people and cannot simply be abolished arbitrarily by the antinomians' assertion that the law has ceased since the year 1 AD.
The final proof, Luther says, is not scripture, the Decalogue, or even the lex praedicata, but experientia based on the reality of the lex naturae or lex insculpta. Even if
you say the Decalogue has been abolished, you still have not removed the law,
claimed, our heart replies: "That's true!" (cf. also 16, 447, 10ff., Exod.-Pred., 1525).
But Elert also points to another passage which shows that Luther also knows that
the opposite is true, namely, that Satan's opposition blinds the heart to such an
extent that the proclaimed word must first awaken that voice in our heart (16,
447, 10; Sermons on the Second Book of Moses, 1524-27). This no doubt is what
Luther means in his responsio when he says that the veil is removed through this
praedicatio .
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Luther tells the antinomians, for the law is not merely external but is also internal
insofar as it inheres in the conscience.625 As Luther said earlier: it is schon da.626
625This is consistent with Luther's emphasis already in the First
Disputation (Arg. 7): Nam si Deus nunquam tulisset legem per Mosen, tamen mens
humana naturaliter habet hanc notitiam, Deum esse colendum, proximum diligendum
(374, 3-5). The argument seems fairly compelling, at least on the level of logic. In
ch. 4 we will need to assess how it fits theologically into Luther's overall defence
of the gospel.

626See 39 I, 477, 7 (2 AD, Arg. 24). On the relation between the lex naturae and lex scripta, see also Schloemann 102, n. 319, where he criticizes E. Wolf
(Gottesrecht and Menschenrecht, 20) in his contention that Luther understands the
lex naturae as a "Rezeptionshilfe fur die Gebote vor allem im Alten Testament."
Wolf uses other Luthertexte (which he misreads) to establish the priority of the
Decalogue over the natural law, even though his project sets him on a collision
course with the passage in this argument (540, 10-13) as well as other parallels,
which clearly state the opposite. Schloemann agrees with Heckel (Lex charitatis,
56-57, 79-80) that Wolf, in attempting to establish the universal validity of the
Decalogue, has shown himself to be more influenced by the positivistic view of
revelation common to Occamism than by Luther. Schloemann (98, n. 304) also
makes the perceptive observation that even though the lex scripta is "vom hymel
herab"(see 2 AD, Arg. 1 for Luther's exegesis of Rom. 1: 18), this phrase should be
understood as pointing to its public proclamation and not as an indication that it
possesses universal authority as revelation. For the Mosaic law (including the
Decalogue) is already a proclamation of the law that has passed through human
hands, a revelation hidden in the 'finitum." For Luther the mediating role of the
angels (Gal. 3: 19) and the man Moses are important aspects of the revelation of
the lex Mosaica (cf. Heckel, Lex Charitatis, 78ff., Siirala, Gottes Gebot, 32-33, 267ff.).
In the light of what Luther says both in the disputations and elsewhere, Schloemann, 102, n. 319 that, contra Wolf, it would be more correct to hold that for
Luther the Decalogue is a "Rezeptionshilfe" for the lex naturae, were this not of
course always "schon da." We have already mentioned in connection with our
analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 24 that it is Schloemann's contention that the fact that the
law is already present in every human conscience (=the universal validity of the
lex naturae) is the decisive weapon which Luther used to refute the antinomian
claim of the total abrogatio legis in the year 1 AD. This will have to be discussed
further in the next chapter.
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Argument 20627
When there is a change of priesthood, what follows of necessity is a
change of the law etc. [Heb. 7: 12].
Response: That is true in regard to ceremonial laws. Also in Hebrews:
The law is weak and useless [Heb. 7: 18]. Response: It is infirm in relation to
justification, for which it has not been given. Otherwise, to reveal sins is the
task of the law alone, but to remove sins the task of Christ alone. Certainly
sin is recognized through many means, not only through disaster and misfortune, but also through threats and promises, calamity and prosperity.
But it is not removed through many means, but only through the blood of
the spotless lamb Jesus Christ, as Peter [1 Peter 1: 18, 19] and Hebrews [Heb.
9: 12-14] say.
The argumentum is very terse. It appears to claim that the translatio legis is
not only possible, but that it was specifically for this purpose that God ordained a
translatio sacerdotio. The scriptural basis for this argument is Hebrews 7, which
gives several reasons for the superiority of the priesthood of Melchizedek over
the Levitical (or Aaronitic) priesthood. However, the proponent of the argument
forces his propositio on the text instead of reading it out of the text. Hebrew 7: 12
argues a priori from the fact of our Lord's priesthood Korth ThV tabu Maxi ageic
(that is, non Levitical) to the conclusion, on the grounds of logical necessity, that
there must have also been a corresponding change to the law govering the priesthood: geratteegivric yap Trig ierxo CRSV Tic it (XV arctic xat

v6µ01.1

gerdeecrie yive-

Tat (7: 12). The antinomians, on the other hand, argue that the priesthood had to
(necesse) be changed in order to enable the change in the law (cf. the vOine iv-white aapriv ne of Heb. 7: 16). Luther does not even worry about this technicality, but comes straight to the point. The first respondent (whose identity we do
not know) rightly points out that the lex in question is not the Decalogue but is de
legibus caeremonialibus, and that the auct. Heb. himself says of this cultic regulation
62739 I, 541, 7-14.
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[ivrohri] that it is set aside [exeir riaic yiver at] oi& TO aim-lc emeev'ec Kth don*Aic
(Heb. 7: 18).628 And the reason it is set aside: olitiev yCcp etaeico crev 6 %/agog
(Heb. 7: 19). Luther then begins his responsio by fastening on to the fact that the
law is infirma et inutilis. He makes it clear that the law is actually very potent,
speaking now about the law in its proper sense as lex theologicus; the one exception being ad iustificationem, for which it was never given anyway. The sole task
of the law is ostendere peccata , whereas Christ's office is tollere peccata (541, 9-11).
God can use all manner of means to bring us to a knowledge of our sin, not only
law, in the sense of the duplex usus legis, but also his grace and kindness, in the
sense of his gracious bestowal of gifts and blessings, both spiritual temporal: vel

etiam plagis et miseriis, item minis et promissionibus, calamitatibus et beneficiis (541,
11-12).629 However, we saw in Luther's last argument that whatever does the
work of the law, that is, reveals sin, is law, regardless of the way it comes. On the
other hand, sin is removed in one way only, per sanguinem immaculati agni Iesu

Christi (541, 12-13).
It remains for us to clarify the point of the antinomian argument. We
know that the antinomians understand the law primarily as the lex Mosaica. This
is clear both from our analyses as well as from the discussion of antinomian the-

628The result of this change in the cultic law govering the priesthood is

that the law requiring priests to be descendants of the tribe of Levi (Deut. 18: 1) is
suspended in order to make way for Christ, who comes from the nonpriestly
tribe of Judah, to be consecrated priest (in a different ordo). This qualification is
not physical descent but the otiv mug Co) fic docaramirov (Heb. 7: 16).

Deus per verbum suum omnibus modis exhortatur te,
ut cesses a peccando et audias eius promissionem (401, 14-15). Cf. also 530, 14-16 (3
AD, Arg. 42/15). Earlier in the same argument Luther says that when the duros et
impoenitentes are not moved by minae and terrores, we should try promissa et
beneficia Dei (401, 4-6).
629Cf. 1 AD, Arg. 24:
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ology in chapter 2. Therefore, they are able to argue that the law of Moses (including the Decalogue) was set aside with the coming of Christ. The only law
they recognize is the noncondemning civil law. Luther, as we have seen from the
previous argument, therefore stresses the universal validity of the law by understanding it first and foremost as the Adamic (post lapsum) lex naturae, which is in
continuity with, but prior to, the lex Mosi and which remains also for the Christian, quoad in se, until death. In this way Luther blocks the antinomians from arguing the abolition of the Decalogue based on the abolition of the Mosaic law.
Argument 21630
Contra 34
No true Christians are to be terrified by the law. All who are members
of the church are truly Christians. Therefore, none of them is to be terrified
by the law.
Response: The law is to be taught to the godly and to ungodly without
distinction, for the godly are partly righteous, partly sinners. Insofar as they
are righteous, they are not under the law, and [yet] they are to be convicted
until they have mortified the remnant of their sins. That is how Paul clearly
addresses the Corinthians, the Ephesians, the Philippian and the Hebrews as
saints [1 Cor. 1: 2; 2 Cor. 1: 1; Eph. 1: 1; Phil. 1: 1]. And yet here there is also
this great catalogue of sins and vices, and with what thunder the words are
heard: God will judge fornicators and adulterers, and they will not see the
kingdom of God [1 Cor. 6: 9-10]. What is this, Paul? Now is this the way
you speak to saints? Surely this is not how you extol their holiness? The
gospel, properly speaking, is not what we do but the proclamation of the
free forgiveness of sins, on account of Christ through faith. Thus it describes
the person, the gift and the place. But when it convicts vices, adulteries,
killings etc, it is not in its proper office, but it uses the office of the law to go
after and expose vices and to prepare for life, how the new people, saints,
ought to walk in the new life. Since however, as we have said above, the
Christian is a true Thomas or twin, partly saint, partly sinner, the law, sin,
and death remain in the interim. Moreover, they will remain until eternal
life. These people want to abolish the law, but they are forced to leave sin
and death behind, although these should have been removed first, and then
the dispute about the abolition of the law would become easier.
63039 I, 542, 3-543, 3.
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The conclusion of the syllogism implies that the law should not be
preached to veri christiani, but only to the impii. The antinomians define christiani
(qualified by veri) with reference to the ecclesia: Omnes, qui stint membra Ecclesia,
sunt veri christiani (542, 3-4). This is perfectly consistent with Luther's assessment
of them in his Praefatio where he mentions two principia characteristic of antinomian theology: First, the belief that Christus formaliter sustulerit omne peccatum; secondly, that suam ecclesiam sic puram et integram esse sine omni macula et labe, ut fait
Adam iamiam creatus in paradiso et perfectus ac integer. From this they conclude that
their followers, even the impii, are formaliter iustos (490, 6-13). Therefore, it is clear
that the doctrine of the church is placed ahead of the doctrine of justification so
that one is righteous and holy in the first instance, not propter Christum per fidem,
but because one belongs to the church.631 In doing this they fail to distinguish
between law and gospel. Luther, on the other hand, understands the doctrine of
the church in complete harmony with the doctrine of justification so that just as
Christians are saints, imputative, through faith in Christ, and at the same time sinners, quoad in se, so too the church is a corpus permixtum. Contra the antinomians'
perfectionistic view of the church, Luther says of it: earn esse mixtam hypocritis et
malis, imo etiam circumferre carnem suam et saepe labi et errare etiam sanctos (496, 3-4).
Therefore, it is thoroughly in keeping with his earlier statements when
Luther, in his responsio, begins with the anti-antinomian assertion that the law
631It is instructive to recall the argumenta where ecclesia is a part of the
minor premise: the church does not err (1 AD, Arg. 30); in the church there is no
sin (1 AD, Arg. 33); the church is led by the Spirit (2 AD, Arg. 4); the church is
free from the law (3 AD, Arg. 15); in 3 AD, Arg. 13a ecclesia appears in both the
major and minor premises: the church is holy in this life (major), the faithful are
members of the church. What the antinomians need to learn is that in this life the
church is also a Thomas.
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must be taught to both the pii and the impii because the pii partim iusti sunt, partim
peccatores (542, 5-6). How is this partim-partim description of the pii to be

understood? Before illustrating this from Paul Luther states his position based
on his familiar distinction between law and gospel: Et quatenus iusti sunt, non sunt
sub lege et sunt arguendi, donec reliquias peccatorum mortificaverint (542, 6-7). From

this we know that Luther understands the partim . partim in the same way as he
does the quatenus . . . eatenus, although in this particular case the second member
is missing.632 From our discussions so far we know that Luther is not using this
language to describe justification.633 In other words, he knows of no progressive
justification. Rather, these terms represent another way of talking about the justified, that is, not imputative or coram Deo, on account of which they have everything already in completion, but rather quoad in se, or coram hominibus, from
which perspective they are not yet iusti et sancti, substantialiter or realiter, but will
only be that in a demonstrable way after the destruction of the old Adam and the
resurrection of the body to eternal life.634 Therefore, insofar as Christians are still
in via, having the lex impleta Christi by faith but not yet per speciem (cf. 2 Cor. 5: 7),

632For a parallel to the quatenus-eatenus way of speaking, see 39 I, 356,
15-16 (ATh, V, Th. 40); 360, 6-7 (1 AD, Arg. 12); 392, 5-8, 14-15 (1 AD, Arg. 18); for
a more detailed discussion, see 431, 8-12 (2 AD, Arg. 3). For the partim-partim usage, see also 561,10-11; 562, 10-563, 1 (3 AD, Arg. 29/2).
633See

especially our analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 3. This matter will be
taken up in discussion once more in ch. 4.
634This also applies to Luther's words in 2 AD, Arg. 7: Sed imperfecte

implemus, ergo imperfecte iustificamur (444, 3-4). The word iustificare here does not
refer to forensic justification (the first justification), where Christ's iustitia aliena is
imputed through faith, but to what we would call sanctification (the second justification), where Christ's iustitia will not be ours realiter and substantialiter until sin
is finally destroyed in death.
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and insofar as they are still subject to the lex implenda because of the the remnants
of sin in the flesh, Luther can say that they are not only simul iusti et peccatores,
but also partim sancti, partim peccatores,635 or again, partly free from the law and
partly subject to the law.636 However, that does not mean that they do not have
the full possession of Christ's holiness and righteousness already and are free
from the law. It rather means that for now they have these realities only by faith
in Christ for they all belong to him (they are res alienae), and will only be ours to
see and to possess as propria in the eschatological kingdom, where our fulfillment
of the law will no longer be imputative but realiter, like that of Adam's in paradise
(and even better!)637 for then we will do God's will sponte, with a free and merry
heart.638
We are now in a position to understand better what Luther means when
he says that the ph are partim iusti and partim peccatores, and that, quatenus iusti,
they are not sub lege, but that, on the other hand, quatenus peccatores, they are sub
lege and will remain so until they have finally mortified the remnants of sin. As

635Cf. 39 I, 392, 5-8: Quatenus igitur mortui sumus legi et peccato per fidem
in Christum et una cum eo sepulti sumus, eatenus nobis mortua sunt peccata . . . (1 AD,

Arg. 18).
636Cf. 39 I, 380, 6-7: Quatenus ergo lex impleta est, eatenus sublata. In
Christo est impleta perfecte, in nobis non, quia hoc firma fide non credimus (1 AD, Arg.
12); 374, 18-19: Quatenus illa [scil. caro] vivit, eatenus non est abrogata lex, non tamen
regnat, sed servituti spiritus subiecta esse cogitur (1 AD, Arg. 7); 392, 14-15: Quatenus
vero carnem habent, eatenus habent dominium in eos lex et peccatum (1 AD, Arg. 18).
63739 I, 354, 13-14 (Am., IV, Th. 41): . . . ut fiat Adam talis, qualis fuit et
etiam melior.
638Cf. 39 I, 374, 8-12, esp. 11-12: Sub Christo igitur lex est in fieri esse, non
in facto esse (1 AD, Arg. 7).
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he explained earlier, we are free from the law in a double way, first imputative,
because my sins against the law are not imputed to me for Christ's sake, secondly
expurgative, since, through the power of the Spirit, we begin to hate sin and purge
out any remnant left in us until we have become wholly clean.639 Furthermore,
we are free from the law in a double way because we are free from sin also in the
same double way, imputatively and expurgatively. And Luther has also made it
clear what he means by the latter. Sin is removed formaliter and expurgative because day by day I cleanse and mortify the sin in the flesh magis ac magis until the
old sinful self is destroyed and the new, holy and righteous one emerges in the
resurrection on the last day .640
Luther is saying the same thing in his responsio to the argument we are
presently considering. The iusti must remain under the lex arguens until the
reliquiae peccatorum have been mortified. Again, this is no more or no less than
sanctification, where through the daily ad baptismum, the vetus homo is killed and
the homo novus is renewed. Here mortificare = expurgare = poenitentiam agere. The
"donec" should not be interpreted temporally in such a way as to suggest that we
may one day reach a terminus ad quem where we have no more sin to mortify, for
in this life we can never get beyond repentance and forgiveness. It is precisely
because of this Doppeldeutigkeit of the Christian life that Luther says that christianus sit vere Thomista vel gemellus, partim sanctus, partim peccator (542,18-19) 641 By
63939 I, 434, 6-12 (2 AD, Arg. 3).
64039 I, 432, 7-11 (2 AD, Arg. 3).
641Cf. 39 I, 504, 6-7 (3 AD, Arg. 3) where the christianum esse verum
Thomam Thomistan seu gemellum corresponds to christianus militans et triumphans;
cf. also 433, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 3): sancti sunt sub lege et sine lege.
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ignoring the present reality of sin in the life of the Christian the antinomians in
the end reject Christ and diminish his glory because our Lord will not be received
by us on any other terms than those that he himself gives us in the gospel,
namely, that we are sinners and that he is savior. To deny that we are sinners is
to deny that Christ is our savior. It is on account of this christological distortion
that Luther fights the antinomian heresy so tenciously for to him it represents
nothing less than a frontal attack on the gospel itself.
We conclude this argument by considering how Luther illustrates and explicates the partim-partim nature of the vita christiana by reference to the letters of
Paul. He points out that Paul clearly addresses the Corinthians, the Ephesians,
the Philippians and the Hebrews as saints642 and yet at the same times lists catalogs of sins and vices which he says ought not be named among them, as is fitting
among saints [icaeW lrpEltEi ayioig] (cf. Eph. 5: 3-13). Luther's terse Latin style
points up the seeming incongruity of the apostle who one minute calls his readers saints and the next is reproving them for acting in ways that are out of character with what they are: Et hic quantus ibi catalogue peccatorum et vitiorum, quantum
tonitru ibi auditur, fornicatores et adulteros iudicabit Deus et regnum Dei non videbunt
(542, 9-11). No doubt the rhetorical questions: Quid hoc, Paule? Nunc sic sanctis
loquendum est? Num quid ita sanctitatem eorum collaudas? take up the objections of
the antinomians whose logical minds could not tolerate the contradictoriness of
such bold juxtapositions. The real paradox, or indeed contradiction, is not in the
theology but in the Christian, and Luther, following Paul, has long parted ways
642We

have included the pertinent passages in the translation, except
from the Letter to the Hebrews. The closest we can come to it is with a text like
Heb. 2: 11.
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with Aristotelian epistemology with its attempt to demonstrate what must necessarily be true (and for Aristotle this means logically true) on the basis of syllogistic reasoning. The doctrine that a Christian is simul iustus et peccator could
never be deduced from an Aristotelian syllogism any more than could the doctrine of the two natures of Christ because both are inherently illogical and can
only be confessed by faith.643 However, although Christians are still sinners,
they are forgiven sinners, and it is precisely this proclamation of the free
remission of sins propter Christum per fidem that is the Evangelium proprie (542, 1213). Thus, Luther says, the gospel describes the persona, donum, and locus. This
terse phrase gloriously expresses the specificity and locatedness of the gospel: the
person is the sanctus, the gift is the remissio peccatorum gratuitae propter Christum
per fidem, and the place is the praedicatio (542, 12-14). Using the word
"Evangelium" in the wider sense of God's word of law and gospel,644 Luther says
that when it645 convicts sins and teaches about life, how the new saints should
643We have already seen in 1 AD, Arg. 8 that Luther rejects a
fundmental principle of Aristotelian logic: contraria non posse simul et semel in
eodem subiecto (375, 18-19).
644Luther knows, besides the definitio specialis, also the general term

"gospel" for the preaching of both law and gospel (cf. Th. Harnack, Luthers Theologie, I, 450-1). See 39 I, 347, 17-18 (ATh, I, #36); 351, 29-40 (ATh, DI, #31-36); 386,
19-388, 20 (1 AD, Arg. 16); 424-5 (2 AD, Arg. 1); 533, 4-9 (3 AD, Arg. 18); 543-4 (3
AD, Arg. 22) et al. But he always stresses that the definitio specialis represents the
real opus proprium of the gospel: Evangelium est proprie non quod nos facimus, sed
praedicatio remissionis peccatorum gratuitae propter Christum per fidem (542, 12-14).
645Re1. B recasts the sentence to show that it is Paulus and

not
Evangelium that is the subject of arguere. While this brings it into line with the
more common modus loquendi, it loses the force of Luther's point that when the
gospel has to do the work of the law, then it employs the law for that purpose
(543, 12-14).
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live the new life, it uses the law [Verum quando arguit vitia, adulteria, caedes etc.,
non est in suo proprio officio, sed utitur officio legis, insectari et arguere vita et instituere
vitam, quomodo jam novi homines sancti novam vitam ingredi debeant] (542, 15-16).
This statement is informative for two reasons: First, although Luther starts out
using the term gospel in the broader sense of God's word, including the law, he
ends up saying, as he made clear in argument 18, that whatever does the work of
the law is law. Secondly, his formulation leaves no doubt that the teaching of the
vita christiana, which includes parenesis and apostolic instruction, falls to the
office of the law (the area that has traditionally been assigned to the tertius usus
legis), even though we have argued earlier that, according to our reading of
Luther, he seems to tie parenesis closely to the gospel for it is both rooted in the
gospel and points back to the gospe1.646 Be that as it may, such instruction is not
gospel but law, because the gospel is first and foremost that which correlates
with the forgiveness of sins but, on the other hand, it can be used by the gospel
and consequently received as God's gift in which case even his discipline is
acknowledged as evidence of his loving kindness. And just because the
parenesis and adhortatives of scripture are stricte dicta law,647 that should be a
646See especially our discussion of 3 AD, Arg. 13 (524, 4-528, 2).
647Paul Althaus, Gebot und Gesetz: Zum Thema "Gesetz und Evangelium,"
in Beitriige zur Forderung christlicher Theologie, vol. 46, ed. Paul Althaus and
Joachim Jeremias (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952), wishes to distinguish
between "command" [Gebot] and "law" [Gesetz], that is, between God's will for us,
and the special form of that will as law. In other words, he retains Gesetz for lex
accusans, but uses Gebot for parenesis. While this distinction may have some
merit from a formal point of view, it seems inherently problematic to replace the
Lutheran law-gospel schema with an idiosyncratic command-law-gospel formula. However, we cannot do justice to Althaus' thesis here. Suffice it to say
that while he understands that the notion of law in the Lutheran tradition is so
overwhelmingly that of lex accusans, arguens, and condemnatrix, and that for that
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reminder that, however much positive teaching may be their goal, the ultimate
task of the law is always to lead us to repentance and thus back to Christ, for it is
only when we are iv Xim at6i that the Christus in nobis can do his work in us by
leading us in the good works that God has prepared for us to do (cf. Eph. 2: 10).
Argument 22648
If repentance is to be taught from the law, as was said earlier, and contrition is to be produced in people through the law, therefore faith also is
taught through the law.
Proof of Conclusion: Repentance includes these two parts.
Response: The law causes and produces repentance in people's hearts,
and indeed goes as far as the knowledge of sin. This cannot be called
Christ's principal office, and yet it is necessary, if he does not want all people to die, that the gospel helps them and hastens to those who are burdened; the gospel comforts them in this distress lest they despair. Thus
Christ also teaches the law but not only the law, otherwise his teaching
would result in despair. But when we say that repentance arises from the
law, we are speaking by synecdoche, [and we mean that] the first part of repentance is from the law. Thus the church is holy by synecdoche, because
many in it are evil and ungodly. And this figure is the most common of all
in the holy scriptures. Thus one psalm regards people are thoroughly godless, while the other regards them as altogether holy and godly, because
both psalms in general speak only about a part by synecdoche. Hence Augustine in his Regulae interpretandae scripturae diligently warns that it should
be noted that scripture frequently speaks avveicOoricac.649 Just as the church
reason thinks it best to avoid the term tertius usus legis to describe the positive
function of the law in the Christian life, yet it seems that his distinction is more
illusionary than real, because--apart from the fact that only the Spirit can determine how it will be heard--even though the parenesis can work with and under
the gospel, it is still law (at least according to Luther) and as such does not only
have the positive goal of teaching life, but also (and here we are interpreting, but
hopefully in the sensus Lutheri) the negative one of leading the pii back again to
repentance.
64839 I, 543, 5-544,18.
649The reference to Augustine's Regulae interpretandae scripturae is probably to his second and third book on Christian doctrine. That is where he
briefly treats the trope synecdoche, III, 50 ch. 35 (MPL, 34, 83). He goes into more
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is said to be holy on account of the holy part, so it is hypocritical and
ungodly on account of the ungodly part.
In summary, there is no language which does not make a great deal of
use of this figure, as we Germans also do, as is common in our language
when we say: a man has been wounded or struck when in fact it is his head
or shin or body that has been wounded, not the person himself. So also,
when we say that a man has been killed we nevertheless understand it to
mean only the body, for the soul cannot be killed, as Christ says [Matt. 10:
28]. In the same way scripture also says that repentance arises from the law,
meaning, that part of repentance by which a person is terrified and frightened. But unless the other part is added it becomes despair.
There can be no doubt that this argumentum has been put forward, not to
defend a position, but to attempt to demonstrate that Luther's logic is faulty. Already twice in the First Disputation the antinomians have made it clear that they
repudiate the teaching that repentance comes ex lege and instead hold either that
it is worked in us by God's grace alone65° or that it arises ex violatione filii.651
Their probatio goes back to Luther's first Thesenreihe where he says that the two
parts of repentance are dolor de peccato and proposito melioris vitae, which presupposes faith, the first being only ex lege, the other by implication being ex evangelio.652 Even if we grant that the antinomians are only arguing hypothetically, the
fallacy of their argument lies in the fact that repentance, according to Luther's
definition, arises not simply from the law but from both the law and the gospel.
detail about the different examples of synecdoche in "Quaest." in Heptateuchum I,
117 (MPL, 34, 578).
650See 39 I, 368, 5-6: Sola gratia Dei operatur in nobis poenitentiam. Ergo
nulla pars poenitentiae adscribenda est legi (1 AD, Arg. 3).
651See 39 I, 384, 4-6: Petrus docuit poenitentiam ex violatione filii. Petrus
fuit concionator. Ergo praedicatores debent docere poenitentiam ex violatione filii, non ex
lege Mosis (1 AD, Arg. 15).
652See 39 I, 345, 16-17 (Am, I, #1) and 345, 22-23 (Am, I, #4).
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Luther's responsio really contains nothing new and so there is no reason for
us to delay over it other than to make a few observations and to point out where
we have discussed similar matters before. The law is instrumental in bringing
about contrition but only the gospel can give rise to faith, without which contrition can never become repentance but may very well end in despair. Luther here
says the same thing in different words. He says that the law causes [afferre et
parere] repentance but that it can only go as far as producing the cognitio peccati.
In recognition of the fact that Christ too can preach the law he says that this is
something other than Christ's principal office [Christi officium minus principale est],
but on the other hand, unless Christ wants all to die at the hands of the law, he
must intervene with the gospel to help and console those burdened by the law
lest they fall into despair (543, 8-544,1). Now precisely because there can be no
repentance without Christ even though it is also true to say that repentance arises
from the law, Luther makes it clear that the assertion: poenitentiam esse ex lege is
really a trope where the modus loquendi is per synecdochen. In other words, not the
whole of repentance but prior pars poenitentiae ex lege est.653 This explains why we
can still confess that the ecclesia is sancta even though, as a corpus mixtum, it has
within it many mali et impii: it is holy per synecdochen. Luther observes that synecdoche is the most common figure of speech used in the Bible.651 He illustrates
653Formally speaking, it is correct to say that dolor or contritio is the

first part of repentance because it comes first. However, axiologically, or perhaps
better, theologically, Christ is first part because he is the main part; cf. 39 I, 471,
16-472, 2: Christus autem est prima et principalis pars. Dolor potest esse prima, sed non
principalis, efficiens causa est omnium optima et prima (2 AD, Arg. 18).
654Luther here concurs with Augustine's observation in his Regulae
interpretandae scripturae where he warns that scripture often speaks avVEK_AOXIKac.
In addition Luther notes that it is extensively used in all languages and proceeds
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this from the Psalter, where one psalm can say that the populus (the referent is
surely the 711T' 47 73 p. as the church of the Old Testament) is omnino impius, while
another can say of the same populus that it is prorsus sanctus et pius. In both cases
he says, the key to the proper understanding of this seeming paradox is the
recognition that the writer is speaking per synecdochen (544, 5-8). The argument
can also be reversed: just as the church is called sancta propter partem sanctam, so
too it is called hypocritica et impia propter partem impiam. In the first case, the pars
sancta are the sancti, or more precisely, Christ, on account of whom the saints are
holy, and in the second case, the pars impia are the sinners who refuse forgiveness, the false saints.655
In summary, even though Christ and faith are the chief part of repentance
and not the contrition worked by the law (necessary as it is), nevertheless Luther
continues to stress that repentance is ex lege vis-à-vis the antinomian insistence
that it is ex gratia or ex violatione filii. The first time we encountered this modus loquendi it sounded somewhat confusing because Luther had made it plain in his
First Thesenreihe that the law is only instrumental in bringing about the pars prima
and that the pars altera (and indeed the more important) cannot be produced by
the law but only by the gospe1.656 Neverthless, here he makes it clear that when
he speaks like that he is using synecdoche. Hence, the antinomian trap has been
sprung. Although they tried to catch Luther on a point of logic they have been
to illustrate how it is used in his beloved German tongue (which is no different to
how it is used in English). On a limitation to the argument by synecdoche, see
the comment of the unknown respondent in 39 I, 471, 4-12 (2 AD, Arg. 18).
per synecdochen, which means that sin does not dominate. In other words, they are in the
flesh but not of the flesh (39 I, 523, 7-9;3 AD, Arg. 11).
655Luther says elsewhere that Christians remain in the flesh

656See 39 I, 368, 5-369, 16 (1 AD, Arg. 3).
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caught in their own trap. For when Luther maintains that poenitentia est docenda
ex lege, he is speaking per synecdochen only of the first part of repentance and not
of repentance as a whole, which he has often said consists of two parts and can
only arise from law and gospel, and not from the gospel only.
Argument 23657
Contra 67
Christ cannot be retained without the law. Christ is salvation and redemption. Therefore, salvation is not retained without the law.
Response: We concede that.
Rejoinder: Do you wholly concede?
Response: Certainly.
Rejoinder: Therefore, this militates against the doctrine of justification.
Response [A I (left col.)]: This we deny because the law is not necessary
for justification, neither is it useful nor possible, as we have stated in our
theses above, because in this matter the law must be rejected and truly, as
they say, consigned to the gallows,658 because it cannot abolish sins or free
from death, nor was it given for this purpose, but this belongs to the lamb of
God. John 1 [: 29] and Isaiah 53 [: 7]. And yet the whole world is of that
opinion, that is, it has been fully persuaded to believe that if only it had the
law it could certainly keep it extremely well, and it does many things also
with this opinion, hoping in this way to be saved. But it is a far different
thing to say that Christ cannot be retained without the law. For unless you
become a poor and helpless sinner, Christ will not bring you good news.
For what need do the healthy have of a doctor? [Mark 2: 17]. If they are not
sick, what is the use of doctors? So also in this case. If there were no law to
make sin sin, or no law that has revealed sin to be sin, what need would
there be of Christ? If I am not a sinner, Christ will be of no benefit to me,
because I am not a sinner, that is, I do not know that I am a sinner and alive
without the law. Moreover, Christ says: I have not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance [Mark 2: 17]. But if the law is abolished sin
also is abolished, and if sin is abolished Christ is abolished, for he is of no
use to anyone. For if sin is abolished, death would be no more. Therefore, if
Christ is to remain savior it is necessary for me to remain a sinner, subject to
65739 I, 545, 3-548, 23.
658For

the formula of execration ic x6paxac, ad corvos, see A. Otto, Die
Sprichworter der Romer (1890), 95, no. 448, and Wander III, 1449, nr. 95. Cf. 39 I,
345, 1-2.
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death and the devil, and these must remain and stand firm at the same time.
If one is abolished the other will perish.
Thus our antinomians, by teaching the gospel and Christ, seek to overthrow the gospel and Christ, as is the case with Satan, who is a thousand
times the deceiver and enemy of Christ. For believe me, the devil is a dialectician, rhetorician, and philosopher, and best knows how to entice people,
even the saints. When he does his teaching of the Lord his purpose is to remove Christ. By teaching in this way he in fact lies, as when he says [of
those who are his]: They glory in the gospel and preach its doctrine and gifts
with high-sounding words, and who can say anything against that. But
meanwhile we know very well what they are up to. And I for my part, so
long as I have life and breath, will oppose them as much as I can. For I see
what they want and what in the end they are aiming at: they want to induce
security and lull people to sleep, as if sin were completely dead and nothing,
just as it really is nothing for the saints since the law has been abolished, but
it opposes sinners, that is, in order that they may acknowledge their sins
and miseries, in which they lie sick or dead, for then they can be healed. But
when the hypocritically secure people see the law, they ridicule and mock it,
like the antinomians, and care nothing about whatever it may say. They
mouth all the best words of our religion: Christ was born and suffered for
them, they have the forgiveness of sins and eternal life. But meanwhile the
devil lies hidden under their tongue and gives these words passage, waiting
for the right opportunity, and when it comes he will overturn these also by
force, just as he once answered some exorcist who asked where on earth he
had received and eaten the sacrament by saying: What, can't a rogue of a
servant lie under a bridge and let his master pass over it?659 Believe me, it
seems that these people, who speak so lightly of Moses and apparently
abolish Christ, have no yet seen through the tricks and snares of the devil,
since the one can scarcely really be known in its totality without the other.
But either he makes secure and worthless hypocrites or he causes despair,
yet these must be separated in the case of antinomians. For I have not seen a
more proud, insolent, malicious, treacherous and worse kind of people than
these. What is the reason for that? Because everything that they do must be
forgiven, for Christ has made satisfaction, and the law has been removed.
That is true. The same can be seen in our peasants, our nobility, and in our
citizens, who abuse their liberty, even though we wear ourselves out
inculcating the law. Therefore, you should not doubt that such will be the
future state of this world. In the not too distant future you will already see
an image of it in these new doctors and reformers of ours, if God should
659For this

aphorism, the WA editors refer us to Wander 4, 82, no. 66
and U.A. Tischreden 6, 212, no. 6820.
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permit such a thing. For after the world has received this dogma of theirs,
which it may well do, for there is a lust for new things, and this kind of
doctrine does sound plausible, and in two or three years at the most it will
throw out the gospel and Christ altogether [cf. 2 Tim. 4: 3-4]. What use will
there be for Christ if the material in which he must work has been
abolished? For a worker is nothing without his material. Christ will be of
no benefit to people who are secure in themselves and live without a sense
of sin, but in the opposite way than is the case with the Jews. With them it is
through the law, with these it is without the law. Therefore, I admonish and
adjure you to hold on to Christ as the worker on our sins. For it was for this
purpose that he was sent, to take away the sins of the world, and on account
of sin to condemn sin [cf. Rom. 8: 3] and to swallow it up in himself.
Therefore, he came to preach the gospel to the poor and contrite in heart, as
if to say: My materials in which I work and am effective are sinners and the
tormented who are fearful, for these I am there, for these I am a physician
etc. But without the law no sin remains in the world and thus the material
of Christ is taken away in advance of him. In this way he becomes for us
redundant.
As in the previous argumentum, here too the antinomians do not advance a
serious thesis but are rather attempting to demonstrate how Luther's position, if
pressed, becomes heretical. Luther readily concedes their argument which is in
essence: Sine lege Christus (and hence: salus) retineri non potest. What he rejects
however is the deduction the antinomians draw from that: Ergo hoc pugnat cum
doctrina de iustificatione. There is a big difference between saying that the salvation cannot be retained without the law and that the law is necessary for salvation. Luther has already shown several times that there is no causality between
the law and justification.660 Although, as Luther will argue here, the law remains
for Christians, insofar as they are still sinners, when it comes to the article of
660See 2 AD, Arg. 17: The law is not the efficient cause but the material

cause of justification; this is consonant with 2 AD, Arg. 8: Many things are
needed for justification but they are not its cause. Again, 2 AD, Arg. 20: The law
and justification belong to opposite and contradictory genera. Indeed, the law is
impossible and useless when it comes to justification (1 AD, Arg. 14).

547
justification, the law must be consigned to the gallows [he uses an idiomatic expression of the day: ad coros relegari] (545, 14).661 On the other hand, it is the
received opinion of the world, which is finally always the opinio legis, that if only
it had laws it could fulfill them. That also corresponds to the thinking of the antinomians, who as we saw in our background study, held that the Mosaic law had
actually been given by God as the first way of salvation. Luther denies that the
law was ever given as a Heilsweg despite a few passages which could be taken as
pointing in that direction.662 Rather, the purpose for God's giving the law in the
first place, and the reason it is to be retained, is so that he can give us the gospel,
for since the gospl is for sinners the law must first persuade us that we are sinners, indeed convict us of sin. Here Luther falls back on a key sayings of Jesus:
Ov
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Eaai oticaiovc &XX& &llama Xo (Mark 2: 17). Furthermore, he follows Paul in
saying that the task of the law is to peccatum facere peccatum (Rom. 7: 7-12). Now
drawing out the implications of this Luther can say: Si non sum peccator, Christus
nihil mihi proderit, quia peccator non sum (546, 11-12). And given the interconnection between the law, sin and death, which he has already established,663 Luther
goes on to conclude: Itaque si Christus debet manere salvator, necesse est, me manere
peccatorem, morti ac diabolo obnoxium, oportet, ut haec simul maneant ac stent. Una
661While Luther says this of the law only quoad iustificationem, for the
antinomians it became a virtual watchword; cf. their Positiones, Item alii, #2: Alle
die mit Mose umbgehen, mussen zum Teufel faren, cm galgen mit Mose (39 I, 345, 1-2).

662See our discussion of 1AD, Arg. 1 and # AD, Arg. 7.
663See

39 I, 348, 25-43 (ATh , II, #18-25).
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ablato utrumque peribit (546, 17-19). This ineradicable relationship between Christ
and the law is the main thrust of the responsio.
But how exactly is this to be explained? Does it mean then that Christ
(and the gospel) are dependent on the law? Only in the sense that the law needs
to do its scarifying work in exposing sin before the gospel can do its proprium,
which is to announce the promise of the forgiveness of sins to all those who confess that they are sinners. However, it does not mean that the gospel is in any
sense derived from the law or that the law is not a necessary presupposition or
precondition of the gospel. Nevertheless, it does recognize that the gospel message will only reach its goal if one first acknowledges the situation into which it is
spoken (a world in which sin, death, devil, wrath, and the law hold sway) and
understands the materia in which it works. Yet by the same token, it would be
just as wrong to argue that the law is "necessary" for the gospel as it is to say that
the law is necessary for justification. Besides, Luther warns against the use of this
Aristotelian scholastic terminology, which he has long since abandoned and instead simply asserts, on the basis of scripture, that it is a contingent fact that according to the ordo rei sin, death, and the law precede the gospe1.6" Now if the
law were already abolished, as the antinomians claim, there would be no sin, and
if there were no sin, there would be no death, and if all of the above were true
Christ would no longer serve any purpose. But that is obviously not the case.665
Hence, when Luther says that if one is abolished the other perishes, he
does not mean that we can dispose of the law, sin, and death, and hence even
664Cf. 39 I, 347,1-6 (AM, I, #27-30).

'Luther has already argued this in 1 AD, Arg. 4. See our discussion
there for more on the nexus between law, sin, death and Christ.
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Christ, by a mere fiat! And for that reason Luther's statement is more a dictum
heroicum than a serious doctrinal assertion. It is not meant to be pressed too far
but to emphasize the fact that what makes the law indispensable, theologically, is
that it serves to prepare people for Christ, and so that its removal would not but
seriously imperil the gospel.
Furthermore, as Luther has shown before, even if the antinomians were to
abolish the law from the church, the law still remains inscribed on the mind, also
of Christians, and thus will remain until the last day. Rather, he uses this causal
thinking in the service of soteriology propter Christ= (just as Paul does) and does
not intend it to be pressed beyond that. In other words, he uses it to show that
the more we downplay the law and sin as the determinative coordinates of the
matrix of our infralapsarian life, the more we diminish Christ and deprive ourselves of his gifts. Faith, on the other hand, speaks like John the Baptizer: ixelVov
bei crUt rimy, Eue Se iharraaeal (John 3: 30), for it wants to do nothing else
than receive for it knows that in this very act Christ himself is glorified. Therefore, Luther admonishes his hearers to hold on to Christ as the one who works on
our sins [operarius in peccatis nostris] (548, 16-17). Christ's person cannot be separated from his office. If he came evangelizare pauperibus et contristis corde, then unless we are numbered among the pauperes et contristes we cannot hear his message
as evangel. For it is as if Christ were to say: Mea materialia, in quibus operor et efficax
sum, cunt peccatores et miseri timidi, his adsum, his medeor etc. (548, 19-21). And
without the law there would be no sinners needing to be forgiven, no sick people
waiting to be healed, and thus Christ's materia would be taken away from him in
advance [et sic materia Christi praecipitur] through a preemptive strike of the evil
one, so that Christ himself ends up becoming redundant or indifferent to us
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[Igitur otiosus nobis feet] (548, 21-23).666 For an operarius is nothing without his materia and Christ will be of no benefit [nihil proderit Christus] to the securi and those
sine sensu peccatorum agentibus (548, 13-15).
Luther knows full well that the battle against the antinomians is at bottom
a battle against Satan, the father of lies, who can even trick the saints by disguising himself as an angel of light, or as Christ himself. Without realizing it, they
have allowed themselves to become his dupes. Consequently, even their preaching of the gospel will be used by Satan to further his own cause. Although the
gospel itself, as the antithesis to the law, is truly "antinomian," yet what the
antinomians have failed to understand is that without the preparatory work of
the law the message of the gospel goes unheard, or worse, is misused by satan to
make people stertentes and to foster securitas. This he sees as the final result of the
antinomians because he knows that behind them stands the power of the evil
one. They do not understand that preaching the gospel to the securi only reinforces their thinking that sin is completely removed and dead and so is nothing.667 Of course, that is precisely what the gospel says to the saints, but these
are people who confess that they are sinners, who struggle daily with sin and
mortify the flesh, who worry about sin and pray constantly for deliverance from
666That this in the end spells our own destruction is made clear in the
penultimate thesis of the fifth Thesenreihe: 39 I, 357, 35-36 (ATh, V, #69): Summa,
legem tollere et peccatum mortemque relinquere, est morbum peccati et mortis ad perniciem hominibus occultare.

667Cf. 39 I, 357, 37-38 (Am, V, #70): Sublatis morte et peccato (ut Christus

fecit) feliciter tolleretur [scil. lex], imo lex stabiliretur, Rom. 3. Here, the Doppeldeutigkeit of the proposition becomes clear. On the one hand, sin, death, and the law
are removed for the saints, propter Christum per fidem; on the other hand, because
the pii remain sinful in se propter carnem, the law is not removed but confirmed.
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its power. To people like that the message of the gospel comes as a liberating
gift. But the antinomians, whom Luther calls securi hypocritae et nequam, presume
on God's fogiveness and claim it as their right, thus become ever more proud, insolent and hybritic.668 Luther does not deny that they proclaim the gospel. He
admits that they can articulate the gospel very well and that they have the right
vocabulary [Habent in ore optima quaeque verba nostrae religionis], and then he gives
some examples—Christum pro se natum, passum, se habere remissionem peccatorum,
vitam aeternam (547, 11-13). But what they did not understand was that Satan was
also there, ready to put his own spin on these words, because when the gospel is
separated from the law it becomes especially vulnerable to demonic perversion.
For Satan is an excellent dialectician, rhetorician and philosopher skilled in deceit. Even though the antinomians preach Christ the devil is out to remove him
and outmaneuver him and because they are not apprised of his strategems they
have unwittingly fallen victim to his guile. That is what Luther means when he
says: Ita nostri Antinomi docendo Evangelium et Christum conantur Evangelium et
Christum evertere (546, 19-20). Using a very telling image he likens the devil, who
conceals himself sub lingua, to a Schalck lying under the bridge waiting for the
right moment to pounce on the Herren and rob him of his goods. So too, Luther
suggests, the devil bides his time, waiting for the occasio; while in the interim he
gives the words of the gospel spoken by the antinomians free passage.669 The
devil will hardly oppose the preaching of the gospel if it is separated from the
668For a complete antinomian profile, based on Luther's description of
them in the disputations, see our analysis in ch. 2.

669Satan's guile is brought out even further in the full text of the anecdote that Luther relates, involving a brief exchange between the devil and an exorcist (547, 15-18).
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law; but if it is kept separate from the law its effects are diminished until finally
Christ is pushed out of the picture because he can no longer do his proper work.
For the one thing that destroys the devil and his kingdom is the one thing that
Christ alone can give, and that is the forgiveness of sins. And, conversely, the
way that Satan can best defend himself is, not by attacking Christ directly, but by
first overthrowing the law. Luther, who has a keen eye for the wily tricks of the
devil, can therefore conclude: Crede mihi, nondum mihi videntur isti perspexisse astutias et dolos diaboli, qui ita leviter loquuntur de Mose,670 ut videantur Christum tollere,
cum tamen alterum sine altero vix totum nosci possit (547, 18-548, 1).
The significance of this responsio is not just the window it gives into the
character of antinomianism as seen by Luther, but even more the connection it
makes between the law and Christ. This is the first time that Luther explicated
this following the lines already laid down in his fifth Thesenreihe.671 Prior to this
the main reason that Luther has given for the retention of the law has been that
the pH still remain sinful quoad carem and therefore need the law to keep the flesh
under check. Related to this emphasis has also been the role he has assigned the
admonitions and exhortations of scripture, which, though strictly law, are taken
under the control of the gospel in faith and used in its service. But here too, the
chief end has been to encourage Christians to remain faithful to Christ, to be
awake, to fight the good fight in the power of the Spirit, to mortify the flesh and
so forth. However, this is the first time that Luther has made it clear that the re670Moses in this context can only refer to the Decalogue and not, as is

more usual, the whole Mosaic law.
67139 I, 357, 29-30 (Am, V, #66):

Est igitur legis doctrina in ecclesiis necessaria et omnino retinenda, sine qua Christus retineri non potest.
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moval of the law will inevitably entail the loss of Christ because only the law can
prepare us for God's opus proprium by reminding us time and again that we are
sinners doomed to die.
This argument is no last ditch effort on his part to bolster his position, nor
does it represent an element foreign to his theology. For when all is said and
done, it is thoroughly consistent with and flows out of the very heart of Luther's
theology, which, by his own testimony, is the doctrine of justification.672 And in
actuality the doctrine of justification belongs to christology for it teaches that we
are justified gratis propter Christ= per fidem. And since the person and work of
Christ cannot be separated without destroying biblical christology, so we need to
show that part of Christ's officium was the fulfillment of the law. This is not to elevate the law over Christ in a teleological sense, as if the fulfillment of the law
was the ultimate purpose of God's coming. Rather, the fulfillment of the law was
one way (but alone does not describe the fullness of our redemption) in which
Christ rescued fallen humanity from its helpness plight vis-à-vis the lex impossibilis, yet paradoxically he not only fulfilled the law, but also defeated it. Enslaved
to sin and unable to fulfill the law and yet held responsible by God for something
that we cannot do—a condition full of existential contraditions, where in the end
we come face to face with the Deus absconditus, which Elert comprehensively describes as the Llrerlebnis,673 that is the predicament from which Christ liberated
us. Now although we only come to full clarity about the hopelessness of our con672See his opening remarks in his Praefatio to this disputation: Quemadmodum iam semper audistis et auditis quotidie turn in lectionibus turn pro concione, ita
quoque nunc dicimus locum iustificationis esse sine ulla controversia doctrinae christianae caput et summam (489, 4-6).
673See Elert, Structure, 17-28.
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dition without Christ when we are iv Xpi orb: looking back with the eyes of faith,
nevertheless, Luther argues that the law makes it clear what Christ fulfilled to
save us and without it we would only know that Christ fulfilled the law but not
what.674 This must suffice for now. The thesis that Luther advances here will
obviously need to be taken up again in the next chapter within the framework of
a more systematic discussion.
Argument 24675
It is superfluous to teach what is known naturally. The law is known
naturally. Therefore, it is superfluous to teach the law.
Response : Both of the propositions are false because we teach and learn
also what we know. Because memory is prone to error even among the best
trained experts, the most learned must go to their books again and again to
learn. Indeed they above all others are constantly learning, as we see from
our greatest geniuses who never stop. Secondly, the law of God is not so
well known that there is no need for it to be taught or urged, for otherwise
there would have been no need to give the law and to send Moses, nor do we
know as much about the law as God would wish. For who can ever know
how great and monstrous an evil his own sin is? Also disobedience, hatred,
anger, greed, fornication, not to mention sins of the first table. For we are so
corrupt through original sin that we cannot discern the magnitude of our sin.
For our flesh, the devil and the world are at hand, who persuade us otherwise and obscure the law of God written in our minds. Here therefore it is
necessary to be constantly admonished lest we forget God's commandment,
especially since the law of God is the highest wisdom and so as the source,
origin, and wellspring of all virtues and disciplines toward God and human
beings, it is infinite because sin is infinite. Till now neither theologian nor jurist has been found who could say, or in saying comprehend, how great are
an evil passion and greed. If there are people who truly feel sin, like David,
they are truly in hell and live at the portals of death, as the psalm says: The
terrors of hell have come upon me [Ps. 18: 6].
674This point does not come out in the responsio but is articulated in his
Thesenreihe: Quid enim de Christo retineas, dum lege remota, quam ille implevit, nescias,
quid impleverit? (39 I, 357, 31-32; ATh, V, #67).
67539 I, 549, 2-550, 7.
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The antinomians attempt to argue here that the law does not need to be
taught because it is already known naturally: Quae naturaliter non sunt [and the
law is included here] supervacaneum est docere. Not only does Luther deny the conclusion, he also rejects both propositiones. And yet by repudiating the minor
premise, he almost seems to be denying an earlier argument, to the effect that
since the Decalogue is written on the heart and inheres in the conscience we all
have knowledge of it naturaliter.676 Nonetheless, it is implicit in what he says that
he still holds to the lex insculpta, his point here however is that by itself it is not
enough to ensure an adequate knowledge of God's law for our memory is fallible
[memoria est labilis] and needs to be refreshed. Luther argues from a human analogy: even the optimi artifices and the doctissimi must recurrere ad ipsos libros et siscere. Even the summa ingenia never stop learning (549, 5-6). His second reason
why the law must be taught is that it is not as well known as God would wish.
Without the revelation of the law the magnitude of our sin remains unknown:
Quis enim est, qui unquam scit, quantum et quam ingens malum sit peccatum ipsum? . . .
Ita enim corrupti sumus per peccatum originis, ut non possimus cernere magnitudinem
peccati (549, 11-12). And this ignorance, or better still, forgetfulness is not just the
result of our human sinfulness but it is compounded by the intrigue and lies of the
devil who tries to persuade us that we are not at all sinful or culpable coram Deo
but intrinsically good. To overcome this amnesia, so to speak, and bring the mandatum Dei to mind again, Luther emphasizes the need for admonition. This admonere however is really nothing different from the preaching of the law, that is,
the lex scripta or Decalogue.
676See 39 I, 374, 1-5 (1 AD, Arg. 7). Again, Luther argues that the law

has been written on the hearts of all people, see 1 AD, Arg. 25 and 3 AD, Arg. 19.
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What is different about the proclaimed law as compared with the inscribed
law is not its content but simply its form.67 As we saw again in argumentum 19,
the lex praedicata serves the lex insculpta or lex naturae, not vice versa. However,
the proclaimed law is still necessary in order to overcome the soporific and amnesiac effects induced in people by the disease of sin and the deceit of Satan. The
memory must not only be reactivated but it also also needs correction for the
flesh, the devil and the world are continually trying to hinder and distort the
knowledge and experience of the law especially in the unregenerate who have
nothing more than the lex insculpta.
Luther pits the lex Dei as the infinite summa sapientia with its fops et origo et
scaturigo [sic] omnium virtutum et disciplinarum erga Deum et homines, against the
peccatum infinitum (550, 1-3). But what is the lex Dei that we need to be reminded
of? Is it the lex accusans? That is clear from the fact that Luther says that we could
never know the enormity of our sin were it not for the law, and then he lists some:
Item inobedientia, odium, ira, avaritia, scortatio, ut taceam de peccatis primae tabulae
(540, 12-13). So the first thing that the law does is hold up a mirror to us so that
we may see ourselves as we are seen by God. That is certainly usus legis theologicus. But it does not stop there. Luther, in the passage we cited earlier (550, 13), speaks about the law in the way faith speaks. Only faith can say that the law,
which condemns sin, is also the fountainhead and source of all virtutes and disciplinae toward God and our fellow human beings. Even though Christians qua
sinners are still targets for the lex accusatrix, they can still make this bold confession about the goodness of the law, like the writers of Psalm 19 and 119, because
67/See our discussion and also the Elert quote in connection with our
analysis of 3 AD, Arg. 19.
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they know that by faith in him who is the lex impletor and whose impletio is given
to them, imputative, as a gift, they need fear no condemnation for they live under
the shadow of his wings. Now the law is seen with new eyes and is treasured as
God's summa sapientia because it teaches us what good works are pleasing to God
and helpful to the neighbor.678 This is how we understand the two terms virtutes
et disciplinae. But Luther does not conclude with this positive use of the law
(traditionally called the tertius usus) but takes us back to the second use or usus
theologicus, and leaves us staring into the depths of Sheol, on the threshold of despair, just as people like David and others who experience the sensus legis feel
themselves trapped by the snares of death [illi vere sunt in inferno et versantur in
portis mortis] (550, 5-7).679 The reason that Luther stresses this point is because
this accusing and convicting function of the law was denied by the antinomians.
They knew only of a positve use of the law which functioned as disciplina in the
civic realm.
In summary, the law needs to be taught to call to mind the forgotten lex
naturae, to clarify its contents on the basis of the Decalogue, to reveal our utter sin6781s

there any important connection between the works offered to
God and those done for the neighbor? Indeed, Luther says elsewhere that God
does not need our works but our neighbor does. Works that are pleasing to God
are those that he himself commands us to do. The fact that they carry his recommendation prevents them from becoming purely arbitrary, self-serving or meritseeking. For good works that are not good and helpful for the neighbor are not
pleasing to God either. Hence, Luther can say in his tractate, The Freedom of the
Christian, that we live in Christ by faith and in the neighbor through love.
while Luther, drawing on Psalm 18: 6, ends with the terrores legis in order to stress that the uses theologicus is the chief use of the law, we
must not forget that the psalm writer goes on to say that when he called on the
Lord, he heard his cry for help and delivered him out of all his trouble (vv. 7, 1720).
679However,
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fulness before God. Moreover, it is also to be used as the source of our knowledge
of all virtutes and disciplinae in the fight against sin.
Argument 25680
Eternal death is the penalty for our remaining sin, because disdain of
God is eternal. Therefore, sin remains and is not abolished in death.
D. M. Luther: The argument is this: A dead person is justified from sin.
Judas, Nero, Caligula, Diocletian are dead. Therefore, all these and others,
beasts rather than humans, are also justified.
Response: I respond to the major premise, in which a distinction needs
to be made along the lines mentioned above: to be dead and to die to sin is a
Pauline phrase meaning to fight with sins and not let them rule us. And this
happens not only in any one member but in all, that is to say, our heart, eyes,
hands, tongue, feet function differently now than before and serve Christ the
Lord, not sins, then straightaway, day by day, I become holier and better.
But because this nature is totally infected by the devil, we have no hope of
being completely free from sins before the body is covered with earth and
consumed by worms. There are then two deaths in Paul: one is to die to sins
or to the world, the other is to die to nature. The ungodly also die to nature,
as much as they are that, but the godly also die in this life to sins, that is, to
the world with all its passions, what Paul elsewhere calls mortifying and
crucifying their flesh, as he says to the Ephesians: Let the thief no longer steal
[Eph. 4: 28]. But such a death on the part Christians is not seen. For it is
hidden in Christ, where there is neither male nor female (Gal. 3 [: 28]). But
meanwhile, as long as this life lasts, we have to constantly struggle here with
remnants of sins in the flesh, and because they cannot be wholly abolished, it
is necessary to retain the law which keeps the flesh in submission.
This argument= is clearly not a serious exposition of antinomian doctrine
but is once again intended to drive Luther into the corner by attempting to show
the illogicality or inconsistency of his theology. The reason we can be certain of
this is because we have already seen from our background study of antinomianism, from Luther's Praefatio, and from his argumentation at different points in the
disputation that the antinomians taught that all sin has been removed by Christ
so that the pii have no reliquiae peccatorum. The absurdity of the antinomian posi68039 I, 550, 9-552, 3.
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tion emerges from Luther's recapitulation of their arguments. According to them
even such bestiae as Nero, Caligula and Diocletian are iustificati because they
teach that mortuus est iustificatus a peccato (550, 11-551, 1). However, this can only
be said if objective justification is stressed in such a one-sided manner that reconciliation is entirely independent of faith. The Pauline and Lutheran view, on the
other hand, is that while from God's standpoint it is true that he has reconciled
the world to himself in Christ, yet that A.4:5yoc Tiic KcactAltayrtc can only be appropriated through faith. Hence, the appeal [napcmaXelv] of Paul's missionary
preaching: Seop.cea i)ieep Xptaroii, Katc0tXdynte Tea: OECi (2 Cor. 5: 18-20). The
antinomian view of justification was simplex: a person is either without sin (if a
member of the church) or is sinful (if outside the church). Luther's view, on the
other hand, is duplex: Christians are both simul iusti and simul peccatores; iusti by
faith, peccatores on account of the old sinful nature.
In keeping with the above Luther clarifies what it means scripturally to be
dead and to die to sin. He says that mortuum esse et mori peccato is a Pauline
phrase meaning pugnare cum peccatis et non sinere, ut in nobis dominetur (551, 2-4).
Clearly then to die or be dead to sin does not mean to be without sin but rather to
fight it and not let it gain the upper hand.681 Because in Christ by faith we are a
'anvil rticsic (2 Cor. 5: 17), it means that our life will no longer be determined by
the old nature but rather by the new, which we received in holy Baptism. Consequently, our eyes, ears, feet, and hands etcetera will no longer be servants of sin
but of Christ and righteousness (cf. Rom. 6: 12-19). Since the baptized belong to
the light, having been transferred [p.€010CdV ad from the goy ai a TO1-5 amitovc
681cf 3 AD, Arg. 6 (esp. 514, 25-515, 11) where Luther stresses the paradoxical fact that being a saint and praying for sin always go together.
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into the kcal hei a of God's Son (Col. 1: 13), Paul appeals to them to walk as children of the light (Eph. 5: 8). Luther maintains that this death to sin brings about a
change in the whole person et sic fieri subinde de die in diem sanctior et melior (551,
6-7).682 As we have had occasion to point out before, when Luther says that
Christians become holier and better each day this is not in conflict with his doctrine of justification according to which Christians receive the whole of Christ's
holiness and righteousness by imputation, through faith in Christ. Luther however also connects the totus-totus of justification with the partim-partim of sanctification.683 The forgiveness of sins and the daily expulsion of sins through repentance are the opposite sides of the same coin. Therefore, as we have already seen,
Luther says that sin ceases in two ways: imputative and formaliter or expurgative.
The Holy Spirit given in justification immediately enters the fray against sin, and
so long as Christians remain steadfast in faith and dead to sin, the Spirit will rule
us and keep sin in submission. As we saw earlier, this is what Paul means by
dying to sin or to the world. This mori in hac vita peccatis is, according to Luther,
what Paul calls mortificare et crucifigere carnem suam, and which evidences itself in
682See 39 I, 432, 7-11 (2 AD, Arg. 3) and our discussion there on the
relationship between justification and sanctification within the context of the
connection between the imputative and formaliter or expurgative aspect of the
impletio legis.
683Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress

Press, 1966), 226, rightly points out that Luther uses iustificare in more than one
sense. In addition to its common declaratory meaning, iustum reputare or computari also has a factitative sense which includes not only the declaring righteous
but also the making righteous (cf. 39 II, 202). "Justification in this sense remains
incomplete on earth and is first completed on the Last Day. Complete righteousness in this sense is an eschatological reality." Thus, cf. Th. 23 of Luther's
Thesenreihe on Rom. 3: 28 (1536): Iustificari enim hominem sentimus, hominem
nondum esse iustum, sed esse in ipso motu seu cursu ad iustitiam (39 I, 83, 16-17).
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his various admonitions to lead a godly life. But the christianus mortuus (our
term) is a hidden reality known only to faith. Therefore, although Luther affirms
that Christians grow more holy each day, this holiness can never be measured or
even seen. All we can see is our sin. And it is precisely this that can so often give
rise to great Anfechtung such as we see in the apostle Paul in the latter half of Romans 7. The more we look for it in ourselves the more unholy we appear because
holiness is to be found only in Christ not in us. As we sing in the gloria in exclesis
of the holy liturgy: Tu es solus sanctus. Rather, it is only as we despair of ever
finding any intrinsic holiness in ourselves and seek it only in Christ (semper ad
baptismum) through the forgiveness of sins, that we will truly grow into Christ
and that his gifts and new life will control and shape us so that we walk less and
less according to the flesh and more and more according to the Spirit. The good
tree bears good fruit for that is the tree it is. In the same way the life of faith will
manifest itself in love and good works to the neighbor. But at the same time this
fruit, these good deeds of loving kindness, are hidden from our sight—we are not
aware of them because we do them unselfconsciously. Faith does not blow its
own trumpet but serves the neighbor without letting the left hand know what the
right hand is doing—hence the surprise of the of lc aim at the Last Judgment in Jesus' parable (Matt. 25: 37-39). Luther, following Paul, says that the mors christianorum is not seen for it is abscondita in Christo (Col. 3: 3).684 Yet even though the
Christian has died to sin and his old self has been buried with Christ in the grave
684Luther goes on to cite part of Gal. 3: 28 [ubi neque masculus, neque
femina], however it would seem that he is getting mixed up with Col. 3: 3 where
Paul says that our life is hidden with Christ in God. Common to both is the idea
that we are all members of the body of Christ through faith. However, the focus
of Luther's thinking here is not the oneness of the body but the hiddenness of the
saints. Therefore, the Gal. 3: 28 does not really fit the context.
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and the homo novus has risen with Christ to walk in newness of life, we still have
to struggle constantly with the reliquiae peccatorum in came (552, 1-2). For it will
not be until the credentes have died the second death (not to be confused with the
second death in the Book of Revelation), coinciding with their physical death,
that they will be free from the scourge of sin. Meanwhile, says Luther, the law
must be retained to keep the flesh in submission.
Two observations may be made at this point. First, the retention of the
law to keep the flesh in officio should not be thought of as corresponding only to
the usus civiiis. It is that, and indeed it is a reminder that the church also has the
task of preaching the usus politicus (if one ever preaches a use!) from the pulpit
for there is genuine reciprocity between the first two uses of the law. For when
preached from the pulpit there is a real mutuality between the usus politicus and
the usus elenchticus which cannot really be separated. This can be seen from the
apostolic admonition (used by Luther above) that the thief should no longer steal.
To the non-Christian that is merely the civil use of the law but for a Christian is
can also be parenesis if it is understood within the framework of the gospel. This
leads to our second point. The law is to be retained, says Luther, to keep the flesh
in submission. Now insofar as the checking and restraining function of the law
has usually been associated with its first use, this remark could be seen as simply
a refernce to the first use of the law. On the other hand, as we have just seen,
parenesis, which is usually understood as tertius usus, functions not only
didactically but also as second use in mortifying the flesh by putting to death sins
and lusts, not just by restraining gross sin as the law does in the case of a nonChristians, but putting to death the old sinful nature so that the new self, born of
water and the Spirit in holy Baptism, may again and again be reborn and walk
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before God in holiness and righteousness for ever. We hope to continue this discussion later.
Argument 26685
Contra 44
The law is not laid down for the righteous [1 Tim. 1: 9]. Therefore, the
law is not to be preached to the godly.
Response: This proposition is aimed directly against the antinomians
because it clearly says that the law is to be taught in the church, not removed,
when it states: [The law is not laid down for the righteous] but for the unrighteous, for murders, for those who kill their fathers and mothers, and for
sinners etc [1 Tim. 9-10]. For there always are such people and they are
found in the church. Therefore, the law is laid down and is not laid down for
the righteous, that is, insofar as they are righteous. The law then is and is not
laid down. Insofar as people are righteous the law has been abolished, insofar as they are sinners, the law remains. The person who knows how to distinguish these properly is a good theologian. To the extent that Christ is our
Lord and we have forgiveness of sins in Christ, we are truly saints, clean and
righteous, just like Gabriel himself in heaven, through faith, and are truly
seated in the heavenly places with Christ [Eph. 2: 6]. But as far as I and my
flesh are concerned, I am a sinner. However, just as there [in heaven] I become lord of all, and thus in the kingdom with Christ beyond the law, death
and the devil, so here I become a servant of all and a soldier of Christ against
sin and all worldly passions, as Christ says: Go, sin no more, lest something
worse befall you [John 5: 14; cf. 8: 11].
Since 1 Timothy 1: 9 seems at first sight to support the antinomian position
perfectly, it is not surprising that this should be one of their favorite texts. It has
already come up at least four times before and will come up once more later on in
this same disputation. Earlier Luther stressed that since Christians already have
in Christ the lex impleta, they should not be burdened with the lex implenda.686
Later he makes it clearer that the law must still be taught and even sharpened on
68539 I, 552, 6-553, 7.
686See 39 I, 478, 20-479, 3 (2 AD, Arg. 25).
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account of the reliquiae peccatorum in the flesh.687 Therefore, he concludes that the
reason why the law is still to be taught to the pii, 1 Timothy 1: 9 notwithstanding,
is because the Christian is a true Tom Thomas or twin, truly simul iustus et simul
peccator.688
What Luther says in his responsio to the present argumentum is substantially
the same. He claims at the outset that 1 Timothy 1: 9 passage is actually directed
against the antinomians because it goes on in verse 10 to say that the law has indeed been given not to the iusti but to the iniusti and that the reason the law still
needs to be preached is because such people are always to be found in the
church.689 Therefore, Luther agrees with the text: iusto non est lex posita, with this
qualification: in quantum iustus (552, 10-11. He recognizes that because Christians
by their fallen nature are at one and the time sancti and peccatores, and that the law
both is and is not abolished for them: Lex itaque posita est et non posita. In quantum
iustus, sublata est lex, in quantum peccatores, manet lex (552, 11-12). This is the clearest and most concise answer that Luther gives to the question of whether the law
is still to be taught to Christians. This is his definitive formulation and when the
text does come up once more as it does in argumentum 37/10 he says nothing new.
Because he is convinced that this distinction, which is nothing other than the distinction between law and gospel, is the key to understanding the role of the law in
the life of the Christian, he remarks: Haec qui bene novit distinguere, bonus est theologus (552, 12-13). He once more elaborates this distinction to make his position
687See 39 I, 502, 16-21 (3 AD, Arg. 2).
688See 39 I, 504, 6-10 (3 AD, Arg. 3); Luther expresses this twofoldness

also by describing the pius as Christianus militans et triumphans.
689See also 39 I, 502, 19-21 (3 AD, Arg. 2).
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crystal clear: on the one hand, quoad Christum dominum nostrum et remissionem peccatorum in Christo we are sancti, mundi et iusti, like the angels in heaven, now
through faith; on the other hand, quod ad me et carnem meam, I am peccator. In the
first case I become dominus omnium and rein with Christ super legem, mortem et diabolum; in the other case, I become omnium servus et miles Christi contra peccatum et
omnes concupiscentias.690
This is a fitting conclusion to the first part of this Third Disputation. He
has shown that when it comes to speaking about the law and the Christian life,
one cannot properly answer the question of whether the Christian still needs the
law with only one statement. Rather, the very nature of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator requires two statements to answer the one question since the pius
must be considered both quoad Christum and quoad in se. From the standpoint of
the first, the law has been abolished as Paul says in 1 Timothy 1: 9, for the law is
not given to the saints. However, from the standpoint of the second, the law still
remains because and as long as sin remains, for Christians are still sinners because
they still have the old nature.
Argument 27691
Paul says: You are not under the law but under grace [Rom. 6: 141.
Therefore, the law is not to be taught to saints.
Response: It is the same argument as that immediately above, and the
same distinction holds true and consists in explaining Paul's sentence, what
it means to be under the law.
690There are overtones here from his 1520 treatise: Von der Freiheit eines

Christenmenschen, were Luther says that the Christian is a perfectly free lord subject to none and also a perfectly dutiful servant subject to all.
69139 I, 553, 9-13.
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We offer this argument= without comment because Luther merely refers
here to what he has just said above. This concludes the disputation held before
lunch.
We turn now to the analysis of the arguments which we presented after
lunch. It would seem that the lunch break provides the transition between the
doctoral disputation, which dealt with arguments propounded by the antinomians, and a fully fledged disputation against the antinomians in which Luther
plays the leading role.
Translation and Analysis of Arguments
of the Third Disputation
Afternoon Session
The preceding arguments were put forward and defended before lunch.
The following were put forward after lunch on the same day.692
Argument 28/1693: Doctor Caspar Cruciger
Contra 18
The efficient cause of sin is not to be taught. The law is the efficient
cause of sin; not only does it manifest sin, but it also incites to sin. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Proof of major premise: The sinful passions, which were aroused by the
law, were at work in our members to bear the fruit of death [Rom. 7: 5].
This means that our passions are effective through the law because our natural lack of trust is confirmed by the law and, as it were, incites us to sin,
and in my opinion, this is what Paul means.
Response: D. Martin Luther: The law came in, he says, to multiply the
trespass [Rom. 5: 20],694 and in order that sinning might become sin beyond
measure, the law that was being added stirred up these passions. And in
69239 I, 554, 1-2: Haec argumenta sunt ante prandium proposita et soluta.
Sequuntur ea, quae a prandio eodem die proposita sunt.
69339 I, 554, 5-560, 12.
694Quoted

according to the Vulgate.
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fact, if the law had not come, sin would have been a good companion and
slept; without the law that wretched sin would not have been thus exposed
or brought forth. Therefore, the law incites us to sin. Quicklime without
water does not catch fire. When it is sparked it does not catch fire, but when
water is poured on it, it begins to burn, so it is also with law, as Augustine
says.695 Therefore, the law is the efficient cause of sin just as the water
added to limestone is the effective cause. Now then whatever happens to
stir people up and incite them to sin is not to be taught but rather forbidden.
The law is such as has already been said. Therefore, it is not to be taught.6%
Here we must ask the question whether the water only shows that
quicklime burns or whether it itself ignites it. Of course it itself ignites it.
Now my response: Augustine's similitude itself refutes the argument.
For if this nature or heat were not in the quicklime, there is no way that it
would be set alight by water or anything else that was poured on it. But because quicklime has a kind of fiery and burning nature, the water arouses it
and gets it burning the more. The same is true of us, because our nature is
evil on account of the serpent's breath in paradise, as we have often said
above, and also secure and wicked. But when the law comes that depraved
and corrupt nature becomes more and more irritated because it sees that it
cannot do what the law demands, and it begins to become indignant, angry
and irritated with God. And the longer it goes on, the angrier it gets against
God. For all of us are such by nature that what we are forbidden we desire
the more, as he says:
We strive after what is forbidden and always desire what we are denied.697
They are unwilling when you want it, and when you are unwilling
they are full of desire.698
AI
Therefore, the law is not the efficient cause of sin but shows that our
nature is sinful, and arouses sin by forbidding it. But it appears by its own
power to urge our natural wickedness and to activate it, so to speak. For if it
were silent and quiescent people would live agreeably, they would not become angry with God, neither would they sin, nor would the trespass
abound, as at present. We have already said that the law is not the effective
695 Augustine,

696This

De civitate Dei, bk. 2, ch. 4; cf. WA 39 I, 450, n. 1.

is a rehearsal of the Cruciger's argument.

6970vid, Amor III, 4, 17.
698Terrence,

Eunuch 813 (IV, 7, 43).
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cause of sin but the ostensive, not the originating but the demonstrative
cause of this so perverse and corrupt human nature. But here it is necessary
to explain that phrase of Paul's, what it means that sin increases and the
trespass abounds through the law [Rom. 5: 20]. These are certainly amazing
words and contrary to reason. For laws are given and made by kings to
counter sins and if possible to heal them. But here he speaks in such a way
that the law, which is good and holy, seems to produce death and despair,
not because it does this itself, as we have also said several times above, but
because when it comes and convicts our corrupt and evil nature, our nature
immediately becomes terrified and angry against God's judgment and
wrath, which it can no longer bear, and begins to despair of salvation, hate
God and blaspheme. The law therefore is a servant of wrath and death and
increases sin [Rom. 4: 15; cf. 2 Cor. 3: 6], not externally of course but internally, and arouses terrors and despair within the heart, that is, it stirs up sin
so that it terrifies and kills us, as it says in 1 Corinthians 15 [: 56]: The sting
of death is sin. Before the law came we lived quit complacently, securely,
thinking nothing evil, but after the law came in to show us the kind of people we are, it commands things which we cannot do even though we might
desire to. There I must then despair and begin to hate and blaspheme God,
who seems to deal so unjustly with me. Thus sin becomes greater and is increased, because formerly I heard the law but lived without it, and at that
time thought that I was fairly holy. But when the law says: You shall love
the Lord your God with all your heart etc, and you shall not have other
gods, I cannot but despair because no one ever could or can keep the law
except Christ. When David committed adultery he by no means thought
that sin was so great, but later he recognized it after he had been reproved
by Nathan the prophet [2 Sam. 12: 1-15]. Here we see how the law truly increases sin, that it, it shows him the magnitude of God's wrath against sin so
that he would have surely despaired in his terror had not Nathan added:
The Lord has put away your sin etc. This is truly to increase sin through the
law, that is, to make it more known, more conspicuous and plain, so that
even by its appearance it strikes and terrifies the heart. It is impossible that
there is any one who ever saw how great a sin it is not to fear God, not to
trust God, not to love God, to despise his word, not to call on God; indeed if
any did see it, he would already be dead. The law was given that we might
know something of these things, that the sin already present in our nature
might terrify and provoke us, and that it might show us what sort of people
we are inside at heart, but the law itself does not make us into that sort of
people, as they falsely accuse the law of doing.
I have spoken about the sins of the First Table. The same should now
be said about all others sins in turn. For just as we are afflicted by them
more when the law is present than when it is absent, and are more terrified
and afraid on account of the commandment, so here we begin to rage more
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against the law and more and more seek after what the law prohibits, as I
have said above. We desire what is denied us, we hate what is present and
seek after what is to come. And because we are forbidden by the law to
covet and lust, so that another man's wife not yield to us, yet we want to indulge in fornication and run after prostitutes. So too in everything else, I
want to do what I do not want to do and what I ought to do I do not want to
do. And this is [what it means] to increase sin in things coarse and fleshly,
but in inward, that is, spiritual things [this happens] if when the law commands us to love and esteem God and to trust him, we begin to despair, to
hate God and to blaspheme him, because we realize that we cannot satisfy
this law. For our nature has been totally corrupted. The law then is the
cause of sin, you will say, if the effect is such that this would not occur if it
were removed? I deny this because the law is not the effective cause of sin
but only the ostensive. But since nature itself has been depraved and corrupted, the good and holy law cannot by itself have a better effect in such a
nature. The law only says what is to be done, that God is to be trusted and
feared. This you do not do, and for that reason you are angry with God and
blaspheme him as you want both God and the law abolished.
Therefore, nature, depraved and corrupt in its condition, not the law, is
like a bad pupil; he is bad per se, since beforehand he was going to do something, but afterwards, when the command of the parent or teacher comes
along, he does not do it. It is not the command of the teacher that causes
this, but because his nature is not good. So too we, when we hear: I am the
Lord your God, you shall have no other gods; I will visit the iniquity of the
fathers etc. [Exod. 20: 1-6] we despair rather than trust God, and Lyra says
that this happens consecutively, because the trespass increases through the
law, not causally.699
The substance of what Luther says here has already been expounded in his
responsio to 1 AD, Arg. 10 and 3 AD, Arg. 16, although here he goes into more
detail.700 We may therefore be brief. As Luther has already pointed out earlier, a
critical distinction needs to be made between the efficient or originating cause of
sin and the ostensive or demonstrative.701 The real cause of sin is not the law,
699 Bibliorum

sacr. tom. VI, cum glossa ordinaria et Nicolai Lyrani expositionibus (Lugd. 1545) fol. 17a on Romans 7: 13.
700See 39 I, 377, 9-378, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 10), and 529, 3-6 (3 AD, Arg. 16).
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properly speaking, but our corrupt nature. What the law does is reveals the sin
that is already there.
Luther illustrates this point by resorting to Augustine's similitudo about
quicklime and water. The quicklime already has quaedam natura ignea et ardens so
that the aqua accendens and superinfitsa does not cause the fire but only ignites it in
the sense of causing it to burn the more vigorously.702 But the law does more
than reveal sin. It provokes and exacerbates sin so that a person's sin becomes
sinful beyond measure, so that instead of making people better it actually makes
them worse. The law therefore does not lie dormant (is not a lex tacens et quiescens) but is a power which acts on our natura corrupta and causes sin and evil to
flare up in our lives. This is exactly what Paul means in Romans 5: 20 when he
says peccatum augere et abundare delictum per legem [voi.toc a impel orIXeev, Iva
icXeovcial TO rapourno p.c]. Again, it is not the law itself that does this because, as
Paul affirms, the law is err oc and KaX6c (Rom. 7: 12, 16), but the law takes advantage of or exploits the sinful nature in order to show the worst in us. It excites sin
precisely by forbidding it [. . . prohibendo exercet peccatum] (556, 8-9)703 Again, the
fact that the law should have such a perverse effect on us is the result of our sinful nature. Its purpose in magnifying and increasing sin is to leave us in no
doubt that we are sinners under the wrath of God. The end result, apart from
701556, 15-557, 3: lam diximus, legem non esse effectivam causam peccati,
sed ostensivam, non auctricenz, sed monstrativam istius tam perversae et corruptae
naturae hominis.
702Luther has already referred to this similitudo in 39 I, 450, 9-11 (2 AD,

Arg. 9).
703Cf. 559, 8-10: Et tamen quia lege prohibitum est, ne desideremus, con-

cupiscamus, ne alterius nobis uxor concedatur, tamen volumus scortari, scorta sectari.
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disobedience to the commandments of the Second Table is hatred and finally despair of God: . . . non possum non desperare, quia nemo unquam potuit nec potest
praestare legem nisi Christus (558, 2-10). Without the law we would live in relative
tranquility simply because we would not know that sin is sin. Luther illustrates
this from the example of David. It was only after the prophet Nathan came and
confronted him with his sin, that is, preached the law to him, that David recognized the magnitude of his sin and God's wrath.704 Luther says that our nature
(not the law) is prava et corrupta like a discipulus malus; he is bad per se because
formerly he had intended to do right but when the mandatum praeceptoris is given,
he does not do it. The reason for this perversity lies in his natura nequam, and is
not to be sought in the teacher (560, 6-9).705
Luther has defended the law against the charge, brought by the antinomians, that the law causes others to commit sin. If the law is "guilty" of aiding and
abetting sin (as, say, akin to an agent provocateur) its sole and sufficient defense
is that it does this, not with "criminal intent," as if deliberately to bring about the
death of the person, but, on the contrary, for the sake of ultimatly saving him
from the certain death that would ensue had the law not apprized him of his
parlous plight as a sinner and pointed him to Christ as the only one in whom he
can find refuge and safety from death. The antinomians lose the case, for to con704557, 18-558, 2: Ita lex est ministerium irae et mortis et auget peccatum,

videlicet non externum, sed internum et intus in corde excitat terrores et desperationem,
hoc est, armat peccatum, ut nos perterrefaciat et occidat, ut I. Corinth. 15: Aculeus mortis
peccatum.
705The proper way of understanding the relation between the law and

sin is consecutively and not causally. This is concisely stated by Lyra (see translation for reference): consecutive fieri, quod abundet delictum per legem, et non
causaliter.
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vict the law of sin is ultimately to convict God of causing sin because he is the author of the law in the first place. On the other hand, the final word in defense of
the law can only come from the gospel, for in spite of their mutual antagonism,
from the standpoint of faith (which is that of the gospel) the work of the law,
teleologically, stands in the service of the gospel, and thus in the service of life
and not death. This is not apprehensible to plain reason but is a reality revealed
only to faith and as such can only be confessed by those who know themselves to
be under the law as sinners and yet pardoned, forgiven, and rescued for Christ's
sake through the gospel.
Argument 29/2706
Contra 41
If saints are partly under the law, but partly not under the law, doubt
lingers and faith becomes uncertain. But faith must be certain. Therefore,
this partiality should not be posited.
Proof of Major Premise: This partiality does not allow anything certain
to be established, because people do not know to what extent they are not
under the law and think perhaps that it is too little or too much, since they
cannot establish for certain to what extent they are sound and to what extent
ungodly.
Response: D. Martin Luther: The argument is this: Christian doctrine
ought to be certain, indeed utterly certain, but if we are partly righteous, and
partly unrighteous, a partiality must be posited. Therefore, we cannot be certain. The statement: I am partly doubtful, partly certain, means nothing.
They [the parts] cannot stand together at the same time. Doctrine per se is
certain and is to be set forth most certainly in order that a person may know
what indeed it is that is taught. Thus Augustine707 says: Faith must be most
certain and no uncertainty can ever arise because it is a firm assent to God's
word or promise of free grace, that is, the forgiveness of sins on account of
Christ our savior and priest. For example, if someone wants to believe and
70639 I, 561, 3-563, 6.
707It

cannot be determined which of all the many passages in
Augustine Luther is thinking of here when he speaks of certitudo, firmitas,
securitas fidei in connection with Christ's salvific work.
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in this way believes that Christ Jesus is the Son of God by his nature, and that
he should attach no importance to this or the other articles, that person truly
gets damned, because faith ought to be certain, firmly believing that Christ is
the Son of God, and in no way leave this in doubt, whether it is so or not so.
For that would not be faith but rather opinion.
Response: This is one dialectical sophism. We are not making the assertion that it is uncertain, neither that the law nor faith is uncertain, because
of what is most certain: we are partly righteous and partly sinners, because
we carry around with us the flesh of our father Adam which has been infected by original sin, in which we have been conceived and born, and if any
one does not know this and does not see sin in himself, let him consult his
own heart and conscience, and he may be convinced by his own conscience,
which may tell him what your bed will call out to you while you are sleeping, who you are. However, we are righteous because it is certain that we
have been baptized in the blood of Christ and have been received into grace
by the Father on account of Christ in whom we believe; here we are altogether holy and righteous by imputation, because sin is not imputed to us, as
we have said at length above. It is true that faith can be weak, but not uncertain and doubtful; this is an enormously important distinction. Therefore,
this must be known and constantly upheld that doctrine, faith, law, and
gospel are so entirely certain that there can be nothing more certain, yet faith
can also be weak and feeble, but not uncertain.
The syllogism rejects the particularitas that sancti partim sunt sub lege, partim
autem non sunt sub lege, on that basis that it leads to dubitatio and so produces a
faith that is incerta. The antinomians argue that this kind of thesis encourages a
quantitative approach to faith in that it forces the Christian to ask: in quantum non
sit sub lege. The result is that some will estimate they are more under the law than
they are and others less, because they cannot establish with certainty quanta sit
sanitas and quanta impietas (561, 3-9). We have already seen that the antinomian
answer to the problem of uncertainty, as they perceive it, is to assert simply that
Christians are wholly saints and righteous, without qualification, and again that
they are not at all under the law.708
708The antinomian syllogism is directed against Luther'argument that

the Christians are still under the law insofar as they are still not wholly free from
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Luther replies that the antinomian rejection of the particularitas on the
grounds that it allegedy leads to uncertainty is nothing but a cy64naga. He restates his position as emphatically as possible: Nos non dicimus, quod sit incertum,
neque quod lex neque quod fides sit incerta, quia certissimum est, nos esse partim iustos,
partim peccatores . . . (562, 9-11).709 Already in the first Argumentum the antinomians wanted to throw out the law because it does not offer certainty or a good conscience. There Luther pointed out in reply that the law does indeed give certainty,
but only with regard to sin, and that it does this by terrifying the conscience. Because the antinomians know nothing about the distinction between law and
gospel they are incapable of knowing the difference between the certainty of the
law (concerning sin) and the certainty of the gospel (concerning forgiveness). So
too in the present argument they misunderstand the certainty of faith. The certainty born of the gospel does not necessitate the complete abolition of the law.
Rather, it believes in the truth of the gospel in spite of the judgment of the law; it
believes that for Christ's sake we are forgiven sinners, saints and righteous, even
though according to the judgment of the law we are condemned sinners under
sentence of death. Because the antinomians do not accept the dialectical tension
between law and gospel they know nothing of the "nevertheless" character of faith
which believes that we are saints in spite of the fact that all that we can see in ourselves is sin. Because Luther knows that the holiness we have as Christians is not
sin. They specifically aim they argument against Th. 41: Quatenus vero nondum est
in nobis suscitatus, eatenus sumus sub lege, peccato et morte (39 I, 356, 17-18).
709We see no grounds for supposing that when Luther says nos esse
partim iustos, partim peccatores (562, 11) he means anything different from the
more common formula simul iustos et peccatores. Since we have already discussed
what this means in Luther in connection with our analysis of Argumentum 3 (39 I,
503, 7-508, 9) we will not go into that here.
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ours but Christ's, and that we by nature are still sinful and unclean, he sees no
contradition in asserting the iustus while at the same time confessing the peccator.
To let go of the simu/ at this point can only end in an unbiblical perfectionism
which, as we saw, Luther strongly denounced in his Praefatio.710
The important thing here is the imputation, which is the cornerstone of the
Pauline doctrine of the simul iustus et peccator: we are entirely sancti et iusti
through imputation [imputative] because our sin is not imputed to us (562, 17-563,
1)711 The non-imputation of sin is simply the reverse side of the imputation of
holiness and righteousness. The big difference between Luther and the antinomians at this point is that he speaks of the non-imputation of sin, through faith,
which means that our sins (or the guilt of our sin) are no longer held against us or
charged to our account but, on the contrary, forgiven. However, this presupposes
that we still have sin, indeed, Luther says that we still carry around the sin-infested flesh of our father Adam, whereas the antinomians talk only of the complete removal of sin. The one new thought that Luther introduces here is the distinction between certain faith,on the one hand, and weak or feeble faith, on the
other. The antonym of certa is incerta or dubia, not imbecillis or infirma. This distinction is important for two reasons: First, it implies that the important thing is
not the subjectivity of faith but its objectivity, not the fides qua but the fides quae,
not the experience of faith but the ground of faith. The two aspects of faith of
710Luther advises those who are in any doubt about the fact that they
are still sinful to consult their heart and conscience; in fact if they had ears, even
their bed would tell them! (562, 13-15).
711Note that Luther connects the imputation with baptism: we have
been baptized in the blood of Christ, received grace from the Father propter Christurn, and here are sancti et iusti through imputation (562, 16-563, 1).
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course belong together but their proper order or priority is important. Hence, it is
of little consequence if our faith at times seems weak and shaky for it is not that
which saves us but only Christ in whom we believe. Secondly, as we have often
seen, Luther stresses the ongoing struggle of faith against sin and Satan. Some
find it easier than others to resist sin, some are often plunged in great bouts of
Anfechtung and can only cry out: Lord, I believe; help my unbelief. Luther then
makes an important distinction between the subjective experience of faith, which
may be weak and feeble, and faith itself which is indubitably certain because it is
grounded in Christ.712
Argument 30/3713
Christ's benefit: justification, new life, freedom from the law belong to
the whole person. Therefore, that partiality, that we are partly righteous,
partly unrighteous, must not be made.
Proof of Conclusion: We are [either] totally righteous or totally sinners.
Response: By imputation, of course. For this is true that by divine imputation we are truly and totally righteous, although sin is still present. It is
proper for us to retain that synecdoche, just as when somebody who had
been wounded is now healed we say that the whole person is healed. Likewise, we say that a person has been injured even if it is only just a part of the
body that has been injured. So also we are truly and totally sinners, that is,
in respect to us and our first birth; on the other hand, insofar as Christ has
been given for us, we are saints and righteous totally. Thus, from a different
viewpoint, we are said to be righteous and sinners at one and the same time.
Luther's responsio here follows on very closely from the foregoing and
again stresses that Christians are both righteous and sinners at the same time.
Luther again affirms the truth of the particularitas in the face of its antinomian re712563, 4-6: Quare hoc sciendum et tenendum perpetuo est, quod doctrina,
fides, lex Evangelium certissima sint ita, ut nihil posset esse certius, sed tamen fidem
posse etiam esse infirmam et imbecillem, sed non incertam.
71339

I, 563, 8-564, 7.
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jection: quod simus partim iusti, partim iniusti.714 The grounds for its rejection by
the antinomians are very cogent and logical: two opposing things cannot both be
true at the same time.715 This comes out in the proof they offer for their
consequentia: quia nos sumus totaliter iusti vel totaliter peccatores (563, 11-12), where
the vel is the operative word. Luther, on the other hand, asserts the theological
truth of the simultaneity of righteousness and sin in the same person at the same
time. Literarily, he justifies this modus loquendi by comparing it with the use of
synecdoche.716 In order words, Luther is proving to the antinomians that even
apart from theology, there is literary precedent (albeit illogical) for saying that
Christians are prorsus sancti et iusti and yet meaning that they are partim sancti et
partim iusti. If in synecdoche the whole may stand for the part, that is exactly
what is happing when Luther asserts sumus et iusti totaliter, for we are that not
quoad se but only by imputation, that is, propter Christum per fidem. Conversely,
Luther holds sumus et totaliter peccatores, but here he is not contradicting what he
said above because this time his point of view is human nature and not Christ
and divine imputation. Therefore, as we have seen before, the only way Luther
can do full justice to the biblical doctrine of anthropology is by speaking
dialectically, that is, by making two opposite statements at the same time and
applying each to the whole person without resolving the tension. And that is
precisely how he concludes: ita diverso respectu dicimur iusti et peccatores simul et
seine! (564, 6-7).
714See

note on partim in above Argument= in connection with 562, 11.

715Cf.

515, 6-7 (3 AD, Arg. 6) and see note there for other references.

7160n the use of synecdoche, see our analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 18, 3 AD,
Arg. 11, and 3 AD, Arg. 22.
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Argument 31/4717
John says: Love drives out fear [1 John 4: 18]. The law teaches fear.
Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Luther: The argument is that those who fear do not have perfect love.
For just as the angels do not fear, that is, do not expect punishment from
God, neither do Christians expect any punishment from God. Therefore, the
law ought not to be presented to them because they are terrified by and exposed to God's wrath and death. For the law is the servant of death.
Response: Most certainly love drives out fear, but not entirely. For if it
were to drive it out entirely we would already be with the angels themselves
in heaven. John's sentence, love drives out fear, is therefore to be explained
in this way: those who believe and who are in the divine imputation are
without fear because fear and comfort cannot coexist: one cannot rejoice in
the Lord and at the same time fear punishment. But otherwise within us and
outside of this sphere of imputation there is, as Paul says, fear within and
crying and terrors without [2 Cor. 7: 5], namely, when we are located in
ourselves (when our point of reference is ourselves), although that fear is
now no longer servile but has been made filial and cannot confound Christians altogether.
Luther has already responded to a very similar argumentum in the last disputation.718 However, not only is his responsio different here, in our estimation it
is also far more lucid and persuasive, mainly because law and gospel are distinguished more clearly. In his earlier response, in opposition to the antinomian insistence that the law be abandoned because it only produces fear and not love,
Luther advocates that the law should be preached precisely for this reason, to
show us that we do not have love; then the gospel should be preached which will
create the faith as well as the love that overcomes fear.719 After he has discussed
the nature of repentance under the gospel in terms of fear and love, he concludes
71739

I, 564, 9-565, 11.

718See
719As

39 I, 437, 6-440,15 ( 2 AD, Arg. 5).

a comparison with the responsio to 2 AD, Arg. 5 will reveal, this
is our simplified summary of a rather tortuous argument.
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by drawing a distinction between two kinds of fear: timor sine charitate and timor
cum charitate, the former being diabolical, the latter evangelical. Here, on the other
hand, he does not discuss repentance from the standpoint of fear and love, nor
does he take up the idea of the two fears, but rather focuses simply on the two
sides to love, or better, looks at love from the vantage point of law and gospel.
Right from the start we know how he will develop his counter-argument when he
says: Certissimum est, quod charitas expellit timorem, sed non totum (565, 3-4). From
the angle of the gospel and imputation, there is no fear, for fear has been replaced
by love, that is, God's love for us in Jesus Christ. Luther says that pavor and consolatio, gaudere in Domino and timere poenam cannot coexist. It is not the subjective
feeling of fear that is excluded by the comfort of the gospel, but the objective basis
of fear. There are no longer any grounds for fear for the credentes who are in reputatione divina, because as far as God is concerned there is no longer any sin to punish. As Paul proclaims, there is now no condemnation for those in Christ Jesus
(Rom. 8: 1). However, there is another side to this for we are not yet free of sin,
therefore Luther (following Paul) says: Sed alioqui infra nos et extra hanc sphaeram
reputationis est, ut Paulus inquit, intus pavor, clamor foris et terrores (565, 7-9). Here
the fear within and the terror without (2 Cor. 7: 5) is descriptive of the Christian as
the simul iustus et peccator, so that in this case, unlike that of the non credens, the
fear is no longer servile but filial [ille timor iam est ex servili factus filialisl and so
does not cause despair (565, 10).720
In conclusion, Luther's answer to the antinomian interpretation of 1 John 4:
18 as a basis for eliminating the law is simple and straightforward: The fact that
720For other references to filialis timor and servilis timor, see our note in

connection with 2 AD, Arg. 5.
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love drives out fear does not mean that it drives out fear entirely, because we are
still sinners, by virtue of our fallen nature, and therefore still need the law to keep
driving us to that love which alone can overcome and banish fear.
Argument 32/5721
What Christ commands to be preached must be preached. Christ has
given the mandate to preach the gospel [Mark 16: 15]. Therefore, the gospel
alone is to be preached and not the law.
Response: Avoid the saying that the law and the gospel fight each other,
nor should this be conceded, because the law is a witness to the gospel, as
Paul says in Romans 3: the righteousness attested by the law and the
prophets [Rom. 3: 21]. Death and life are indeed opposites, but the revelation
of death, wrath and sin causes life. For the purpose of the manifestation of
death and wrath is not that you should perish but that, knowing these
things, you might flee to him who is the Lord of death and wrath, and the
author of this life. We however are really the opposites and the contradictions to law and gospel because there is nothing in us that matches the law.
Response: It is not like that in the law and gospel, for the physician is
not the contradiction and the opposite to the disease, but a servant who
warns about the disease in order that you might know the gravity and a
severity of the disease and consequently seek a remedy.
We cannot be certain as to the identity of the first respondent in this Responsio. By convention, if a student attempts a response first, Luther will also follow it with his own. There is no precedent of Luther himself giving two independent responsiones. The closest we come to that is when he first sums up the
gist of the antinomian argument before offering his responsio. But that is not the
case here. However, this response by its very nature and length seems more authoritative than that of a student's (consider already the opening sentence).
Therefore, this leads us to assume that this second part of the Third Disputation
is not simply a continuation of the doctoral disputation begun in the morning but
is really an independent antinomian disputation.722
72139 I, 565, 13-566, 11.
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The point made in the first responsio is that law and gospel are not inimical
to each other but that they in fact both work for the good of the person whom
they impact: Absit hoc, quod lex et Evangelium pugnant inter se, neque hoc concedi
debet, quia lex est testis Evangelii, ut Rom. 3 ait Paulus: Iustitia testificata a lege et
prophetis (566, 1-3). Since the 81 Kai o criiv n eeoi5, as given by the gospel, is attested
by the law (= Torah) and the prophets, the law and the gospel cannot be at cross
purposes. However, it is important to define our terms here. The law that is being spoken of here is not the lex accusatrix et condemnatrix, but the revelation of
God's will in the

Secondly, the antinomians are wrong when they think

that Christ's mandate to preach the ei)ayyiXtov precludes the preaching of the
vcigoc. Since the mandate in Mark 16: 15 does not include any term antithetical to
ei.)ayyiA.tov it is reasonable to conclude that in this case the referent of the term
gospel is the whole teaching of Jesus (cf. the ncivta Oa a aye-ratite/pm? vµiv of
Matt. 28: 20) inclusive of the law (where law does not mean only lex accusans but
also parenesis). Even though the responsio does not explain it in exactly these
terms, our explanation is consistent with the assertion that lex et Evangelium non
pugnant inter se (which is a reformulation of the opening warning in a positive
form). The respondent goes on to say that the real opposition or contradiction is
to be found between ourselves, on the one hand, and the law and gospel, on the
other, because there is nothing in us that matches the law (566, 6-8). Death and
life are indeed opposites but the purpose of revealing our death is to drive us to
him who is the Lord of death and the author of life (566, 3-6). The second
respondent merely reinforces the point that law and gospel work together for the
health/salvation of a person by comparing the law with the physician who first
722See our introductory remarks to the Third Disputation for further

details.
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diagnoses the disease and warns the patient of its severity and then induces him
to seek the remedy of the gospel.
The main point that needs to be emphasized here is that the argument that
law and gospel are not inimical to each other should not be interpreted to mean
that they are not antithetical. The responsio is specifically intended to refute the
antinomian contention that the dominical mandate to preach the gospel eo ipso
excludes the law. Here, however, we need to remember what was pointed out
above. The term gospel as used in the mandate is not exclusive of the law but
includes the whole of the dominical teaching. The precise denotation of the term
gospel (whether used broadly or narrowly) can only be determined by context.
Moreover, there are several passages which we have already discussed where
Luther clearly teaches that law and gospel are so antithetical that the law
(especially when it is used by Satan) would simply drive us straight to hell and
plunge us into the abyss of despair were it not for the gracious intervention of the
gospel which plucks us out of the grasp of the law and givs us life and comfort in
Christ.723
Argument 33/6724
Paul was converted by a voice from heaven. The voice of God is the
preaching of the gospel. Therefore, people are converted through the gospel
and not through the law.
Response: Nothing is proven from single statements. Another refutation: It was not the gospel but the terrible law that formed the greatest part of
the (heavenly) address and vision, for it made him a murderer, not of the
723See our discussion of 2 AD, Arg. 8 where Luther says that the law
must be told to stay within its bounds, and that although Paul calls the law a
paedagogus that leads us to Christ, it is that only when interpreted by the Holy
Spirit. This problem will be taken up again in ch. 4.
72439 I, 566, 13-567, 14.
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Jews but of Christ the Lord. Therefore, first he is accused of being a murderer, a thief and a worthless traitor. In fact, it also terrifies him so much that
he calls out: Lord, what do you want? and the voice responds: I am Jesus
whom you are persecuting [Acts 9: 5]. But the voices of the gospel are these:
your sins are forgiven you, go in peace, and you will be saved [Luke 7: 48,
50]; be assured, I have overcome the world [John 16: 33], and in this story of
Paul: go into the city and there you will be told what you must do next [Acts
9: 6]. The voice of God and the voice of the Lord do not always mean the
gospel, but God also utters a voice that convicts sin, as in Psalm 29 [: 3]: The
voice of God above the heavens, but also sometimes it is a voice that breaks
the rocks [Jer. 23: 29]. Therefore, this passage is in our favor and against the
Antinomians because God wanted Paul to be converted through the voice of
the law and not through the gospel, as the whole story proves.
Luther has dealt with the role of the law and the gospel in the conversion of
Paul three times already, but the present responsio is the most detailed and cogent.725 The pivot of the antinomian argument, expressed in the minor premise,
is that the vox Dei = Evangelii praedicatio (566, 13-14). Luther, on the other hand
(assuming he is the respondent), points out the fallacy of this equation and argues
that most of the Lord's speech from heaven is lex horribilis for it accuses Paul of being homicida, latro et perfidus nequam (567, 3-4). That this is an accurate diagnosis is
confirmed by Paul's reaction to the heavenly voice: Domine, quid vis? which is
hardly a reaction to the gospel, and by the Lord's own self-identification: Ego sum
Iesus, quem to persequeris (567, 5-6). Instead of assigning the vox coelestis to the
gospel, like the antinomians, Luther ascribes it to the law and thus distinguishes it
from the gospel which, in his view, embraces the subsequent events culminating
725All three occur in the First Disputation: 39 I, 393, 17-394, 6 (1 AD,
Arg. 20); 7-11 (1 AD, Arg. 27); 406, 19-407, 5 (1 AD, Arg. 28). However, the
present Argument= is the only one where the topic is the made the subject of the
syllogism and also answered in the responsio. By way of contrast, the topic is
raised by the proponent of the argument in Arg. 20 but not really answered by
Luther in the responsio. On the other hand, the topic of Paul's conversion is not
directly raised in Args. 27 and 28 but is introduced by Luther all the same in his
responsio.
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in Baptism, though he himself does not mention Baptism but simply refers the
gospel to the words: Vade in civitatem, et ibi dicetur, quid tibi faciendum sit porro
(Acts 9: 6; Baptism is only mentioned in 9: 18). Luther's thesis is the opposite to
that of the antinomians: Vox Dei et vox domini non semper significat Evangelium, sed
vocem etiam arguentem peccata sonat Deus. Here he gives the example of Psalm 29:
3: wpri -51) ron,. 51p which he translates as: Vox Dei super coelos,726 as well as
Jeremiah 23: 29 where he describes the vox as conterens petras [159 *p0 5. ttPODI
71171? -13tV W

'1;7 n.D t41571 ].727 In both cases Luther argues that the vox Dei

= lex arguens, which in turn supports his thesis: vox Dei Evangelium (at least not
always). We would contend that there is a parallel in the mind of the antinomians
between their thesis here that the vox Dei is identical with the gospel and their
argument that the words of Paul in Romans 1: 18: duroicalairretai yCcp Opyit eeoii
ovpavov mean that de coelo = ex evangelio because the gospel comes from
heaven. Luther, on the other hand, argues that the phrase means nothing more
726The text merely says Psalm 29 (567, 10); we take the words vox Dei
super coelos to be referring to v. 3 rather than as a description of the whole psalm.
If that is the case, it is easy to see how the error in translation came about since
the words C1 5.pn and t35.0
look very similar. Nevertheless, the mistranslation
works in Luther's favor for he obviously identifies the vox Dei super coelos with
the vox coelestis (law), which spoke to Paul on the Damascus road.
727Technically, Jeremiah. 23: 29 does not use the word 71p but 1;1.

All the same, we would not want to suggest that there is any difference in meaning. Luther of course implies no contrast between the vox Dei of Psalm. 29 and
that of Jer. 23. His point is simply to show that the vox coelestis which spoke to
Paul (which he identifies with the vox Dei super coelos of Psalm. 29) is not the
gospel, indeed, it is not even a quiescent word, but is the same word of judgment
and wrath, which Jeremiah likens to a fire and a hammer that splits rocks. Exegetically, both passages are talking about the dynamic power of the vox/ verbum
Dei, the former in the realm of nature, the latter in the realm of proclamation.
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than that God's wrath is divina ac coelestis, hence not terrena.728 So here too, the
mere fact that the vox is e coelo (or super coelos) does not automatically make it
evangelium. It is not its point of origin that is important, for both law and gospel,
judgment and mercy are e coelo because God is the author of both. The decisive
factor is rather the content, and here Luther has clearly established criteria as to
what constitutes law and what constitutes gospel. The law is anything that puts
us under divine wrath and judgment and exposes our sins; the gospel on the other
hand is the gracious word of promise that offers and gives us forgiveness of sins,
life, and salvation.
Argument 34/7729: Justus Jonas
The law was always in the world, also in especially worthless people
like Caligula, Nero and others. But the law did not produce contrition in
them, but blindness remained. Therefore, the law is not the cause of contrition and terror, but is an outward discipline.
Response: To say that a person is without the law is the same as saying
that he is secure, just as these people were once secure, but [only] until that
hour when the law bursts forth and comes to life again, and then they grow
pale after they have perceived the meaning of the law, not to mention the
fact that they immediately rush forth and do violence to themselves, like
Nero himself, Caligula etc, and as you also see from the fact that certain
people become so frightened at the sound of thunder it is as if they were
dead. For in that hour no one would hope for salvation unless Christ should
intervene as mediator and draw him out of that hell.
This argumentum brought forward by Justus Jonas is not an antinomian argument because they in the first place deny the proposition lex semper fuit in
mundo. We will come back to that. Rather, it seems that Jonas floats an argument
that was particularly dear to Melanchthon. Not that the latter ever denied the lex
accusans (usus elenchticus), but he certainly put more emphasis on the character of
728For the full refutation see 39 I, 423, 1-425, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 1).
72939 I, 568, 2-569, 2.
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the law as externa disciplina than did Luther.730 The argument= attempts to show
from history that the primary purpose of the law is to maintain external discipline
(usus civi/is) and not to cause contrition (usus theologicus). As we intimated above,
the view that the law was always in the world is not an antinomian argument;
rather the universality of the law in the sense of the lex naturae was specifically
advanced by Luther to combat the narrowing of the law in antinomian theology
by equating it with the lex Mosaica.731 Therefore, to say that a person is without
the law is not to be understood as a negation of the lex insculpta but rather as a
recognition of the fact that the person is in the grip of securitas. But the person is
securus only until the law suddenly bursts into his life and becomes an existential
reality for him, after which he becomes terribly distraught and may even take
steps to end his own life.732 This view of things is consonant with the distinction
Luther made earlier between the law and its effect or power: the former is universal but not the latter.733 However, this does not exclude the need for the verbum
praedicatum because sin has made the natural knowledge of the law vague and uncertain. Therefore, it is only through the ministerium legis that the sententia legis
730For more on this see the background discussion in ch. 2.
731The lex naturae, written on the heart, predates the law of Moses (1
AD, Arg. 25); the law was not given through Moses but it belongs to the whole
world; lex Mosaica # Decalogus (2 AD, Arg. 25).
732Cf. the death of Dr. Krause of Halle who committed suicide after he
was overcome by despair, but in this case brought about, not by the law but by
the gospel heard as law (3 AD, Arg. 18).
733Cf. 39 I, 369, 13-14:

(1 AD, Arg. 3).

Lex est omnium, sed non omnium vis et sensus legis
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will become clear.734 However, once the vis legis has been felt one's life becomes a
living hell and the only way out is through Christ. Luther wants to make it clear
that we are not yet talking about the power of the law if we speak of it only in
terms of externa disciplina. That is certainly one of its functions but not its main
one. Nor is it within our power to bring about the effectus legis. God alone does
that. But when the law does strike its effect is so frightening that we would give
up all hope of salvation, Luther says, nisi Christus mediator intercesserit et to ex isto
inferno eduxerit (569, 1-2).
Argument 35/8735
The veil is not removed from the face of Moses through the law [Ex. 34:
29-35]. To have the veil removed is to know that the law demands. But to
know that is true contrition. Therefore, true contrition does not occur
through the law but through the gospel and the Holy Spirit.
D. M. Luther: The argument is that Moses put a veil over his eyes which
is not removed through the law but through the gospel, 2 Corinthians [3: 15,
16]. Therefore, contrition does not arise from the law but from the gospel
and consequently the law is not to be taught.
Response: Paul speaks of two faces, that of Moses and then that of
Christ, and then he says that Moses' face is twofold, namely, veiled and unveiled. Those who look to the veiled face of Moses are hypocrites for they do
not see that the law is spiritual and think that it can be satisfied with works,
as Paul thought before his conversion, and as the people of Gemorrah
thought who killed the prophets and who never had any sensation of the law
or a true knowledge of it. Therefore, the veiled face of Moses causes their
hypocrisy. So when Moses came down and said: You are hypocrites, ungodly, and sacrilegious, they were by no means able to bear the brightness of
his face nor listen to this voice of his. Therefore, Moses was forced to veil his
face and to speak kindly, otherwise he would not have kept even one hearer,
as happened at Mount Sinai. You shall not kill, you shall not steal are interpreted according to the deed alone, as if somebody kills another person with
his hand; likewise as if somebody digs into another person's treasury and
the relation between the lex insculpta and lex scripta (or lex praedicata) see 3 AD, Arg. 19.
734For

73539 I, 569, 4-571, 3.
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takes his goods. These are the veils of Moses. Clearly the law is to be interpreted as Christ does in Matthew 5: Whoever hates his brother is a murderer;
again, whoever is angry with his brother [Matt. 5: 21-22] etc.; if anyone
covets another person's property etc.; that is to look into the very face of
Moses and to grow pale because of dread and the magnitude of the divine
wrath against sin. But we should not stand here or linger too long lest we be
swallowed up, but draw near to the face of Christ which is far brighter than
the face of Moses, for he overcame in himself all our evils: sin, death and the
devil. Before this light Moses is nothing at all, nor do I worry here much
about his deadly horns with which he formerly used to stab me when I had
not yet fixed my gaze on Christ.
At first blush the antinomian argumentum looks persuasive, but it contains
a fundamental flaw. The crux of the problem revolves around the interpretation
of the removal of the veil of Moses and what this entails. First we need to look at
the biblical data. After God had (re)written on stone tables the 3l'1317 '1;1 also
called the ten words [1:151p

rrivp] Moses' face shone so much from speaking

with him that the people we afraid. Therefore, after Moses finished speaking
with the people he put a veil on his face [;i 19 154 -$1; in,.1]. He only re moved the veil when he went into the $7.7i4 to speak to the Lord and when he
spoke on behalf of the Lord to the people. At all other times he kept his face
veiled (Ex. 34: 29-35). From the Old Testament point of view the reason Moses
veiled his face was mercifully to prevent them from becoming unduly troubled
by the reflection of the divine glory in the face of Moses. However, St. Paul interprets this action in a different way in the light of the Kaiv 4 totaeliKri. The reason he gives for Moses' veiling his face is that this was to hide his fading glory
from the people. Thus he says that the people could not look at Moses' face
because of its glory, even though it was fading [St& Tip/ Way tov Irpo (Farm)
ctivroiS Thy citrapycugivnv] (2 Cor. 3: 7). The operative word here is fading
[Kcerapriv]. Again: MayucatcEii6Et Kakup.ticx Em rb rixiaconov crinoi5 irpbc tb
atevicrai tons viol

Eic TO tiXoc tot') xarapyovµivov (2 Cor. 3: 13).
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Paul naturally is at pains to stress the temporary character of the old covenant
compared with the permanent character of the new: ii Op TO KaTapyoiii.tevov
oth ootric, m:a.A.6): ga'XXov TO pivov iv WI) (2 Cor. 3: 11).
Furthermore, he interprets the veil as symbolic of the naipco otc of contemporary Judaism, which is removed only through faith in Christ: aixin yCcp Tic,
arip.epov futipac TO cctiTO Kcikupii.ta Em Tri ay ayvoloci Trig 7raXisrieic eaccorlicric
give', p.it avaicakurrOp.Evov On iv Xpio-Tki KaTapyarca (2 Cor. 3: 14). For Luther
however the ea cocovia toll eaVaT01) (3: 7), or Oicocovia Toi.5 icaTaxpicric (3: 9),
represented by Moses and the ypap.i.ta is not purely a past event but continues in
the present wherever the hegemony of the killing law (TO yCcp ypcinta alCOKTEVvEt) remains unchallenged by the gospel, for the otaKovia toi5 eaV &MU is finally

synonymous with the old existence under the law. On the other hand, the taaicovia Twi.i irveligaTK (3: 8) or SI aKovia Tfic Swat° ativ nc (3: 9), which is inaugurated by Christ and enacted through the Spirit (TO SE nveiii.ta Cqwrotei), is
identical with new life created by the gospel. These two contrasting 5iccoviai
describe not two successive dispensations but two different modes of existence,
the former life under the law, the latter under the gospe1.736 Moreover, Luther
makes a further distinction between the two faces of Moses in the ethos under the
law: the Mosis facies velata and the Mosis facies non velata (569, 11). All who look at
the former are hypocritae, for they misunderstand the law at the critical point:
they do not see the law is spiritualis but think that it can be satisfied with their
736When Luther says: Paulus facit duas facies, Mosis et deinde Christi (569,

10), the deinde should not be interpreted in an exclusively temporal way. There is
indeed an historical sequence: Christ comes after Moses. But, by the same token,
Paul teaches that the veil of Moses remains unlifted wherever people do not
believe that Christ is the TiXoc of the law.
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works. In order words, they see only the letter of the law and follow the law to
the letter, like the pre-Christian Paul, but know nothing about its spiritual aspect
as shown by Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount.737 But after Paul became a
Christian and understood the law in an altogether new light, he no longer
boasted as he did during his days in Judaism: Kat Cc Oixotioaxivriv Thy iv yowl
yevOp.evoc alizturroc. Now turning his back on his former sarxic pride he says:
Citiva iv poi xipon, Taikra ifyiwat oiat -Ow Xpiatbv flitiav and no longer seeks
a euxonoalivn Thy ix vatov but instead a oixonoalivn Eric till niatet through faith
in Christ (Phil. 3: 6-9). Christians understand the law spiritualiter because they
understand it from the standpoint of its Taoc, Christ the impletio legis. For them
the law is not an end in itself but its purpose is to lead people to Christ (cf. the
ratbaywric of Gal. 3: 24). Unbelievers however cannot see beyond the ypai.u.ta
and cannot interpret the law any other way than de facto because for them the
velum Mosis has not yet been removed.
This way of viewing the law is good and useful as far as externa disciplina
is concerned, as we discussed in the last argument, but it breeds hypocrisy and
pride because it fosters the idea that legi satisfieri posse operibus. It is only when a
person has been unmasked and stripped naked by the law so that he stands coram
Deo with nothing to offer but the plea: O ez6c iXduenti goi r6 agiciptwidi (Luke
18: 13) that the law loses its comparatively harmless character as legislation or
instruction and becomes an overwhelming power that puts one under the wrath
737The hypocrite interprets the commandments only according to the

deed [de facto tantum], that is, literally, but for Luther such interpretations are the
velamina Mosis. However, those for whom the veil has been removed through
Christ and who understand the sensus legis, know how to interpret the law spiritually (569, 11-570, 9).
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and judgment of God. Perceived spiritualiter the law as lex arguens et accusans
lumps us all together without distinction and charges us with idolatry, murder,
adultery, theft, etcetera. And the faith that is given us by God in that hour
recognizes the truth of the charges preferred against us by the law, but in spite of
that appeals against the law to the gospel and receives divine acquitta1.738 Such
is the confidence that Luther has through the forgiveness of sins that he is no
longer worried by the accusing voice of the law that will continue to try to accuse
us of all manner of sins and evils that still plague us and will do so until the day
we die. Because he does not trust in his own imperfect righteousness but Christ's
perfect righteousness, he now has nothing to fear from the parentalia cornua which
formerly used to threaten death before he began fixing his gaze on Christ.739
We must now attempt to nail down Luther's argument and show at what
point it differs from that of the antinomians. Both agree that the veil is removed,
not through the law, but through Christ or the gospel (2 Cor. 3: 15, 16). However,
the antinomians equate the removal of the veil with contrition, and hence argue
that vera contritio non fit per legem, sed per Evangelium et Spiritum sanctum (569, 46)740 Luther however holds that the veil is only removed through faith, for the
depositio veli is not just the recognition of the sensus or effectus legis in contrition,
but the abrogation of the law altogether through faith in Christ the impletor legis.
Luther says: Sed hic non est standum neque diu morandum nobis est, ne absorbeamur, sed appropinquandum est ad faciem
Christi longe clariorem facie Mosis, ut qui in semetipso vicit omnia mala nostra, peccaturn, mortem et diabolum (570, 13-571, 2).
738Thus speaking of the vis legis

739For an explanation of the "horns" of Moses, see the note in
connection with our analysis of 1 AD, Arg. 10.
740Cf. 569, 4-5: Velum tolli est cognoscere, quod lex exigit.
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For this reason Luther, as we saw above, distinguishes between the unveiled face
of Moses and Christ. Although the veil is removed through Christ the Mosis fades non valata is not equated with Christus. The former is equivalent with the lex
arguens and produces contrition, while only Christ can give the contrite repentance through the gospel. Both Luther and the antinomians agree that the veiled
face of Moses leads only to hypocrisy, but for Luther the unveiling of Moses' face
is the same as Christ taking the law into his own hands and using it spiritually to
expose our sin.741 That produces contrition, but only when the law is seen with
the eyes of faith is its christological intention understood for the depositio veli is
brought about only per claritatem Christi. The mistake made by the antinomians is
the assumption that the removal of the veil through Christ is the same as contrition, whereas in fact in contrition the veil is not yet removed as it is through faith
in Christ, but it is simply removed in the sense that now the sensus and effectus of
the law is recognized, just as it is when Christ preaches the law in the Sermon on
the Mount. But that is not Christ's gospel office but his law office; not his proper
work but his alien work. To avoid this error Luther not only talks of the contrast
between Christ and Moses (where the veil is lifted only in Christ) but also about
the duplex face of Moses (where the unveiled face of Moses is equivalent to the
usus legis spiritualis or second use of the law).
741Cf. the parallel text in 39 II, 140, 14-20 (Marlin, Arg. 26): Claritas est

duplex, Christi et Mosi; claritas Christi non tantum tollit velamen Mosi, sed etiam ipsam claritatem, quia claritas Mosi collata ad claritatem Christi aut nulla aut exigua est;
140, 29-31 (B): In eodem textu constat duplicem esse claritatem Mosi et Christi, et depositio veil fit per claritatem Christi et non per claritatem Mosi; credit Moses cum suo velamine.

593
Argument 36/9742
The contrition of the godly comes about through the love for righteousness. The love for righteousness, in the sense that one is willing to be
righteous, does not spring from the law but from the sweetness of the
gospel. Therefore, instead of the accusing law, the gospel is to be taught in
the church .
Luther: The argument is that the love of righteousness produces true
contrition but the law causes hatred for God's righteousness. Therefore, the
gospel is to be taught and not the law. For by terrifying us the law does
nothing other than create hatred for God.
Response: It is true that immediately at the beginning of this cause we
began vigorously to teach the gospel and we even used to use these words
which are now being used by the Antinomians. But the circumstances then
were much different than today. At that time the world had been terrified
more than enough so that the pope or the face of one little priest caused the
whole of Olympus to shake, not to mention earth and Tartarus,743 for that
man of sin arrogated to himself authority over all these realms. Thus, since
consciences had already been oppressed and terrified by troubles, anxieties,
and afflictions, it was not necessary to inculcate or even teach the law. But
here it was necessary to apply that other part of Christ's teaching where he
also gives the mandate to preach the forgiveness of sins in his name [Luke
24: 47] in order that those who are already desperate and terrified enough
might learn not to despair but to flee to the grace and mercy offered in
Christ. But now, although the times are different and dissimilar than those
formerly under the pope, our Antinomians, as they are "sweet" theologians,
hold on to our words, our doctrine, and that joyful promise about Christ,
and what is worse, want nothing but that, having no regard for the fact that
people now are not the same but are different than they were under the
hangman the pope. Indeed, they have become and are secure and evil,
stubborn, wicked robbers, better yet, Epicureans, who respect neither God
nor human beings, who are confirmed and greatly strengthened by this
teaching. At that time we were so terrified that we would tremble at even
the rustling of a leaf falling from a tree [cf. Lev. 26: 36]. Therefore, I admit
that we also at first had taught that repentance springs from the love of
righteousness, that is, from the gospel, because people at that time had been
crushed too much by the papacy and brought to the brink of despair, and
indeed were already living in the midst of hell so that, unless we wanted to
utterly destroy them, it was necessary to lead them back out of hell as
74239 I, 571, 5-575, 2.
743Vergil, Aenid, IX, 106.
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quickly as possible. Now, if God will permit it, our Antinomians want to do
the same thing and sing of nothing but sweetness and light, meanwhile they
care nothing about the fact that the state of the times is far different now
from what it was at first, that it, it is most perverse. Therefore, they make
people who are secure in themselves still more secure in order that in the
end they fall from grace completely because it is done very methodically.
Therefore, my response to the argument is this: Repentance is to be
taught or began out of the love for righteousness, that is, in those who are
and were afflicted and contrite, as we were at that time under the pope; we
have hardly yet returned and [still] we flee those monstrous terrors and
fears which that worthless man inflicted. I know, and have established
through great effort, that I will only gradually escape, and even today I
[still] cannot look on my Lord Jesus as joyfully as I would like: they have so
inculcated that pestilential doctrine in me by which they depicted God as
angry with us and Christ as judge, because all their sermons said nothing
about faith in Christ and the free forgiveness of sins on account of Christ,
and [likewise] there was nothing but silence in all the canonists and
summists even though they expressly said that what they wanted to do was
to heal consciences.
Now these [Antinomians] of ours want to preach sermons belonging to
an age when people were contrite in an age when people are secure. But
that certainly is not a proper dividing of God's word, but wounds, scatters
and destroys souls. In our opinion, it is still sound and ought to be done
like this. Preach Christ, preach grace as much as you can to those who are
troubled and contrite, but not to those who are secure, indifferent, immoral,
adulterers, and blasphemers. If you do not do this you will be held accountable for their shameful misdeeds [cf. Ez. 3: 17-21]. There are two kinds of
people in the world: the poor, weak, and godly, or those who want to be
godly, on the one hand, and the rich or healthy, that is, the ungodly and
secure good-for-nothings, on the other. People in all ages therefore remain
the same, but it is over against this that you learn how properly to divide
the word of God, as I have said already, so that you do not teach everybody
everything without distinction. If you do that who will receive what they
need? What is the need? For as Christ said, what need do the healthy have
of a physician? [Mark 2: 17]; likewise, what need do the rich have for
charity? On the other hand, comfort the faint hearted [1 Thess. 5: 14].
Again, do not fear, little flock [Luke 12: 32]; God will judge the immoral and
the adulterous [Heb. 13: 4].
The antinomian syllogism encapsulates the heart of their theology of contrition. The major premise particular offers a terse summary: Contritio piorum fit
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amore iustitiae (571, 5).744 The reason for their insistence that it is the gospel that
induces contrition is coupled with their belief that the law engenders only hatred
of God, not love. Prior to Luther's response to this argument he gives us a very
informative autobiographical sketch of his method of preaching in the early
stages of the Reformation. He concedes that at the beginning he too preached
only the gospel and used the same language as the antinomians use now: Est
verum, nos sub initium causae huius coepimus strenue docere Evangelium et utebamur
etiam istis verbis, quibus nunc Antinomi (571, 10-12)745 However, Luther is emphatic that there is a crucial difference between the beginning of the Reformation
and the contemporary period, namely, the state of the times [status temporis]. The
people then lived in such constant fear and terror due to the thoroughly nomistic
preaching of the papists that it was not necessary for Luther to inculcate and
teach the law.746 They had already experienced the vis legis. Therefore, he
preached illa altera partem concionis Christi, namely, Christ's mandate to preach the
forgiveness of sins in his name (572, 3-5).747 The antinomians however blindly
followed Luther's early method and preached only the gospel regardless of the
744For documentation, see our discussion in ch. 2.
745Cf. 572, 15-573, 1: Quare dico nos etiam primo docuisse poenitentiam ex

amore iustitiae, id est, ex Evangelio.
746Luther remarks that he has been so deeply scarred by those ingentes
terrores et metus inflicted by the pope [ilk nequam homo] and that the pestilentem
doctrinam inculcated at that time, in which Christ was depicted only as judge, left
such a profound impression on him that it has taken him a long time to recover
from it and that even to this day he still cannot look at dominum meum Iesum as
joyfully [laeto vulto] as he would wish (573, 13-574, 4).
747This is clearly an allusion to Luke 24: 47; for Luther's treatment of
that text and other references to its occurrence, see our analysis of 1 AD, Arg. 19.
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fact that times had changed and that people in the late 1520s and 1530s were no
longer living in fear of God's wrath and judgment as at the beginning of the Reformation, but, on the contrary, had slumped into a state of spiritual complacency [securitas] and were in grave danger of falling from grace.748 The superiority of Luther as a theologian compared to the antinomians is that he was not beholden to any one particular "method." The critical issue for him was the proper
distinction between law and gospel so that the gospel could be heard in its full
clarity. Consequently, when he realized that the times had changed and that he
could no longer presuppose the effects of the law in his hearers, he changed his
method. He began to preach law and gospel, not just gospe1.749 The antinomians
however stuck rigidly with Luther's early gospel-only preaching and actually
criticized Luther himself for being unfaithful to his early evangelical begin748Describing the way that people have changed Luther says that they

are now securos et malos, praefractos, iniquos raptores, imo et Epicuraeos, qui neque
Deum neque homines revereantur (572, 12-13). On the other hand, he recalls, in
memorable words, the fear and terror of people at the time when he began
preaching the gospel: Nos tunc eramus perterrefacti, ut vel ad strepitum folii de arbore
cadentis tremeremus (572, 14-15). This reminds us of the close nexus between fear,
guilt and the wrath of God. To a guilty conscience, even a falling leaf can be a
messenger of divine wrath. For Elert, all this belongs to the Llrerlebnis, which is
the necessary presupposition for experiencing the joy and peace of the gospel
(Structure, 17-49).
749Although in another sense he never really changed his method at

all. He always preached law and gospel; but at the beginning of the Reformation,
because of the fear that had been inculcated in people by the papacy, he did not
need to articulate the law himself because people had already experienced its
crushing effects and were in desperate need of hearing the gospel. For a further
discussion on the problem of methodology in relation to Luther's distinction
between law and gospel, see our critique of G. Heintze, Luthers Predigt von Gesetz
and Evangelium (Munich: n.p., 1958) in ch. 1.
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nings.750 Luther is prepared to grant that repentance can be taught or begun
amore iustitiae provided that the people in question here are those who are and
were afflicti et contriti (573, 10-13), in other words, people who already know the
sensus et vis legis. But in reality that is no concession at all, for the antinomians
argue that contritio comes about amore iustitiae, that is ex evangelio, while Luther is
in effect saying no more than he has always said, namely, that contritio is ex lege
and that repentance, which presupposes the law, is ex evangelio. The amor iustitiae
therefore does not supplant the law in the act of penitence but rather follows the
law as the second part of repentance. When the task of producing contrition is
not carried out by the law but given to the gospel, the problem is that the impenitent are absolved and that, as Luther says, can only lead to securitas for such
people then presume against the grace of God and think that it is their right even
though they refuse to acknowledge themselves as sinners under the wrath of God
who are in need of grace and forgiveness. That is why Luther criticizes the antinomians for taking sermons belonging to an age when people were contrite and
preaching them in an age when people are secure [conciones saeculi contritorum in
saeculo securorum] (574, 5-6). Instead of the one-track gospel-only method of
preaching espoused by the antinomians, Luther stands by his two-track method
of preaching law and gospel which he already enunciated in his first set of theses.751 The method that he advocates [Sententia nostra adhuc sana est et debet sic
Teri] is this: Preach Christ or grace to the afflicti et contriti, but law to the securi,
otiosi scortatores, adultri et blasphemi. Luther's method is predicated on his belief
750For more on this see our discussion of antinomianism in ch. 2.
751See 39 I, 346, 34-347, 24 (Am, I, Ths. 25-39). The method is epito-

mized in the message of Jesus: Poenitemini et credite Evangelio (Mark 1: 15) (Th. 35).

598
that, theologically speaking, there are only two types of people in the world:
pauperes, infirmi, pii vel qui desiderant pii esse, et divites seu sani, hoc est, impii et securi
nebulones (574, 7-13). Even though Luther said earlier, contra antinomos, that times
change and that the method of preaching needs to change accordingly (which is
saying nothing more than that one always needs to distinguish between law and
gospel), he also knows that human nature itself does not change [Idem manent
igitur homines omnibus ternporibus]. When one fails to distinguish between the
demand of the law and the gift of the gospel one simply teaches everybody
everything without distinction. But that is like a doctor prescribing all the
remedies at his disposal without even doing a diagnosis and telling the patient he
is ill. When applied to preaching such an approach does nothing but harm because it deprives the hearers of a proper spiritual diagnosis and therefore robs
them of a lasting cure.752
Argument 37/10753
The righteous are not under the law. All Christians are righteous.
Therefore, no Christians are under the law.
Response: To the extent that they are Christians, it is correct to call them
righteous and to say that they are not under the law, because the law was not
laid down for the righteous [1 Tim. 1: 9], to the extent that a person is righteous. Certainly we must be extremely careful lest any difference come between the bride and the bridegroom. For the forgiveness of sins ought to rule
the conscience with Christ, and it should not be allowed to be harassed by
this law. For this little bed is now too narrow to receive and accommodate
752Without wishing to press the analogy, mutatis mutandis, it is almost

like the unworthy reception of our Lord's body and blood. Ironically, unworthiness here is to think oneself worthy. In the realm of preaching, unless we are first
apprized of our unworthiness coram Deo, we receive the gospel "unworthly" because it is meant only for the unworthy, or to change the image, as medicine it is
meant only for the sick.
75339 I, 575, 4-576, 4.
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the law or any tradition as well. Here the bridegroom alone will sleep with
his bride when all witnesses have been thrown out. Yet because we still
carry around with us the flesh and the body of sin, the law is to be applied
and urged, and a yoke added, lest we begin to grow licentious since the flesh
is commonly the most powerful part. Therefore, put its fodder higher and
keep a tight rein on it, lest it go beyond the limits. And in the case of those
who kick over the traces, the law is to be sharpened even more rather than
for the gospel to be preached. Otherwise my answer is this: Insofar as that
they are upright, they are called righteous and are not under the law,
because the law was not laid down for the righteous.
There is nothing essentially new in either the argument= or the responsio.
The error in the syllogism comes in the minor premise and is typical of antinomian anthropology. Instead of asserting with Paul and Luther that Christians are
at one and the same time righteous and sinners, the premise omits the simul and
merely states: Omnes christiani sunt iusti (575, 4). In his counter-argument Luther
does not specifically speak of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator, but such a
view dearly lies behind and controls his use of quatenus. He agrees with the antinomian argument that Christians are under the law, on one condition: Quatenus
sunt christiani (575, 6). As we have already seen, this is also Luther's way of interpreting 1 Timothy 1: 9: ot 066: voiloc ov Kacca.754 He agrees that the law has not
been given for the righteous, that is, insofar as they are righteous. However, he
does not want this qualification in any way to weaken the certainty that Christians
have been freed from the law, that is, the lex accusans, and that they therefore have
a good conscience with nothing to fear. To underscore this he again utilizes the
image of the marriage relationship between Christ and his bride, in this case, not
the church but the individual Christian, or more precisely, the Christian's con754See 39 I, 552, 7-553, 7 (3 AD, Arg. 26) and our analysis for a
summary of Luther's exegetical comments on this passage. Since this present
responsio adds nothing new to Arg. 26, we regard that as his definite statement.
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science. He makes it quite clear that the nuptial bed is too small to accommodate
the law as well so that as long as Christ is there and only he,755 there is no room
for the law in the Christian's conscience.756 When the bridegroom is alone with
his bride, all witnesses who would watch in judgment are thrown out (575, 11-12).
But how is that possible when the Christian is still a sinner? Here everything depends on the imputation of divine forgiveness through faith. It is because
the law now has nothing to condemn since Christ has fulfilled it on our behalf that
it is not permitted to harasses us. And yet the law does still have a place because
we still carry around with us our caro et copus peccati, but it does not belong in the
conscience. Rather its domain is the body. The yoke of the law that was lifted
from our conscience through faith in Chrisus impletor legis is now imposed on our
flesh to keep it under restraint so that we do not begin to turn our freedom into
755This is not the unio mystica of the German mystical tradition but a

metaphor to express the intimate relationship between Christ and the believer
which results from justification and faith. At this point a tertium quid, such as the
law, is excluded. The phrase: Hic sponsus cum sponsa solus cubabit (575, 11-12)
bears nothing more than a terminological connection with the thought-world of
late medieval mysticism. We agree with the basic criticism made by A. E.
McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 171, n. 69,
against many authors' writings on the relationship between Luther and mysticism, and that is that they tend to assume that a reference to, or a citation from, a
mystic such as Tauler implies Luther's full acquiescence with the view expressed
or that he uses terms in exactly the same way. For a sane approach to this problem see the essay by H. A. Obermann, 'Simul Gemitus et Raptus: Luther und die
Mystik,' in Kirche, Mystik, Heiligung und das Natiirliche bei Luther: Vortriige des
Dritten Internationalen Kongresses fur Lutherforschung, ed. I. Asheim (Gottingen:
n.p., 1967), 20-59.
756 575, 10-11: Nam hic lectulus angustior est, quam ut praeterea legem aut
ullam traditionem possit recipere et admittere. Hic sponsus cum sponsa solus cubabit
eiectis omnibus arbitris. Cf. 39 I, 498, 16-18 (3 AD, Arg. 1) where Luther again
highlights the exclusivity of Christ's claim to his bride: hic sumus in Domino, qui
noster sponsus est, nec patitur, ut quisquam in hoc tam angusto lectulo condormiat.

601
licence and become licentious. Although the flesh has been subdued by the Spirit
and sin is no longer peccatum regnans but regnatum, nevertheless, Luther recognizes that the flesh is so potent and intractable that it often breaks away and gains
the upper hand.757 When that occurs the law-gospel balance needs to be tipped in
favor of the law. He does not say that the gospel is not to be preached at all but
that the law must be sharpened: Et effrenibus plus est acuenda lex, quam praedicandum Evangelium (576, 2-3). When the law is to be sharpened, it is no longer being
used parenetically as when Christians are warned and admonished to walk
according to the Spirit in the footsteps of Christ. For this is, as Luther has pointed
out, a softened and mitigated use of the law, and it can be that for the credentes
since they are constantly looking to and taking comfort in the lex impleta wrought
for them by Christ.758 However, the situation with the effrenes is different. They
have given up the struggle against and instead have given in to sin. Consequently, they must be brought back. The law cannot do that alone, but it can begin by
confronting them with their sin and giving them a guilty conscience. To do that
however the law must reenter the conscience, but now it has every right to do so
because the conscience has broken faith and deserted the marriage bed. But it is
permitted by Christ to accuse and terrify only so long as the person remains
impenitent.759 As soon as faith returns and the struggle against sin resumes the
757575, 12-576, 1: Verum quia adhuc circumferimus carnem et corpus

peccati, adhibenda lex est et urgenda, addendum iugum est, ne lascivire incipiamus, ut,
cum caro maxima pars sit plerumque. An "ut" is best replaced by an "et" as in Rel. B.
7580n the

amelioration of the law among the saints in connection with
its use in exhortation, see our discussion of 2 AD, Arg. 21.
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law must exit from the conscience for then the Pauline dictum once again comes
into effect: iusto lex non est posits (576, 4).
Argument 38/11760
Those who have been translated into the kingdom of God [Col. 1: 13]
are driven by the Holy Spirit without the law. Christians are such people.
Therefore, they are driven by the Holy Spirit without the law.
Response: We concede the whole argument, but Christians still fail in
one point: the children's feet still stick out, insofar as we have been translated, as in Romans 7 [: 25]: with my flesh I serve the law of sin.
The antinomian argument= brings into antithesis the law and the Spirit:
Those who have been translated into the kingdom, either are driven by the Spirit
or by the law. Luther concedes the whole argument: Christians are in fact driven
by the Spirit without the law, but again with one qualification: quatenus sumus
translati. He could have equally said: quatenus sumus Christiani. As we saw in the
previous argument, the reason he has to qualify his answer is because the antinomies deny that Christians in se are still sinners. For them therefore it is unnecessary for Christians to be admonished to stand firm and fight against the temptation to sin because they believe that Christians can no longer sin for all sin has
been forgiven through Christ. As we have seen in the Praefatio and elsewhere,
Luther regards such a teaching as satanic because Satan is allowed to enter the
citadel of a Christian's life through the ensuing securitas and make his assault from
within.
Luther for his part knows the reality of the temptation to sin and the everpresent danger of apostasy. He knows that even against his will, due to the weak7591n 39 I, 498, 10-16 Luther says that the law must be sharpened in the

church militant in order to discharge its duplex usus, but that it must not be allowed to trouble the conscience and rob it of peace.
76039 I, 576, 6-10.
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ness of the flesh, he still sins daily. Falling back on an image that he used earlier,
he says that the reason for this failure in Christians is this: Das dem kindlein die
fufilein noch herfur hangen. It follows then that the admonition to Christians, using
this same imagery, is: Keep your feet tucked up and don't let them stick out from
under your robe.761 This is a paranetic appeal which is based on the gospel. It is
not intended to accuse but to keep the Christian alert to the ever-present danger of
the assaults of sin and Satan. In the previous Argumentum, on the other hand, we
saw that the law functioned primarily in its theological capacity (usus theologicus)
because the Christian had succumbed to sin and was in danger of forfeiting
salvation. It is this dynamic use of the law in the life of the Christian that the
antinomians know nothing about, where the law oscillates between parenesis and
accusation, depending on whether it is heard in faith or not. Because the law has
already been fulfilled in Christ and Christians are no longer sinners, the only use
of the law that they are prepared to acknowledge is the usus politicus. Since this
has already been spelled out earlier there is no need for us to elaborate on it here.
Argument 39/12762
D. Philipp Melanchthon, Rector of the Wittenberg Academy
No one can please God unless he is totally righteous. No one is totally
righteous, as our many theses show. Therefore, no one pleases God.
Response: Nothing follows from pure particularities and from pure
negatives.
Melanchthon's763 argumentum leads nowhere, as Luther says. The conclusion at any rate, even as it stands, is not sympathetic to the antinomian cause.
761See 39 I, 521, 7-11 (3 AD, Arg. 10) where Luther warns that they

should keep their feet tucked up lest Satan should bite them.
76239 I, 576, 13-15.
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That is confirmed by a quick glance at the arguments which they have proposed
in this disputation. On the contrary, they would claim that it is only the law that
would destroy this certainty that we are pleasing to God or that would give us a
bad conscience.
Argument 40/13764
In every conversion the Holy Spirit is given through the gospel, not
through the law, as Paul says: Faith comes from what is heard [Rom. 10: 17].
The law however does not come from faith. Therefore, the law is useless for
converting the godly and avails only for bodily discipline and least of all for
the conversion of the godly.
Proof of Conclusion: When the Holy Spirit is given only through the
gospel and the preaching of Christ, what need is there for the law, especially
since its preaching has no effect because it is a useless word and a mere letter? And I am speaking only about the beginning of conversion and the mortification and vivification that precedes it. I do not think that the law is useful for the converted and the godly other than for discipline and morals.
Response: It is true that God gives his Holy Spirit on account of the
word that is heard, given or preached to the world through Christ. But it
does not follow that the law of Moses is therefore nothing and is to be completely removed, as they want, for this too has its office and circuit or sphere
in which it is to operate. And we cannot and ought not concede, nor do we
wish to support what they say for they regard the law as some kind of external discipline, by which the godly may be admonished to lead a godly life.
As far as I am concerned, Master Philipp, you concede too much to these
antinomians, who openly say: Moses belongs on the gallows! You should be
helping me to proceed against them, and regard them as our enemies.
Philipp's Response: Father and teacher Luther, I have said this for
the purposes of discussion, not to defend them, in order that fact and truth
may shine through more clearly in our investigation. For the antinomians
are profane and ungodly and their opinions blasphemous.
Luther: Now to your argument. The Holy Spirit is not given through
the law but through the gospel. Therefore, the law is not to be taught, which
is taught in vain where nothing follows. Response: The law indeed does not
763For Melanchthon's role in the antinomian controversy, see ch. 2.
There is a resemblance between this argument (except for its negative form) and
that of 1 AD, Arg. 11 where Melanchthon posited that human beings cannot purpose good by themselves.
76439

I, 577, 2-579, 2.

605
give the Holy Spirit, as through the gospel, but in the mean time the material
is prepared by the Holy Spirit through the law, in which he can later manifest his power and virtue, namely, in the poor, the troubled, and the contrite.
For otherwise the Holy Spirit is given neither through the law nor through
the gospel unless the material first has been prepared through the law in order that it may have need of such a physician and comforter, as it is written:
A contrite and humbled heart, God, you will not despise [Ps. 51: 19]. But the
Holy Spirit is not given to all the contrite. Why this way and not some other
way? Response: This has not been revealed to us, but is to be left to the
judgment of God.
The antinomian argument is very logical: if faith is ex auditu or per Evangelium et praedicationem de Christo, as Paul indeed argues (Rom. 10: 17), the law can
play no role in conversion but is useful only for external discipline [Ergo lex est
inutilis ad conversionem piorum et valet tantum ad corporalem disciplinam et minime ad
conversionem piorum] (577, 2-5). In other words, the antinomians claim that the lex
accusans has no role to play in the church and that the only function of the law that
is appropriate for Christians (as well as for society at large) is the first or political
use. In the probatio the opponents reaffirm that when it comes to the beginning of
conversio and the preceding mortificatio et vivificatio, the law is inutile verbum et
tantum litera, that is, that it is useful only quoad disciplinam et mores (577, 6-11).
Luther naturally agrees that the Spirit is given propter verbum auditum seu
praedicatum mundo per Christum, but for him it is a non sequitur that propterea lex
Mosis nihil sit et tollenda prorsus e medio. Against the antinomians he asserts that
the Decalogue--this is surely what Luther intends with lex Mosis—still has its officium et circuitum seu sphaeram also in the Christian life. That this is a reference to
the usus theologicus is clearly implied by his gentle rebuke of Melanchthon whom
he accuses of conceding too much to the antinomians. From our reading of the
text, the concession apparently is that the law is an externa disciplina by which the
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pii can be admonished to lead a godly life.765 But Luther, as we have seen, can
also admonish Christians to lead a godly life. So where is the difference. The difference seems to lie in the fact that Luther does not exclude the usus theologicus but
continues to see it as the chief use of the law also among Christians, whereas the
antinomian slogan was: Moses gehort an den lieclzten galgen. This is a very important difference and bears further explication. The only use of the law that the
antinomians will allow for the pii is that of externa disciplina, which is really just
another way of describing the usus politicus, which is charged with restraining sin
and evil. Although Luther hardly uses the term discipline, it is significant that it
should come up precisely in the controversial conclusion to the Second Disputation. There we saw that the paedagogia was connected with disciplina or the usus
civilis rather than with the usus theologicus as is typical in Luther. In other words,
the conclusio interpreted paedagogia or preparation for Christ in terms of disciplina.
In his responsio here however Luther understands praeparatio in terms of the
second use of the law by the Holy Spirit, and thus as preparation for Christ and
the gospel. The Holy Spirit is not given through the law but through the gospe1;766 nevertheless, the Spirit uses the law to prepare the heart so that people
may become penitent, that is, pauperes, afflicti et contriti, and hence prepared for
the gospel. In other words, it would seem that Luther associates disciplina with
765578, 5-8: Neque possumus neque debet concedi neque ferre volumus, quod

dicitur, eos ponere legem pro externa disciplina quadam, qua admoneantur iam pii, ut vivant pie. Vos, mi domine, Philippe, nimium istis indulgetis Antinomis, qui iam aperte
dicunt: Moses gehort an den liechten galgen.
766See

our analysis of 1 AD, Arg. 4 where Luther points out the distinction between the law-Spirit, who is synonymous with the Deus nudus, and the
gospel-Spirit who is the equivalent of the Deus revelatus and is pure gift.
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paedagogia and uses both in connection with the usus theologicus, whereas Agricola
and the antinomians connect them to the usus politicus.
What is the difference then between Luther's admonition to Christians to
lead a godly life and that of the antinomians? The answer lies in the relationship
between the law and the gospel. Luther's use of parenesis, as we have seen, arises
from the gospel and leads back to the gospel. It is not simply moral instruction,
for one does not need the gospel for that. Parenesis is gospel parenesis because it
is anchored in the gospel and its demands have been fulfilled in the gospel. It is
the gospel that provides both the motivation and goal of parenesis. Its purpose,
one could say, is to admonish Christians to remain free: not to fall back into
bondage to the law (by thinking that one's salvation, or certainty of salvation, is
based on performance and achievement), or to sin (by succumbing to temptation
instead of resisting it). So long as credentes remain in Christ and struggle against
the flesh, parenesis takes the form of encouragement and warning and exhortation. But when Christians fall into open sin and remain impenitent, then the
parenesis becomes rebuke and accusation in the hope that they will repent and
return to Christ and find shelter under his wings.767
Parenesis admonishes us not only to remain free in Christ, but to continue
fighting against sin and Satan, and to keep our feet tucked up under our baptismal robe, accordingto Luther's vivid picture. This is an altogether different use of
the law than the externa disciplina advocated by the antinomians to the exclusion of
any other use, for the former presupposes the gospel and is intended specifically
for Christians whereas the latter is intended for both, but in the case of Christians,
767See also our discussion of law and parenesis in connection with our

analysis of 3 AD, Arg. 13.
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it is a purely external use of the law to govern the life [mores] and behavior of
Christians but can never accuse them of sin. For Luther such a separation is artificial and impossible. In his view the parenesis achieves its goal not simply by
instructing Christians what they should do or how they should live but also by
reminding them at the same time how far short of the goal they are always falling
and then pointing them, not to their own good resolve, but to Christ who has
already fulfilled the law for them and in whom alone they can find strength daily
to preservere and daily to confess their sins, for a contrite and humble heart God
will not despise (Ps. 51: 19).768
This then is the chief difference between Luther's use of parenesis to
instruct and admonish the godly and the antinomians' use of the law as externa

disciplina. And it would seem that the reason why he is so severe on them and
even chastises Melanchthon for conceding too much [Vos debetis mihi auxiliari in

persequendo eos, et habendi sunt a nobis ut hostes nostri (578, 8-9)] is bound up with
the fact that they will have nothing to do with the lex accusans, which after all is
the praecipuus legis usus of the law, also for Christians, because the pii are not only

sancti but at the same time are peccatores. The simul with its implied anthropology
is what stands between Luther and the antinomians at this point.
Another Argument 40/13 A769
The church is holy also in this life. The faithful are members of the
church. Therefore, the faithful are holy also in this life.
Response: We concede the argument entirely, to the extent that they are
such.
768With regard to the final question: Cur sic et non aliter? and Luther's
response: Hoc nobis non est revelatum, sed relinquendum iudicio Dei, see his remarks
in 39 I, 368, 5-369,16 (1 AD, Arg. 3).
76939 I, 579, 4-6.
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This argumentum is not entirely new and Luther's response is consistent.
We review his earlier statements on this matter. When he says he agrees with the
argument entirely, quatenus sunt tales (scil. sancta), he is simply affirming the
doctrine of the simul iustus et peccator. Earlier he said that the church is never
without the ungodly and hypocrites and that the sancti in the church still have sin
but that it is not imputed to them because they are deemed righteous for Christ's
sake.770 Because sin never ceases, the sancti and the impii are always comingled.
Hence, the church is holy, yet not holy, and individually members are righteous
and yet not righteous, blessed and yet not blessed.771 By synecdoche (or we could
also say, but in a different sense, by imputation) the church is holy and righteous
but yet it is not without sin.772
Argument 41/14773
What is given for a time ceases. The law is of such. Therefore, it ceases.
Proof of Minor Premise: The law and the prophets are until John [Luke
16: 16].
Response: The law is until John; it includes him and does not exdude
him. The condemning and accusing law will no longer exist for those who
have received Christ through the pointing of John. But if only we could hold
on to that, so that the law might not go beyond John and we find rest in the
revealed lamb and so be certain of salvation. When the bride and bridegroom come together, the piper falls silent and puts his pipes away in the
bag.774 Tomorrow is soon enough for sobriety.
77039 I, 514, 13-16 (3 AD, Arg. 6).
7711bid., 515, 1-5; Cf. 544, 4-11 (3 AD, Arg. 22): The church is holy by

synecdoche. It is holy on account of the holy part, and unholy on account of the
ungodly part.
77239 I, 564, 1-7 (3 AD, Arg. 30/3).
77339 I, 579, 8-580, 2.
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Again there is nothing essentially new here. The argumentum confuses the
Mosaic law and the Decalogue. The former was given ad tempus, not the latter.775
Therefore, as we have often seen, Luther cannot agree that the law ceases.
Rather, he says that the law is until John,776 meaning that for those whom John
points to Christ, and who then receive him in faith, the law ceases, but for the
others, and also for the Christian quoad peccator, it remains.777 But the law is not
so domesticated or compliant that it automatically ceases as lex accusatrix et
condemnatrix as soon as John points to Christ. The law must be told by the gospel
not to overstep its limits.778 The only way that we can find refuge from the
accusing law and certainty of salvation is to cling to Christ, the impletor legis and
hence also the finis legis accusans (579, 12-580, 1).
Argument 42/15779
The gentleness and kindness of Christ calls us to repentance. Therefore,
there is no need for the harshness of the law.
The conclusion is valid from the nature of correlatives.
Response: It is true, as Paul says in Romans 2 [: 4]: Do you not know
that the God's kindness moves you to repentance? But if only it were possi774Cf. Mark 2: 19-20. See the supplementary note, 39 H, 585, where ref-

erence is made to Wander, Sprichworterlexikon I, 454, no. 56 under "Braut." The
saying is said to be a further elaboration by Luther of a conventional proverb.
The WA text however reads Pfeifer for Pfeffer.
750n the relationship between the law of Moses and the Decalogue
(=lex naturae), see our analysis of 2 AD, Arg. 25.
776But John himself is under the law: Lex usque ad Ioannem inclusive, non
exclusive (579, 10). But he points to him who fulfills the law.

77For John as the monstrator agni, see 39 I, 366, 6 (1 AD, Arg. 2), and

455, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 13).
778See 39 I, 445, 15-16 (2 AD, Arg. 8).
77939 I, 580, 4-16.
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ble for us to follow God, after having been moved by divine kindness, rather
than run away from him, as we said above. When you consider how many
gifts you have received from God the Father without any merit, and neglected, what else can follow from this than an even greater kind of despair than
would have resulted if you had acknowledged your sins on the basis of the
law (since this is truly the knowledge of the law). For what sin is greater
than ingratitude, especially to God? There are four ways to repentance
which God mostly uses: threats, promises, benefits, and calamities. Those
not moved by these may perish or prosper.
The argumentum is a statement of one of the central doctrines of antinomian theology, and that is that repentance arises exclusively through the gospel
(specifically the benignitas Christi,780 as here, or the violatio filii781). Luther, does
not deny that repentance may be ex evangelio, indeed earlier he said that Christ is
the principal part of repentance, though he does not hold that it must arise exclusively from the gospel or from the benignitas Christi (or Dei). In fact, for reasons
that we have already seen, he argues the opposite way: that normally repentance
(more precisely, contrition) is produced by the law and that when it arises from
the gospel instead, it may have the unfortunate consequences of driving someone
to despair, and even suicide, as in the case of Dr. Krause of Halle,782 because they
have no where else to turn. This is a solemn reminder that when Christ does the
work of the law (as he does when the gospel is used to bring about repentance)
one cannot so easily turn to him again for comfort and seek refuge in him from
the condemning law. The antinomian argument is purely logical as is clear
already from the probatio: Consequentia valet ex natura correlativorum (580, 6),
780Rom.

2: 4 is used as a probatio in 39 I, 400, 17-18 (1 AD, Arg. 24).

781See

39 I, 384, 4-6 (1 AD, Arg. 15).

782For

Luther's verdict on the case of Dr. Krause, see our analysis of 3

AD, Arg. 18.

612
whereas Luther's is theological. However, to exclude the law from repentance
because the acerbitas legis is not a correlative to the benignitas Christi, is a
reductionist argument which arbitrarily limits the horizon of revelation to the
gospel and hence accepts the law only in synthesis with the gospel and not as its
antithesis. Luther, on the other hand, as we have already seen, holds the law and
gospel in dialectical tension, even in the vita christiana because Christians must
still struggle with sin in themselves even as they celebrate their victory over it in
Christ through faith. Luther's anthropological realism, over against the perfectionism of his opponents as evidenced in their claim to sinlessness, reveals
itself in the wistfulness inherent in his response to their use of Romans 2: 4, as if
repentance signaled the end of sin altogether: Atque utinam sic possit esse, ut moti
benignitate divina Deum sequeremur et non magis eum fitgeremus (580, 8-9).
Luther's main concern here is not with the origin of repentance. Indeed,
he readily admits that the repentance wrought by the gospel (contemplation of
the beneficia Dei and the benignitas Christi) can lead to far greater despair than that
ever produced ex lege (580, 10-13) for what sin is greater than ingratitudino,
especially erga Deum?783 In fact Luther earlier advocated that when the duri are
not moved to repentance by threats and terrrors then we need to try using gifts
and promises,784 or even tears and entreaties (ars rhetorica) like the sons of
Korah.785 However, although one can come to repentance by means of either law
783Cf. 39 I, 536, 4-537, 19 (3 AD, Arg. 18). It is precisely for this reason

that Dr. Krause ended up in interminable despair, as the continuation of the passage shows (537, 19-538, 13).
784See 39 I, 401, 4-6 (1 AD, Arg. 24). In the present Argumentum Luther

says that there are four ways in which God can work repentance: minae, promissa,
beneficia, and plagae (580, 15-16); cf. 541, 11-12 (3 AD, Arg. 20).
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or gospe1,786 that does not alter the fact that when the gospel is used in this way
to bring about repentance, it is functioning not as gospel in the proper sense but
as law. Luther made this clear earlier when he pointed out that whatever accuses
and condemns the conscience, whether it comes from the law or the gospel, is
finally law.787 That is also proof of the fact that the law has not yet been abolished per se, but only abolished for faith. This then is what Luther wishes to
stress here: Even if repentance does arise ex evangelio, that does not negate the law
as such but rather establishes it.
Argument 43/16788
The proper purpose of the exposure of sin is despair. But despair is induced by the law. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
Response: Despair of ourselves is the best thing and is pleasing to God.
But despair of God is the greatest outrage and a sin against the First Commandment. Here either way it is a sin in the highest degree, either to despair of God or to rely on our own powers and be secure. Therefore, we
should argue like this: The law leads to despair of God. Therefore, the law
is not to be taught. Here I deny both the premise and the conclusion, because it is not the intention of the law that you despair of God but rather
that, having acknowledged your sin, you despair of yourself and learn to
seek help from him in whom it has been offered by God. For this is the sum
of the first commandment: do not despair, but trust and fear and love God
above everything, for he wants you to believe in him with your whole heart,
and this is more than just your hands and feet. But by the same token, if the
law comes along and finds that we do not hope and do not love God, there
it convicts that security and infidelity, the contempt for God and our presumption and both commands and desires that we despair of ourselves, but
have good hope of God and trust in him. But I cannot. Then call upon him,
he says, who is powerful to bring it about that you can, and hope, do not
despair, but cry out to him.
785See 39 I, 401, 6-15 (1 AD, Arg. 24).
786See 39 I, 407,1-13 (1 AD, Arg. 28).
787See 39 I, 535, 2-5 (3 AD, Arg. 18).
78839 I, 581, 2-582, 5.
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The major premise presupposes that despair is a bad thing. Hence, the
law, which causes it, is not to be taught. Luther, on the other hand, rejects the
notion that despair per se is bad, but distinguishes between good and bad despair, or in other words, between evangelical and demonic despair. He suggests
to his opponents that "desperatio" needs to be qualified because the word itself is
equivocal. Hence, it would be more correct to argue: Lex inducit desperationem de
Deo. Ergo lex non est docenda (581, 8). But even with that added precision Luther
still denies both the premise and the conclusion because lex non vult, ut desperes de
Deo, sed magis agnito peccato de te ipso et discas quaerere auxilium ab eo, in quo propositum est a Deo (581, 9-11). The summa primi praecepti is that we fear, love and trust
in God above all things; that is the very opposite of despair and so one could
hardly say that the law given by God was given to end in making us despair. On
the other hand, where this fear, love and trust in God is missing and there is only
securitas et infidelitas, contempt= Dei et praesumptio, the law does create despair,
but not de Deo, at least that is not its intention, but rather de te. That also is the
difference between the demonic and evangelical despair.789 And where someone
finds it hard to trust in God, Luther's advice is not to despair in God but rather in
one's own strength and ability, and to pray to him and he will give it to you.
Argument 44/17790
Paul commands the godly to rejoice always [Phil. 4: 4]. Therefore, the
godly are not to be terrified by the law.
Response: To the extent that they are godly. But how am Ito know
whether they are godly or ungodly? Where the word of God has not been
heard, we must be silent, as the Lord says: If they do not welcome you in
789Luther has expressed himself on this theme before; see, for example,
427, 18-428, 6; 430, 7-11 (2 AD, Arg. 2).
79039 I, 582, 7-13.
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this place go elsewhere [Luke 10: 10]. But since we do not know who are
truly ungodly and who are truly godly, we must preach until the ungodly
separate themselves; then I must not preach to them. I will certainly not
preach to the devil nor are we to cast [pearls] before swine [Matt. 7: 6].
The argumentum bears similarity to others in this disputation, such as those
that basically argue that the law must not be preached because people ruled by
the law cannot be certain or have a good conscience.791 In all of these arguments
the antinomians disregard sin and accordingly fail to distinguish between law
and gospel. Paul certainly does exhort his readers to rejoice, but they are to
rejoice in Christ. On the other hand, they are to be sorrowful over the sin that
still marks their lives as children of Adam. And when Paul in his catalog of
sufferings (and for him suffering is a mark of the true apostle) says: We are
treated as imposters and yet are true; . . . as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing Pc
A.intolipEvoi at SE xaipovtEsi ... (2 Cor. 6: 10), he beautifully captures the
dialectic of the Christian life lived between the twin poles of law and gospel. But
even more, the gospel is not merely a counterweight to the law that results in a
life of suspended tension. The gospel is victorious over the law as lex accusatrix et
condemnatrix, it routs the law and elicits from the pii the spontaneous joy that is
characteristic of the new life in Christ. It is the "nevertheless" of the gospel contra
legem that allows Paul to exult in the fact that although he may be sorrowful because judged by the law he is still peccator, yet he can also rejoice greatly as iustus
because the judgment of the law is no longer determinative for him and his life
since Christ, as the impletor legis, took that judgment on himself. However, of the
simul iustus et peccator nature of the vita christiana, the joy of the new life will often
be hidden under suffering, just as Christ's victory is victoria sub cruce tecta.
791Cf. 3 AD, Args. 1, 3, 6.
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Luther however does not respond to the argumentum in terms of the saintsinner dialectic, at least not directly, although it is only because of it that he can
say here what he does. Since the new life is a hidden reality and not open to empirical verification, Luther is justified in asking how one can distinguish between
the pii and the impii. For this Luther relies on the &iv aInc of the word. Where the
word is preached people will either receive it or reject it.792 This is in line with
our Lord's instruction to the seventy-two (Luke 10: 10). Hence Luther says: Cum
autem nos non sciamus, qui sint vere impii et qui vere pii, praedicandum est, donec ipsi
se ipsos separent, tunc non debeo illis praedicare (582, 10-12). The pii are not terrified
by the law, or if they are, they immediately take refuge in Christ who has
overcome the law; the impii, on the other hand, either remain in unbelief or
despair. Therefore, the antinomian argument falls to the ground. Luther does
not preach the condemning law to the pii, and moreover whenever their
conscience does accuse them, they again and again receive forgiveness through
faith in Christ. Hence, the pii are not terrified by the law, in quantum sunt pii (582,
7-8).
Argument 45/18793
Abraham is righteous without any law. Therefore, we are all justified
without the law. Therefore, the law is not to be taught.
792There is parallel between the Kpicnc-character of the verbum praedica-

tum and that of the verbum incarnatum, Jesus Christ, the living word. The "crisis"
precipitated by our Lord's coming to his world is nicely described in John's
Gospel; see esp. 3: 19-21 where xpi Gig means a division of the world into two
groups: those who come to the light and do the truth (pii) and those who shun the
light and do evil (impii). Different things are said of each in mutually exclusive
terms. Each can function as either law or gospel.
79339 I, 583, 2-17.
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D. M. L.: The argument is this: Abraham is righteous before the law.
Therefore, Abraham is righteous before sin [came into the world], since
without the law there is no sin, and consequently he was justified in vain
because he was already righteous beforehand. Or alternatively: Abraham
was justified without any law convicting sin. Therefore, we too are justified
without the law, and consequently the law is not to be taught.
D. M. L. Response: It is the same as if somebody were to say: This
person has been raised from the dead although previously he was not really
dead. Therefore, the passage must mean: the law was 400 years earlier, that
is, the written law or the law of Moses [Gal. 3: 17]. For that matter the law is
there with us when we are born. Nor was Abraham entirely without the
law, since God said to him: walk before me and be blameless [Gen. 17: 1].
And he was also not without sin, for scripture clearly says that Abraham
lived beyond the River and served foreign gods [Joshua 24: 2]. Therefore,
Abraham was an idolater. Hence, it also necessarily follows that he was not
without the law. But heeding him who was calling him, he was justified
through faith in the promised seed.
In the argumentum premises are correct but the conclusion is wrong.
Abraham is indeed justified or iustus without the law, but the sine ulla lege does
not mean, as the antinomian suppose, that he is iustus ante legem, but that he is
justified apart from the law (meaning specifically the works of the law). Paul's
argument in Romans 4 is not against the law per se but against justification on
the basis of the law, for Abraham (and indeed all Christians) is iustus through
faith alone in the promised seed. Again, it is not, as the antinomians think, that
Abraham is iustificatus sine ulla lege arguente peccatum, for it is precisely the lex
arguens that exposes our sin and guilt and thus shows us our need for
justification. Therefore, Luther cannot agree with the antinomian argumentation,
nor with the conclusion that that lex non est docenda even though he agrees that
Abraham is righteous without the law in the sense that the law has no part in the
article of justification (583, 2-8).
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Luther argues that to say that Abraham was justified ante legem is to say
that he was justified ante peccatum, for sine lege non est peccatum.794 Consequently,
justification would be superfluous because he would be righteous already. The
passage that he undoubtedly has in mind is Galatians 3: 17 where Paul argues
that the law that came 430 years after the promise made to Abraham (based on
his having been justified through faith; cf. Gen. 15: 6) does not annul the prior
covenant of grace or make the promise void [6 v6i.toc aim docupoi eig TO Kacapyfiaat inv brayyeXiav]. In what appears at first to be a somewhat arbitrary
reading of the text Luther posits: Ideo intelligendus est locus: 400 annis antequam
esset lex, where lex is understood to be the lex scripta or the lex Mosis (583, 10-11).
Where Paul says that the law came 400 odd years after the promise Luther says
that we should take this to mean that the law 400 years earlier, meaning that it
was coterminus with Abraham. What is true of us all is true of him also: Nam
alioqui lex nobiscum nata est (583, 11). Luther's interest here is not the dating of the
law given on Sinai but the prior existence of the universal law in the sense of the
lex naturae. The natural law is something that all people are born with and that is
equivalent to the Decalogue (which is what Luther means here by lex scripta vel
Mosis) in terms of content.795 Luther's purpose here is not to contradict his
earlier assertion about justification sola fide, but rather to demonstrate that even
Abraham was not without the law although he was justified apart from the law.
As further proof of this Luther adduces the fact that before Yahweh called him,
794Luther

has already shown the inseparability of the law and sin; see,
for example, 39 I, 354, 24 (ATh, V, Th. 7). In fact the whole Fifth Thesenreihe deals
with the theme of the inseparable nexus between law, sin, and death.
7950n the

relationship between the lex naturae or lex insculpta and the
Decalogue, see our analysis of 1 AD, Arg. 13, 25 and 3 AD, Arg. 19.
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Abraham was an idolater; he lived with his polytheistic family beyond the River
and servierit diis alienis (Joshua 24: 2). Therefore, Luther concludes, Abraham had
to have the law even before he was justified by faith because, as we have seen,
there is an inseparable connection between law and sin. There is no real
contradiction between what Luther says here and what Paul says in Romans 5:
13: cvzxpi yCtp veip.ov attapria riv iv Kcia

ap.aptia SE oimc in.oyitral pit iivioc

vottou.796 Each is speaking from a different point of view. The referent of voiloc
in Paul is the voiloc Mcoiiciw c, whereas the referent of lex in Luther is the lex
naturae. Given Luther's standpoint then he could say that there is a lex accusans
even before Moses for the lex insculpta is a given fact, it is schon da.797 Thus,
Luther has established that Abraham was not sine lege, even though he was
justified through faith in Christ [in semen promissionis].
However, not only is the law present to Abraham as lex naturalis, but also
in the form of a command given by Yahweh: Nec fuit Abraham omnino sine lege,
cum Deus ad ipsum dixerit: Ambula coram me et esto integer [n ,r]T1 r1'i71 5395
15irri] (Gen. 17: 1). Although Luther's concern is only to cite this as an instance
of law, we might parenthetically inquire into its usus? Could this directive be a
candidate for the so-called tertius usus legis? We notice at the outset that these
words are spoken to Abraham after justification. Consequently, they have the
same function as the parenetic appeals of the New Testament. They presuppose
God's gracious turning toward us in mercy, his declaration that we are righteous.
Therefore, the imperative ambula coram me et esto integer is really an invitation to
796Cf. also Rom. 4: 15: oi; SE 4:yoK 'iGT1VOLLoc
797See 39 I, 477, 7 (2 AD, Arg. 24).

oi)a irapaAacric.
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do something that would be quite impossible without justification. But since
through faith Abraham was integer coram Deo, God was simply asking him to be
what he was and to live accordingly. Therefore, what we have already said
about the nature of New Testament parenesis applies here also. The law is taken
into the service of the gospel, under the control of the gospel, and since it does
not address us as the demanding lex implenda (=lex acusans) but the encouraging
lex impleta, it is really at this point an evangelical use of the law rather than a
nomological one.798
Conclusion799
The vote of thanks by D. M. L. We thank you all, both those who have
participated in the disputation and those of you who have come along to listen.
This is the end of this disputation dealing with the blasphemous teachings of the Antinomians.
This disputation was held at Wittenberg
Deo Laus
798When

used (by God) evangelically, the law bestows, enables,
prompts etc., but when used (by God) nomologically it is accusing, demanding,
and condemning.
79939 I, 584, 1-5.

CHAPTER FOUR
EXPLICATION OF KEY THEMES IN THE DISPUTATIONS
IN THE LIGHT OF LAW AND GOSPEL
Introduction
In this chapter we will attempt to pull together some of the main threads
running through the disputations and organize them under certain key topics in
order to develop a clearer understanding of why Luther insists that the law must
continue to be preached in the church and how he defends this thesis against the
antinomians. In doing this we will at the same time gain a more complete and
coherent picture of Luther's understanding of law and gospel, his doctrine of the
law, and the role that it plays in the Christian life. Since many of the points to be
covered have already been discussed in a preliminary way in our analyses of the
disputations, we will not attempt to reargue our interpretation of the points in
question but will take them as our point of departure for a more comprehensive
discussion of the given topic both within the whole compass of the disputations
and within the wider framework of modern Luther-scholarship.
At its most basic level, the antinomian contention is that the divine law
must not be taught in the church because it represents a false Heilsweg, which was
brought to an end with the birth of Christ. We saw the various arguments for the
antinomian position in our analysis of the positiones antinomicae in chapter two.
From these arguments the central doctrine of Agricola's antinomianism can be
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formulated as follows: 1) Since the law only convicts and drives to despair, the
gospel, as the one word of God, is called on to do double duty (duplex revelatio):
first to announce God's forgiveness, and then in the light of his goodness and
grace to lead the sinner to a recognition of the divine wrath against sin, and thus
to repentance. 2) Therefore, repentance is to be taught ex evangelio and not ex lege;
in other words, ex violatione filii and not ex violatione legis. 3) The scriptural basis
for this position was found especially in Luke 24: 47, John 16: 8; Romans 1: 18, 2:
4, and the account of the conversion of St. Paul (Acts 9: 1-6 and pars.). Agricola
finds further evidence for his conviction that the law is not necessary (and we
remember this problematic word necessitas was itself the subject of several arguments in the disputations) since the gospel both forgives and condemns, in the
Augustinian schema of sacramentum—exemplum.1
1The meaning of this term has already been discussed in connection

with our analysis of WA 39 I, 461, 20-466,11 (2 AD, Arg. 15). The crucial distinction is that quoad exemplum we can follow Christ and imitate [imitari] him, whereas quoad sacramentum Christ is alone and we cannot do anything but receive. This
discrimen represents the watershed between the early Augustinian Luther and the
later evangelical Luther because it reflects the proper distinction between law
and gospel. Augustine could also distinguish between Christ as sacramentum and
exemplum but it was not a distinction between law and gospel but a distinction
within the law and simply represented two stages along the one continuum of
the lex. The distinction between Christ as sacramentum and as exemplum was one
of degree. Thus, early Luther says that Christ is different from us (the saints)
only in degree; his passion and death is not yet seen as unique and substitutionary (pro nobis and extra nos) but merely as exemplary, in that Christ provides the
model of how God works salvation in nobis as we submit to the sufferings and
crosses (the use of the plural cruces is indicative of early Luther) which God lays
on us as we follow in the footsteps of Christ. Thus, the exemplum is understood
here in the sense that God now puts us through the paradigm of Christ's suffering and by means of iudicia, accusatio sui, humilitas etc he gradually transforms
and heals us (sin is sickness according to this scheme of things) so that being
made like Christ, the imago Dei, we eventually become worthy to be loved by
God. Thus the sacrametum-exemplum schema is the classical solution to Augus-
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In what follows, we will attempt to show that Luther's response to antinomianism is not simply to counterbalance it with a (pro)nomian emphasis in the
opposite direction. That would simply result in an error of equal magnitude of
the opposite kind and would finally fail, according to Luther's criteria, because it
falls into the trap of a law-oriented way of doing theology and therefore fails to
distinguish between law and gospel. And whenever this distinction is forgotten,
the victim is never the law but always the gospel. This was something that
Luther was keenly aware of. It is surely not insignificant that in the three disputations we have studied, disputations in which Luther was specifically engaged in
tine's own problem of how to reconcile the divine attributes of wrath and love: It
is the way of factitive iustitia and transformative iustificatio, not an iustitia aliena
imputed to faith as a gift. In all of this it is the "gospel" (understood as nova lex) in
the service of the law. Later Luther knows that what Christ does as sacrament=
is inimitable. When it comes to bearing the full weight of the world's sin for us,
Christ stands alone and in our place before God as the agnus Dei. Alone he
suffers the law, fulfills the law, and overcomes it pro nobis. And what he wins he
gives us freely. Here there is no imitatio. But afterwards, faith follows in his
footsteps, and does so hilariter et sponte. He is now our exemplar or Vorbild in
good works.
It should be noted that the antinomians argued that since they had Christ's
exemplum they did not need the law. Here they are simply restating their central
thesis re the duplex revelatio. Christ in the gospel first pardons then shows us our
sin. Luther, faithfully following his law-gospel distinction, connects the Doppelamt of Christ as redemptor (donum, sacramentum) and as exemplum with a twofold
preaching of the law. When Christ is preached as redemptor, the law is preached
at the same time in the sense of the usus elenchticus (= theologicus); for whoever
has Christ as redeemer is also confessing himself a sinner. However, when Christ
is also preached as exemplum, the command (Gebot) is preached at the same time
in a way that immediately norms the Christian life. Thus, Wilfried Joest, Gesetz
und Freiheit: Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche
Parainese, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 76. Hence, Luther
refuses to speak of the Christ of Calvary as exemplum. There he is sacramentum et
donum. However, Luther will accept the term exemplum for Christ as the exemplar and teacher of good works. Thus, he proposes the Augustinian sacramentumexemplum distinction, interpreted now on the basis of law-gospel antithesis, in
place of the twofold distinction within the exemplum Christi as taught by the anti-

nomians.
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combatting what he later came to realize was one of the most subtle and yet virulent heresies in Christian theology, he never insists that the law must be preached
simply for its own sake (even if it is in the Bible!), and even when he recognizes
that the libertinism inevitably results from a failure to preach the law properly,
he never suggests that the law should be preached more fervently in order to improve the people's morals. Luther is no moralist; there is no question about that.
Then why does he defend the law? Indeed, is that even the right question? We
will attempt to show in this chapter that when Luther insists, contra antinomos,
that the law must be retained and preached in the church, he does it for the sake
of Christ and the gospel. He has no interest in the law per se (even though it is
God's law) but only because it serves to magnify his dear Lord Christ. He knows
that if the law is lost, Christ (and hence the gospel) will be lost as well.2 It is this
evangelical outlook that informs his whole approach to antinomianism, and is the
reason why he attacks it so fiercely.
In each of the following parts, the heading represents one counterargument to the central antinomian thesis. However, because Luther's response, considered in its entirety, is never simply the assertion of an opposing position, but
always involves distinguishing law and gospel without losing one of them, we
will attempt to show how Luther's response is able to confess both sides of the
law-gospel dialectic.
The Universality and Permanence of the Law
In this first part we will not only look specifically at how Luther meets the
antinomian claim that the law is purely temporary, but also consider how he un2WA 39 I, 357, 29-30 (ATh V, Th. 66): Est igitur legis doctrina in ecclesiis
necessaria et omnino retinenda, sine qua Christus retineri non potest.
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derstands the law before and after the fall, the uses of the law as well as the lawgospel dialectic. Although these later topics do not directly address the question
of the universality and permanence of the law, they need to be discussed here because they are fundamental to everything that will be said in all parts of this
chapter. We make no claims to treating any of these areas exhaustively. The discussion will focus primarily on the disputations that we have examined rather
than simply being a wide-ranging theological inquiry in general. Our concern
here is not simply with the question of the unity and universality of the law in
general but with how Luther used these ideas to combat the antinomian denial of
the law.
Unity and Universality of the Law
It is clear from Luther's Auseinandersetzung with the antinomians that they
rejected the law for at least two reasons:3 1) the law is nothing but a shadow of
the coming Christ and is thus purely temporal and temporary;4 2) the law was
given to a specific people, namely, the Jews.5 Certainly Luther admits that the
3We saw in ch. 2 from our study of Agricola's own writings that he asserted (but never proved) that the law, which he took at God's failed Heilsweg in
the Old Testament, came to an end in the year one with the birth of Christ. This
idea lies behind the antinomian assertion that the law is impossible (WA 39 I, 476,
3-4 [2 AD, Arg. 23]; 515, 14-15 [3 AD, Arg. 7]). It is presupposed in the their arguments put forward in the disputations but not explicitly stated. The arguments rather try to substantiate this basic thesis exegetically. Luther, on the other
hand, knows a double finis legis, first of all through Christ's first advent (cf. John
the Baptizer pointing to the Christ as agnus Dei), and then through his daily coming to us. See Gustav Hammann, "Nomismus and Antinomismus innerhalb der
Wittenburger Theologie von 1524-1530," unpublished diss., Bonn, 1952, 31-33, 45.
4WA 39 I, 475, 9 (2 AD, Arg. 22).
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rite of circumcision and the other ceremonial and juridical laws found in the Old
Testament have no continuing validity but are limited to a specific time and nation. We know from elsewhere that Luther refuses to accept the law of Moses as
binding on Christians but rather regards it as der Juden Sachsenspiegel. It applies
to Christians only insofar as it illuminates the Urschrift of God's will, which is
carved into the hearts of all people from the creation of the world.6 Moses is not
the author but merely the interpreter of this Grundschrift [interpres et illustrator
legum scriptarum in mentibus omnium hominum].7 Thus Luther consistently refuses
to identify the law with the lex Masi, but instead connects it with the Adamic lex
naturae, which he in turn equates with the decalogus, in terms of its content.8 This
is an important hermeneutical distinction because it gives Luther a basis for criticizing the antinomians for their wholesale rejection of the Old Testament law as
passé, without at the same time obligating him to accept everything Mosaic in the
canon. Thus, he argues that the validity of the Decalogue is not confined to one
particular people (the Jews) but makes a universal claim on all people, of all
5WA 39 I, 380, 11 (1 AD, Arg. 13); 539, 4 (3 AD, Arg. 19); 39 II, 142, 9 (6
AD, Arg. 30). Neither Agricola nor Luther makes the modern and important distinction between the Israelites, as God's Old Testament people, and the Jews, as
the nation stemming from the emergent Judaism of the intertestamental period.
6WA 39 I, 454, 4-5;14-16 (2 AD, Arg. 13).
7WA 16, 380, 23 (Unterrichtung, wie sich die Christen in Mosen sollen
schicken, 1525): Also halt ich nu die Gepot, die Moses geben hat, nicht dariimb, daft sie
Moses geboten hat, sondern daft sie mir von Natur eingepflanzet sind and Moses allein
gleich mit der Natur ubereinstimmet.
8WA 39 I, 478, 16-18: Decalogus non est Mosi lex, neque primus ipse earn
dedit, sed decalogus est totius mundi, inscriptus et insculptus mentibus omnium
hominum a condito mundo (2 AD, Arg. 25). We make no attempt, either here or
elsewhere in this chapter, to cite all the parallel passages. For cross-references the
reader is referred back to ch. 3.
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times and places, because it has been inscribed on the hearts of all people already
at creation.9
What then is the difference between the law of nature and the Decalogue,
if the content of each is identical? First, one of the great merits of Martin Schloemann's work is that he has convincingly shown that the lex naturae and the lex
praedicata form a unity.10 However, the preaching of the law both points back to
(thus presupposes) and clarifies the lex naturalis inscribed on the heart.11 Thus
we have the following identity: lex naturae = lex insculpta = decalogus = lex
praedicta.12 This means that although the Decalogue was given at Sinai to
90n

the identity of the decalogus and lex insculpta, see WA 39 I, 352, 5-6
(ATh BI, Th. 40); cf. 374, 2-3 (1 AD, Arg. 7): Decalogus vero haeret adhuc in conscientia.
loMartin Schloemann, Natiirliches and Gepredigtes Gesetz bei Luther: eine
Studie zur Frage nach der Einheit der Gesetzesauffassung Luthers mit besonderer
Beriicksichtigung seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den Antinomern (Berlin: Verlag
Alfred Topeimam, 1961), 97-131. The following is based on his work.
11In

WA 39 I, 403, 2-3 (1 AD, Arg. 25) Luther understands the divine
revelation of the law on Sinai to be also the institution of the ministerium publicum
of the preaching of the law. And yet he also knows of an oral tradition of the law
(thus, doctrina legis) that was handed down by the patriarchs (WA 39 I, 402,16403, 3 [1 AD, Arg. 251). In addition to that, it is clear from 403, 14-404, 8 that with
Christ a new public office was inaugurated to make it known that ever since
Adam the essence of sin has been incredulitas Christi. For wherever there is the
proclamation of the gospel in the form of the promise of Christus venturus, there
is also a preaching of the law.
12WA 39 I, 413, 14-15 (1 AD, Arg. 34): Decalogus autem idea maior et praestantior est, quia est insculptus omnium cordibus et mentibus et nobiscum manebit etiam
in futura vita. It is significant that the Decalogue is preeminent, not because it is
given by divine revelation on Sinai, but because it is inscribed on the minds of all
people and will remain for all eternity. However, Luther qualifies the decalogus
aeternus by saying that in the futura vita it will remin not as lex but as res. On this
see below.

628
particular people, it has universal applicability insofar as it agrees with the
Adamic law of nature in all people. Since the lex naturae is prior to the
propagation of the decalogus, already before the revelation of the lex Mosi human
beings were confronted with the lex as lex generalis.13 Thus the natural or general
experience of the law is prior to the lex praedicata because it precedes it both
temporally and materially.14 It is instructive in this connection to recall why God
gave Moses the Decalogue in the first place. Luther says it was to remind man of
the knowledge of the divine will which he already had but which became
progressively dimmer as he fell deeper and deeper into sin after the fall. God
gave man the Decalogue, not as something new, but to remind him of the natural
knowledge of the law, which he had all but forgotten15 Thus, the lex praedicata
exercises a retrospective function in relation to the lex naturae. Furthermore, just
as there is no difference in terms of content between the commands of the natural
law and those of the preached law, so too there is no difference between natural
13WA 39 I, 374, 3-5 (1AD, Arg. 7): Nam si Deus nunquam tulisset legem
per Mosen, tamen mens humana naturaliter habet hanc notitiam, Deum esse colendum,
proximum diligendum; cf. 456, 1-2 (2 AD, Arg. 13). Even without the decalogus
people would know naturaliter that God is to be worshipped and the neighbor
loved. Through the lex naturae every persons stands in this double relationship.
And this demand is always experienced in the concrete, practical situation of
daily life. Hence, there are not two different demands but one natural law which
claims and binds man in two relations. Luther always describes the double command to love God and neighbor (law of Moses and natural law) as one. These
two relations, which were integrated in perfect harmony in paradise and which
fell apart through the fall, become for the natural man the cause of idolatry and
despair. They occur in every individual (whether he knows it or not) as a
demand for faith and love.
14This

will be taken up again when we discuss the temporal priority of
law to gospel as a reflex of the ordo rei.
15WA 39 I, 426, 9-13 (2 AD, Arg. 2).
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sensus legis and that produced by the lex praedicata.16 Thus, Luther's concept of
the law is that of the general law (lex generalis = lex naturae). In other words,
Luther does not make any distinction between two kinds of laws or demands.
Rather, as Schloemann points out, he consistently stresses the unity of the law
which he then sets in antithesis to the gospel. That which makes the preached
law special compared with the natural law is only the presence of the gospel, for
Luther insists that wherever the law is preached the gospel must also be
preached.17 This can only be stated here but it will be developed further below.
Luther's idea of the unity of the law sheds light on the relation between
law and gospel. One important consequence is the fact that the real antithesis is
between Adam and Christ more so than than between Moses and Christ.18 The
Mosaic public ministerium legis in Christian preaching merely makes accessible
16The

sensus legis stands under the "ubi et quando visum est Deo" (to use
the language of CA V) as much as does the proclamation of th gospel; cf. 39 I,
345, 20-21 (ATh I, Th. 3); 368, 9-369,16 (1 AD, Arg. 3); 370, 3-371, 3 (1 AD, Arg. 4).
But the sensus legis is not necessarily bound to the verbum paedicatum in the same
way as the gospel, although the full experience of the Strafamt and Zornesamt of
the law apart from lex praedicta would be rare.
17The

law can never realy be "added" because it is schon da as a universal fact. However, this does not mean that we could dispense with the explication
of the law, the concrete interpretation of what is demanded of us. Therefore, the
lex praedicata, based on the Decalogue, will clarify and interpret what is implicit
but still unclear in the lex inscuipta.
18We note in passing that exegetically, the New Testament knows both
contrasts. Moses is the antithesis to Christ in terms of the contrast law and grace
(John 1: 17), Adam (as the representative of fallen or Adamic mankind) is the antithesis to Christ in terms of the contrast sin/ death and grace/righteousness
(Rom. 5: 14:
n$ roc Tov aithowroc). The latter however is the more important for Luther because it reflects the ordo rei. This will be taken up again
below when we discuss the basis of Luther's law-gospel sequence.
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again the experience of the Adamic lex naturae, which has been forgotten through
the blindness of natural man. That is to say, the preaching of the gospel forms
the antithesis to all the experience of the law and the preaching of the law. It is
consistent with this that Luther does not take the generalis definitio evangelii (the
whole teaching of Christ) as his proper definition of the gospel, like the antinomians do, who contrast the "one" revealed word of God (gospel in the broad sense)
with the natural experience of the law.19 Rather, for him the gospel in the proper
sense (definitio specialis) is the gracious word of absolution, the bestowal of the
forgiveness of sins. His real concept of the law, on the other hand, is that of the
general law (lex generalis, lex naturae), which is common to all people (though not
all experience the full sensus legis), and which is renewed through the special
preaching of the law.20
There are three key emphases to Luther's doctrine of the law that play an
important role in his disputations against the antinomians: The first is the unity
of the law; that is to say, the content of the Decalogue (lex praedicta) is one with
the lex naturae. The second is that the law in its totality (natural law, Decalogue,
Golden Rule, Love Command etc.) stands in dialectical opposition to the word of
the gospel. It follows from this that while the preached law can find continuity
with our experience of the lex naturae, the gospel, on the other hand, comes as a
completely new word, because it is purely an external word and has no base or
19WA 39 I, 343, 21-23 (Positiones antinomicae, Th. 18).
20WA 39 1, 354, 27-28 (Am. V, Th. 9): Legem accipimus extra Christum.

Cf. 39 I, 445, 5-446, 8 (2 AD, Arg. 8). For the above, see Schloemann, Gesetz, 129130.
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Anknapfungspunkt in creation or our world of experience. The third emphasis in
Luther's doctrine of the law is its universality and hence its inescapability.21
We have seen that one way Luther argues for permanence of the law over
against the antinomian claim that it is intrinsically Mosaic and thus ipso facto
purely temporal, is to show that it is an absolutely inescapable reality for every
human being because it does not simply go back to Moses but to Adam.22 The
antinomians, on the other hand, always took Moses as their point of departure in
talking about the law, which they understood as a preliminary but false Heilsweg,
which God revoked and abolished at the coming of Christ. Luther, on the other
hand, outmaneuvers them on the level of sheer dialectics (logic) by consistently
refusing to identify the law with the lex Mosi, but connecting it instead with the
Adamic lex naturae, which he equates with the decalogus, in terms of its content.23
210n the basis of this fact, Luther can argue contra antinomos that even
if they were to remove the letters LEX, they would still not have succeeded in
getting rid of the law for the chirographum (the lex damnans) remains etched on
our hearts (WA 39 I, 456, 18-457, 1 [2 AD, Arg. 13]); cf. WA 50, 473, 475 (Wider die
Antinomer, 1539).
22This will need to be nuanced more carefully later because, as we will

see, even if Luther does use the term lex to describe the Grundverhaltnis between
God and Adam in the primal state, it is not the same lex that confronts man post
lapsum and is imposed on all people coercisively. Hence, when we use the term
Adamic law in this discussion, we are not speaking from a supralapsarian perspective, but always post lapsum.
23The law of nature and the Decalogue coincide only insofar as we see
in the decalogus the unveiled face of Moses; for it is the veiled face that the hypocrites and Pharisees see who do not realize that the law is to be understood
spiritually, and think that they can satisy it with works. The unveiled Decalogue,
as it was originally, is understood on the basis of Jesus' interpretation; see WA 39
I, 569, 9-571, 3 (3 AD, Arg. 35/8). The lex naturae therefore is the same as the
Decalogue interpreted in a Christian way, and is presnt as the lex insculpta in very
person.
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From the standpoint of academic theology, Luther advanced an invincible
argument when he asserted the universality of the law and thus its inescapability
as a datum of human existence. He always defines the law in the general sense of
the lex naturae and thus can simply assert as fact: The law is schon da24 and is imposed on every human individual from birth.25 In Schloemann's opinion, this
argument about the universal validity of the law based on the notion of the lex
naturae was the clincher in Luther's debate with the antinomians, ensuring him a
decisive and conclusive victory. It is an irrefutable denial of the possibility of a
simple and total abrogatio legis in the year 1 AD as Luther's opponents claimed.26
Its decisiveness and cogency is indisputable. However, if it is true that this is his
top-ranking argument, what implications does it have for our thesis that Luther's
argument for the retention of the law is ultimately christological and for the sake
of the gospel? Perhaps, the keyword here is "ultimately." We would submit that
it is important to understand the function of this line of argumentation within the
overall framework of Luther's scheme of thought. Here surely he is attacking the
antinomians at one of their most vulnerable places, and he uses the argument of
the universal validity of the law to his advantage, in order to show his opponents
that if they think they can remove the law by mere assertion they are mistaken,
because it is inscribed on the heart and conscience of all people. This of course is
24WA 39 I, 477, 7: Nam lex iam adest, ist schon da. Lex prius adest in facto.
The real question rather, as Luther goes on to say, is how we can be free from the
law.
25WA 39 I, 539, 7-11 (3 AD, Arg. 19). Luther's only exception are the
prorsus monstrosi.
26Schloemann, Gesetz, 54-55.

633
not yet to say why the law must be retained and taught in the church, but simply
prepares the way for positive doctrinal statement by first refuting the error of the
opponents.27 If he had said no more than he does here, Luther he would have
merely advanced a law argument, which has no immediate connection with the
gospel. If however it can be shown that this is no more than propaedeutic to his
main theological argument, that the law must be preached for the sake of Christ,
then the rational argument about the universality of the law as lex naturae would
assume its proper place as ancillary to Luther's theological arguments.
Law and the Primal State
For Adam the fulfillment of the law was not only possible but delightful.
He did what the law required and did it perfectly because he did it with his
whole heart, spontaneously, without any coercion.28 After the fall the situation is
27With his incisive logic Luther is more than capable of exposing the
absurdities, banalities, weaknesses and errors of his opponents' arguments, and
at times he revels in poking fun at them, showing them up to be incapable of
rigorous dialectic, and teaching his own students a lesson in the process. For
instance, he describes the antinomians to his audience as theologians who are
examples of poor thinkers and bad logicians. He wants the future doctors of the
church to learn from their mistakes. See WA 39 I, 385,14-20 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
Nevertheless, until we look below the surface of his dialectics and rhetoric and
discover what it is that drives his theology, we will not understand Luther the
theologian. And we are convinced, in the light of our analysis of his
argumentation in ch. 3, that his theology is evangelical to the core. And it is the
role of dialectics to serve that end. The antinomians, on the other hand, as we
have had occasion to observe several times in the last chapter, use their logic
against theology rather than in the service of theology. Consequently, the gospel
itself finally becomes a casualty of their logic because of its sheer illogicality and
they themselves becomes the prisoners of their own system.
28WA

39 I, 364, 11-13 (1 AD, Arg. 1).
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reversed. Now the law is impossible to fulfill and becomes a burden.29 Luther
makes it clear however that this is not the fault of the law, which, as Paul says, is
holy and good in itself (Rom. 7: 13-14), but it is the fault of sin and Satan3o However, as we will see later, the burden of the law is lifted through faith in Christ,
the fulfiller of the law, so that even now faith begins to know that joy in the law
which will be perfected in paradise of heaven.31
The fact that the law in paradise was a thing of delight while after the fall
it became not only a burden but above all a lex accusatrix et condemnatrix, raises
the question of whether the term law [lex] should even be used to describe the
will of God in paradise. Even though Luther himself uses the word lex at this
point, it is clear from his description of the function of the law after the fall that
the paradisal law, which is in every way a lex iucunda, is now an altogether different law, or at least functions altogether differently, than the post lapsum law
29The the assertion of the impossibility of the law is made in view of justi-

fication. Luther holds that vis-à-vis justification the law is both impotent and impossible (see Thesenreihe for 2 AD). See Lauri Haikola, Usus Legis (Helsinki: n.p.,
1981), 85-92, who argues that there is no support in Luther for the idea that the
law could have been a way of salvation if only it had been properly kept. This
notion was defended by the Gnesio-Lutherans in connection with the later antinomian controversy after Luther's death. On the impossibility of the law and its
abiding validity, see the essay by Rudolf Hermann, "Zur Bedeutung der lex, ihres
Unvermagens und dennoch Bleibens, nach Luthers Antinomerthesen," in Gott und die
Glitter, Festgabe fur Erich Fascher (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1958), 142153.
30WA 39 I, 364, 17-365, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 1); 449, 8-450, 14 (2 AD, Arg. 9).
31WA 39 I, 373, 6-7 (1 AD, Arg. 6): Ergo reddere legem iucundam, immaculatam est officium Christi, impletoris legis; cf. 365, 2-6 (1 AD, Arg. 1).
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which exposes our sins, terrifies our conscience, and threatens us with wrath and
eternal death.32
Before we consider the nature and function of the law post lapsum, we
must first inquire into the nature of the law in paradise before the fall. Here we
are faced with the importnt question of how are we to understand the divine
command of Genesis 2: 16-17. Is this law or is it not? As we have already hinted,
the law ante lapsum is an all together different law than that post lapsum.33 It is
certainly tempting to follow Schloemann in maintaining that the divine
command given in Genesis 2: 16-17 [771] is not yet law, but law and gospel
together in one (as-yet) undivided word.M Accordingly, he refuses to
characterizes the primal Grundverhaltnis as Gesetz in the sense of an eternal,
immutable divine will [lex aeterna] that orders the way Adam and Eve stand in
32This contrast was noted already by Th. Harnack and prompted him
to distinguish between the Wesen and the Amt of the law. See Theodosius Harnack, Luthers Theologie mit besonderer Beziehung auf seine Versohnungs- und
Erlosungslehre, Part I: Luthers theologische Grundanschauungen, new ed. (Munich:
Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1927), 368-461, esp. 368-401.
33li is this recognition that has prompted Paul Althaus, Gebot und

Gesetz: Zum Thema "Gesetz und Evangelium," in Beitrage zur Forderung christlicher
Theologie, 46 (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952), 12 to distinguish between
the Gebot of paradise and the Gesetz of the fallen world. Before the fall, he says,
God's command means life and joy. However, after the fall the command
becomes law [Durch den Fall wird das Gebot zum Gesetze]. The law is the form that
God's will for us must take on account of sin.
MCf. Hoc verbum erat Adae Evangelium et lex (WA 42, 110, 18 [Gen.Vorl., 1535-45]; cf. 112, passim). Adam faithfully kept God's word. Therefore,
Schloemann, Gesetz, 52, n. 156, thinks that Althaus' assertion, that after the fall the
command becomes law, is only a half-truth. Luther can just as easily connect the
creative primal word with the gospel and derive the latter from it, as his Genesisvorlesung often shows.
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relation to God.35 He supports his position in two ways: 1) by the analogy
between protology and eschatology: in heaven the law will remain in re, but not
as lex accusans because it will have nothing to accuse; likewise, before the fall
man was perfect and so the law would have had nothing to accuse. 2) Since
35It is not our intention to enter into a discussion of the concept of the

lex aeterna, a philosophical term used in scholasticism, which Luther eliminated,
but which later found its way back into theology via Melanchthon and the orthodox dogmaticians of the seventeenth century orthodoxy. See Johannes Heckel,

Lex charitatis: eine juristische Untersuchung iiber das Recht in der Theologie Martin
Luthers (Munich: n.p., 1953), 55, n. 355. Although the term as such does not
appear in the disputations, the idea of the eternity of the law (= decalogus) does;

see WA 39 I, 349, 39-350, 6 (ATh II, Th. 45-48); 353, 39-40 (Am. a Th. 34); 413,
14-20 (1 AD, Arg. 33); 459, 13 (2 AD, Arg. 12). However, Luther reinterprets the
whole notion on the basis of the gospel. Thus, Haikola, Usus Legis, 101, n, 53 (cf.
Studien, 10), is right when he notes: "Gottes 'ewiges Gesetz' (lex aeterna) bedeutet bei

Luther, wie im Nominalismus, die Treue Gottes zu sich selber, aber dieses Gesetz kommt
in der dem Menschen zugtinglichen Erfahrungssphare (potestas ordinata) niemals in
endgiiltig fixierter Gestalt vor." One of his major criticisms that Robert Schultz,
Gesetz und Evangelium (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1958), makes of Th.
Harnack focuses on the concept of the lex aeterna, which he thinks lies behind
Harnack's purportedly nomological description of the primal relationship of man
to God. Leaving aside the problem of Harnack's interpretation of Luther, Schultz
is right in saying that it is not the case that in Luther the law "von der Schopfung
bis in alle Ewigkeit als Grundverhtiltnis des Menschen zu Gott gultig sein sollte" (144).
When Luther says in one passage decalogus est aeternus (WA 39 I, 413, 17), he is
not referring to the lex aeterna but to the lex naturae with which it agrees and
which was inscribed in the heart from the beginning. He goes on to say in that
same passage, it is eternal, not as lex but as res, because in the futura vita what the
law demands will be fully realized (cf. WA 39 I, 374, 5-12, where Luther stresses
that the lex has a limit and will be abolished completely in the life to come). See

Luther und die Theologie der Gegenwart: Referate und Berichte des Fiinften Internationalen Kongresses fur Lutherforschung, ed. Leif Grane and Bernhard Lohse
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 161. In Luther one can really only
speak of lex in the interim between the fall into sin and the return of Christ (WA
39 I, 383, 17-19). The existentialist interpretation of Luther stresses that the law
has validity only for the old aeon, which Christ has abolished. Hence, it denies
the normative authority of the law for Christians. This is a point we will need to
come back to later. For now it is enough to point out that the defense of the
tertius usus doctrine in orthodoxy is built on the foundation of the lex aeterna.
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according to Luther the law also accuses Christians, quoad carnem, even as it
instructs them,36 the command given Adam can not be lex in the sense of the
counterpart (or antithesis) to gospel, for Adam was sinless and the gospel was
preached only post lapsum. Therefore, this command was not lex in the sense in
which Luther normally uses it37 (hence his qualification in re), but simply verbum
Dei.38 As helpful as Schloemann's suggestion is in attempting to understand the
nature of the divine command to Adam, the fact remains that in the disputations
Luther consistently calls it lex, but then always proceeds to distinguish it from the
lex which was given after sin.
Luther's Genesis lectures, which he would have been preparing at the time
of the disputations, shed some light on this usage. We learn here that the reason
he insists on calling the command lex is to guard against a schwdrmerish interpretation of Genesis 2: 16-17 which provides a basis for the denial of original sin.39
36We have already made this point ourselves several times in our

analyses in ch. 3 and will take it up again below in connection with our
discussion of the problem of the tertius usus legis.
37 Luther

says that when we speak of the law we are not talking about
a lex vacua, such as it is for angels (and we could add, righteous Adam too), for
they do not know any law and are without the law, but we are talking about the
law as lex accusans, reos agens et exactrix (39 I, 434, 1-4 [2 AD, Arg. 3]). An example
of a lex vacua is the command to tell a tree to grow!
38Schloemann, Gesetz, 52, n. 156. He also criticizes Heckel, Lex charitatis, 56, for holding that the Urstand was governed by the divine Naturgesetz.
Schloemann, 15, n. 41, concedes that no one will object to saying that for Luther
the primal Gottesverhdltnis was an undisturbed and ungesetzliches Rechtsverhiiltnis,
so long as as the term Recht here is quite neutral and means nothing more than
richtige Verhaltensweise, and does not slip back into the scholastic doctrine of the
lex aeterna.
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The fanatics argued that since there was no law in paradise, Adam's disobedience
is not sin because Paul states that where there is no law there is no transgression
(Rom. 4: 15).40 Furthermore, they cited Paul as saying that the law was not given
to the righteous (1 Tim. 1: 9). Luther counters by pointing out that all this means
is that the law given to the unrighteous is not the same law as that which was
given to righteous Adam. Conversely, when a law is given to righteous Adam, it
follows that this is a different law from the one which was given later to the unrighteous. Notwithstanding that, however, in other places in the commentary
Luther can refer to the divine command as the verbum Dei, and on at least one occasion expressly state that for Adam this word was gospel and law. While this
may be a pointer to the fact that he may well understand the divine command in
paradise as being an as-yet unseparated word of God, the context in which he
equates the primal command with gospel and law (note the order) is an explanation that the command is really God's mandate for the institution of the externus
cultus et opus obedientia externum erga Deum. Consequently, Luther's conviction
that the divine command here is the Lord's mandate and institution of the external cultus of the Old Testament would account for why here he suddenly refers
to the mandatum (Luther often uses this word and the verb praecipere) as verbum
39WA 42, 80, 1-83, 31 (Vorlesungen fiber 1. Mose, 1535-45). Luther

points out that even though Adam was perfect God still gave him a command
not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in order to fortify him
against temptation. In other words, being given a command is not inconsistent
with his state of innocence. We could draw a parallel here to the preaching of
parenesis to the saints. Because apostasy is always a live possibility the saints
must be urged to remain faithful and to renounce temptation.
40We have seen that the antinomians used these texts in the same way.
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Dei against which the Schwiirmer of every ages oppose their own verbum, and secondly, why he then equates this verbum Dei with evangelium et lex.41
The Law-Gospel Dialectic
Following Adam's fall into sin, God's law (command), which in paradise
was pure gift and embodied the love that informed the relationship between God
and man, became an expression of his wrath and judgment. It demands holiness,
righteousness, and obedience from sinful human beings who are are now incapable of loving God with their whole heart and their neighbor as themselves, and
who therefore fall under God's wrath, judgment, and condemnation. And yet he
still preserves them by his grace. God's word, which ante lapsum, was still one
undivided word, now becomes two words: a word of law and a word of judgment. His word of law expresses his just demand and righteous judgment on
sinners; his word of grace expresses his mercy and compassion in his promise
and gift of forgiveness. The office of the law is to accuse and kill; the office of the
gospel is to make alive42 These two words, law and gospel, exist in antithetical
tension and will continue to do so until the end of the world. God's law, as sum41Ibid., 110, 18-20: Hoc verbum erat Adae Evangelium et lex, erat eius
cultus, erat servitus et obedientia, quam poterat Deo in ista innocentia praestare. Luther
holds that Satan's temptation was not simply to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree,
but to draw Adam and Eve away from the word. And after he has deprived
them of the word and thereby of their trust in God, he makes them believe his lie.
For Luther, this temptation to believe Satan's word instead of God's word is the
most diabolic of all, because faith lives only from God's words, detached from
those words it dies, and this is then the unbelief which is the source of all sins.
Once Satan had brought about this unbelief in Adam and Eve, the rest was easy.
42WA 39 I, 363, 19-20 (! AD, Praef.). The gospel properly defined is the

promise concerning Christ (387, 2-4 [1 AD, Arg. 16]).
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med up in the first commandment, demands faith in God and love to the neighbor, but the law is not only a legal statute, it is also and especially a power (indeed, a hostile power), which joins forces with our other enemies: sin, death, and
the devil, to become a tyrannical monster, which threatens to destroy us utterly.
Only one could withstand and conquer the dread fury of this combined attack:
Jesus Christ our blessed savior, who, as Luther says in one of his chorales, turned
away God's wrath for ever, and rescued us from the evil foe.43 By faith in him
we already share his victory over these tyrants—including the law, even though
insofar as we remain sinners we are still vulnerable to attack, and Satan will not
cease to harass us unless we keep our feet tucked up under the mantel of Christ's
righteousness," so to speak, and stay under the protective wings of our hen.45
The strict antithesis of law and gospel then is the result of the fall. God's
word, which in paradise was one, now becomes two: a word of law and word of
gospel and it will remain that, also for the Christian as sinner, until the eschaton
when sin will be destroyed and the law will have nothing more to accuse. When
Luther speaks about the opposition between law and gospel, his statements are
decidedly eschatological, for at least two reasons: 1) they are oriented to the eschaton, the primal state being mentioned merely by way of contrast; 2) law and
gospel belong to this aeon; they have their genesis outside the gates of Eden and
43"Jesus Christus, unser Heiland, der von uns den Gotteszorn wandt"

(Evangelisches Gesangbuch, no. 215).
"WA 39 I, 482,16-17 (2 AD, Arg. 27).
45WA 39 I, 521, 7-11 (3 AD, Arg. 10).
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will cease at the threshold of the futura vita.46 Hence, the law-gospel dialectic is
ultimately resolved eschatologically.47
The above is nothing more than an outline of the contours of Luther's
thinking on the law-gospel antithesis. Since it is not imperative for our purposes
to trace out all the details of this article, the above summary will suffice. Other
details will be added as we go along.
The Uses of the Law
Before we can properly discuss the relationship between law and gospel
we need to consider briefly the double use (usus) of the law, which is characteristic of Luther's theology." Although in his mature years he only ever speaks ex46WA 39 I, 364, 9-365, 6 (1 AD, Arg. 1); 374, 1-375, 12 (1 AD, Arg. 7);
379, 16-380, 8 (1 AD, Arg. 12).
47This is generally recognized; cf. Albrecht Peters, Gesetz und Evangelium (Giitersloh: GUtersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1981), 30-38; Werner Elert, "Gesetz und Evangelium," in, Zwischen Gnade und Ungnade: Abwandlungen des
Themas Gesetz und Evangelium (Munich: Evangelischer Presserverband fUr Bayern,
1948), 132-169, is probably the one who has stressed most strongly the real radical
dialectic between law and gospel vis-à-vis Karl Barth's emphasis on the unity of
gospel and law in the one word of God. Elert's term, realdialektischer Gegensatz,
expresses the core of his position. It designates a dialectical opposition in the
very content of law and gospel [res] and not just in terminology [verbal. The antithesis is substantive and not just formal. Karl Barth's position is set out most
dearly in his famous essay, "Evangelium und Gesetz," in Theologische Existenz
heute, 50, 3d ed.; neue Folge (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1961). If the lawgospel dialectic is eschatological, this effectively precludes the notion of an abiding lex aeterna which slips through the net of the law-gospel distinction.
48For the usus legis in Luther generally, see Gerhard Ebeling, "Zur
Lehre vom triplex usus legis in der reformatorischen Theologie," in, Wort und
Glaube, 3d. ed. (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1967), 50-68. He notes the
striking fact that while the term usus legis appears so prominently in his
Galaterbriefvorlesung of 1531/35, when we come to the Antinomian Disputations,
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pressis verbis of a duplex usus legis, some scholars claim that he implicitly teaches a
tertius usus legis (or even a multiplex use). The question of the third use will be

taken up later. Although the term duplex usus legis emerges only once in the
disputations/19 there is no question that Luther here speaks of a twofold use of
the one law rather than making distinctions within the law itself as he did in his
early period when he was still under the influence of Augustine.50 In other
words, for the mature Luther (that is, post 1525), the gospel is not understood as
being on a continuum with the law, as the nova lex which completes and fulfills
the vetus lex. Nor is the gospel seen as merely the radical spiritualization of the
which are so closely related to his Galatians Commentary both in time and
subject-matter, it suddenly recedes into the background (61).
49WA 39 I, 441, 2-3 (2 AD, Arg. 6); cf. however, 460, 21 (2 AD, Arg. 14);
483, 14-16 (2 AD, Arg. 28); for a discussion of the peculiar triplex usus legis mentioned in the conclusion to the Second Disputation (485, 16-24), see our analysis
in ch. 3. For a listing of the various usus which Luther mentions in his great
Galaterbriefvorlesung of 1531, see Ebeling, "Triplex usus legus," 60.
50Schloeman, Gesetz, 24-27, has demonstrated this by tracking the de-

velopment of of Luther's interpretation of 1 Timothy 1: 8 and the allusions to this
passage, step by step. He shows (contra Haikola, Usus Legis, 106-109, 143, 151)
that over the course of time, the usus proprius (theologicus, spiritualis) acquired a
different, narrower meaning. Whereas earlier it had both a negative side (exposing and convicting sin) and a positive side (usus rectus, legitimus etc.) covering the
way in which the Christian uses the law (what was later called the tertius usus
legis), in his mature period this Doppelheit within the concept of the usus spiritualis
or theologicus drops away, and the true, legitimate use of the law more and more
clearly comes to be used only in connection with the unrighteous or the caro of
the Christian. The doctrine of the double use of the one law comes to fruition
above all in Luther's Galaterbriefvorlesung of 1531. On the historical development
of the term duplex usus legis, see Hayo Gerdes, Luthers Streit mit den Schwarmern
um das rechte Verstandnis des Gesetzes Mose (Gottingen: Verlagsanstalt, 1955), 63.
He shows that after Luther discovered that evangelical meaning of iustitia Dei, he
began to understand Recht and Gesetz radically coram Deo but then the Schwarmerstreit forced him to distinguish a twofold use of the law, one (theologicus) understood coram Deo, the other (politicus) understood coram hominibus.
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law, the higher lex spiritualis in comparison with the lower lex carnalis. On the
contrary, Luther does not differentiate between laws, whether lower and higher
or old and new, but he contrasts two righteousnesses, the heavenly (coram Deo)
and the earthly (coram hominibus) with one law.51
In describing the uses of the law as we find them in Luther, we will avail
ourselves of the terminology of the classical Lutheran dogmaticians in their division of the law because this allows us to make important distinctions as well as to
relate Luther's ideas to the later modus loquendi.52 The first use (usus politicus seu
51At first it seems as if Luther in his responsio in WA 39 I, 457-461 (2

AD, Arg. 14) supports the idea that the gospel is the lex spiritualis. The argument= that he refutes states that the law cannot condemn the righteousness based
on the law because otherwise the law would end up condemning itself. He counters that by arguing that the law can indeed condemn itself if understood spiritually, as interpreted by Christ and Paul. However, even here Luther does not understand the gospel as the lex spiritualis. That rather is the assumption lying
behind the antinomian argument that he is refuting. The distinction he makes is
rather that between the usus politicus and the usus theologicus. The later, which is
the proper use of the law, unmasks the works-righteousnes fostered by the law's
civil use in preparation for the gift of the true and heavenly righteousness in the
gospel. Jesus uses the law in the same way in his Sermon on the Mount. Consistent with this is Luther's conviction that anything that unmasks and convicts sin,
even if it is words of Christ, is law. The gospel in its opus proprium does not
convict sin but forgives sin. An interesting parallel to this is the argument that
since the law commands faith in Christ, the law also condemns unbelief in Christ,
not the gospel (WA 39 I, 384-386 [1 AD, Arg. 15]).
52Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, vol. 2 (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1953), 238, cites Nitzsch-Stephan, Dogmatik, 509, in explanation
of the how the uses of the law were divided by the classical Lutheran dogmaticians. Most followed the FC with its threefold use, some preferred to speak of a
fourfold usus of the law: 1) an usus politicus seu civilis; 2) an usus elenchticus; 3) an
usus paedagogicus; and 4) an usus didacticus seu normaticus. Often numbers two
and three are combined. Where they are distinguished, the usus elenchticus signifies the peccati manifestatio et redargutio (the exposure and refutation of sin),
whereas the usus paedagogicus represents the compulsus indirectus ad Christum, on
the basis of Gal. 3: 23-24. Both the usus elenchticus and the usus paedagogicus then
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civilis), is purely civil:53 Its purpose is to restrain wickedness and to maintain
order in society. The second and chief use of the law for Luther (usus theologicus

seu spiritualiter) is the one where the law terrifies and frightens the conscience in
order to drive the penitent to Christ (Gal. 3: 24).54 The distinction between these
make up the usus theologicus or the second use of the law. The term tertius usus
legis is usually identified with the usus didacticus seu normaticus. Luther, as we
have observed in the last chapter, does not use this terminology. However, his
duplex usus would correspond to the usus civilis and the usus theologicus. One
reason why this subdivision within the usus theologicus is helpful is because it
enables us to distinguish between the usus elenchticus and the usus paedagogicus.
As we have seen, the former corresponds the lex accusans; however, the latter is
already oriented to Christ and presupposes the gospel. This makes it clear that
the law by itself does not lead to Christ, but does so only when Christ takes it in
hand. Luther has repeatedly said that the law by itself leads to despair. Only
through the agency of Christ and the Spirit does the law become a true paedagogicus ad Christum, rather than a latro.
53Schloemann, Gesetz, 99, n. 305, points out that it really only comes

out in his controversy with Agricola that Luther understands the law of Moses
not only as worldly legislation, but also especially as a preaching of the law for
Israel in its special situation. Gerdes, Luthers Streit, considers the lex Mosi too
one-sidely as only lex civilis. This aspect of the law in Luther's thinking has
developed since the Schwiirmerstreit.
54See WA 39 I, 459, 30-460, 24 (B) (2 AD, Arg. 14). Schloemann, Gesetz,

114, notes that the usus politicus and the usus theologicus have the same office. The
difference is that in one case the law has nothing more than an external impact,
while in the other it "hits home" and really penetrates the heart and conscience.
Furthermore, Schloemann, 115-119, points out that the natural law and the twofold usus have one and the same office. The Strafamt and Zornesamt of the law,
which is latent, but always present, in the natural law, as expressed in the usus
civilis, comes to expression in the usus theologicus, resulting in Anfechtung, and in
extreme cases, can even result in the experience of the full sensus legis. No matter
how the Strafamt of the law (which belongs to the very nature of the law as it is
experienced by sinful human beings) is encountered, whether in the usus politicus
or usus spiritualis, it can only be overcome by the gospel: Quando loquimur de lege,

loquimur de proprio effectu legis, quid ipsa tota in hac corrupta natura possit efficere seu
praestare. Iam experimur omnes, eam aliud nihil posse efficere, quam desperationem
(WA 39 I, 445, 5-7 [2 AD, Arg. 8]). This passage goes on to speak about the limit
of the law and the role of the paedagogus, which will be taken up below.
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two usus legis corresponds to Luther's important distinction between the two
righteousnesses: iustitia activa or the political (civil) righteousness coram hominibus, on the one hand, and iustitia passiva, or the Christian (theological) righteousness, on the other, which is the only righteousness that avails coram Deo, because
it is given by God himself as a gift, propter Christum per fidem.55 This distinction
between the two kinds of righteousness has its counterpart in Luther's distinction
between law and gospel and is certainly common in the disputations. Although
from the theological standpoint the usus politicus and the usus theologicus have to
be sharply distinguished, yet in the preaching of the law they are most closely
interwoven, insofar as it is the preacher's aim that the law should be understood
at the same time in both its usus politicus and its usus theologicus. It is not as if
each is meant for a separate category of persons, although Luther does
distinguish between two groups of people, the duri and the pii, when it comes to
preaching the law.56
Luther's view of the law differs radically from that of the antinomians,
who expressly reject the notion of a lex condemnatrix (the spiritual use of the
law)57 precisely because, in their opinion, the lex praedicata, does nothing but ac55Luther sets out this distinction in his 1535 Preface to his Galaterbrief-

vorlesung (1531); see AE 26, 4-12.

56WA 39 I, 399, 4-6 (1 AD, Arg. 21); 513, 4-6 (3 AD, Arg. 5). See also

Ebeling, "Triplex usus legis," 67. Luther does, however, distinguish between two
groups, as we will see later, the dun and the pii, but specifically for the purpose of
explaining how the law is to be preached differently to the one than to the other.
57WA 39 I, 343, 16-20 (Positiones antinomicae, Th. 16, 17).

Furthermore, the antinomians classified Luther's statements about the Strafamt of
the law from his great Galaterbriefvorlesung as "impure" (344, 20-23), and, on the
other hand, a passage from the Jesajakommentar (WA 25, 249-50,1527/30), where
it says that the lex and conscientia are to be separated from each other as far as the
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cuse and condemn. Therefore, the only use of the law that they are willing to
concede is the civil use, where the law functions in a positive, non-condemning
way. Luther opposes this doctrine at two points: First of all, he argues, as we
have seen, that the law is fundamentally one, and that it is a fallacy to believe that
by moving the law out of the church into the Rathaus, one has in any sense removed it.58 Secondly, he contends that one has not really understood the law at
all in its proper sense if it is not understood in the way Jesus interpreted it in his
sermon in Matthew 5. He lumps the antinomians together with the Jews, Turks,
and papists because—and here they show themselves to be hypocrites—they think
that they can satisfy the law with works, like Paul did before his conversion. Yet
they see only the veiled face of Moses (cf. 2 Cor. 3: 15-16), that is, they interpret
the law only de facto,59 in the sense of a mere external fulfillment,60 but they do
not experience the vis legis, which is accompanied by terror and death,61 as when
one looks at the unveiled face of Moses and takes cognizance of Christ's interpretation of the law in the Sermon on the Mount.62
heaven is from the earth: Item alliganda est (scil. lex) ad corpus et exteriora membra,
ut moderentur exteriora officia. Hic legis usus et proprius usus est, was approved as
"pure" (39 I, 344, 11-13).
58Cf. WA 39 I, 456, 18-457, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 13), where Luther argues that
you cannot remove the law materialiter simply by removing the letters LEX.
59WA 39 I, 570, 2-9 (3 AD, Arg. 35/8).
60WA 39 I, 459, 30-460, 24 (B) (2 AD, Arg. 14).
61WA 39 I, 483,16-19 (2 AD, Arg. 28); cf. 401, 13-14 (1 AD, Arg. 24).
62WA 570, 9-12 (3 AD, Arg. 35/8).
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The usus legis merely repesents two functions of the same law, and in each
case the law is the instrument of God's wrath and punishment, even though we
experience this far more explicitly in the preaching of the law than in the natural
law and its manifestation in the lex civilis. Therefore, for Luther, even though the
civil use of the law may appear to be positive, outside of faith the law is predominately negative and condemning. However, the difference between the antinomians and Luther is not that the former connect the usus politicus with Galatians
3: 24 at all, but that they apply this text exclusively to the usus politicus and therefore call it usus paedagogicus as well. For Luther both the usus civilis and the usus
theologicus are included in Galatians 3: 24 insofar as it is the same law that is at
work in coercere delicta as in ostendere peccata.63 However, he will never equate the
usus politicus with the usus paedagogicus.64 As will be shown below, Luther rather
ties the usus paedagogicus to the usus theologicus and thus sees the law in this usus
as being oriented to Christ (with the proviso naturally: ubi et quando visum est
Deo). A true theology of the law understands the law as interpreted by Jesus in
the Sermon on the Mount, thus spiritualiter, as that which accuses, terrifies, kills,
and damns.65 Luther employs a second argument to oppose the antinomian
63WA 39 I, 358, 28-29 (ATh VI, Th. 15): Nec politica aut naturalis lex est

quidquam, nisi sit damnans et terrens peccatores (Rom. 3; 1 Peter 2). See on this,
Ebeling, "Triplex usus legis," 67.
64See the discussion of this in our analysis of the conclusio to the Second Disputation (WA 39 I, 485,16-24). Schloemann, Gesetz, 123, n. 385, opines
that Agricola and Melanchthon are united in one point, and that is in their tendency to play down the Strafamt of the law. Neither of them sees that every demand of the law, even if it is intended to be quite neutral or is abolished in the
gospel, still has some element to it that accuses spiritually.
65WA 39 I, 410, 4-6 (1 AD, Arg. 31). This is not the place to discuss

Luther's exegesis of the Sermon. Suffice it to point out that the Formula of
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rejection of the duplex usus legis, in particular the lex condemnatrix, in favor of a
duplex revelatio evangelii, where the gospel not only forgives but also condemns
and drives to repentance. He says that the whatever condemns sin and preaches
wrath is the law, even if it should happen with the words of the gospel. This
important insight will be discussed in the next section.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of who is the subject of the
usus legis, we recall from our analysis that Luther consistently speaks of two possible outcomes when the law (paricularly the usus theologicus) is "used," or better,
"misused," apart from faith: either securitas or desperatio.66 On the other hand,
when the law is used with faith, the penitent is ushered to Christ, and the law
remains outside the Christian's conscience.67 The former outcome (despair and
pride) will result whenever the law is preached unaccompanied by (that is, isolated from) the gospel; the latter (faith) can only result when the law does not act
alone but works towards the gospel. We now need to focus more closely on this
second use and especially on the important cooperation and interchange between
law and gospel.
Concord follows Luther in seeing the Sermon as an illustration of Christ taking
the law into his own hands and explaining it spiritually (FC Ep. VI, 8).
the sensus legis has its full effect and is unaccompanied by the gospel, it will lead immediately to despair and hell (note: elsewhere Luther says hell
is knowing only the law, for the law is a doctrina damnans). The sensus legis can
never be entirely avoided—except in Christ.
66If

67Although the term conscientia in evangelio—caro in lege (and variants)

occurs chiefly in the Galaterbriefvorlesung of 1531 and not not in the antinomian
disputations, the idea is certainly present (cf. 39 I, 410, 9-16 [1 AD, Arg. 31]; 499,
14-21 [3 AD, Arg. 1]). For a discussion, see Joest, Gesetz and Freiheit, 101-109. For
more on this question, see our remarks below in the section dealing with the
third use of the law.
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The key text in this matter is Galatians 3: 24: Lex paedagogus in Christum.
The fact that the lex may become a paedagogus already shifts it out of the realm of
the law and opens it to the gospel. However, Luther insists that the law cannot
become this teacher by itself, but only by the agency of the Holy Spirit.68 Left to
itself it would become a robber.69 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the
law will in fact become a paedagogus every time it is preached. The times and seasons for this rest with God alone (cf. ubi et quando visum est Deo). On top of that
the devil may also interfere with the express purpose of derailing the whole "operation." When that happens, the law, instead of becoming a paedagogus, become
a latro, because it drives the person to despair instead of into the arms of Christ.
Here Luther makes a distinction between the evangelical use of the law toward
Christ (paedagogus in Christum) and the demonic use of the law (latro ad diaboium).70 The paedagogus in Christum is a word of comfort for it points to the end of
68WA 39 I, 445,11-13 (2 AD, Arg. 8). This is the evangelical use of the

law as opposed to the demonic use where it drives a person to despair. On the
difference between these uses, see 441, 2-443, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 6).
69WA 39 I, 446, 3-5 (2 AD, Arg. 8):

Evangelium sua virtute ex latrone
paedagogum et rapit ilium occisum per legem et reducit ad Christum, id quod non fecit
lex.
70WA 39 I, 440,18-443, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 6). Luther explains the usus paedagogus of the law using the example of a child being raised by his tutor until he is
ready to receive his inheritance. The paedagogus at times has to discipline him
harshly, not to kill him, but to return him to the paterfamilias a better child. That
is how we are to think about the law, says Luther, and not consider it anything
other than a tutor until Christ. His advise to those who feel themselves harassed
and terrified by the law is instructive: Think of it as good training. And remember, it is a tutor and not a robber: Si to terret [scil. lex], vexat, bene est et recte fit, sed
statim subeat animum tuum: Ecce adest paedagogia (442, 11). But that is a recognition
which can only be made by faith.
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the law, and thus points to the proper definition of the law.71 This is important
to note. Although the usus theologicus is the chief use of the law for Luther, the
exposure and condemnation of sin and the accompanying terrores conscientiae are
never meant by God to be an end in themselves—and when they are, that is already a perversion of the divinely ordained usus legis—but they are meant to lead
the crushed (poor) in spirit to faith in Christ, for he is the tiAcic of the law.72 It is
surely significant that Luther calls the paedagogus in Christum (which is really the
usus paedagogicus of later orthodoxy) the propriissima et iucundissima legis definitio.
That for him then is more than a use, it is already a definition of the law in that it
tells us not only about how the law functions, but what it does. But as we shall
see below, the law only takes on this pedagogical role when it is taken into the
service of the gospel. Here we stand at the threshold of that important transitus
from law to gospel, which we will have to say more about later.
Luther never tires of emphasizing that although sinful human beings will
always experience the law as a lex accusatrix et condemnatrix, this is not because
the law itself is inherently bad but because fallen man is sinful. Indeed, Paul expressly says that the law is holy and good (Rom. 7: 7) and Luther says that it does
not demand anything impossible. Rather, it is sin that makes the praecepta impossibilia.73 Since the fall we cannot hear this holy law of God without fear and
trembling. Our sin makes the law what it did not have to be, the ostensio peccati,
71Ibid., 441, 11-15: The paedagogus in Christum is verbum solatii et prop-

riissima et iucundissima legis definitio et magnam affert mihi consolationem et fiduciam.
72WA 39 I, 440, 6-15 (2 AD, Arg. 5).
73WA 39 I, 515,16-17 (3 AD, Arg. 7).
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which thereby becomes the revelatio irae Dei.74 The law shows us what we were,
how we are, and what we will become.75 The law exposes our sin and accuses
us, but it cannot improve us. Indeed, it only succeeds in making us worse! For
far from preventing sin, the law only provokes and increases sin all the more
(Rom. 5: 13). Left to itself, it can do no more than drive to despair.76 These are
the consequences of the demonstrative or ostensive function of the law, but the
reason that it has these effects is to be found, not in the law, but in sinful human
beings themselves.
A discussion of the usus legis would be incomplete without asking who is
the subject of this uti? God as the author of the law? Or man, to whom the law
applies? Gerhard Ebeling is convinced that Luther's answer would be God,77 for
to make a human being the subject would be tantamount to making the law
necessaria ad iustificationem.78 Like man, the law is also only the causa materia, not
the causa efficiens of justification. Luther insists that the law, in its usus theologicus,
cannot itself lead us to Christ. Only Christ or the Holy Spirit can turn the law
74WA 39 I, 348, 27-28 (ATh II, Th. 19).
75WA 45, 147, 17-20 (Eine schorte Predigt von dem Gesetz und Evangelium [Matt. 22],1537): Christus will solche Lere [of the fulfillment of the law, as in
Matt 19: 17; Luke 10: 28; Gal. 5: 19-23] bei den Christen erhalten haben, daf3 sie wissen, was sie gewesen sind, was sie noch schuldig sind und was sie wider werden sollen,
dafl sie nicht jnn dem schlam bleiben, darinn sie jtzt sind, Denn wo sie darinn blieben,
milssten sie verloren sein.
76WA 39 I, 445, 5-10 (2 AD, Arg. 8).
77Ebeling, "Triplex usus legis," 64.
78WA 39 I, 447, 3-448, 7 (2 AD, Arg. 8).
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into a paedagogus and prevent it from being a latro or a diabolus.79 If, on the other
hand, Satan were lege uti, it would no longer be an usus legis but an abusus legis,
for its end would be desperatio not fides. To that extent faith could also be
considered the subject of the uti lege, for only faith rules out finalis praesumptio
and finalis dubitatio, but faith is never independent of Christ.80 For the right usus
legis, in contrast to a demonic, will not allow the law to become either a means to
justification or an objection to it, but will turn it into a paedagogus in Christum.81 If
the triune God is the real subject of the uti lege, it follows then that while pastors
must distinguish between law and gospel, and not preach the one as the other,
they themselves cannot determine how people will hear the law; they leave that
to God who uses his words as he deems fit.82
79WA 39 I, 446, 22-23 (2 AD, Arg. 8) (B): Evangelium facit ex lege paeda-

gogum in Christum, non fit ab ipsa lege per sese; cf. 445, 12-13. We will return to this.
80WA 39 I, 428, 19-429, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 2).
81Ebeling, "Tiplex usus legis," 66.
82Haikola,

Llsus legis, 129-32, thinks that the real distinction between
the different usus legis, as between law and gospel itself, depends on the hearers
themselves. He maintains that the distinction made by the preacher is only of
theoretical interest, for it happens only in the word. The word of the preacher
can never anticipate the use of the word as such. The decisive distinction
between the uses of the law, just as between law and gospel, depends on the use
of the word by the hearer. At first blush this might seem as if Haikola is saying
that the distinction between law and gospel is a purely human decision. However, he offers the following clarification (p. 133):
Wenn man nun recht verstehen will, wie Luther zwischen den
verschiedenen Gebrauchsweisen unterscheidet, muss man erstens
berucksichtigen, wie der Prediger in Worten 'dart, zu welcher Wirkung das
Gesetz rein theoretisch bestimmt ist, und gleichzeitig zweitens, welchen
Gebrauch die verschiedenen Subjekte: Gott (Christus, der Heilige Geist), Satan
und Mensch vom Gesetz machen (emphasis original). Ulrich Asendorf, Die
Theologie Martin Luthers nach seinen Predigten (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
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In this section we have seen Luther answer several arguments for the
abolition of the law raised by his opponents. They may be summarized as follows: 1) The antinomians claim that the law increases sin. Luther, on the other
hand, argues that the law does not increase sin in the sense that it causes it, but
only in the sense that it exposes it, for the law is not the cause of sin, but we are.
b) Luther also maintains that law should in fact be praised for causing sin rather
than condemned, because in this way it humbles us and puts us in a position
where we want nothing else than to receive the gifts that Christ gives us in the
gospe1.83 2) The antinomians hold that the bad (preaching the law) should not be
done in the name of the good. Luther, on the other hand, insists that God, like a
good doctor, uses the law first to show us our disease before he gives us the
remedy of the gospel. If the law drives us to despair, it is only to save us, not to
kill us 84 3) The antinomians contend that the law diminishes sin and thus makes
for righteousness (Gal. 3: 24). Luther however maintains that paedagogus is not a
reference to the external discipline of the law. Although the law terrifies the conRuprecht, 1988), 337, n. 70, cites the above passage with approval and thinks that
Haikola is right in emphasizing the relational use of the law in Luther. The
purpose for the citation is merely to show that some scholars posit multiple
subjects. In our opinion, Satan's use of the law is not an usus but an abusus, and
secondly, we do not believe that faith uses the law but merely receives the divine
usus paedagogus; unbelief, on the other, will inevitably misuse the law by seeking
to use it for justification. Therefore, God as author of the law remains the only
proper subject of the uti lege.
83WA 39 I, 377, 9-378, 2 (1 AD, Arg. 10).
84WA 39 I, 425, 8-430,11 (2 AD, Arg. 2); cf. 530, 5-532, 7 (3 AD, Arg.
17); 581, 1-582, 5 (3 AD, Arg. 43/16): The law leads to despair of ourselves, not of
God.
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science, its purpose is not to drive to despair but (through the gospel) to open the
way to Christ.85
Law, Gospel and Repentance
Although Luther always insists that law and gospel must be carefully distinguished, in his struggle against the antinomians he is forced to emphasize just
as strongly that law and gospel belong together and must never be isolated. In
this part of our chapter, we will consider the different ways in which Luther argues this, particularly with reference to the preaching of repentance. We will
conclude by examining the significance of the sequence law-gospel and the implications of the antinomian error that only one of them has a place in preaching.
Law and Repentance
The question of the cause of repentance was one of the key issues at the
center of the antinomian controversy in the 1520s and 1530s. At its most basic
level, Luther insisted that repentance was inseparably linked to the law, while the
antinomians claimed that repentance was to be found only in Christ, and that
faith takes the place of the power of the law to produce repentance and also the
continung significance of repentance for the Christian life. Luther too, of course,
knows that Christ can teach repentance and make us into people who are contriti
and pauperes. But Luther emphasizs that he does this through the interpretation
of the law.86 This is an important point and betrays a much profounder under88WA 39 I, 440,18-443, 4 (2 AD, Arg. 6).
86WA 39 1, 533, 5 (3 AD, Arg. 18); 425, 1-2 (2 AD, Arg. 1): Christ

preaches and interprets the law.
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standing of the law than we find in the antinomians. Even though the words
come from Christ himself or from the gospel, if they lead to sorrow and repentance, they are words of law.87 Although Christ can preach the law with all severity, this is not his propriissimum officium, but rather evangelizare pauperibus, hoc est,
annunciare remissionem peccatorum et sanare contritos corde.88 Luther almost approaches a definition of the law here when he identifies law with whatever functions
as law, that is, accuses consciences, even if it be the gospe1.89 Here he reveals a
87Luther is also fond of pointing out that Christ does not say: Repent

according to the gospel, but he says: Repent, and believe the gospel (WA 39 I,
533, 11-14 [3 AD, Arg. 181).
88Ibid., 533, 9-9.
89Luther's functional understanding of the law is taken over by the
Formula of Concord. Thus Luther, in a sermon on the gospel for the fifth Sunday
after Trinity (WA 15, 228) is quoted as saying: Everything that preaches about our
sin and the wrath of God, no matter how or when it happens, is the proclamation
of the law (BSLK 955, 12). Again, Luther is quoted (WA 39 I, 34825-28 [ATh
Th. 18, 19]), as saying, wider die Gesetzstiirmer (= contra antinomos): everything that
rebukes sin is and belongs to the law, the proper function (Amt = officium) of
which is to condemn sin and lead to a knowledge of sin (Rom. 3: 20; 7: 7); again:
the proprium legis officium is to expose (arguere; Ger. strafen) sin and to give instruction about good works (BSLK, 957, 17, 18). James Nestingen, "Luther: The
Death and Resurrection of Moses," in Dialog 22 (1983): 277, suggests that Luther's
Nominalism enabled him to move from a structural view of the law [lex aeternal
to a more functional definition [lex = officium]. "Structurally defined, the law is
understood statically, in terms of a world order built into the creation or a set of
eternal moral requirements prescribing relationships with God and the neighbor.
Functionally defined, the law is understood not so much in terms of the structures of things, or of what it says or requires, but rather in terms of what it does."
However, a purely existentialist interpretation of the law, such as we have in Gerhard Ebeling, "Erwagungen zur Lehre vom Gesetz," in Wort and Glaube, 3d ed.,
255-293, esp. 290-95, where the content of the law is not equated with the Decalogue, cannot be supported in Luther. The law does have content and this forms
the basis of its judgment. It is one thing to be terrified by a rustling leaf because
one has a guilty conscience. But we only know for certain that we are guilty
coram Deo on the basis of the Decalogue. What becomes of statements like Gal. 3:
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functional understanding of the law, which does not tie it to its authorship (Old
Testament, New Testament, Moses, Christ, Decalogue, Sermon on the Mount,
parenesis) but understands it on the basis of what it does.90 Here law is not in
the first instance equated with content (Inhalt) but with effect (Amt). Luther says
that although the antinomians themselves still preach admonitions and give
directives for how to live, and thus make use of the law, it is clear that already the
vocable lex frightens them. However, when Luther now says what the law is, he
describes it in a remarkably neutral way. Irrespective of whether a given word is
adjudged to be law or gospel as it stands written on a page, the law is whatever
performs the duties of the law and causes the sensus legis. Therefore, law and
gospel must be distinguished not merely on the level of grammar but on the basis
of effect. That means that even though poenitentia and lex are different words
both according to grammar and considered materialiter seu TEXV1 nig, factually
speaking [quoad rem] it is the same thing to preach repentance and to preach the
law. The law is the revelation of wrath, because repentance, at least insofar as it
is the recognition of sin, and the revelation of wrath are the effects of the law.91
24 (the law is our paedagogus to Christ) and Rom. 10: 4 (Christ is the telos of the
law), and consequently of the whole Pauline doctrine of the law, if the law is no
longer, as Ebeling maintains, to be equated with the Mosaic law?
90Cf. WA 39 I, 534, 17-535, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 18). Schloemann, Gesetz,128,

n. 392, is probably right in his remark that Rudolf Hermann, Zum Streit um die
Liberwindung des Gesetzes: Erorterungen zu Luthers Antinomerthesen (Weimar:
Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolge, 1958), 19-20, goes too far when he holds that it is
not the author, authority, and "signature" that are constitutive of the law, but
function. It would seem to us that if one focuses on the function of the law to the
exclusion (or virtual exclusion) of its content, as in existentialist theology, there is
no factual basis for the law's accusation and judgment, and that everything then
is made to depend on the feeling of terror and the pressure of conscience
(Hermann: Druck auf das Gewissen) engendered by the law in its totality.

657
Luther takes this insight a step further and argues that the law, sin, wrath,
and death are inseparable.92 This in turns becomes a very powerful argument in
Luther's hands for the permanence of the law in this life. For to deny the existence of the law is tantamount to denying the reality of death. The antinomians
might deny sin (or, as we will see later, at least it poses no threat to them because
it is forgiven), but death they cannot deny, for the law is the power of sin, and
death follows in the wake of sin. This exegetical argument concerning the inseparability of law, sin, wrath and death further undermines the antinomian view
that the preaching of the law should be abolished from the church and not taught
because it is unnecessary.93 Luther's riposte to that is: necessary or not, the law is
inescapable for it is part of creation and Christians themselves still have remnants
of sin.
We have seen that Luther rejects the antinomian claim that repentance
arises ex evangelio and insists that, on the contrary, it arises ex lege. However, this
is not to say that he denies that repentance can occur ex evangelio or that the gospel belongs to repentance.94 Rather, as we saw, his point is that even if repen91WA 39 I, 415, 13-18 (1 AD, Arg. 36); cf. 348, 25-33 (ATh II, Th. 18-21),
esp. Th. 20: Lex et ostensio peccati, seu revelatio irae, sunt termini convertibiles velut
homo, et risibile vel rationale.
92This is the main theme of the second Thesenreihe (WA 39 I, 347-350);

see also the sixth Thesenreihe (39 I, 358).
93Cf. WA 39 I, 583, 2-17 (3 AD, Arg. 45/18), where Luther argues that
the law and sin are inseparable: Abraham was sinner, hence, he had to have the
law.

%Indeed, in WA 39 I, 572,15-575, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 36/9), he admits that at
first he himself used to teach repentance ex amore iustitiae, that is, ex evangelio,
because at the time people had been exceedingly crushed by the papacy and had
been brought to the brink of despair, in fact were already in medio inferni, and that
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tance does arise from the preaching of the gospel, it is not really caused by the
gospel, but by the gospel functioning as the law. The favorite way the antinomians have of speaking about repentance is to say that it arises ex violatione filii instead of the ex violatione legis.95 As we saw in the analysis, Luther does not allow
them to play the Son off against the law in this fashion, for he contends that since
sin has been revealed through the law, and the Son has been given to fulfill the
law (and he gives the Spirit to fulfill it), the real violatio filii is not to believe in
him. But this at the same time amounts to a violatio legis, for the first commandment of the Decalogue requires nothing more than faith in Christ.96 Furthermore, since the law enjoins faith, it is the law and not Christ (certainly not in his
opus proprium) that condemns unbelief.97 In having the cross call us to repenunless he had begun to haul them out immediately with the gospel, they would
have utterly perished. However, when the antinomians claim simply to be following him in preaching only gospel, Luther contends that they fail to understand the circumstances which made that necessary at the beginning of the Reformation. The situation in Wittenberg in the 1530s was radically different than at
the end of the 1510s and in the early 1520s. We will comment further on that
when we deal with his law-gospel pattern. For now, it is enough to note that
Luther says that if repentance is to be taught or begun amore iustitiae, this can
only happen in those who are afflicti et contriti (10-11).
95We saw this already in first thesis of the

positiones antinomicae (WA
39 I, 342, 9-10), where ex Decalogo, or ex lege Mosi was used for ex violatione legis.
96In the final analysis violatio filii and violatio legis are one and the same

sin against the law because, as we have already seen, the law is one. Admittedly,
in polemical contexts Luther can sometimes speak of a double sin against the law
and against Christ, but he does so only to show that they are one and the same.
Thus, we agree with Schloemann, Gesetz, 108, n. 337, that the violatio Christi can
just as well be defined as sin against the one law, since all sin against the law is
always incredulitas in Christum (WA 39 I, 384-386 [2 AD, Arg. 15]; 399-404 [1 AD,
Args. 22, 23, 24, 26].
97For Luther's answer to the antinomian argument that repentance is

not ex lege but ex violatione filii, see WA 39 I, 384-386 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
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tance, the antinomians seize on one of the central insights of the early Luther
which however even the later Luther does not deny (though he does caution its
use). Luther reproaches them for making a foolish self-contradiction: by using
the violatio filii instead of the violatio legis, the cross exercises the function of the
law, and thereby become a terrifying accusation. They seek to bring the law back
in the form of the decalogus and establish it as a terrifying accusation on the basis
of the cross of Christ. On the one hand, the Decalogue thereby loses its character
as instruction; on the other, the cross is in danger of being changed from the gospel into a new law.98
But there is another reason, besides theology, which accounts for Luther's
opposition to the idea of preaching repentance ex evangelio rather than ex lege. It
has to do with the pastoral care of people plagued by doubt and Anfechtung. In a
decisive argument in this connection he recalls the suicide of Dr. Krause in Halle
ten years earlier. This man, a senior official of the well-known Archbishop
Albrecht, had received the Lord's Supper in both kinds when the Reformation
first began to take hold in Halle; admittedly, the archbishop was out of town.
When he returned and opposed the attempted reforms Krause stood back and
denied the gospel. The fact that others willingly accepted suffering and banishment, among other things, on account of the evangelical faith not only shamed
him, but drove him to such despair that he could no longer take comfort from the
gospel and ended up taking his own life on All Saints' Day, 1527.99
98Thus, Albrecht Peters, Gesetz and Evangelium, 46.
99WA TR 1, 278,16-42 [No. 590],1533.
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In Luther's opinion, the antinomians are ill equipped to deal with such a
situation in a pastoral way, even though both agreed that nothing but faith in
Christ can help. But unless one properly distinguishes between law and gospel
precisely at this critical point, Christ is deprived of his opus proprium as the savior
of all the Krauses of this world, and instead becomes a merciless judge. Luther
seems to be of the opinion that nobody at the time had been a true Seelsorger to
Krause; there was no confession and absolution, no proper distinction between
law and gospel; no one had spoken the proper word to him.100 To distinguish
between law and gospel in Luther's sense means not to torment oneself before
God over something that one has done or not done. That is what the devil loves
to dispute with us over, and as soon as we enter into dialog with him he binds
our conscience under the law. This is not the time to remind the Angefochtene of
the goodness and loving kindness of God, for that may well be heard merely as
condemning law, thus driving him deeper into despair. Only when there has
been confession of sins coram Deo, is the way open for a person to receive the
forgiveness of sin. This is classically illustrated by the story of David and
Nathan story (2 Sam. 12: 13), which Luther refers to several times. First, David
confesses his sins (law); then Nathan, speaking in loco Dei, pronounces the abso100According to previously cited Tischrede, such a word in Luther's

opinion would have been: "Si fecisti, so ist's gethan." In spite of the "getan" the
devil does not have his soul. "Quia vber das facere, ist noch das credere" (WA TR 1,
277, 3-5). Ultimately it does not depend on what we have done or left undone.
Luther stresses the gravity of such Anfechtung: Gott allows it to happen that "offt
so auf die Heften kommen, das einer nit mehr kan" (Ibid., 16-17). He also shows a
profound grasp of the insidious cunning of the old evil foe, for Satan can take the
gospel and stand it on its head so that it becomes law. Thus Satan: "Sed Deus dicit
te, quia legem non feceris, esse damnatum; respondeo: Dixit etiam, ut vivam" (Ibid., 1011). Only the person who can properly distinguish between law and gospel in
tentatione, can quote scripture against scripture, the gospel against the law.
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lution (gospel). Only when a person has confessed his sins, received the absolution, and has been admonished to take his eyes off his sin and fix them firmly on
Christ and his words of forgiveness, is his conscience freed from the law. Failure
to distinguish law and gospel here opens the door to Satan, who turns the gospel
into a law just as quickly as he transfigures himself into an angel of light, or worst
of all, appears before us as Christ himself.101 The poverty of antinominism,
which becomes clearly apparent at just at this point, is its inability to offer genuine comfort to souls that are deeply troubled for it is unable to speak a clear and
unqualified word of gospel, unmixed with law. Indeed, the very claim of the
antinomians to have a non-condemning law, by allowing the gospel to do the
work of the law, proves to be their own undoing. Precisely because for them the
gospel, the word of forgiveness, can never be spoken without people at the same
time hearing the voice of the law summoning them to repentance, it can never be
heard as pure gift, without any demands whatever. In such a case, the sheer
goodness and loving kindness of God, which is meant to lead one to repentance,
is unable to rescue the penitent and lead him from contrition to faith in the beneficia Christi. In the end he is smothered by the grace of God and plunges into
despair.
The antinomians, of course, for their part, would no doubt turn Luther's
reproach back on himself and accuse him of making a law out of the gospel, and
101Rudolf Hermann, Zum Streit, 25 n. 8, suggests that even though
Luther in the disputations never actually says that the devil turns the gospel into
the law, as he states in hs Tischrede, the idea is there in substance. We concur, and
would go on to argue that it is just because Luther sees this as one of the grave
dangers of antinomianism that he warns his hearers against opening a door to Satan by failing to distinguish the gospel from the law. The other danger is libertinism, where the freedom of the gospel is used as a pretext for license. In both
cases the gospel is lost.
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that in two ways: 1) by demanding that the gospel cannot be heard as gospel unless the law has first exposd our sin and put us at the mercy of God; 2) by claiming that law is also to be found in the beneficia Christi (understood as a motive of
repentance), for as we saw earlier, Luther willingly grants, in agreement with
Paul, that the goodness and kindness of God can lead to repentance (Rom. 2: 4).
But for him, this is a case of the gospel doing the law's work, its opus alienum and
not its opus proprium, which is always pure gift, comfort, forgiveness, received by
faith. For the antinomians, however, the beneficia Christi function in a dual
capacity: first they comfort, but then they can also cause fear. Because by denying the law they cannot distinguish between law and gospel, they have to make a
new distinction within the gospel, that is, between the gospel as Bufipredigt, on
the one hand, and as the proclamation and gift of forgiveness, on the other. From
Luther's standpoint, this means that the law is forced into the gospel and thus
destroys it. He admits that sin can be exposed either through law or gospel, for
we are not all called to Christ in the same way, but he insists that when this happens through the gospel, it is not really the gospel that does it, whose opus proprium is to forgive, but the law.102 In antinomian teaching, the comfort of the
gospel becomes a means to an end: the end being repentance, instead of repentance itself serving as a means to the gospel. The result is that God's ultimate
word in the gospel loses out to his penultimate word in the law.
An analogy that Luther sometimes uses in describing the role of the law in
connection with salvation is to compare God to a doctor, who cannot heal a disease before he first diagnoses the problem and informs the patient. Law and gospel then are related to each other as diagnosis and cure (remedium). In line with
102WA 39 1, 425, 2-5 (2 AD, Arg. 1).
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Jesus' words that those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who
are sick, the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins (the office of the gospel) presupposes that people know that they are sinners.103 One could not even recognize Christ's work as proclaimed by the gospel if the law had not first exposed
the sin. In other words, the gospel cannot be proclaimed in any other way except
in contrast to the law. To do otherwise would be no different from a doctor first
prescribing a treatment before doing a diagnosis. Therefore, even to know one's
sin is already a magnum beneficium, but only because the remedy is applied afterwards in the gospel.104 By itself the law would only bring death, but followed by
the gospel it prepares for the gift of life. This example, which underscores the
impossibility of having Christ without the law, further strengthen Luther's
contention against the antinomians, who claim that if one has Christ one does not
need the law. But now we need to turn our attention to the important transition
that occurs when one moves from contrition to repentance, from sorrow to faith,
and to inquire into the nature of the transition from law to gospel.
Luther has insisted from the beginning that repentance, strictly speaking,
consists of two parts: first, dolor de peccato, and then propositio melioris vitae.105
103WA 39 I, 348, 40-42 (Ath, II, Th. 25); 424, 6-19 (2 AD, Arg. 1); 535, 14-

15 (3 AD, Arg. 18). Cf. 416, 10-11 (1 AD, Arg, 37): To preach forgiveness is nothing else than to indicate and show the presence of sin.
104WA 39 I, 517, 3-11 (3 AD, Arg. 7).

105wA 39 1, 345,16-17 (ATh I, Th. 1). Cf. CA 12: Nun ist wahre rechte
Bufl eigentlich nichts anderes dann Reue und Leid oder Schrecken haben fiber die Siinde
und dock daneben glauben an das Evangelium und Absolution, daf3 die Sande vergeben
und durch Christum Gnad erworben sei, welcher Glaub wiederum das Herz trostet und
zufrieden machet. Darnach soil auch Besserung folgen, und daf3 man von Siinden lasse .
. . . (BSLK, 66-67).
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The dolor is ex lege but the propositum bonum is ex evangelio.106 Both law and
gospel have a role to play here, for although Luther stresses, contra antinomos,
that repentance arises from the law and not the gospel, he does not mean to imply that the gospel plays no part at all. In fact he can even say that the gospel or
Christ, and not the law, is the principal part of repentance.107 And the reason
why the gospel (or faith) is the chief part of repentance is because without it the
law could not lead to life, but would only kill and drive to despair. But under the
power of the gospel, the killing of the law is not a mere killing, but a killing of the
vetus homo in the service of life. Then it can truly be said of the law: occidendo
vivificat. But the law does not have life in itself nor the power to give life, it can
only Idll,108 but when faith is kindled, this killing is then a preparation for the
gospel. To say it again, the law can only lead to life because and insofar as the
gospel comes and thus for Christ's sake the sin exposed and convicted by the law
is not imputed to the believer coram Deo. Only when the law is used with faith
does it become a paedagogus in Christum, and not a latro, who wants only to
kidnap and kill. Therefore, to give more precision to our definition, we may say
that repentance is not strictly ex lege, but rather arises from the preaching of both
1061bid., 345, 22-23 (Th. 4).

107WA 39 1, 471,16-772, 2 (2 AD, Arg. 18): Christus autem est prima et
principalis pars. Dolor potest esse prima, sed non principalis, efficiens causa est omnium
optima et prima. This is his reply to the opponents who say that the law is necessary (and hence justifies) as the efficient cause of repentance. Luther, in his Smalcald Articles, says [Part 3: Von der Bufle] that where the law exercises its office
alone, without the addition of the gospel, there is only death and hell, and a person must despair like Saul and Judas [BSLK, 437].
108WA 39 I, 446, 3_5 (2 AD, Arg. 8): Evangelium sua virtute ex latrone
paedagogum et rapit ilium occisum per legem et reducit ad Christum, id quod non fecit
lex.
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law and gospe1.109 And although Luther will admit that repentance can also
arise from preaching the gospel first,110 even if for seelsorgerlich reasons he does
not recommend it, neverthless it always remains a movement from law to gospel,
and not vice versa, as the antinomians teach.
The exact location of the origin of repentance is not the important thing,
whether in the picture of Christ or the Ten Commandments, as long as the remorse it engenders is understood as a function of the law (diagnosis of problem/preparation) and not as part of the gospel (treatment/restoration). The important thing is rather getting beyond the temptation to morbid introspection,
self-accusation, and finally despair, where, as we have seen before, the law becomes a devil and kidnaps us from Christ instead of a teacher who leads us to
Christ.111 But how can we be certain of making the transition from the terrores
109WA

39 I, 414,11-13 (1 AD, Arg. 35). The thesis of S. KjeldgaardPedersen, Gesetz, Evangelium und Busse: Theologiegeschichtliche Studien zum
Verhaltnis zwischen dem jungen Johann Agricola (Eisleben) und Martin Luther
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), is that if we say both law and gospel are necessary for
repentance, we mean that the law only reaches its goal where the gospel prevails
and is heard. Another way of putting it is to say that the law only reaches its goal
if its fulfillment is given, as done in Christ. However, we need to remember that
this is a statement made from the standpoint of faith, for the law only reaches its
proper goal of leading people to Christ if it is pulled along by the gospel.
110As we have already seen, the fact that a peson is led to repentance
ex cruce seu passion Christi does not imply that the law is thoroughly useless or is
to be removed. In WA 39 I, 407,1-15 (1 AD, Arg. 38) Luther simply acknowledges the fact that people come to Christ either ex cognitione legis or ex cognitione
crucis Christi. He holds that whether you come by the law or the rhetoric of the
gospel [Evangelii rhetorica] is immaterial, the end result is the same. Luther
explains what he means by the rhetoric of the gospel. Unlike the law which simply proceeds accusando, damnando, arguendo etc, the gospel compels [compellit] you
to repent with its aluring words [blandissime] and entices [pellicit] you arte quadam
seu rhetorica ad agendam poenitentiam. Cf. 400, 15-402, 7 (1 AD, Arg. 24).
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conscientiae to faith? What warrant do we have of this? The uncomforting truth
is that we can produce no guarantees. If there were, we would have God in our
power and would be able to maniplulate him with the right formulas. All
depends on Christ and his Spirit, for he is Lord of both law and gospel. The shattered conscience cannot put itself together any more than a man with broken legs
can stand up and walk. Repentance and faith are both gifts of God. Repentance
is not a precondition for faith in the sense that it is a human accomplishment, yet
there can be no faith without repentance. Repentance, which strictly speaking includes faith, is God's work in us and not our work. It is not a psychological state
which we reach through the law for such an anthropocentric view would open
the door to synergism. Rather, repentance is produced in us by God working
through law and gospel.
We should note here in passing that Luther distinguishes the Spirit's work
in the law from that in the gospel. In response to the antinomian claim that the
law by itself cannot expose and convict sin, but that this happens only by the
power of the Holy Spirit, Luther distinguishes between the Spirit in his divine
nature as the author of the law and the gospel-Spirit as gift through Christ (the
Spiritus proprie dictus). This forms a counterpart to his distinction between the
Deus nudus and the Deus incarnatus, or again between Christ's opus alienum and
his opus proprium (although these terms do not occur in the disputations).112 The
crucial point here is that where the Spirit exposes sins and moves the heart
through the law, he is not doing the same as when he works faith through the
111This is what Hermann, Zur Streit, 28, calls the Ubergangsproblem.
112This is discussed in WA 39 I, 369, 19-371, 16 (1 AD, Arg. 4) and 388,

23-391, 20 (1 AD, Arg. 17).
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gospel. These two works of the Spirit are as radically different as law and gospel.
By means of this argument Luther refutes the argument of his opponents that the
law is unable to produce the terrores conscientiae without the aid of the Spirit and
thus is useless.
Luther's Law — Gospel "Pattern"
We saw earlier that Luther can talk about the law before the fall as a lex iucunda, which Adam delights in like the angels. Since he is without sin the law
has nothing to accuse. Although Luther still calls it law, it is in effect no law at all
but is more like the gospel in the sense of God's good gift. However, all that
changes after the fall. Because Adam rejects the gift of this law, it now accuses
and condemns him. No longer a friend, it becomes his fiercest enemy, exposes
his sin, and becomes an agent of death. It points to life but is unable to deliver
life. Luther echoes Paul in stressing over and over again that the fault is not with
the law but sin. But God in his mercy does not leave sinful human beings in the
grip of death and under everlasting condemnation. He now speaks another
word, a word of life which destroys death, a word of forgiveness which wipes
out the guilt of sin, a word of pardon which overturn the condemnation of the
law. This other word, which God speaks after the fall, is the gospel, and it stands
in direct antithesis to the law. Inasmuch as Christians are both saints and sinners
at the same time, they live out their life in the tension field of this twofold word
of law and gospel. Each must be carefully distinguished from the other, not for
the sake of the law but for the sake of the gospel. Since the law is a datum of this
world and belongs to the structure of creation, it cannot be lost nor can it be
escaped. As Luther says, it is schon da. The gospel, on the other hand, as God's
novum, a word which comes only from him, which does not belong to this world,
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but is spoken definitively in Jesus Christ. When law and gospel are not carefully
distinguished, the gospel is lost and becomes a new law.113 However, over
against the antinomian heresy, according to which the law has no place in the
church, Luther must also emphasis the inseparability of law and gospel. Those
who want to pull law and gospel apart, holding onto the gospel while letting the
law go, need to be reminded that if the law is lost the gospel will be lost too.
How exactly he argues that will be considered in more detail in the final part of
this chapter.
In the first Disputation against the Antinomians Luther spells out his
methodus: First, the law must be preached to expose and convict sins that people
may then receive the promise of the gospel.114 And in the Praefatio he says that
the best way to teach doctrine and to keep it pure is to follow this method: divide
Christian doctrine into two parts, law and gospe1.115 When this is not done, the
113Hence Luther says that the ability to be able to distinguish between
law and gospel is for Luther the mark of the skilled minister and true theologian
(WA 39 I, 466,12-13 [2 AD, Arg. 15]).
114WA 39 I, 345-347, esp. Th. 25-39 (ATh I); 362, 15-363, 20 (1 AD,
Praef.). On the ordo rei, see 347, 1-6 (ATh I, Th. 28-30). The order is Death
(Adam = law) first, then life (Christ = gospel). This is an important argument
based on experientia. When Luther says Adam comes first, then Christ, he is not
denying Christ's preexistence, but is explaining the order of law and gospel
which in turn mirrors the order of salvation history (cf. Rom. 5). Cf. 347, 5-6 (Th.
30): Therefore, Adam is to be taught first (i. e. sin and death), then he who is the
form of the coming Christ [Quare prior docendus est Adam (id est, peccatum et mors),
qui forma est futuri Christi postea docendi]. Note how Adam here functions in a
dual capacity, both as the progenitor of the fallen world (by Adam sin entered the
world), as well as the type of the coming Christ. See too 358, 1-4 (Th. 1, 2), 358,
14-15 (Th. 8), where law and death are correlated. The significance of this
method will be discussed later.
115WA 39 I, 361, 1-4 (1 AD, Praef.).
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error also results in the loss of the gospel. The antinomian view, that the gospel
must be preached before the law, is predicated on the belief that it is the law that
exposes sin and shows the need for redemption. However, this turns the gospel
into a law.116 The antinomians defended their gospel-only preaching by appealing to historical precedent. Luther himself at the beginning of the Reformation
did not preach the law but only the gospel, that is, he preached repentance amore
iustitiae or ex evangelio.117 However, he says that for the antinomians to emulate
116See 1 AD, Args. 3, 16, 17, 22-24, 26-28, 32, 35-37; 2 AD, Args. 1, 14,

15, 28; 3 AD, Args. 18, 33/6, 34/7, 35/8, 36/9, 40/13, 43/15. The opposite view,
held by the papists, that observance of the law is necessary for salvation, turns
the law into the gospel by making it the way of salvation. See 39 I, 448,10 (2 AD,
Arg. 9): Lex Dei est sermo vivus et institutus ad vitam. Ergo lex vivificat (cf. Heb. 4:
12; Lev. 18: 5). See also 224, 7-12 (PT, Arg. 13); 227, 2-9 (PT, Arg. 14); cf. the
argumentum and Luther's responsio in 408, 5-409, 24 (1 AD, Arg. 30); 440, 18-443, 4
(2 AD, Arg. 6). Both positions stem from the same basic failure to properly
distinguish law from gospel. Luther fears that after his death this distinction will
be lost (WA 39 1, 507,12-15 [3 AD, Arg. 3]).
117As we saw above, Luther freely admits this (see WA 39 1, 572,15-

573, 5 [3 AD, Arg. 36/9]). It is probably misleading to say that at this early period
Luther simply preached the gospel and that it was only later in the 1520s that be
began to preach the law also, and hence to distinguish between law and gospel.
In our opinion, it would be more correct to hold that Luther's early preaching of
the gospel is a direct outcome of his law-gospel distinction, and accordingly a
correct application of his maxim: preach grace to the afflicti et contriti, but not to
the securi, otiosi, scortatores, adulteri et blasphemi (574, 8-10). The distinction between preaching law and gospel corresponds, in Luther, to his conviction that
there are only two types of people in the world: pauperes, infirmi, pii vel qui desiderant pii esse, et divites seu sani, hoc est, impii et securi nebulones (574, 11-13). He
gives sage advice to future pastors: People in all ages therefore remain the same,
so that it is against this background that you learn how properly to distinguish
law from gospel, in order that you do not teach everybody everything indiscriminately (574, 13-15). Thus, in keeping with the above, it has been pointed out by
H. Ivarsson, Prdikans uppgift (Lund, 1956), 158ff., cited by Schloemann, Gesetz,
113; the Swedish is inaccessible) that Luther's basic homilectical rule of thumb is
as follows: 1) Where there is no Anfechtung (experience of sin and the law) at all,
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that method today when things have changed so drastically is utterly perverse.
People are no longer living in fear and terror as they were in the early days of the
Reformation. Here Luther recalls that they were so burdened by the law in those
days that they were filled with panic even at the rustling of a leaf falling from a
tree, while the pope or the face of a priest caused the whole of Olympus to shake!
He charges that "our antinomians" want to preach sermons belonging to a time
when people were contrite at an time when people were secure [condones saeculi
contritorum in saeculo securorum[ .118 Preaching only the gospel however would
result in grave spiritual repercussions: the securi per se would become even more
secure so that in the end they would fall from grace completely.
However, the problem of antinomianism has serious pastoral consequences for both classes of people (according to Luther's division): Not only are the securi made more secure, with the risk of falling from grace, but at the opposite
end, the afflicti et contriti are driven to despair. We have seen from our discussion
of Dr. Krause's suicide how the antinomians, by turning the gospel into law in
such a way that it falls to the gospel first to forgive sin and then to convict, are
quite ill-equipped to comfort troubled Angst-ridden souls with the certainty of
the gospel, which as God's final and definitive word for faith, stands over against
the accusation of the law and silences it propter Christum. But why should that be
the case? We will allow Dr. Luther to be our teacher. In one of his responses he
especially addresses those in the audience who would eventually become doctores
of the church, and advises them what to do when one day someone comes to
no gospel is to be preached either; however, 2) where Anfechtung already predominates, the law must not be preached on any account.
118WA 39 I, 574, 5-6 (3 AD, Arg. 36/9).
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them with a deeply troubled conscience, unable to find peace from the constant
assaults of Satan. He warns that in such a case it is unnecessary to sharpen the
law any further for such people are already troubled by the law and sin.119
Rather, he says, begin like this:120 Dear brother (sister), you are sad and
burdened by the law and God's wrath. That is good and necessary. But, on the
other hand, it is also God's will that you are do not remain tormented but are
comforted and cheered. Each of these two is the command and will of God: to
believe that because of sin you are under penalty of eternal condemnation, and,
on the other hand, to believe that God does not want you to despair of his divine
mercy toward you. In the midst of your terrors he wants you to learn to flee to
his divine mercy promised in Christ, even if you see nothing but sin and death,
for God wants to create life out of death, and righteousness out of sin. Luther
advises his students that as pastors they need to be on the lookout for people
(especially young people, for we are not all tempted equally by Satan) who have
been gripped by the devil, and who should be comforted in a similar way: Dear
brother (sister), because Satan harasses you like this, he is bringing about his own
end, and this is the way it must be in order that your triumph in the end may be
the more glorious. But they will say: God hates me, he has forgotten about me
and does not want me. Luther says that the pastor should reply: On the contrary,
he does want you and commands you through my mouth and that of St. Paul's to
put your hope in him and believe that Christ died and was raised for you, and
[supra
modum exasperat] against the iustificati (WA 39 I, 474, 11-14 [2 AD, Arg. 21]).
119Luther says that it is Satan who always sharpens the law

120The following is our paraphrase and summary of WA 39 I, 427, 18-

429, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 2).
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that by his death God's wrath has been appeased and that the Father has been
reconciled to you. He goes on to say that the pastor must make it clear that this
must be believed in spite of what one feels. To doubt this and to go on
despairing is not pleasing to God (here Luther rejects all contritionism and
anthropocentric attempts to atone for sin through one's own suffering), but is
indeed a deliberate sin against the first commandment, which demands that you
believe that he is your God, and not your enemy, not the devil, not death, not sin.
Luther reminds those aspiring to be pastors and teachers that at this point faith
must simply be urged because finalis praesumptio and finalis dubitatio are each a
sin against the Holy Spirit, for where forgiveness is not sought it cannot be
received.
The pastoral proclamation of the law to the contristati et perterrefacti does
not really entail preaching the law in the sense of the usus theologicus, but rather
aims at clarifying to them that what they are experiencing is the sensus legis, and
that this is not intended by God as an end in itself but as a prelude and preparation for the comfort of the gospel. Even though, as we said, this is not a proper
preaching of the law, because these people have already been crushed by the
weight of the law, it is an important preparatory step that conforms to the basic
direction of preaching from law to gospel, and interprets to those suffering the
terrores conscientiae that what they are feeling is indeed the impact of God's law,
and for good reason, but that that is only meant to be the door to the gospel.
Here the pastor is to be like John the Baptist (to use Luther's image) who points to
Christ, the end of the law; he must admonish the conscience-stricken penitent to
be bold and tell the law: You have reached your limit. You have no authority to
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go any further, now back offi121 Here the pastor is not only preparing room for
the entry of the gospel, but he is teaching his people how to distinguish law from
gospel themselves. This indirect proclamation of the law to the troubled in conscience is an important preliminary step to the preaching of the gospel for it
identifies and locates the work and effect of the law and thus facilitates a concrete
specific, in situ preaching of the gospel. Furthermore, this indirect proclamation
of the law to the pii in tentatione, does not contravene Luther's pastoral advise not
to preach the law to those who are troubled by the sensus legis (Anfechtung), nor
does it jump the proclamation of the law all together, because wherever the law is
not explicated, interpreted, and applied, the gospel is that much weakened or
even lost entirely. Even though as we saw earlier it is impossible to escape the
effect of the law altogether because our entire earthly life is connected to the web
of the lex naturalis, people do not understand that what they are experiencing is
indeed God's law, and that its purpose finally is to lead them to Christ in whom
the law finds its fulfillment and end. When the pastor fails to explain this to the
penitent, he is like the careless doctor who overlooks the diagnosis and simply
writes the prescription, with the result that the gospel becomes like a generic
panacea unable to target the disease, and is thus robbed of its power to deliver
the sinner from the grip of the law and its attendants effects. Therefore, not to
preach the law, even if only indirectly, does not magnify the gospel, but on the
contrary, diminishes it.
We note in passing that Luther's proposed methodus, which recommends
that the law be preached before the gospel, does not mean that in every semon
the law must first be preached in all its severity as if there were no gospel, and
121WA 39 I, 454, 19-455, 8 (2 AD, Arg. 13); 445, 13-446, 5 (2 AD, Arg. 8).
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then after people are sufficiently frightened or crushed, end with the gospel. To
understand Luther's law-gospel ordo in such a rigid, schematic way is ultimately
to misunderstand it, not least because it fails to take account of the fact that the
gospel can also function as law. He intended this method as a theological statement in order to clarify the relationship of law and gospel; it is not meant to be a
homiletical rule that is slavishly followed in every sermon.122 It means that the
gospel cannot be heard as the gospel of the savior unless the law is first heard
(even if only indirectly in the case of the justified) reminding us that we are still
sinners. On the other hand, Luther also says that the law must not be preached
to the justified in a way that frightens them but must be softened and preached in
the form of exhortation. What this means will be explained in the section on
Faith and the Law.
We see from the foregoing the vast gulf that separates Luther from the
antinomians when it comes to ministering pastorally to people who are tormented by Anfechtungen. The latter, because they teach that the gospel contains both
a word of comfort and a word of accusation, and because the basic thrust is always from gospel to law, cannot help those who feel they are unworthy of God,
that their sins are too great, that they are not contrite enough, or that they cannot
forgive themselves! Since, for the antinomians, the selfsame word that forgives
also condemns, the penitent has no recourse to a higher court or greater authority. He is left turned in on himself, mired in guilt and remorse. Only the pastor
122Gerhard Heintze,

Luthers Predigt von Gesetz and Evangelium
(Munich: n.p., 1958) turns Luther's law-gospel ordo into a rigid orthodoxes
Lehrschema which must always be followed in strict succession, and then criticizes
him for not following his own principle in his sermons. For a ctitique, see
Schloemann, Gesetz,37 -41.
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who can distinguish between law and gospel can point such a person beyond his
fear and doubt to Christ, who as the agnus Dei bore all our sin, and for whom
whom no sin is too great to be forgiven. Only the pastor who tells the penitent
that everything depends on what God has done for him in Christ and not what
he has done or not done, only the pastor who tells him that his dear Lord wants
him, indeed commands him, to believe that he is forgiven, and that to listen to his
conscience rather than to the voice of Christ is nothing less than an act of unbelief, only that pastor is properly distingishing law and gospel and can be used by
the Lord to bring comfort to the broken in spirit. The gospel loses its character as
absolution if it burdens people before or afterwards with new demands instead
of freeing them.
The Transition from Law to Gospel in Repentance
We have already said that the law, which post lapsum is no longer a lex iucunda but a marauding power, our enemy in fact, can only serve as paedagogus after it has been indentured to Christ. For not until it has been subdued, indeed,
overcome by Christ, so that it no longer serves death but life, no longer despair
but faith-or more precisely, now that death is the way to life, and despair of self
the way to faith-can it be a good paedagogus and lead its charge faithfully to
Christ. This is the crucial transition that the law cannot make by itself, but only
when it is taken over by Christ (or his Spirit) and is in his service. However, the
crossover from sorrow to faith can only happen when the person who has been
crushed and accused by the law acknowledges the veracity of the accusation and
that it is not just the judgment of the law but in fact corresponds to the judgment
of God himself. In agreeing with the verdict of the law, or, what amounts to the
same thing, confessing with the psalmist that God is justified in his judgment (Ps.
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51: 4), we gain the victory over the law for it can no longer hold us, its work is
done, and it must release us into the charge of the gospel. If this confession is not
wrung from us but cheerfully made, this is only possible because it we have
heard the liberating news of the gospel and now know that God does not want
the death of the sinner but that he turn from his sin and live. This confession of
sin can only be made in the light of the gospel. The law can produce fear, terror,
and remorse (as well as hatred and hostility toward God when unaccompanied
by the gospel), but only the gospel can elicit from a person a genuine confession
of sins.
Therefore, the gospel seems to function in a dual capacity at this point of
transition. First, it performs its opus alienum by confirming the judgment of the
law, then it carries out its opus proprium by bestowing on the penitent sinner the
gift of forgiveness and all the other gifts of Christ that are bound up with salvation. In other words, the fact that the gospel is for sinners, and only for sinners,
means that if I am forgiven then I am a sinner.123 Confession of sins is the re123This point has been emphasized by James Nestingen, "Preaching

Repentance," in Lutheran Quarterly NF 3 (1989): 259-262. He goes so far as to say
that when the gospel enters the law's realm it, in effect, "overlaps" it. He points
out that Luther spoke in just this way in his Commentary on Hebrews where he
discussed God's alien and strange work (AE 29,135). "So the Spirit through the
gospel takes hold of the law and without intermixing them, joins them to make
them both function in the very same words" (260). He cites the first commandment as an example of both law and gospel: the gospel bestowing what the law
demands. And he finds another instance of the overlap between law and gospel
in the words, "Zacchaeus, I am coming to your house today" (Luke 19: 5). He also
acknowledges that it is only under the power of the gospel that repentance can
come to its true end: faith. "When the gospel enters, it overlaps the law, confirming its requirement and accusation by bringing the law to its true end in Christ"
(261). We, for our part, prefer to talk about the law being pulled along by the
gospel in order to avoid any suggestion that the "overlap" between law and gos-
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verse side of forgiveness. There can be no forgiveness if there is no sin to forgive,
no cure if there is no disease to cure. Therefore, while the gospel, properly speaking, is not demand but pure gift, the very reception of the gospel implies that I
am a sinner.124 This is the recognition the penitent will come to as a result of
God's twofold way of acting through law and gospel, each working in its own
way doing only what it can do, and yet neither being able to complete its work
without the other. Both work here in the closest possible way, and yet there is no
confusion or bridge between them. The work of the law prepares us for the work
of the gospel. But that final transition cannot be effected without the gospel taking the law in tow. Nevertheless, when the gospel is preached following the law
in a way that first confirms the judgment of the law, it is not yet doing its own
proper work but is first completing the work of the law by bringing it to its tiitoc.
Although the presence of the gospel and its acceptance already implies
that I am an sinner. It would be wrong to say that the gospel announces: You are
a sinner, but you are forgiven; or even the milder form: As a sinner you are forgiven, for that might suggest that the proprium of the gospel is something more
than gift of absolution.125 Nonetheless, if I am forgiven, the implication is that I
pel amounts to a bridge between them, even if it it is projected from the side of
the gospel.
124Luther

says in 1 AD, Arg. 19 that when Christ commands
repentance he shows that people are sinners and transgressors of the law, and
that they cannot avoid the condemnation of the law in any other way than by
believing the gospel message that Christ has satisfied the law (WA 39 I, 393,1215).
125Luther expressly says in 1 AD, Arg. 16 that the gospel does not convict sin but shows that law convicts sins (WA 39 I, 388,14-15). However, in 1 AD,
Arg. 37 he says that to preach forgiveness is to indicate and show the presence of
sin, and that fulfillment cannot be understood unless the law is understood, and
hence forgiveness of sins cannot be understood unless it is first known what sin,
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am a sinner, and that really only becomes clear after forgiveness. This is no concession to the antinomians, for they begin with the gospel and end with the
law.126 We are suggesting however that the movement from law to gospel may
be followed by a backward look at our former plight in the light of the gospel.
Although we may have confessed our sins before absolution, we could not fully
comprehend the gravity of our lost condition before viewing it retrospectivly in
the light of the gospel. The recognition of the magnitude of my sin coram Deo is
only possible only through faith. This is not a move back to the law for faith in
Christ has freed us from the law, for this retrospective view can only be had from
a vantage point outside the law, in the light of the gospel. However, we may not
simply dismiss the law at this point as if, having played its part in bringing us to
faith in Christ, it is now redundant. The truth rather is that the law now takes on
a new role for Christians qua sancti, no longer that of lex condemnatrix but as
teacher and companion, guiding our feet in the way of truth. It is the law that
can be praised by the psalmist as that which is a lamp to our feet as a light to our
path (Ps. 119: 105). But this law that the psamist loved (Ps. 119: 97) is not the lex
proprie dicta, which is the lex implenda, but rather the lex impleta. However, once
we talk about the lex impleta, we are really talking more about the gospel than the
law, for the lex impleta is the lex iucunda, whose fulfillment is given us in Christ
and that can only be known through the law (416, 10-14). Thus Luther says that
the gospel both presupposes and shows the presence of sin.
1260ne cannot establish a "law" as to how exactly God will use law and
gospel to bring about faith. It may be that the gospel (in the broad sense) first
agrees with the law in telling us that we are sinners, and then it forgives us; in the
antinomian view, it first forgives us and then tells us that we are sinners. Thus
for Luther the thrust or overall movement is always from law to gospel, whereas
for the antinomians it is always from gospel to law.
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per fidem. This is consistent with the fact that the law that is delighted in by the
psamist is the rr''') in, which is certainly not law in the sense in which Luther
understands lex, but is often equivalent to God's word (that is, law and gospel),
and in many places to the gospel itself. It is for this reason that we have our
reservations as to whether the the term tertius usus legis is best way of describing
the Christianir, in which accompanies the saints on their pilgrimage to heaven.
Further discussion however will have to be deferred until a later section.
Fulfillment and Abrogation of the Law
One of the most common statements made in the disputations is that
Christ fulfilled the law; in fact the term "fulfiller of the law" becomes almost a
christological title.127 However, Luther also knows that Christ's fulfillment went
far beyond the demands of the law; he did not just fulfill the law measure for
measure, but he did so i)Irernrepi creiSco .128 There is no exact correspondence
between the law's demands and Christ's fulfillment, otherwise the law finally
would be served by Christ instead of serving Christ.129 The fulfilment is never
127See,

for example, WA 39 I, 367, 9 (1 AD, Arg. 2); 392, 11 (1 AD, Arg.
18); 393, 5-6 (1 AD, Arg. 19). The titles mediator, salvator, and impletor legis coincide.
128WA 39 I, 367, 2-3 (1 AD, Arg. 2): is [scil. agnus Dei] praestitit abunde,
quod lex requirebat. One could almost apply the words of Luke 6: 38 to Jesus'
fulfillment of the law. Luther is often careful in his formulations to stress the superabundance of Christ's fulfillment. This infinite "over-fulfillment" of the law by
Christ is also noted by Ragnar Bring, Gesetzz und Evangelium und der dritte
Gebrauch des Gesetzes in der lutherischen Theologie ( Helsinki: Akateeminen
Kirjakauppa, 1943). The law does not set a limit to the gospel which happens
when they are regarded as commensurate.
129Cf. WA 39 I, 353, 39-40 (ATh IV, Th. 34): Vult [scil. lex] enim ab initio
peccati per Adam perpetrati, usque quo per Christum victorem impleatur doceri, nosci, et
regnare. This passage is also interesting because it ascribes to the law (before it is
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merely the fulfillment of the old in the sense of its continuation and end, but it is
a new thing which can never be contained by the old but always fills it to overflowing, indeed bursts it, just as Jesus said that new wine (pointing to the joy of
the kingdom) calls for new wineskins (Mark 2: 22).130
Luther knows that the law has not just been fulfilled in Christ but also abrogated; indeed, its fulfillment is at the same time its abrogation.131 Furthermore,
there are also statements to the effect that Christ overpowered the law and now
keeps it in check in order that it might not drive us to despair.132 He robbed it of
its power to condemn by breaking the curse of the law through his perfect obedience that we might be free from its curse and through him begin to fulfill the
law.133 Thus, Christ takes the law into his own service. This way of speaking is
very closely connected to what we said earlier about Christ talking control of the
taken over by the gospel) the desire to be fulfilled by Christ. We would suggest
that that is a loose way of speaking.
130The eschatological abunde-dimension of the fulfillment also comes

out in Luther's remark that Christ restores the law in such a way that makes
Adam even better than he was: Quare non tollitur per Christum lex, sed restituitur,
ut fiat Adam talis, qualis fuit et etiam melior (WA 39 I, 354, 13-14 [ATh IV, Th. 41]).
This dimension is lost if we understand everything within the framework of the
lex aeterna, for then the gospel brings nothing decisively new. Instead of standing
in radical discontinuity with the present, it simply is a continuation of the past
which brings it to its proper fulfillment. See also Schloemann, Gesetz, 96-97, n.
296.
finis legis.

131WA 39 I, 482,15-16 (2 AD, Arg. 27): . . . Christum, qui est impletio et
132WA 39 I, 374, 5-8 (1 AD, Arg. 7): Habet et decalogus suum praefinitum

tempus, quo scilicet Christus in carne apparuit et sese legi subiecit, is ademit ei ius et
cornpescuit eius sententiam, ne posset in desperationem adigere, et condemnare.
133WA 39 I, 386, 13-15 (1 AD, Arg. 15).
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law and turning it into a paedagogus to himself However, our concern here is
with the fulfillment and abrogation of the law.
Unlike the antinomians, who know only of a simplex abrogatio legis (the
year one), Luther consistently speaks of a duplex abrogatio legis, first in Christ and
in us through faith, the second in us fully and realiter at our death. For now it has
been abolished for us only insofar as we are saints and righteous imputative, on
the other hand, insofar as we are still sinners, the law also remains in force for
our caro.134 However, this is simply the reverse of the double fulfillment of the
law: the first (primum) and principal fulfillment being Christ's, which is imputed
to us through faith; the second (deinde/insuper) fulfillment being that which takes
place and must take place (here Luther uses the gerundive at times) in us through
the agency of the Holy Spirit. The former is the perfect fulfillment wrought by
Christ, which is imputed to us through faith, the latter is the inchoative fulfillment, which has already begun in us expurgative135 by the power of the Spirit
134Variations on this formulation are sprinkled throughhout the dispu-

tations, for example, WA 39 I, 379,16-380, 8 (1 AD, Arg. 12).
135Hermann, Zum Streit, 30 n. 10 points out that imputative and for-

maliter are scholastic terms and that therefore there is always some risk involved
in taking words like this across and fitting them into a different conceptual
schema. Here the danger could be that the imputation of Christ's righteousness
may seem more preliminary and unreal than the final, proper formaliter fulfillment
at the resurrection. However, this would amount to following the Augustinian
distinction between the res and res signata. In this case the res would be the
imputative corresponding to Augustine's gratia inspirationis, while the res signata
the formaliter corresponding to the gratia remissionis. According to this scheme of
things the imputed iustitia or remissio etc. would be lower, less real, and less
important than its higher, more real, spiritual counterpart in the process of
salvation to which it merely points. That however is manifestly not how Luther
understands these terms. He has taken them into the service of the gospel so that
they have been cleansed of any of the above connotations. Nevertheless,
Hermann wonders whether Luther does not enter a danger zone when in
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through the means of grace, and which will be brought to completion formaliter at
the resurrection on the last day.136 We hope to show later that it is just in connection with the fulfillment of the law in us expurgative by the Spirit that the law
plays its normative role. For here the law remains the rule and norm [Mafistarb
and Richtschnur] for the battle against sin.
This twofold fulfillment and abrogation of the law along with the double
cessation of sin is an important aspect of Luther's doctrine of the law. Because
the antinomians do not accept that Christians are simul iusti et peccatores, they
claim, on the basis of Romans 6: 14, where Paul says that we are not under law
but under grace, that the law has been abrogated entirely.137 Luther agrees, but
with this important qualification: The law has been abrogated only for faith, not
for the acipt. Since the antinomians reject the Pauline teaching that the baptized
are at one and the same time (simu/) saints and sinners, and are subject to the
connection with the abrogatio legis, following on from this line of thinking, he
posits that the law ceases first [primum] through forgiveness, and that on top of
that [insuperj God gives the Holy Spirit that we may begin to fulfill it already
here. Insuper/deinde is then is to be understood in the sense of "along with that,"
and not "pulled forward from above," as we have it in the Augustinian way of
thinking.
136WA

39 I, 383, 5-13 (1 AD, Arg. 14); 444, 4-6 (2 AD, Arg. 7) et passim.
Another way of expressing the double fulfillment of the law is to say that it is fulfilled by both faith and love: first by faith through the imputation of Christ's own
fulfillment, and then by love as the law is fulfilled by us and in us through the
power of the Holy Spirit (cf. Rom. 13: 10).
137WA 39 I, 373, 15-18 (1 AD, Arg. 7). WA 39 I, 356, 27-32 (ATh V, Th.
46-48): The antinomians think that sin has been removed formaliter et philosophice
seu iuridice (Th. 46), whereas Luther maintains that it has been removed relative,
not formaliter aut substantialiter (Th. 48); cf. 355, 34-40 (ATh V, Th. 29-32): Luther
says that to think that the law has been removed is as ludicrous as in vacuo theatro
ludos fingere et spectare (Th. 32). This tells against the perfectionist thinking of the
antinomians which results from their false realized eschatology.
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battle between the scrcirg and the nve.iii.ta (Gal. 5: 17; cf. Rom. 7: 13-25), they are
unable to understand properly what Paul means when he says that the pii are not
under law but under grace.138 Galatians 5: 18 spells it out even more clearly: ci
8e ayElSgatt CiyEaee, ovx icrie inth voiLov. Conversely, those not led by the Spirit
are under the law. As we will see below, that also includes Christians insofar as
they are still a Gig. Luther encapsulates this antithesis in a remarkable statement:
Quatenus ergo lex impleta est, eatenus sublata. In Christo est impleta perfecte, in nobis
non, quia hoc firma fide non credimus.139 At first glance it appears from the context
as if Luther is talking about two stages,140 one preliminary and the other final:
The first corresponding to the forgiveness of sins on the basis of Christ's imputation, the second to the gift of the Spirit and what he works in us with that fulfillment.141 However, we know already from the way Luther ties justification
and sanctification together, that we would be going against his sense if we were
to interpret the statement in question in such a way as to pull these two apart and
turn them into two stages, thus separating the Spirit from the gift of forgiveness.
In fact, sanctification is nothing more than the Spirit's application of forgiveness
to the life of the baptized. On the one hand, sanctification never advances to the
138For

a discussion of the differences which Ebeling sees between Paul
and Luther in their understanding of the abrogatio legis, see, Erwiigungen zur Lehre
vom Gesetz, 281-293.
139WA

39 I, 380, 6-8 (1 AD, Arg. 12).

140The clue is the insuper (380, 5), which is usually accompanied by its
counterpart primum, but not here. These terms will be discussed below.

380, 5: Insuper dat Spiritum sanctum, ut incipiamus hic implere.
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point where we are not in need of forgiveness; on the other, the Spirit is already
given fully with forgiveness.
We have seen that Luther's understanding of Christ's fulfillment of the
law, which is a central soteriological tenet of his theology, is sloped in such a way
that Christ does not end up becoming the servant of the law, but that in fulfilling
the law he overcame it as lex accusatrix et exactrix and takes it into his service so
that the lex impleta is now no longer an enemy of the sancti but a teacher and
guide. The law is abolished insofar as it condemns us, hence the law as revelatio
irae Dei. It is now newly grounded in Christ through his action and is fulfillible
by us and in us through the Spirit. In that sense he gives us the lex back as
iucunda, but since sin still clings to us our joy in the law is not yet full.142 In the
futura vita love for God will no longer be commanded because it will be a present
reality, and the decalogus, while it will remain forever as God's will, will not be
present as lex but as res, for what it demands here will be present there realiter.143
Luther's logic is worth pondering here. It is as if he delivers a grand tour de force
when he asserts, contra antinomos, that the law does not even cease in heaven, but
then quickly qualifies it by saying that in heaven it will not exist as lex (because
there will be nothing to demand or condemn) but only as res.144 It is as if Luther
142WA 39 I, 374, 14-16 (1 AD, Arg. 7): Sic legis exactio est illis, qui extra

Christum sunt, tristis, odiosa, impossibilis. Econtra iis, qui sub Christo sunt, incipit fieri
iucunda, possibilis in primitiis, tamen non decimis.
143WA 39 I, 413,17-18 (1 AD, Arg. 34). Cf. the note above on what
Luther means by the decalogus ist aeternus.
144There is an echo of this idea in Luther's second Thesenreihe where he

says that in the futura vita, that which the law demands here, namely, the creatura
nova, will continue as a fulfilled reality. Therefore—and this is the part most relevant to our discussion—the law will never be abolished [tolleri] in all eternity, but
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distinguishes between the content and the form of the law. Here on earth, post
lapsum, the law can take no other form than that of lex accusatrix et exactrix et
condemnatrix, even though now by faith we already begin to experience the lex as
iucunda (= iucunditas legis) as Adam did in the earthly paradise and as we will do

so fully in the heavenly paradise. However, because for sinners form and content
are inseparable, we can only confess the goodness of the law as a gift of faith. In
this life however the demanding and accusing law has been abolished for faith,
but not yet for the caro on account of the remnant of sin. Therefore, on the one
hand, the law is fulfilled and, on the other, it is not yet fulfilled, but is being
fulfilled: Sub Christo igitur lex est in fieri esse, non in facto esse.145 This, as we have
will go on being fulfilled in the damned or already fulfilled in the blessed [vel
implenda in damnatis, yel impleta in beatis] (WA 39 I, 350,1-4 [Th. 46, 47]). Since in
heaven the pii will be without sin the lex impleta will not even be experienced as
lex but only as res. Here the content of the law, which in its sum and essence is
love, will also be its structure, for love will characterize the relationship between
God and the saints in heaven forever. On the other hand, for the impii, whose sin
remains unforgiven, the law will never cease being the accusing, demanding and
condemning lex implenda. Since the curse of the law is banished only in Christ,
the damnati, who have chosen to remain forever apart from Christ, will be forced
to exist forever under the maledictum legis. Therefore, the law remains forever,
either in the form of blessing for the beati, where it ceases as lex altogether and
becomes entirely res (synonymous with love), or in the form of curse (the full
sensus legis) for the damnati, where it must necessarily be experienced as nothing
but lex (synonymous with wrath).
It is important to note that Luther's statements about the perpetuity of the
law offer no support for the scholastic doctrine of the lex aeterna which was commented on above. This is expressly excluded by the qualifications he adds at
both ends: the law in the earthly paradise was not a true lex and in the heavenly
paradise it will remain only as res. Luther's assertions about the "eternity" of the
law are probably best understood as a bold attempt on his part to counter the
antinomian assertions that the law was purely temporary. In our opinion, the argument is weak theologically even though logically it is quite compelling. This
may be an instance of where he allows himself to be overly influenced by his opponents, at least partially.
145WA 39 I, 374, 11-12 (1 AD, Arg. 7).
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seen, is the reverse of the duplex abolitio legis: To the extent that it is fulfilled it is
abolished; but to the extent that we are still sinners it remains.146 For those
outside of Christ the law remains loathesome and impossible; for those under
Christ it begins to become delightful and partly possible. Luther therefore
concludes: The law should be taught to Christians, not propter fidem, for in faith
the Christian's spirit is subject to no law (cf. Gal. 5: 1), but propter carnem, for the
flesh resists the Spirit in the saints.147
In the light of the above, we see that when we speak of the impletio legis we
must say two things: one from the standpoint of the gospel, the other from the
standpoint of the law. On the one hand, Christ is the TiXoc of the law in the
twofold sense of its fulfillment and end (Rom. 10: 4). Indeed, for faith Christ is
the end of the law both as an historical fact as well as privatim again and again for
individual believers.148 Christ was and always will be the end of the lex accusans
146WA

39 I, 380, 6-8 (1 AD, Arg. 12): Quatenus ergo lex impleta est, eatenus sublata. In Christo est impleta perfecte, in nobis non, quia hoc firma fide non
credimus.
1.471bid.,
148WA

374, 16-18.

39 I, 367, 13-14 (1 AD, Arg. 2): Ideo tempore loannis cessaverunt lex
et prophetae, quo Christus apparuit. Sic privatim fit cum quolibet homine. Ebeling,
Erwiigungen zur Lehre vom Gesetz, 269-71 notes that whereas Paul sees the tempus
legis and tempus evangelii in strictly historical sequence, Luther interprets this in a
dialectic way, in the sense of law and gospel, rather than seeing the two as
mutually exclusive, representing two eras: then and now, old and new. In other
words, Ebeling suggests (and he is here only repeating what New Testament
scholars have generally observed, although not always properly understanding
Luther) that in Luther law and gospel are stripped of the concrete historical references which they bear in Paul and are made into hard and fast general basic
concepts of theology, so that they find a more universal application than in Paul.
Ebeling is right in observing (p. 288) that Luther found justification for extending
the Pauline notion of the law on the basis of Rom. 2: 14-16, where the apostle
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for faith. And whenever the lex accuses the pii and tries to enter the conscience,
John the monstrator agni will continue to point them to Christ, the agnus Dei, who
in his office as both victima et victor, willingly submitted to the law and overcame
it. When Christ comes the law must be told not to overstep its limits,149 for he is
the end of the law for faith, first imputative and then also formaliter et expurgative.150 On the other hand, insofar as a remnant of sin adheres to our flesh, the

law must remain, for Christians need the law as a monitor on account of the continual battle waged by the flesh against the Spirit.151 However, it is one thing to
say that the law must remain quoad carnem, it is an all together different thing to
posit that the law also remains for faith. It is the difference between the lex impleta and the lex implenda. Luther insists that only the former is to be preached to

the saints, for the conscience must not be burdened by any demands made by the
law. The lex impleta is given to faith and to preach that is to preach gospel not
law. On the other hand, Luther often says that it is not enough that Christ has
fulfilled the law, it must also be fulfilled in us (which Luther will often qualify by
adding: through the Spirit). This is the lex implenda which is to be preached to the
speaks of the law written on the hearts of all people. Three steps are involved in
the universal interpretation and application of the of Old Testament law. First,
the traditional doctrine of the lex naturalis; secondly, the reduction of the lex Mosi
(as a result of the abrogatio legis that took place in Christ) to the lex months of the
Decalogue; and thirdly, the identification of the lex naturalis and the Decalogue.
low A 39 I, 445, 13-16 (2 AD, Arg. 8): Sic quando agitur de lege, agitur de
natura et vi et effectu legis, quid ipsa per sese possit, sed cum docetur lex, succedit seu
subintrat Evangelium: Audi, inquiens, o lex, vide, ne extra tuas regiones our saepta
transilias. Cf. 39 I, 478, 20-479, 6 (2 AD, Arg. 25), where Christ says to the law:
Ecce me, qui facio pro illis, quod exigis, desine (479, 5-6).
150WA

39 I, 434, 1-435, 13 (2 AD, Arg. 3).

151WA

39 I, 432, 14-433, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 3).
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old Adam, that is, to Christians insofar as they are still sinners. But we will see
later, that this needs to be done carefully, lest the law overstep its bounds and
attempts to enter the conscience. This whole matter is very closely related to the
problem of the tertius usus legis, and will need to be taken up again in that
context.
Faith and the Law
In this part we will focus on the abiding role that the law plays in the vita
christiana and why Luther is so insistent that it must continue to be taught in the
church. The discussion will be couched within the framework of justification and
sanctification which we shall discuss below before turning our attention to the
main topic of this part: the preaching of parenesis, the place of good works, and
the problem of the so-called tertius usus legis. Whatever else is discussed will be
tangential rather than central.
Justification and Sanctification
This section will be kept very short for our intention is not to explicate
Luther's doctrines of justification and sanctification for themselves, but only to
make such comments as are necessary to provide a framework within which to
develop our discussion of the role of the law in the Christian life. Some of the
following points have already been made earlier in this chapter but they will be
briefly repeated, not just for the sake of completeness, but to show how Luther
consistently applies his key emphases to various doctrines.
Critical to the understanding of justification and sanctification in Luther is
the recognition that these two doctrines, representing two ways in which God
acts in the life of the Christian, are different and must therefore be distinguished,
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and yet they are of a piece and must not be pulled apart. Justification, while
logically prior to sanctification and independent of it, never occurs without it.
Although Luther will often distinguish between these two doctrines in the disputations with terms such as primum-deinde/insuper, the primum does not signal a
temporal but logical sequence between them. On the other hand, the deinde or
insuper, which balances the primum, indicates the inseparability of justification
and sanctification in Luther's mind.152 If this sequential formulation occurs in
the disputations more noticeably and more consistently than anywhere else, it
may well be a polemic against the antinomians who hold that the law has been
terminated in Christ and is no longer existent. However, it would not be in
keeping with Luther's emphasis if we were to maintain that the reason that he so
consistently stresses the second member of this formulaic expression (introduced
by the deinde/insuper) is to remind the antinomians that it is not enough to teach
that Christ has fulfilled the law for us vicariously, for his fulfillment is also to go
on in us, albeit only as worked by the Holy Spirit.153 Although some of Luther's
formulations might suggest the interpretation that we are the ones who fulfill the
law in sanctification with the help of the Spirit, more often than not he makes it
152See WA 39 I, 380, 2-5 (1 AD, Arg. 12); 395, 20-24 (1 AD, Arg. 21).
This is connectd also to the end of the law; thus, 434, 1-10 (2 AD, Arg, 3): the law
ceases per Christum, primo imputative (through non-imputation and pardon) . . .
deinde expurgative (when per spiritum we begin to hate sin and do good works).
Justification and sanctification can no more be pulled apart than law and gospel
without losing the gospel.
153Hermann, Zum

Streit, 32, does not think that this formulation represents a second step following that of remissio and imputatio, but rather indicates
that the Holy Spirit, who is given, does not overfly the law. This then would
have a polemical overtone: The Spirit esteems it highly enough by effecting the
beginning of its fulfillment also in us here on earth [ut incipiamus hic implere],
while in the futura vita we will be like Christ the fulfiller (WA 39 I, 380, 5-6).
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clear that it is the Spirit (alternatively, the Christus in nobis) who fulfills it in us
(which of course happens through the Means of Grace, even though he may not
say that in so many words). We can hinder the fulfillment of the law in us, however we ourselves cannot fulfill it, but only live in and from the lex impleta given
to us in faith.
For Luther sanctification is simply the Spirit's application to the baptized
of the gifts received totaliter and gratis in justification, propter Christum per fidem.
There is a radical break between early and late Luther just at this point. In early
Luther, following Augustine, justification is sanctification. The core difference
between Augustine and the mature Luther is that for Augustine justification is
the renewal or gradual transformation of the believer into the image of Christ,
while for Luther it is the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of divine righteousness for Christ's sake. Both see justification as consisting of forgiveness and
renewal. Whereas Augustine understands justification primarily as renewal or
transformation, Luther does not see renewal as a part of justification but as its
fruit.154 Hence, the former conceives of it as a process that occurs within us (in
nobis), the latter as an act which God accomplishes for us (pro nobis) outside us
(extra nos). When justification is understood progressively and transformatively,
Christians are partly righteous and partly sinners [partim iusti, partim peccatores].
On the other hand, when it is understood forensically and imputatively, Christians are at one and the same time totally righteous jtotus

propter fidem, and

totally sinners, [totus peccatores], propter carnem. That is, to use the classical ex154Justification in Luther is used in two ways: 1) stricte dicta, it denotes

God's forensic declaration when he declares us righteous; 2) late dicta, it includes
regeneration and renewal, stretching from the imputation of righteousness
(justification) to our becoming righteous (the end of sanctification).
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pression, they are simul iusti et peccatores.155 As we have already seen, the big difference between Luther and the antinomians in respect to the doctrine of sanctification is precisely the simul. Another difference between Augustine and Luther:
according to Augustine, salvation results from the fulfillment of the law made
possible by the power of grace; for Luther, on the other hand, the law can only
begin to be fulfilled after we have first been justified and received Christ's perfect
fulfillment through faith. Consequently, each has a different view of the law: for
Augustine, the law drives people to Christ to seek power to fulfill the law in love
and humble obedience; for Luther, the law points people to Christ to receive from
him his own perfect fulfillment of the law; their own fulfillment of the law
through love to the neighbor will follow as a fruit of faith.
If Luther holds that the Christian is always simul iustus et peccator and that
justification and sanctification cannot be pulled apart without losing both, can he
also speak of growth or progress in sanctification? There are many passages in
Luther which would reject that notion altogether.156 Sanctification is simply to
believe the divine imputation and with it the totus peccator. Our holiness is never
ours but Christ's, just as our righteousness is always a iustitia aliena. On the other
hand, there are also many passages in Luther which suggest that the Christian
life is not lived on a flat continuum but that it oscillates continually between the
iustus and the peccator.157 He can even say that a Christian is partim sanctus, par155This has been amply documented by Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light Upon Luther's Way from Medieval Catholicism to
Evangelical Faith (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), 9-18.
156See Joest, Gesetz and Freiheit, 57-60.
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tim peccator.158 However, we must be cognizant of the fact that when we find
such expressions in the mature Luther, although the terminology is the same as
that of early Luther (hence Augustinian), it is freighted differently, for justification, though still inseparable from sanctification, is now distinguished from it in
that God imputes righteousness to faith in toto. However, this righteousness,
while given whole and without fractions imputative, is only the first fruits of the
Spirit [primitias spiritus] and not yet the tithes [decimas spiritus].159 First [primum],
the law is fulfilled for us imputative through faith, but then [deinde] it is also
fulfilled in us expurgative et formaliter by the power of the Spirit as we begin ex animo to hate all those things that offend the Spirit.160 Again, when Luther says
that sin is removed formaliter et expurgative, because from day to day I more and
more [magis ac magis] cleanse and mortify the sin that inheres in my flesh, he is
not saying anything that contradicts the forgiveness given in toto in justification,
as is evident from the context.161 We should hasten to point out that although he
157Joest,

Ibid, 62, diagrammatizes this where the zigzag line, representing the transitus of the Christian life, oscillates between two lines representing
the totus peccator and the totus iustus.
158WA 39 I, 542, 5-6,18-19 (3 AD, Arg. 21).
159The Begriffspaar primitias spiritus - decimas spiritus does not occur in
the antinomian disputations, simply contrasting pair primitias - decimias (WA 39 I,
374, 16 [1 AD, Arg. 7]). The idea is also implicit in the use of the primum-deinde or
insuper schema to describe the duplex abrogatio legis or the twofold fulfillment of
the law (see next section for passages). However, the terms do occur in Luther's
1535 Galaterbriefvorlesung: WA 40 I, 364,12-18; 408, 12-14. They also occur in his
1519 Galaterbriefkommentar, but there they witness to the progressive nature of
justification which will only be complete with the decimas spiritus.

160WA 39 I, 395, 22-24 (1 AD, Arg. 21).
161WA 39 1, 432, 7-9 (2 AD, Arg. 3): Atque hoc modo formaliter et expurgative tollitur peccatum, quia hic de die in diem magis ac magis expurgo et mortifico
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speaks of himself here as the subject of the verbs, there is no doubt in the light of
other passages that he fully recognizes that the real factor is Christ and the Spirit.
The secret to understanding the relationship between the totus and the partim is to see them as two ways of speaking about justification: it is totus coram Deo
and partim coram mundo. There is no conflict between the simul and the partim,
once the divine imputation has destroyed all thinking based on the Aristotelicum
dogma that practise makes perfect, and that the way to become holy is by practising to live a holy life. Luther, on the other hand, says that first God makes us
holy, then we live a holy life. He stands Aristotle on his head. So too the only
way correctly to interpret what Luther means by growth or progress in sanctification is to reverse all human ideas of progress, and to understand it eschatologically. Progress then is not our upward movement to the goal, but the goal's
movement down to and into us per Spiritum sanctum. The bestowal of the iustitia
imputativa propter Christum per fidem initiates the great battle between the Spiritus
and the caro which takes place in all the baptized and of which they also are a
part. It is this activity of the Christ and his Spirit dwelling in us by faith and the
imputed righteousness that gradually drives out sin and overcomes the resistance of the flesh and begins to make us in re (partim) what we already are in fide
and will be in spe (totus). Complete sanctification is always the same as justification, never more or less. Sanctification is not the goal but the life of good
works. "The way is not from the partial to the whole, but from the whole to the
peccatum adhuc haerens in came mea . . . . The more the battle against sin is
engaged, the more sin recedes expurgative et formaliter. When Luther says this
he is not saying that we gradually become less and less sinful and need correspondingly less forgiveness. Rather, it means that the more sin is expelled by the
Spirit through the means of grace, the more we will be ruled by the Spirit instead
of the flesh.
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partial. The movement is not up but down. "The good works that result are not
building blocks in the progress of the Christian; they are the fruit of the whole,
the 'good tree.'"162 In other words, any progress in the Christian life is not a
human achievement, but nothing more than the fruit of the Holy Spirit. Luther
makes this clear when he says that the iustitia legis is first fulfilled in us by
imputation-and now the important point-then also formaliter, yet not by us but
by the grace of God who sent his Son in the flesh.163 Again, Christ fulfilled the
whole law for us, he did it all [totum]; we, on the other hand, can only keep it in
part [ex parte], and even then not by our own strength but by the power of the
Holy Spirit.164
Faith always issues in good works. They are produced sponte et hilariter by
the indwelling Spirit.165 The works are a mark of a faith, yet the works them162Thus, Gerhard 0. Forde, "Eleventh Locus: Christian Life: 3. Justification and This World," in, Christian Dogmatics, vol. 2, ed. Carl E. Braaten and
Robert W. Jenson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 435. Sanctification is so often wrongly identified with good works instead of seen as their presupposition.
Forde follows Joest fairly closely and also reproduces his diagrams. Although he
does not distinguish between early and late Luther, at least he interprets his early
writings in the light of the his later ones. Hence, he rightly sees no conflict between the simul and the partim, even though he can cite Luther's early ROmerbriefvorlesung alongside his 1531/35 Galaterbriefvorlesung without seeing any conflict.
163WA

39 I, 383, 8-10 (1 AD, Arg. 14).

164WA

39 I, 468, 10-469, 3 (2 AD, Arg. 16).

165The terms spote et hilariter do not occur in the disputatons, yet they
accurately mirror Luther's thinking about works. Joest, Gesetz and Freiheit, 109113, shows that when the law is used as parenesis, there is no limitation placed
on the hilariter and spontaneitas of faith. Luther also uses the term the delightful
term quellende Liebe (again outside the disputations) to describe how God's love
fills us to overflowing so that the love we show to the neighbor is not really our
love at all but God's love working through us. That such love (= good works) is
spontaneous is without question. On the term quellende Liebe, see Hans Joachim
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selves are good only because they are done in faith and are forgiven. Where
there are no works there is no faith, although we can never use our good works
to prove or measure our faith.166 Luther has to remind the antinomians of this by
stressing the twofold fulfillment and abrogation of the law, first in Christ then in
us, for they know only a simplex abrogatio and thus know nothing about the simul
and the partim of the Christian life in which the spiritus is engaged in continual
battle with the caro. They reject the teaching that the pii are simul iusti et peccatores
on the grounds that it is a logical impossibility: Contraria non possunt esse partes
eiusdem.167 Luther sees their denial of sin (which amounts to a false realized
eschatology) with its attendant securitas as an open door to Satan. When the
watchmen are asleep the city falls into the hands of the enemy without a fight.
Iwand, Nachgelassene Werke, ed. Helmut Gollwitzer et al., vol. 5: Luthers Theologie,
ed. Johann Haar (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1974), 141-47.
166It is the temptation of the Protestant pietists, particularly of the Re-

formed mold, to use their works to measure their faith. But this is finally to misuse them and to lose them. As soon as we begin to contemplate our good works
they cease to be good. It is not by chance that Jesus warned his disciples to beware of practising their piety in front of people in order to be seen by them, for in
so doing they will miss out on their reward in heaven (Matt. 6: 1).
167WA 39 I, 375, 15 (1 AD, Arg. 8). Luther's responsio to this argument= could easily be interpreted in an Augustinian partim iustus—partim peccator
direction if it were not for other clear passages which would contradict that.
Thus, for example: Cum sanitas perfecta est, morbus excluditur. Sed fide nondum
perfecte sumus sani, sed sanandi. Samaritanus coepit sanare eum, qui in latrones
ceciderat. Ideoque morbus nondum est plane sanatus, sed subinde molestat nos (376, 58). It would seem as though Luther here has forgotten the total aspect in favor of
the partial. Gerd Rosenberger, "Gesetz and Evangelium in Luthers
Antinomerdisputationen" (Unpublished Dissertation; Mainz, 1958), 59-65, rightly
questions Joest's attempt to interpret the relationship between the totus and the
partim in terms of complementarity and thinks that he is in danger of
surrendering the totus iustus—totus peccator aspect of justification, which Luther
always upholds, in trying to make sense of the partim—partim aspect.
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Therefore, as we will see later, one of the key tasks of preaching parenesis in the
church is to summon the saints to watchfulness and to join the battle against sin,
the flesh and Satan. This like good works is also a fruit of faith.
Preaching Law to the Baptized
Not only does Luther say that the law has been fulfilled and overcome, but
following Paul he also says that faith confirms or upholds the law (Rom. 3: 31:
vagov ovv xorrapyoihiev Sax Tqc niatE(.0c; tth yEvotto• Cal.& vattov iattivoitev).168 But what does Luther mean by that? Surely nothing more than the fact
that faith acknowledges that the law, by exposing our sin and putting us under
judgment, blocks all attempts on our part to justify ourselves g gpyco v (Eph. 2:9).
To put it positively, faith confesses that we are freely justified ro pts 'ipra v vOgov
(Rom. 3: 28), that is, without the help of the law. However, Luther, following
Paul, does not deny that the law does has a God-given role in preparing us for
the gospel, although it plays no role in justification itself. In other words, as he
has ofen argued, the law is not the causa efficiens of justification. Furthermore, he
also makes it clear that the law plays a role after justification, that is, in the vita
christiana, which differs from that before justification. However, as we have already indicated, the term tertius usus legis is not the most helpful way of describing this. In a later section will suggest other ways of speaking about the role of
the law in the Christian life which may be more faithful to Luther.
168WA 39 I, 466, 18-21 (2 AD, Arg. 15): Luther cites this passage to

show that the skilled pastor must be able to rightly divide the word of God. The
feroces et impii need a hammer, whereas the pii are to be told that Christum
implesse legem and that they are forgiven. Here of course, as we have seen before,
what applies to the ferox et impius also applies to the Christian quoad carnem.
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We have already pointed out that when Luther speaks of faith and the law
he says two things. On the one hand, the law has been abolished by Christ who
is the end of the law; on the other hand, the law cannot be abolished in this life
and must continue to be taught in the church, both on account of the impii, on the
one hand, and of the pii, on the other, who still have to fight the remnant of sin in
the flesh. In a moment we will look more carefully at the role the law plays in the
battle against the caro in the vita christiana. But first we need to take this distinction between the abrogation and non-abrogation of the law a step further. It is
not enough to say that Luther merely teaches that the law must be retained because sin is not yet destroyed in our flesh. He also knows a postive function of
the law for faith since he knows that faith already experiences in part that joy and
delight in the law which our first parents experienced in the earthly paradise in
full measure, and which we too will one day experience perfectly in the paradise
of heaven when there will no longer be any sin to mar our joy.169 However, perhaps we can push this still a step further and say that our final joy in heaven will
not even be in the lex impleta but the lex impletor, Jesus himself. Important as it is
to recognize Luther's awareness that the lex in paradise is patterned after the gospel (in the sense of gift) and not the law, and that faith both restores protologically and anticipates eschatologically the lex iucunda, which finds its ultimate
expression and fulfillment in Jesus Christ, in whom all things hold together (Col.
1: 17), Luther himself never talks about the unity of law and gospel, in either the
169But, as we have seen, although Luther maintains that the law will

continue on for all eternity, in heaven it will no longer be as lex but as res, so that
when faith gives way to sight, our joy and delight will not be in the law as lex but
as res, in other words, not in the lex as such (which for Luther is stricte dicta the lex
accusatrix et exactrix, that is, the lex implenda) but in the fulfilled lex, the lex impleta.
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earthly or heavenly paradise, as do some of his modem interpreters,170 nor does
he say that the antithesis of law and gospel finds it unity in Jesus Christ.171 He is
content simply to say that Adam's experience of the law in paradise is altogether
different from our experience of the law outside of paradise on account of sin, but
that faith knows it to be God's good gift and can even now anticipate the joy of its
fulfillment in heaven. As we have already noted, when Luther speaks about the
gospel fulfilling the law and the restoration of all things, it is never just a restoration, but a totally new thing which is brought to pass, which while it might
be like the old is infinitely greater and entirely surpasses it.172 And just as we
170For

instance, Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 2d ed.,
trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966) 'the 2d. German ed.
was unavailable to the writer], 266: "The opposition between law and gospel in
the life of sinful man is only a transitional stage between their original unity and
their paradoxical Christian unity in the Christian life. This paradoxical Christian
unity consists in the fact that the Christian has not fulfilled God's law and stands
under its accusation and condemnation; yet he believes the gospel in spite of it
and thus in the midst of his sinful existence fulfills God's First Commandment."
This is certainly not the way Luther speaks. It is surprising that Althaus at this
point does not even refer to the lex implenda and the lex impleta. Another modem
Luther interpreter who betrays a Barthian influence by the way in which he
speaks about the functional unity of law and gospel is Wilfred Joest; see Gesetz
und Freiheit, 197-98. See our comments on this in the section on the Problem of
the Tertius Usus Legis. Still a further example of this tendency to want to build a
bridge between law and gospel is to be found in the Th. Hamack; see his Luthers
Theology, esp. 444461. He distinguishes between the Wesen and Amt of the law
and sees the Wesen as essentially one with the gospel. Rather than saying that in
its essence the law is ultimately one with the gospel, it is more faithful to Luther,
in our opinion, to speak about the way the law functions evangelically once it is
pulled into the service of the gospel.
171Contra

Peters, Gesetz und Evangelium, 318.

39 1, 354,11-14 (Am. IV, Th. 40, 41). Luther includes the lex
here in the restoration of all things, which means especially the lex iucunda of paradise, so that Adam may be just as he was, and even better.
172WA
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have seen that the lex of the earthly paradise is really no lex at all, so too it will be
restored in the heavenly paradise not as lex but as res, where we too will be like
Christ the fulfiller, and where the fulfillment will be beyond measure.173
Is there however another way in which we can talk positively about the
law in the Christian life? We discovered from our analysis in chapter three that
Luther preaches the law to Christians in two ways. The first is the milder parenetic appeal to lead a life worthy of the gospel. It encourages the pii to pray for
strength to overcome temptation, to be good soldiers of Christ, and to fight
against sin in the power of the Holy Spirit. The second way of preaching the law
is stringent by comparison because it is addressed to those who have lapsed from
the faith or who are impenitent. It warns them of the dire consequences of
securitas, where the danger of losing salvation is the greatest precisely because the
securi think that it cannot be lost.174 Now we need to ask how these two ways are
related to each other and whether preaching parenesis (admonition, exhortation,
warning and encouragement) is a preaching of law to the baptized, or whether,
as WilfriedJoest contends, it is a preaching of comfort, indeed ultimately even the
gospel itself. In other words, is parenesis equivalent to the tertius usus legis, is it
the application of the gospel (usus practicus evangelii) or is it something else? This
question will begin to be answered here but will be carried over and discussed
further in the next section where we deal with apostolic parenesis. The second
question that now arises is whether Luther knows of a normative or didactic use
173WA 39 I, 380, 6 (1 AD, Arg. 12).
174See our summary in connection with our analysis of 3 AD, Arg. 13.
The question of the nature and function of parenesis vis-à-vis the third use of the
law was also discussed in connection with the Arguments 4, 5, 40/13, and 45/18
of the Third Disputation.
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of the law (to use the terminology of the later dogmaticians) and if so in what
sense? These two questions are closely related.
Let us take the last question first. Luther certainly does not use the term
(usus) normativus in the disputations, but is there evidence that he understands
the law as rule and norm? In our opinion, Luther recognizes the normative authority of the law on account of its divine authorship, but does not see it in the
first instance as a rule and standard for instruction in the Chrstian life. Rather, it
seems that more often than not he uses the law in parenetic contexts in connection with the fight against the flesh because it marks out the lines of battle by exposing sin. This, we hold, is how Luther speaks about the normative authority of
the law. That is to say, using the later terms, it seems as if Luther connects the
usus normativus seu didacticus with the usus theologicus rather than positing it as an
independent tertius usus legis. To be confronted by the normative authority of the
law is to know that one's life is judged by it and found wanting. This naturally is
true also of Christians quoad carnem, but then they immediately appeal to Christ's
fulfillment given through faith. Now according to our reading of Luther these
things are all closely connected: being taught God's will by the Spirit through the
law, confessing our sin and our failure to do his will, and then looking to Christ
for forgiveness. The prayer "teach me your way, 0 Lord," which finds its answer
in scripture, always goes hand in hand with the prayer, "God, be merciful to me a
sinner." Therefore, we would contend that the usus didacticus does not occur in
isolation, but that insofar as we are sinners, we will also be reminded of our failure to do God's will ourselves and thus of our utter dependence on Christ our
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savior.175
Furthermore, we would contend that it is not Luther's customary practise
to say that the law teaches faith to do good works; rather, more often than not he
stresses that faith does good works because faith can do no other.176 However,
175Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, cites WA 39 I, 542, 16-17
(3 AD, Arg. 21): . . . sed utitur [evangelium] officio legis, insectari et arguere vitia et
instituere vitam, quomodo lam novi homines sancti novam vitam ingredi debeant, to
show that Luther knows of a function of the law (cf. tertius usus) that governs the
life of the saints. That is right as far as it goes but it does of go far enough. A
more careful reading of the passage reveals that Luther is speaking here about
the opus alienum of the law as it exposes and convicts sin, which is nothing else
then the usus elenchticus , and it is in this context that he further says that the law
teaches life [instituere vitam], that is, how the saints should live the new life. Our
point however is that both functions here belong together. It is precisely on the
basis of teaching the saint-sinners what God requires of them that the law convicts them of sin. In other words, we do not see in this passage any reference to
two different usus legis, but one and the same, namely, the usus theologicus. That
Luther is not suggesting here that the law teaches Christians qua saints the good
works required by God is further borne out by the fact that in this passage he is
specifically stressing contra antinomos that the law must be taught to Christians,
quia pii partim iusti sunt, partim peccatores (542, 5-6), and again: Cum itaque, ut supra
diximus, christianus sit vere Thomista vel gemellus, partim sanctus, partim peccator,
manent interea lex, peccata et mors (542, 17-19).
176 Rosenberger, Gesetz and Evangelium, 82-95, admits that prior to the

antinomian disputations Luther hardly ever speaks of the law as a Lebensnorm
but rather sees as its function the exposure of sin and exclusion of all attempts to
make oneself righteous coram Deo. He is convinced that in Luther's earlier writings from the Sermon von den guten Werken (1520) up to and including his Galaterbrief-vorlesung (1531), he consistently says that good works flow automatically
[sponte] from faith and do not need to be coerced. He concludes, especially with
reference to Luther's great Galatians commentary, that the law as such has no
weisende task for the Christian life. He sums up Luther's view by citing WA 40
146, 20-21: Quidquid autem de bonis operibus Theologicis dicitur, simpliciter soli fidei
tribuitur. The lex therefore has only das Amt des Transitus, and from this point of view
those who dispute the "Lutheran" character of the tertius usus legis are correct (95). (As
we mentioned in chapter 1 however, Rosenberger himself upholds the integrity
of the third use.) Although he himself does not point this out, Luther continues
to hold to his earlier line also in the disputations, or to be more precise, in the
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this does not exclude the fact that the law, in service to the gospel, stirs Christians
up to love and to good works and teaches them what good works are, since they
may well be deceived by the flesh into choosing to do those works which are
ultimately self-serving rather than neighbor-serving. If even righteous Adam
needed the warning of God to resist temptation, how much more do Christians,
on account of the sinful flesh, need the warnings, reproof and instruction of the
law, as well as the promises and consolation of the gospel, to do the will of God
in this life.ln
God uses the law in a normative way to show us our sin and to call us to
resist it in the power of the Spirit. However, when it comes to the actual fight,
the same holds true as in the case of Gideon's battle against the Midianites, where
the Lord did the fighting and Gideon (at his behest) simply claimed victory. In
the same way, we do not really fight sin at all, or better, we cannot win the battle
against sin ourselves, but the Lord does that for us through his word and Spirit.
That happens when God's law exposes our sin by telling us what God demands
of us and when we in repentance confess that we have not done it. However, as
we have already seen, when the law works under the control of the gospel, it
does not show us this demand in order that we might fulfill it ourselves but
Thesenreihen; thus see WA 39 I, 354,1-6 (ATh IV, Th. 35-37): 35. Sola vero fides in
Christo iustificat, sola implet legem, sola facit opera bona sine lege. 36. Sola enim accipit
remissionem peccatorum et sponte facit opera bona per charitatem. 37. Verum est post
iustificationem sponte sequi bona opera sine lege scilicet iuvante nec iam extorquente.
That, we would submit, is Luther's settled position: bona opera arise sponte ex fide
and without the coercion of the law. The fact that this is found in his Thesenreihe,
which comes from his own hand, and not just in a Nachschrift of the disputation,
makes it all the more compelling. Could it be that Rosenberger did not wish to
cite this because it runs counter to his thesis?
177See

et passim.

WA 39 I, 372, 14-373, 12 (1 AD, Arg. 6); 472, 5-15 (2 AD, Arg. 19)
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rather that we might be pointed to Christ as the fulfiller of the law pro nobis.
Therefore, the law that is preached to Christians is the lex impleta and not the lex
implenda. In other words, Christ gives us his fulfillment as we follow him in faith;
he does not ask us to strike out on our own thinking that, since he has fulfilled
the law, we now must follow his example and strive to fulfill it too with the help
of the Holy Spirit.178
On the basis of the foregoing we may conclude that the normative or
didactic use of the law is closely connected to the usus theologicus since it marks
out the battlefront for the ongoing war against the flesh and the onslaughts of
Satan. Therefore, for this reason alone, we would suggest that the isolation of
this usus (to take them as one) in a tertius usus, disconnected from the usus
theologicus, does not do full justice to Luther's understanding of the didactic
function of the law in the Christian life. The other reservations we might have
178It is often wrongly thought that the redemption won by Christ enables us now to fulfill the law ourselves with the help of his grace. This is
Augustinianism and Luther would have none of it. First, Christians can never
fulfill the law, not even with the aid of God's grace. We can only receive Christ's
fulfillment of the law as a gift, whence it ceases to be a burden and becomes a delight. Clearly, the flesh still needs to be cajoled and the lex exactrix has more than
enough muscle to attend to that, but Luther would insist that it dare not be
allowed to put me under its yoke and rob my conscience of that peace and certainty which I have through the gospel. Secondly, the theological presuppositions lying behind Augustine's way of thinking is such that it subverts the gospel
and ends up yoking it to the law instead of having the gospel press the law into
its own service. The result is catastrophic: The law as lex spiritualis remains
ultimate, and the gospel penultimate. As we have attempted to point out earlier,
we need to be very circumspect in our modus loquendi about Christ's fulfillment of
the law. There is a law-way of speaking about this which goes back to Augustine, and which turns the gospel into a nova lex; and there is a gospel-way of expressing it which Luther discovered when he broke with Augustine and began
speaking about the radical antithesis between law and gospel instead of their inner unity.
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over against the concept of a third use of the law will be mentioned when we
discuss this topic in a later section.
Luther makes it clear that the godly, who still have to battle sin in the caro,
may need to be admonished and convicted [moneri et argui] by the law lest they
fall asleep in their securitas. But again, the purpose of this parenesis is not to
teach Christians how to lead a God-pleasing life, but to summon them to pugna et
militia against the remnant of sin and the great many temptations which are common to every age. This comes out in the example Luther cites the of the christianus robustus adolescens who is sorely tempted by a formosa puella aut mulier.179 In
spite of the fact that he is baptizatus et iustificatus, he is so inflamed by passion that
the only thing that restrains him is the threat of disgrace and the fear of punishment. That is a good example of how the law must restrain the caro. But Luther
says there is another side to this story: If I am a Christian, my heart and the Holy
Spirit will cry out: Get behind me, Satan, and I will at once enter into a spirited
dialog with domina caro: be quiet, stop your urgings, I will not let you rouse me to
unchastity, adultery, or other shameful deeds against God. I will wait till God
gives me a woman of my own to love. For her sake I will leave this woman for
her husband and children. And now Luther makes a remarkable statement:
Words like these do not come from a human being but from Christ and the Holy
Spirit who say to my the heart: Leave this little girl in peace; I will give you
someone else in due time. What is so amazing is that Luther makes no mention
of the law till later. It is Christ and the Spirit who sustain the adolescens in his
battle against the flesh. Even though he is almost overcome by his sexual urges,
he neverthless heeds the Spirit, resists the flesh, and prays that he may not enter
179WA 39 I, 500, 16-501, 11 (3 AD, Arg. 2).
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into temptation. Only now does Luther say that he stands firm, keeping the
word and the law of God which says: Do not covet, and heeding the Holy Spirit,
who admonishes him regarding the will of God [obediens verbo et legi Dei . . . et
Spiritu sancto admonenti eum de hac voluntate Dei et non succumbit], and not succumbing. Following the example, Luther compares Christians with the ungodly
who know no battle against sin,180 whereas Christians resist temptation because
they know the law and are aware of the sin in their flesh. But if ever the godly
are in the midst of grave temptation (and here he is talking First Table not Second
Table) and they begin to doubt whether they are pleasing to God, Luther says
that they must tell Satan that he is a liar and get rid of him by reciting all the
great gospel promises in scripture.181
We have taken the liberty of citing this example at length because it is
instructive to see exactly how in Luther's view the baptized are resourced for the
battle against the flesh. Although we will discuss this later, it is worth noting
here already that in the midst of his temptation adolescens is not delivered by the
law, but is bouyed up by the Christ and the Spirit. At the same time, however,
Luther can say that in standing firm he heeds the commandment not to covet
(obviously we can assume here a pars pro toto), and yet even then he says that it is
the Spirit who admonishes him.
Such is the ongoing struggle of the spirit against the flesh which marks the
life of every baptized person which Paul reflects on in Romans 7 and in Galatians
5. The law and faith each plays its part in the fight against temptation: The
180WA 39 I, 501, 11-22 (3 AD, Arg. 2).
181WA 39 I, 500, 9-502, 12 (3 AD, Arg. 2).
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threats of the law are necessary to subdue the flesh, but yet the reason finally
why the Christian does not give in to temptation can be no better expressed than
with the words uttered by Joseph when he was tempted by Potiphar's wife: How
can I do this great wickedness and sin against God (Gen. 39: 9). That is how faith
speaks. Luther says that in such cases the Christian stands firm obediens verbo et
legi Dei . . . et Spiritu sancto admonenti eum de hac voluntate Dei. Again, if Christians
are tempted by avarice, for instance, they will not cheat and deceive even if they
have the chance because they know the law and understand that temptations will
come so long as they have the sinful flesh, which they must fight against day and
night.182 Where sin threatens to get the upper hand the law must be preached.
But to what end? To expose the sin hindering faith, to call people to fight against
the desires of the flesh, and to stir people up to love and good works (Heb. 10:
24). First, the sin must be named and exposed as contrary to the will of God, then
an appeal is made to confess this as sin and thus to defeat it, which is simply
living in one's Baptism. However, this appeal to resist sin and conquer it in the
name of Christ, no less than the exhortation to good works, is not strictly a
preaching of the law but of grace. In other words, the appeal and exhortation (=
parenesis) is based in the gospel and not in the law; to that extent Werner Elert is
quite correct when he distinguishes between imperatives of grace and
imperatives of the law. We will say more about the relation between parenesis
and the gospel later.
Luther sums up the connection between the law and spiritual warfare
when he says that the saints themselves also need the law as a kind of instructor
[quasi monitore quodam] because of the continual battle being waged within them
182Ibid.,

501, 9-18.
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between the spirit and the flesh, only that in the sancti et credentes this is not imputed propter Christum. Because he fights against sin it is not allowed to rule in
the saints. It is surely significant that Luther links monitor with bellum. The
monitor is one who warns and instructs.183 In parenesis these two functions are
closely interconnected.184 And the instruction here is in spiritual warfare, that is,
in the S/spirit's battle against the flesh. The law teaches us from scripture how to
be a good soldier (ars militiae). Here faith can profit from the teaching of the law.
It does not need to be told to do good works for it does them spontaneously. But
it does need to be instructed in the ways of the enemy and in the art of warfare; it
needs to be shown where its defences are weak, and to be roused to battle. However, insofar as we are still sinners [in quantum peccatores], complacent and indifferent to the dangers surrounding us, we must not only be instructed in the art of
warfare but also admonished to join battle against the flesh and to give it no opportunity to get us in its grip. Even though the pii have died to sin and are free
from sin, and thus free from the law, they need the law in this life to rouse them
to battle lest they be deceived by the father of lies into letting down their defenses
and thus become helpness in the face of the seductive temptations of the evil one.
What is needed here is not just knowledge of God's will. That has been clearly
written down in the Decalogue and inscribed on the mind of all Christians by the
183WA
184The

39 I, 432, 14-433, 1 (2 AD, Arg. 3).

pastor needs to warn and exhort his people to put on the
nav orAi a Tei eeoi.5 (Eph. 6: 10-18) and especially to take in their hand the gladius
eeind in the battle against the flesh. He needs to encourage them
spiritus (=
to use their Baptism as a bulwark against Satan (that is, to remind oneself that I
am baptized, that my name is linked with the triune God, and that Christ has
promised that I am his and he is mine and that he will let no evil befall me), to
keep alert at all times, and to pray for strength to overcome temptation.
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Spirit. What is needed is to know how to live as Christians in evil days (cf. Eph.
5: 15-20). Thus the apostle Paul has to remind his readers, in keeping with our
Lord's own admonition, to watch at all times, to wake from sleep, and to cast off
the gpya rov cric6r4:yoc and put on the OrX a to

Tog. He calls them to live

axrip6vw g and not to make any nri6voia cram* (Rom. 13: 11-14). One of the
great dangers posed by the antinomian teaching is that people were being persuaded that sin is harmless because it has been forgiven. Hence, Luther finds
himself warning them against securitas and indifference to spiritual warfare lest
they become drowsy, fall asleep [oscitantes et segnescentes] and finally perish.185
Therefore, God uses the discipline of the law to train us to be prepared for
the attacks of Satan by dying daily to sin and finding our refuge and strength
alone in Christ, who has already defeated Satan at Calvary and will destroy him
once and for all on the last day. On the other hand, insofar as we are righteous
[in quantum iusti] the law has been completely abolished because sin has beeen
abolished. That is the message that the baptized need to hear whenever they are
struggling against sin and temptation and feel as if they are fighting a losing battle. Then the gospel must be sounded loud and clear: It is not your battle, Christ
has already won it, he has defeated the foe for you, and invites you to enter into
his victory. It is like Gideon's battle against the Midianites, where the Lord did
the fighting and Gideon simply claimed the victory in the Lord's name. On the
other hand, insofar as we are still sinners [in quantum peccatores] the old Adam
needs to be killed and coerced by the law [lex implenda] so that it does not hinder
185WA

39 I, 510, 8-17 (3 AD, Arg. 4); cf. 513, 5-7 (3 AD, Arg. 5): the pii
need to be taught the law in order to admonish and encourage them to stay and
fight the battle, lest they themselves be overcome.
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the saints from doing good works. These then are the two poles of Luther's lawgospel dialectic, and the pastor must know which word is to be spoken to which
people at the proper time.
Therefore, he says that the saints are both under the law and not under the
law [sub lege et sine lege].186 In other words, even when the law is reminding us
that we are sinners, urging us to battle, and warning us of the grave dangers of
crossing the line and straying into enemy territory, we still need to be vigilant in
distinguishing law from gospel. For even if we admit that the Decalogue marks
out the boundaries within which faith will freely exercise itself in good works, it
can easily happen that the law wants to restrain, direct and control faith even
within this prescribed area and thus to rob it of its untrammeled freedom and
make it answerable to the law. When that happens the freedom of faith has been
transmuted into the obedience of faith, and faith, instead of being in control of
the law becomes controlled by it.187 It is at this point that one must protest with
Luther that we will forget the law and make new decalogues, as Jesus and the
186WA 39 I, 552, 11-12 (3 AD, Arg. 26): In quantum iustus, sublata est lex,
in quantum peccatores, manet lex. The baptized cannot live under law and gospel
simultaneously for then they would be in doubt as to whether the law applies to
them or the gospel. Hence, it is better to say that Christians live under the gospel
but that the law must still be applied to the old Adam.
187No

matter which way one looks at the idea of the obedience of faith
it will always be susceptible to a Barthian interpretation. The term is not used by
Luther. What exactly Paul means by i)nalco n rciatew c (Rom. 1: 5) is an exegetical
quandry. Here no less than elsewhere, exegesis is influenced by one's dogmatics.
In our opinion however the dogmatic question here is the more decisive. Barth's
understanding of faith as obedience does not rest on this passage. By the same
token, our rejection of the definition of faith as obedience is made independent of
the exegesis of this text. To call faith obedience presupposes the Barthian schema
of gospel-law where faith (which is a corelative of the gospel) is finally brought
within the compass of the law and serves the law rather than being served by it.
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apostles did, which are clearer than Moses just as the face of Christ is clearer than
the face of Moses.188 We mention this here only to make the point that whenever
the law is instructing Christians, whether in summoning them to fight sin or
stirring them up to do good works, it must never be allowed to enter the chamber
of the conscience and dicate to faith, so long as faith is wed to Christ, for then the
law has ceased being servant and is vying with Christ to become master. If this
interpretation is correct, and we are convinced it is, it calls for a reappraisal of the
usus normativus or usus didacticus and the way it functions in relation to the usus
elenchticus and the usus paedagogicus.
There are three key terms which must be discussed in connection with
preaching the law to the baptized. They are mitigata, mollienda, and praerogativa.
We will look briefly at each of these terms in context and then draw some conclusions.189 The first two occur within the same argumentum: Luther says that the
law has already been considerably softened through justification so that it ought
not terrify the justified [Lex est iam valde mitigata per iustificationem, quam habemus
188WA

39 1, 47, 27-30 (Thesen de fide, 1535; Th. 53, 54). Although these
theses predate the antinomian disputations, they agree with what we have heard
Luther say about the Decalogue. Note especially Th. 56: Quanto magic Paulus aut
perfectus Christianus plenus spiritu potest decalogum quendam ordinare et de omnibus
rectissime iudicare. Statements like these must be understood in context and can
never simply be asserted by themselves in isolation. To do so would be to make
the same error in the opposite direction as that which these assertions want to
counterbalance. However, Luther will insist that Christians can make their own
decalogues—and even better than Moses—in order to defend the freedom of the
gospel against those who want to put the novus homo under the law. This, as we
will see, is the ever present danger inherent in a so-called third use of the law,
where law and gospel may not be carefully distinguished.
189For a more detailed discussion of each of the terms the reader is referred back to the analyses in ch. 3.
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propter Christum, nec deberet ita terrere iustificatos]. He observes however that Satan
himself nevertheless often comes and sharpens the law beyond the limit [supra
modum exasperat] among the justified.190 Later he elaborates further on this. On
the other hand, he says that the law must be especially sharpened [acuenda] for
the impii as well as the pii who allow themselves to be led by the caro instead of
by the spiritus (cf. Gal. 5: 25), while on the other hand, he insists that it must be
softened [mollienda] for the pii and taught just as exhortation [Itaque lex illis mollienda est et quasi exhortationis loco docendal.191 He then illustrates this by referring
to three parenetic passages from the New Testament: Once you were heathen, but
now you have been sprinkled and washed with the blood of Christ (1 Cor. 6: 11; 1
Peter 1: 2). Now, therefore, offer your bodies for obedience to righteousness, put
off the desires of the flesh, and do not fashion yourself after this world (cf. Rom.
6: 12-19; 12: 1-2). Be emulators of the good works of righteousness, you are not
unrighteous, you are not condemned like Cain and so forth., you have Christ.
Finally, Luther says that the pii should be admonished and exhorted [monendi et
cohortandi causal to stay in the battle and fight, lest they allow themselves to be
enticed by the flesh.192 Therefore, the law is certainly taught to Christians—and
now comes the key word—but with some privilege [cum aliqua praerogatival,193
190WA 39 I, 474, 8-14 (2 AD, Arg. 21); cf. 349, 39-40 (ATh II, Th. 45): Lex

enim fait ante Christum, nos quidem accusans, sub Christo autem per remissionem
peccatorum placata, et deinceps spiritu implenda. The law that is to be fulfilled in us
is the law that has been "placated" through forgiveness.
191WA 39 I, 475,1-2 (2 AD, Arg. 21).
192Here he cites Micah 6: 8: Ambulate in sollicitudine cum Deo vestro.
193WA 513, 8-10 (3 AD, Arg. 5).
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because they triumph over the desires of the flesh and do not yield to sin, even if
they have opportunity.
The words are all closely related and mean much the same thing. In each
instance the term wants to highlight the different way in which the law is to be
used with the justified [pii] in comparison with the unjustified [impii]. As we
have already seen, Luther insists that the pii must not be burdened by the lex implenda, for they already have the lex impleta through faith. Hence, for Christians
the law is not burdensome or oppressive for it can no longer condemn them since
they have by imputation Christ's own fulfillment. This is the xp n ark Cul* of
Matthew 11:30, which is light because it is really no yoke at all. The burden has
been shouldered and the onus is his, both in terms of weight and responsibility.
That is why we can already begin to delight in the law. Not only is it what faith
wants to do ex animo, but we have the pleasure without the responsibility! To
equivocate on that point is to lose the gospel. But this is not yet the answer to the
question about the meaning of the mitigata. In the light of what we have said so
far we can state that it is not the law per se that changes for the justified for inasmuch as they are still sinners by virtue of their fallen nature, they are subject to
the lex accusatrix et exactrix. However, insofar as peccatum in the justified is never
regnans but always regnatum, the law is not to terrify him to give them a bad conscience, but simply to keep them dependent on Christ. Hence, for them the law is
always tolerable even when it is directed to their flesh (the only place Luther
would direct it) because as soon as guilt pangs or sorrow arises, Christians may
appeal at once to the gospel of Christ and his absolution.
This in turn has implications for how the law is to be preached to the
justified. In a word: gently [mollienda]. It must never disturb their conscience, for
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Christ will never share his narrow bed with the law; yet, on the other hand,
Luther says that it must be sharpened when it comes to fighting the sinful flesh
[usus theologicus] and regulating life in the worldly sphere [usus politicus].194 Yet,
amazingly, Luther asserts that Christ will not even permit the law free exercise of
its authority even in its assigned sphere if it in any way threatens justification by
entering the conscience and robbing it of its peace and certainty.195 This has an
important implication for preaching. The law must never be preached alone, but
every time it is preached the gospel must be preached alongside it as remedium;196 indeed, law and gospel should not even be separated too long lest the law
exceed its bounds and begin to trouble the conscience.197 Here one must
remember Luther's caution that the law is to be taught to Christians cum aliqua
praerogativa. Thus the law is to be softened [lex mollienda] for Christians and
194WA

39 I, 498, 10-21 (3 AD, Arg. 1). This is an important passage because it shows just how concerned Luther is that the preaching of the law never
disturb the conscience, but appplies to the civil sphere and our flesh; that is, its
place is extra locum iustificationis, never in loco iustificationis. Thus: Quare lex debet
manere et diligenter acui in parte militante, hoc est, quantus hic in came et hic inter
homines vivimus et agimus. . . Ita lex pertinet ad partem militantem, non autem ad
triumphantem, hoc est, quando agitur de iustificatione et pace conscientiarum, quia hic
sumus in Domino, qui noster sponsus est, nec patitur, ut quisquam in hoc tam angusto
lectulo condormiat.
195We

need to remember here that the Lord also exercises the law in its
civil role through the lex praedicata of the sermon.
196WA 39 I, 534, 12-13 (3 AD, Arg. 18); 362, 4-14 (1 AD, Praef.); 372-73
(1 AD, Arg. 6); 397, 12-13 (1 AD, Arg. 21).
197WA 39 I, 410-411 (1 AD, Arg. 31); esp. 410, 18-19: Itaque non debent
haec duo longe inter se separari, ut fecerunt papistae, sed se invicem comitari. The
whole argument is important for it clearly sets out the limits of the law and
warns that if it is permitted to exceed those limits unopposed, the result could be
despair.
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taught as exhortation or parenesis. On no account is it to be preached to the
godly [pii] as lex implenda, but that is to be reserved only for the ungodly and for
the baptized who have fallen into securitas and are in grave danger of apostasy.
But even then, Luther would say that the law must never be preached alone; it
may have to be sharpened, but the gospel must always be preached afterwards,
for only the gospel can grant faith.
Apostolic Parenesis
Now we must say something about the nature of apostolic parenesis for
this is closely related to the question of the tertius usus legis which will be discussed in the next chapter. Perhaps the key concern has to do with the relationship
between parenesis andthe Decalogue? How does it differ from the Decalogue? Is
parenesis just the application of the commandments to the life of Christians in the
light of the gospel. The classical summary formula is: Be what you are. You are
holy, now live as God's holy people (cf. 1 Cor. 6: 19-20). That is baptismal language; it calls people to live in (and thus to live out!) their baptism. To that extent parenesis is baptismal parenesis.198 The Decalogue is also set within a
"gospel" framework (cf. the prologue in Ex. 20: 2), but has a different basis. The
parenesis of the New Testament is grounded in the forgiveness of sins, won at
Calvary and bestowed in Baptism. However, it is instructive to note that Paul
hardly ever uses the vocable 1/61.toc to describe the will of God for the baptized.
Christ is the end of the vO p.oc for faith (Rom. 10: 4). We need to take notice of the
radicality of Paul's rejection of the v6 p.oc as a description of God's will for the
198While this may not be able to be demonstrated conclusively in every
case exegetically, it remains true theologically.
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Christian life.199 Therefore, just on sheer linguistic grounds, let alone theological,
there can be no simple identification between parenesis and Decalogue or velgoc.
Parenesis is rooted and grounded in the gospel and points us back to the
gospel. The imperative presupposes and is anchored to the indicative." There
is a sense in which one can talk about gospel imperatives: they are imperatives
that have the gospel as their basis. However, to say that the gospel addresses us
as both indicative and imperative is problematical, unless one is using gospel in
the broad sense.201 Paul's customary word for command in the context of the
199Although

Paul critiques the legalistic perversion of the Torah in
contemporary Judaism, he does not do so from the standpoint of the Torah but
from the new standpoint of faith. Although some modern scholars fault Paul for
misunderstanding and perverting the Torah by turning it into something burdensome, this is irrelevant. Paul's critique of the law finally is made in view of Christ
and the gospel (cf his autobiographical remarks in Philippians. 3), not from the
standpoint of the Torah. It is in the light of God's revelation in Christ (the gospel)
that Paul must reassess his former reveltion in the Torah.
"This was recognized also by Luther; see 39 I, 396,11-13 (1 AD, Arg.
21). However, he also holds that the preacher should employ whatever rhetorical
devices are needed to bring people back to repentance. He cites the example of
Korah's sons who, when their father was not at all frightened by the threats of the
law, resorted to the ars rhetorica and with tears in their eyes began to beseech him
to turn from his sinful ways. The fact that he could not be moved to repent either
by entreaties or tears is a sober reminder that our devices, even God's own law
and gospel, can never be used to force the Lord's hand, for he disposes over the
word in his own way and in his own time (WA 39 I, 400,19-402, 7 [1 AD, Arg.
24]; cf. 541, 8-14 [3 AD, Arg. 20]). Luther says in 580, 15-16 (3 AD, Arg. 42/15)
that there are four ways that God commonly uses to bring people to repentance:
minae, promissae, beneficia, et plagae.
201See

Bartling, "Hermeneutics and Pauline Parenesis," in A Project in
Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. Richard Jungkuntz (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1969), 72. He says that the gospel itself in continuous action addresses
Christians in both indicative and imperative. He is right however in maintaining
that the relationship between indicative and imperative is paradoxical but not
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indicative is RapaKaheiv, or the nominal nap (Zia n mg. Although parenesis is the
traditional word used to describe the exhortations and commands of the New
Testament, Rapala n aig is better because the word can include the sense of exhortation, command, warning, admonition, and even--paradoxically—comfort.
apcianing conveys the sense of assurance. God never commands (or demands) anything that he does not first give. He gives before he requires, he gives
what he requires. The term itapthan Gig has been especially taken up by Joest.
He rightly says that New Testament parenesis is admonition and instruction
given to Christians in the name of the gospe1.202 Although we cannot follow him
all the way here, as we will see later, Joest, instead of speaking about a tertius
usus legis talks rather about an usus practicus evangelii which he in turn identifies
with rapdanotc. It is also in keeping with the observation that apostolic parenesis for the most part is positive.m Of course, Pauline parenesis can also contain
antithetical as in the law-gospel polarity. Here there is no either-or; it is bothand.
2°2Joest, Gesetz and Freiheit, 13. This is exactly what Paul does (Rom. 12:

1) when he bases his parenetic appeal on the mercy of God. These are evangelical
exhortations because they are grounded in the gospel and are heard within the
context of the gospel, that is, never apart from faith and justification, so that we
hear them as gracious invitations rather than as threatening commands (i.e. as a
lex accusans which has been fulfilled in Christ and hence has had its sting pulled
for faith). However, if ever we depart from the stance of faith (that we are nothing but forgiven sinners in Christ) the delightful and gentle yoke of the lex impleta
becomes the irksome, heavy burden of the lex implenda, which the law as lex
accusatrix et condemnatrix always is outside of Christ.
203The

overwhelming number of parenetic statements in Romans. 12
(which is the parenetic chapter of the NT) are positive and not negative like the
Decalogue. Again there is theological significance here. Baffling, "Hermeneutics,"
75, argues that the negative form of the commandments presupposes human
brokenness and sin (vetus homo), whereas Pauline parenesis presupposes the
newness of the justified person coram Deo (novus homo). Even statements that are
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words of warning against the danger of apostasy. Christ is both our iustificatio (1
Cor. 1: 30) and iudex. Here indeed the law does enter into parenesis, for works
are the basis of the future judgment (1 Cor. 3: 12ff; 6: 9ff et al.).204 That this is law
in its native Pauline sense is clear. It is addressed to the peccator, or to Christians
insofar as they are still flesh (acipt; cf. the simul in Luther's phrase). It is noteworthy however that even in such instances Paul never introduces the term vOlioc
into his parenesis.205 The motive force is still the irap(lariorc of the gospel, but
now predominately in its connotation as warning. But if the harshest Irapcinegative are either balanced by immediately parallel positive expressions or have
such positive counterparts in the context. And even when vOgoc is mentioned in
Gal. 6: 1 it is paradoxically in a verse that stresses the freedom of the individual
to serve the neighbor. Obedience is never simply an gpyov veogov even though
love can be described as the fulfilling of the law (cf. Rom. 8: 4). To fail to observe
this and thus to reinstate the v6µ06 as a regulative norm in the vita christiana (as
in the case of the tertius usus) is, according to Bartling, to reduce Christian moral
pedagogy to a casuistically expanded Decalogue.

204See Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, 155-169, where he asks whether the NT
data supports Luther's conception (as he interprets it) whereby he dissolves the
tertius usus into an usus elenchticus legis for faith and an usus practicus evangelii
from faith? Or is there now a "new law" which is added to the message of
justification and which points to a final verdict being made on the basis of faith
and works?
205Paul Aithaus, Gebot und Gesetz: Zum Thema "Gesetz und Evangelium"
(Giltersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952), distinguishes between command
[Gebot] and law [Gesetz]: that is, between God's will for us, and the special form of
that will as law. For Althaus the Gebot of paradise become Gesetz after the fall.
The Gebot is based on God's eternal love. Hence, the Grundverhiiltnis between
God and man is not regulated by the law in the sense of the eternal, immutable
will of God, but by love. After the fall the v6p.oc becomes a limited and temporary form of the eternal will, a form which in Jesus Christ has been superceded
and abolished, and the Gesetz returns to Gebot, but now it is not identical to the
primal Gebot for it must have one feature in common with the Gesetz, because we
remain sinners: It must express the positive will of God also in the negative form
of prohibitions (see esp. pp. 11-12, 24).
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lanatc is essentially a warning to perservere in faith, Joest argues that this surely
is still usus practicus evangelii?206
C. F. W. Walther in his own way would agree that biblical parenesis is not
the preaching of the vOiloc but is rather napaan mg. He in fact he goes a step
further and warns pastors that they are not rightly distinguishing law from gospel if they try to urge the regenerate to good works by means the commands of
the law rather than by the admonitions of the gospel. The examples he cites of
such gospel admonitions belong to what we call parenesis. Clearly, then he does
not regard parenesis as a preaching of vOgoc. Although he does not say that it is
gospel, parenesis is very closely related to the gospel. Walther, following Luther,
says that preaching the law will only produce hypocrites, for the works that are
extracted from people by the law are not good works but works of the law. He
maintains that a preacher of the law (and here he would mean a pastor who does
not preach the gospel) is like a jailer, because in trying to force obedience from
his congregation he only puts them in stocks and fetters them. Preaching the law
then is not the way to remedy sluggishness and lukewarmness in a congregation.
Only the gospel can "improve" people because only the gospel can breathe new
life into dead bones (cf. Ezekiel. 37). Of course, Walther knows that there is time
to preach the law (in the sense of the usus elenchticus) in order to alarm the securi
and make them contrite, but only the gospel can change the heart. And where
the law is preached it should be followed up immediately with the gospel. The
preaching of the gospel dare never be postponed. This, as we have seen, is exactly what Luther says. He holds that the preaching of the law should never be
separated too long from the preaching of the gospel. And it is precisely because
206See Joest, Gesetz and Freiheit, 78-82; 129-133; 190-200, for summaries.
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the gospel is preached along with the law that it is tolerable for the saints since
they can immediately appeal against its threats to the gospel. For Walther Paul's
words in Romans 12: 1 (and here he simply follows Luther): ri apa aidd oi3v
itheXctioi, oth TO7V oirrIpp.ca-v T0i5 0£0i5 ... is a quintessential example of
how to preach to the baptized. Paul's aiiv looks back to his explication of the
gospel in the preceeding chapters. That is why he can appeal to his readers by
the mercy of God. Here Joest is right when he argues that parenesis is not a
preaching of the law, for here the baptized are addressed in the name of Christ.
Hence parenesis is Kap cixX riaic, here Christ through the mouth of his ordained
servant pleads with his people. Here they are coaxed and won over by sweet and
gentle words, not by threats and demands (cf. Hosea 2: 14 where Yahweh says
that he will allure Israel and take her into the wilderness, and there speak tenderly to her). Wather comments that if people are not melted and dissolved in
the fire of heavenly love and grace, how can they be softened and cheered by
laws and threats?267
207C.

F. W. Walther, The Proper Distinction between Law and Gospel,
trans. W. H. T. Dau from German ed. 1897 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1929), 381-392 (Thesis 23). He illustrates his points with several citations
from Luther. Especially significant is Luther's exposition of Romans 12: 1 where
he says:
Paul does not say: I command you; for he is preaching to such as are
already Christians and godly by faith, in newness of life. These must not be
coerced by means of commandments, but admonished to do willingly what has
to be done with the old sinful man in them. For any person who does not do this
willingly, simply in answer to kind admonitions, is not a Christian; and any any
person who wants to achieve this result by force applied to such as are unwilling
is not a Christian preacher or ruler, but a worldly jailer. A preacher of the Law
comes down on men with threats and punishments; a preacher of divine grace
coaxes and urges men by reminding them of the goodness and mercy which God
has shown them. . . (emphasis is not ours; p. 388).
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Thus, in parenesis the law functions in an un-law-like way (usus alienus
legis). Joest's term usus practicus evangelii as a substitute for tertius usus legis is a
laudable attempt to explain the evangelical character of the law in the apostolic
parenesis. The one reservation we have with Joest's term is that it signifies that
parenesis is the application of the gospel rather than of the law being used in the
service of the gospel. Admittedly, faith knows that even natocia is salutary and
for our aw t n pia so that even warning and rebuke can be gratefully received and
is accepted as a evidence of love (Heb. 11: 7-11).
Luther, on the other hand, still insists that exhortation, which belongs to
parenesis, is law.208 Thus, he expressly says that Paul's words in Philippians 4: 89 are the doctrina legis, whereas the antinomians, on the other hand, claim that
they are grace. It is important to observe that just prior to Luther's remark about
exhortation being a preaching of the law, he points out that the law must be
taught to Christians cum aliqua praerogativa, since they triumph over sin and do
not let it rule them.209 Hence, he makes it clear that the law that is to be preached
to the baptized is not the lex implenda but the lex impleta. However, the lex impleta
is not law but gospel. It demands nothing but announces that Christ has done
and fulfilled everything demanded by the law for us. And yet Luther insists that
This passage pulls together at least key points about parenesis which we
have been stressing on the basis of our analysis of the disputations. First, it is
based on the gospel and calls us back to the faith; in that sense it is really nap °Ilan mg. Secondly, it exercises an anamnetic function. It reminds us of what God
has done for us in Christ and of who and whose we are as baptized children of
God.
208WA 39 I, 513, 11-14 (3 AD, Arg. 5): Nostri Antinomi ita coeci sunt, ut

non possint cognoscere doctrinam legis in Paulo vel in his verbis tam manifestis: Quaecunque pudica, iusta etc. sectamini.
209See our discussion above above on mitigata

and praerogativa etc.
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the parenesis of Phillipians 4: 8-9 (and by extension other passages like it) is not
grace but law. How are we to understand this? It is important first of all to
remember the context of his statement. He is debating with the antinomians who
reject the preaching of the law entirely. And that to him is like opening a
window to the devil. It only breeds securitas because Christians do not
understand the gospel of the lex impleta if they have not first heard the stern
demand of the lex implenda. They cannot believe in Christ as lex impletor if they
are not told what he has filled.210 And when people are no longer made aware of
their sin and the law's judgment on sin, they have no need of repentance and
forgiveness and so finally even lose Christ, because he belongs only to sinners. It
is for sinners that he came, and it is sinners whom he calls. To refuse to recognize
oneself as a sinner is to exclude oneself from his company. But if, on the other
hand, we do confess that we are sinners we can do so only because the law has
210Luther strikes out against the antinomians in his great treatise Von
den Konziliis and Kirchen (1539),where he chastises them for preaching redemp-

tion but not sanctification, that is, the new life in Christ, which he says is akin to
granting the premise and denying the conclusion. For there is no such Christ that
died for sinners, who then do not, after the forgiveness of sins, desist from sins
and lead a new life. Luther says that the antinomians are fine Easter preachers
but they are very poor Pentecost preachers, for they do not preach de sanctificatione et vivificatione Spiritus Sancti, but solely about the redemption of Jesus Christ,
although this same Christ has won redemption so that he might transform us out
of the old Adam into new people. Christ not only earned gratia for us but also
the gift [donum] of the Holy Spirit, so that we might have not only the forgiveness
of sins but also the cessation of sins (WA 50, 599, 5-17). He blames their error on
poor logic. They fail to see that they are preaching Christ without and against the
Holy Spirit because they propose to let people continue in their old ways and still
pronounce them saved (600, 3-19). Commenting on the sancta catholica christiana,
he says, contra antinomos, that they are called Christian people and have the Holy
Spirit, who sanctifies them daily, not only through forgiveness of sin won by
Christ on Calvary but also through the abolition, the purging, and the mortification of sins, on the basis of which they are called a holy people (624, 28-625, 2).
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taught us that.211 While the law teaches us that by means of its own proper
office, the law's proprium officium may also be done through the words of the gospel. Or more precisely, the gospel, although its proprium officium is to forgive
sins, can also use the office of the law to convict sin and teach life, that is, how
God's sancti should live the vita nova.212
So then, does Luther's statement calling parenesis law contradict Joest's
claim that parenesis is nap dtxX crtg, and indeed the application of the gospel?
Admittedly, although Luther sees parenesis serving the gospel he does not call it
gospel or Rap than mg. In our opinion, that would be too much of a concession to
the antinomians who deny the law altogether and preach only gospel. Even
though they preach parenesis, they understand it only in the sense of the usus
civilis. Luther however nails them on just this point for here he detects a major
inconsistency in their theology, if not in their logic. He notes approvingly that
they admonish [admonere] people to live chaste, godly and holy lives, and to be
gentle, kind, humble and sincere. However, according to Luther such exhortations constitute a preaching of the law, and yet the antinomians want to have
nothing to do with the law in the church. He finds this to be an intolerable contradiction and counters by declaring that the law is whatever performs the officium legis, in a word, whatever exposes sins, whether it be in Evangelio or in
211This of course is not to deny that the full magnitude of our sin can

only be properly grasped in the light of the gospel as we look back in faith on our
former condition.
212WA 39 I, 542, 15-17 (3 AD, Arg. 21): . . . sed utitur

Evangelium]
officio legis, insectari et arguere vitia et instituere vitam, quomodo iam novi homines
sancti novam vitam ingredi debeant.
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Mose213 The passage that we have in mind here is important because it confirms
what we heard Luther saying earlier in connection with Paul's exhortation in
Philippians 4. In both cases Luther understands parenesis to be a teaching of the
law. Moreover, in view of the double office of the gospel, that is its opus alienum
as well as its opus proprium (as mentioned above), Joest needs to remember that
even if we do call parenesis napeachnaic that does not prevent the Lord from using it as an officium legis.
We would submit that although parenesis, even rebuke, can be accepted
by faith as gift, and hence ultimately as zapcianatc, nevertheless, it is the most
appropriate way to preach the law to the baptized for here the law is under the
control of the gospel. Thus, rapthancric can bring to mind our sin and our failure to let the Christ-light shine through us to others. In reminding us that we are
now light in the Lord, and exhorting us: kin p.ciCorrec ri early etiapeatov TuT
rupicii, Kai WI crupcolvcovetre Toic gpyoic Tag docapicatc TOIU clicatovc, geDt2tov tie
Kan eXeyxEre (Eph. 5: 10-11), and in beseeching us in the name of Christ: MOyoy
aticoc Tov 6ayyeXiou cob"' Xpiatoii noXtrzlieaee (Phil 1: 27), the 7rapcbanciic also
reminds us of the ever present distance between what we are in Christ and what
we are in ourselves, and how we have often grieved the Holy Spirit by giving
into the desires of the flesh instead of resisting them. This makes us sad. How213WA 39 I, 534,18-535, 6 (3 AD, Arg. 18). In our opinion the phrase in
Evangelio refers first and foremost not to the gospel as the message of forgiveness,
but to the four gospels, which finds its counterpart in Mose, representing the law.
Luther never uses the word Evangelia even when the referent is clearly the
literary gospels and not the preached gospel. This passage is important because
it shows, contrary to certain opinions, that the antinomians Luther was dealing
with were not guilty of libertinism. The problem is theology not ethics, although
Luther more than once sees the theological error opening the door to moral laxity
and securitas, thus giving opportunity to Satan.
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ever, to use the language of Paul, for the baptized who live in daily repentance,
this

is not T0i5 ic6 a gov, but 1(c:et& 0E6v, for it does not lead to despair but to

11ET 61/01a (2 Cor. 7: 10).

By calling parenesis law, in our opinion, Luther is doing two things. First,
holding the line against the antinomian dismissal of the law. Secondly, he is
giving recognition to the fact that parenesis, by its very nature, is not gospel per
se, and although it can be heard in a gospel way or received as gift, this never
happens without calling to mind the fact that we are sinners and as such are
entirely dependent on Christ, who wants to be nothing more than evangelizator
pauperum. If we were not sinners, we would not need to be reminded to what we
should do and how we should live. But the splendid thing about parenesis is
that here, because the law is controlled by the gospel, it gently reminds the sancti
that they are still peccatores, which is exactly how Luther says that the law ought
to be preached to the saints, without attempting to enter their conscience and rob
them of the peace and certainty of the gospel. Therefore, the preaching of
parenesis to the baptized, as we see it in the New Testament, is the best way of
preaching the law, because it is indirect and retrospective, and to that extent
softened mitigata per iustificationem because it is working for the gospel and not
for itself (officium proprium = usus elenchticus). Furthermore, because preaching
parenesis is not identical with preaching the gospel but indeed, as we have seen,
will bring to our remembrance not only that we are saints through Baptism and
faith, but also that we are sinners in need of forgiveness, the gospel dare never
be assumed, but must also be preached alongside the parenesis so that nobody is
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left in any doubt. For only the gospel points us away from ourselves unambiguously to Christ the conqueror of sin and the fulfiller of the law.214
In summary, it is in recognition of the fact that the law is also at work in
the apostolic rapaxXrtmg and not just the gospel, that we prefer to speak of
parenesis as a preaching of the law in the service of Christ and the gospel rather
than as designating it as impala ri mg per se and identifying it with the gospel.
However, we must now turn our attention more specifically to the problem of the
tertius usus legis, even though we have already crossed that threshold more than
once in our previous discussion.
Problem of the Tertius Usus Legis
This discussion is very modest in its aims and does not pretend to be anything like complete. Our intention is not to discuss the topic generally, but to
limit it to Luther's antinomian disputations. Therefore, in one sense this section
is almost out of place because, as we have already seen, Luther does not teach a
third use of the law expressis verbis. However, the matter cannot be side-stepped
quite so easily if only because the literature forces us to take a position on
whether the tertius usus is compatible with Luther's theology or whether it is a
retrojection from a later period having no organic connection to Luther at all. It
214 WA 39 I, 532, 13-539, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 18), where Luther speaks
highly of the preaching of repentance to Christians based on the goodness and
loving kindness of God (Rom. 2: 4), for Christians in whom the flesh is under the
control of the S/spirit do not need the heavy hand of the law to bring them to a
recognition of their sins. However, the important thing here, which is not understood by the antinomians, is that when one preaches the goodness and grace of
God, one cannot stop there. For since this may also bring to mind our sins, the
pastor must clearly preach the gospel, so that people are not left with a troubled
conscience or are in any doubt about forgiveness.
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should already be obvious from the discussion thus far that we are of the latter
persuasion. We must now attempt to set out more comprehensively our reasons
for rejecting the thesis that Luther knew a tertius usus legis and to offer some thing
in its place which we think is more consistent with Luther's own understanding
of the officium legis in the Christian life. Our analysis of the conclusio to the Second
Disputation as well as remarks made in other arguments will be assumed.215 In
order to establish some point of reference for our discussion about the third use
of the law, we begin with a brief resume of the main thrust of Article VI of the
Formula of Concord, which addresses this very issue. This then will be our definition of the tertius usus legis. However, it needs to be remembered from the outset
that this article flows out of the later antinomian controversies which occurred
after Luther's death and so does not have the first controversy ( which we are
investigating) within its purview.
The following is a summary of the status controversiae as set out in the
Epitome:216 The law has been given for three reasons: 1) to maintain external
discipline; 2) to bring people to a knowledge of their sin; and 3) on account of the
sin that inheres in the flesh, to give the regenerate a certain rule [gewisse Regel]
according to which they should pattern and regulate [anstellen and regieren sollen]
their entire life. The controversy that erupted after Luther's death centered on
215See in particular our comments in connection with 3 AD, Args. 4, 5

and especially Arg. 13; see also 3 AD, Arg. 40/13 and 45/18. We saw that the
only place that the notion triplex usus legis (and thus by implication a tertius usus
legis) occurs in Luther is in the conclusio to the Second Disputation, the authenticity of which has been denied by Elert.
216FC Ep. VI,1 (BSLK, 793, 9-24). A proper study of the tertius usus
would need to compare the wording of the Epitome with the Solida Declaratio, as
well as the German version of both with the Latin.
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the third use, that is, whether the law should be taught to reborn Christians. This
usage has come to be known as the usus didacticus or the usus normativus.
Obviously, the issue of a third use was not Luther's question, and so in one sense
it is unfair to ask him for an answer. On the other hand, we know that
Melanchthon was already using the term triplex usus legis in the late 1520s and
introduced it into the 1535 edition of his Loci Communes, and reaffirmed his
position in the 1543 edition.217 It is not unreasonable therefore to assume that
Luther had his reasons for not following Melanchthon with his triplex usus legis,
or perhaps more to the point, Melanchthon had his reasons for departing from
Luther's duplex usus legis. The Formula of Concord, in trying to settle the dispute
between the Gnesio-Lutherans and the Philippists (which as we saw in chapter 2
dealt with a different issue than that which engaged Luther and Agricola),
attempted to steer a middle course between the unevangelical alternatives of
antinomianism and legalism. How well it succeeded is not for us to judge here.
Our concern is merely to demonstrate that the concept of the tertius usus legis,
both terminologically and theologically, does not adequately reflect Luther's
understanding of the law and its function after justification. However, since we
ourselves have undertaken neither a careful investigation of Article VI of the
Formula nor of the concept generally, we are not in a position to offer a proper
evaluation of the third use of the law.
We have already seen that Luther knows of a preaching of the law to the
pii alongside the gospel even though he does not use the terms norma et regula
217see Ebeling, Triplex usus legis, 50-68, for a carefully documented discussion of the origin of the usus legis in general.
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[Regel and Richtschnur] to describe it as we find it in the Formula of Concord.218 In
both the vita christiana is marked by an initial fulfillment of the law in us through
the gift of the Spirit, although the reason the law must be taught is formulated
differently. Luther makes it clear that the law must only be taught to Christians
in quantum peccatores, and not in quantum sancti, whereas for the Formula of
Concord leaves it somewhat vague and says only that the law it must be taught as
a norma et regula vitae.219 This means that in Luther the law is not taught in order
that renati learn to live and walk in the law,220 nor is it taught as a rule and norm
for achieving a godly life and behavior in accord with God's eternal and immutable will.221 Its purpose rather is to warn the faithful, insofar as they are still
sinners, not to give way to the flesh or to fall back under the power of sin, but
remain steadfast in faith. In other words, it exhorts them to fight against the
flesh, to guard against temptation, and it summons them to the good works that
are the fruit of faith. We should note here that Luther distinguishes between
218FC SD VI, 3 (BSLK, 963, 10-18).
219Forde, Christian Dogmatics, vol. 2, 460, n. 3, observes that FC VI

vacillates on the issue of the third use. "On the one hand, it speaks of a third use
of the law to be applied to the regenerate, but then it goes on to say it is necessary
because regeneration is incomplete in this life. It is an attempt to have it both
ways and thus threatens only to obscure the issue."
220Cf. FC SD VI, 1 (BSLK, 962, 14-15); the German original has no
words corresponding to "learn from the law to." The Latin version renders this:
lege docentur ut in vera pietate vivant et ambulent. How to interpret the renati is a
moot point. If we follow Luther the referent would be Christians as simul iusti et
peccatores. However, in our opinion, the thrust of the FC is such that the authors
at this point are probably referring to Christians qua saints. If that is not the case
our critique falters.
221FC SD VI, 3 (BSLK, 963, 15-18).
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preaching the law (that is, the Decalogue) as lex accusans, hence as lex implenda, to
the impii and to the pii, insofar as they are still sinners, on the one hand, and
preaching the law as exhortation, hence as lex impleta, to the pii qua saints, on the
other. This distinction is not made so clearly by the Formula of Concord and therefore contributes to its lack of clarity at some vital points. Furthermore, as we saw
in an earlier section, it is our contention that if we are going to talk about a normative or didactic use of the law for Christians in Luther, then it is primarily negative (usus elenchticus) rather than positive (usus didacticus).222 That is, the main
purpose of the law is not to teach the baptized how to lead a God-pleasing life,
but to summon them to the battle against the flesh, expose the remaining pockets
of resistance to the spirit, warn them of the danger of apostasy (usus elenchticus),
and lead back to Christ through repentance (usus paedagogus). But God can also
use the law in the form of parenesis to stir the saints up to love and good works.
However, as we saw above, it is not really the law per se that does this but the
222Schloemann, Gesetz, 25-26,

is emphatic that Luther in 1528 expressly
rejects the tertius usus normativus legis in his lecture on First Timothy (WA 26, 13,
17-15, 35). He no longer wants to talk of the possibility of a positive and normative usus spiritualis in fides and caritas for the Christian life, as he had done in the
past (documented by Schloemann). Rather, by this stage the duplex usus legis has
crystallized and he no longer attempts to ascribe the usus legitimus to Christians,
in the sense of an usus spiritualis, but expressly limits it to the impii and the caro.
Furthermore, Schloemann stresses that this is Luther's mature position and that
he does not deviate from it for the rest of his life. He insists that any third
officium legis would lead to a righteousness based on the law and make Christ
superfluous. The truth rather is that we are given his fulfillment of the law
through faith. Schloemann argues that Luther makes this perfectly clear in WA
26, 17, 2-7. He is surprised that this passage has hardly ever been cited in the
dabate over the tertius usus legis. We cite the passage in its entirety: peccatores
ostendere et arcere sunt 2. officio legis. Sed 3. officium tollere peccata et iustificare, est
reservatum huic: Agnus dei non lex tollit peccata christus est qui aufert peccatum et
iustificat, ergo secernendum officium legis et christi, ut legis officium in ostendendo
malum et bonum, quia indicat, quid faciendum, et convincit peccatum, ut non faciendum.
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law under the control of the gospel and in the service of Christ. For this reason
we prefer to call this use of the law in parenesis the usus evangelicus rather than
the usus tertius legis. Other reasons may become clear presently.
We will attempt to sum up the major differences between Luther's duplex
usus legis and the idea of the tertius usus legis. First, as we have just seen, Luther
will not allow us to separate the usus didacticus from the usus elenchticus and the
usus paedagogicus.223 The law still teaches even when it exposes sin, points to
Christ, and summons us to battle. As it stirs us up to do good works (the works
which faith does sponte) it also uncovers the unwillingness of the flesh to be led
by the Spirit. On the other hand, when the law in the form of parenesis reminds
us that we are iv Xpi at through Baptism, and calls us back to faith, it is no
longer acting strictly as law but is working under the control of the gospel.
Therefore, this parenetic usus of the law does not qualify for consideration under
the rubric of tertius usus legis. Secondly, the role of the law in the Christian life,
according to Luther, is inextricably bound up with Christian warfare in that it
constantly exposes sin and then, in the form of parenesis (where the law is pulled
into the service of the gospel) summons us to the battlefront and exhorts us
always to watch and pray lest we succumb to temptation, expose our flank to
2230n the one hand, the transitus function of the law (usus paedagogus)
is based on its didactic role. Luther says in WA 39 I, 502, 16-503, 3 (3 AD, Arg. 2)
that the law is to be taught and even sharpened [acuenda diligenter] on account of
the reliquiae peccatorum in Christians, and then he cites 1 Tim. 1: 9. On the other
hand, the didactic function of the law also includes and points to its transitus role.
Luther remarks in 512, 10-513, 14 (3 AD, Arg. 5) that even though we desire to
live iuxta legem Dei as closely as possible (lex Dei here would be better rendered
word of God than law of God, for it is the lex impleta that is in view, not the lex
implenda), the flesh always gets in the way and impedes us. Here he cites the battle of the saint-sinner in Romans. 7, which the impii know nothing about because
in them the caro has full reign.
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Satan or even be attacked from behind.224 But again, we need to remember that
this war is to be fought in the same way as it was won: by and in Christ. Hence,
being summoned to the battlefront constitutes an appeal to faith, and the path to
victory is by way of the recurrere ad baptismum. However, in this the law is not its
own master but serves the gospel as the usus paedagogus. In a word, the law is
our paedagogus ad Christum, which points us in the direction of Christ. This,
according to Luther, is the most proper definition of the law. Here again the
law is not operating by itself or for itself but is in the employ of the gospel and
precisely for that reason does not fit in the category of a tertius usus legis. Thirdly,
another difference between the usus didacticus, and thus the tertius usus, and
224It is precisely their complete ignorance of spiritual warfare occasioned by their defective doctrine of sin that prompts Luther to warn the antinomians that they are easy targets for Satan. In fact he attributes their alleged securitas to their illusion that since all sin has been forgiven, sin is behind us, and
Christians can never fall. Furthermore, we would contend that it is only when
the teaching of the law is set within the framework described above that it is adequately defensed against being turned into moralism or legalism.
22539 I, 441, 11-15 (2 AD, Arg. 6). To talk more about obedience to the

law (or the obedience of faith) than the freedom of the gospel could be a sign that
faith is being hobbled by the law instead of being allowed to range freely and to
do what faith cannot but do: overflow with love for God and neighbor without
the constraint and prodding of the law. The law can be a kill-joy. This is not to
say Christians do not need discipline, they do, but once again, the aim of
discipline is the same as that of the good paedagogus, to escort the hier safely to
the parterfamilias, who first entrusted him to his care. So too here, the aim of the
law's paedagogia is to deliver the pii safely to Christ, to bring them again to faith.
The law is never number one but is always subordinate to Christ, and precisely
because the law now serves him we will also gladly receive its discipline and instruction as gift, for in and through its warning and admonishing voice we hear
the voice of Christ who wills nothing for us but salus. So long as we remain in his
care (under the wings of our hen, to use Luther's picture), we need never be
afraid of the law for it cannot condemn us (Rom. 8: 1), but we may celebrate it
with the same solemnity and exultation as the writer does the Torah in Psalm.
119.
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Luther's duplex usus legis is that the former ultimately reduces the law-gospel
antithesis by giving the law preeminence over the gospel, and therefore does not
make it clear that the saints are both under the law (because of the remnant of
sin) and not under the law (insofar as they are truly saints). Paul says not only
that the v 6 tioc is established by faith (Rom. 3: 31), which we take as a reference to
the lex arguens et accusans, necessary on account of sin,226 but he also says that
Christ is the end of the v6 ttoc for faith (Rom. 10: 4). However, the tertius usus legis
is purportedly not a normative use of the law for Christians in quantum peccatores,
but rather in quantum sancti. On the other hand, we have shown that the law
applied to the Christians qua saints is not the lex implenda but the lex impleta,
which is no law at all, but the gift of Christ's own perfect fulfillment. The "law"
then for the pii as saints is not a proper law, which for Luther is always lex
exactrix et condemnatrix, but the law that law which is now pulled into the service

of the gospel. Moreover, as we saw, even when the law must be preached to
Christians as lex implenda on account of the flesh, Luther says that it has been
tempered through justification [valde mitigata per iustificationem] and should be
softened and taught as exhortation [lex mollienda est et quasi exhortationis loco
docenda], and done so with some privilege [cum aliqua praerogativa], for in

Christians the caro is regnata and not regnans.227 These points now need further
clarification.
Luther the peccator is the materia legis. Hence, following in his steps we can formulate a basic axion: Si vis disputare de lege, materiam
legis accipe, quae est peccator (WA 40 I, 535, 1 [Galaterbriefvorlesung, 1521/35].
226According to

227For

references to mitigata etc see above. On the difference between
peccata regnata and regnans, see WA 39 I, 506,1-3 (3 AD, Arg. 3): Paul's sin is
victum ac languidum, whereas that of the impius is vivum, dominans, triumphans.
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We have said that when Luther talks of the law in the Christian life he describes it more in terms of parenesis than the usus didacticus. Does that mean that
the law has no didactic role for Christians at all? Certainly not, but we need to
explain more clearly what exactly that entails. Luther does not say that the law
teaches the renati good works. They issue spontaneously from faith. But insofar
as they are still sinners, they need to be reminded, encouraged, warned, and
stirred up to do good works. But this is not the same as teaching good works.
Therefore, if we are going to talk about a didactic function of the law in the life of
the baptized, it needs to be developed along the lines of apostolic parenesis.
Furthermore, although parenesis is law, it is not really law, just as Luther says
that the lex in the earthly paradise was not really lex at all in the proper sense of
the term. Nor, on the other hand, does he say that it is gospel. There is a parallel
between the role that the law plays in paradise and its role in the vita christiana,
but not an identity, for Christians are also sinners. If Adam needed the command
to withstand temptation, we need it even more to fight the flesh. However, as we
have said before, in the final analysis the battle is done and the victory won, and
we are simply invited to claim that victory for ourselves in the name of Christ.
That is the evangelical side of parenesis. To say it again, although we contend
that Luther calls the exhortations and admonitions of the New Testament law, it
is not really law because it is not the lex implenda, which demands fulfillment
from us, but the lex impleta, which Christ gives us in faith and which he then
works in us in order to bring us into conformity with himself (cf. Paul's doxology
to God as the one Kari( d v erlivainv rijv ivepyoviiivn iv iunv, Eph. 3: 20).
Thus when Paul appeals to the Romans: lietatiop.oiSoeE rIa dtv coccavoiaet
TCZ

vocic (Rom. 12: 2), he can say that because their voiic has already been trans-
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formed by faith. Again, when he says: TOAITO 4po vette ev lifiv o Kith iv Xpi atuli
Inaoii (Phil. 2: 5), he can do so because he knows that his readers already have
the 4pciv atc of Christ through Baptism. Consequently, this parenesis is not a
teaching of the law but it calls to mind the gospel, what God has done for us in
Christ. It is an appeal to let God have his way with us and to be led by the Spirit
and not to hinder his work in us. While it summons us to good works it also calls
us to be part of the good work that Christ and the Spirit are working in us and
through us for others. Christians are not summoned to do or fulfill the law themselves, but they are invited to live in Christ's fulfillment, to stay under the wings
of their "hen" and keep their feet tucked up under the robe of Chist's righteousness, which they received at Baptism. Admittedly, there is also teaching involved in parenesis, but as we have said, it is not the teaching of the law. For in
stirring us up to do good works (or to fight against the flesh and to watch and
pray) the law may be teaching us, but what is it teaching? It is pointing us back
to the gospel, to faith, to Baptism. In sum, apostolic parenesis is not a tertius usus
legis, for the law here is not demanding obedience but serving faith and the
gospel. Therefore, in our opinion, it would be better to speak about faith's use of
the law or the gospel's use of the law.
The view that the chief task of the law after justification is to teach the
faithful how to lead a godly life circumscribes faith too narrowly by the law and
does not take sufficient account of the freedom of faith and the spontaneity of
good works.228 That faith will do the good works prescribed by the Decalogue is
228li is sometimes said that if one denies the tertius usus, or more
specifically the usus didacticus of the law, it means that the gospel must take on
the teaching role of the law by default. However, in the light of our discussion, it
is dear that that conclusion is a non sequitur. According to our reading of Luther,
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a promise of the gospel; the law has no need to sit on faith's shoulder, so to speak,
as if to keep a watchful eye on it, but it does need to keep its eye on the flesh to
make sure that it does not step out of line. Secondly, when the law's main task is
seen to be that of teaching good works the result almost inevitably is to see the
good works as the obedience of faith. When the word obedience is used it can
only refer to the law since faith makes no demands but simply bursts forth in
love and good works in the same way as a spring gushes forth water and a tree
produces its fruit in due season. This is Luther's characteristic way of speaking.
To talk of good works as the obedience of faith or as that which is taught by the
law robs the gospel of its preeminence. For faith the debere of the Decalogue
become a posse through the gospel.
We have said several times that Luther stresses that Christians, in quantum
sancti, are not to have the lex implenda preached to them but only the lex impleta.
This comes out especially clearly in an argument in the Third Disputation, where
the antinomians argue that since Christ has fulfilled the law, it does not have to
be fulfilled by us so that the law and all disciplina should be abolished.229 But
Luther immediately points to the experience of all Christians as typified by Paul
in Romans 7. Sin is still alive and so the law must still be preached. Yet earlier he
asserted unequivocally that Christ has fulfilled the law and thus abolished it. Is
not Luther contradictng himself here and agreeing with the antinomians? The
difference between them becomes clear when Luther says that Christ has indeed
the law retains its teaching role, but it does not teach the lex implenda and therefore does not demand obedience from the 6 g ow eiveptaroc but only from
61vOpp(anoc, for the conscience of the Christian lies outside the jurisdiction of the
law.
229WA 39 I, 524, 3-528, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 13).
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fulfilled the law—but observe what he then adds: Now see that you lead a life that
is holy, godly, and pure as is becoming of a Christian [Sed additum est: Herrzach fac,
ut sancte, pie et integre vivas, ut decet christianum]. The implicit subject here is
clearly God. The divine monologue continues: Up to this point you have heard:
You are forgiven, but now, in order that you do not complain of being altogether
abandoned, I will give you my Spirit who will make you a soldier, and he will
cry out in your heart against sin with unutterable groans in your heart so that
you become what you desire. The heart replies: But I cannot. God responds:
Pray, that I may hear you, and I will see to it that you can [Ora . . et faciam, ut
possis]. The formulation here is significant for what Luther says here does not
equate with the lex implenda. We have seen that he says that the law is fulfilled in
two ways: First, imputative, which is the lex impleta, and then also expurgative et
formaliter, which is the lex implenda. But this second is not preached to the conscience but to the flesh. The law must also be fulfilled in us, Luther says, insofar
as we are still sinners. But here he makes no mention of that, even though—and
this is what makes it all the more remarkable—he is engaged in an argument with
the antinomians who deny the truth of the lex implenda all together. In the
passage we have considered, God is speaking reassuringly to the conscience of
the homo novus troubled by Angst and Anfechtung, not to to the recalcitrant old
Adam. Here then we have an excellent example of Luther carefully distinguishing between law and gospel in preaching to the baptized. This is what we suggest should replace the tertius usus legis.
We have already made the point that Luther strongly insists that after justification the task for the law as law in its role as lex implenda is to discipline the
flesh, and that it must not be permitted to displace the gospel from the con-
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science. Christ will brook no opposition from the lex when it tries to take over the
conscience for there he rules alone as Lord with his glorious gospel of freedom.
There he is head of the "household of faith," and the law is welcome only if it
comes as servant, but not if it comes seeking to usurp the place that belongs to
Christ alone. If the law does try to force an entry, Luther says that faith must
turn it away.230 Faith, as it were, is to say to the law: "If you want to teach my
flesh to lead a godly life, that's fine, but see that you don't come accusing my conscience." That is what it means to distinguish properly between law and gospel
in experientia, and in our opinion, it is just this matter which cannot be adequately
addressed by positing that Christians qua sancti are subject only to a positive
didactic use of the law. Rather, we need to realize that law and gospel must be
distinguished just as carefully after justification as before. The teaching role of
the law is never without risk because we are still sinners, and hence the law every
now and then may very well kick over the traces, so to speak, cease serving the
gospel and sail under its own colors. When that happens, faith must put the law
in its place—unless of course the Christian himself is the one who has kicked over
the traces, in which case he indeed needs to be disciplined by the law. But that
distinction can only be made in faith, and yet it is a crucial distinction to make if
TWA 39 I, 410 (1 AD, Arg. 31). Luther also deals with this matter in
his 1532 sermon: "The Distinction Between the Law and the Gospel" (trans.
Willard L. Burce from WA 38, 8-42 and St. L 9, 799-811, in, Concordia Journal 18
[April, 1992], 153-163). Here he says that when law and gospel are battling head
to head in your conscience, it is important that you can separate them rightly and
to say: '1 am going to have these two words unmingled, with each one shown to
its own place, with its own strengths: the law for the Old Adam, the gospel for
my timid and terrified conscience." Again: "See to it, he says, that you do not let
the law get the upper hand or rule in your conscience and so bring you into
judgment, for that would be a denial of the gospel" (p. 162). See also Luther's
1535 Preface to his great Galatians Commentary (AE, 26, 11).
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the law and the gospel are to be rightly divided. Because of this ambiguity with
the law, where a friend can suddenly became an enemy, our confession to the
goodness of the law can never be unambiguous this side of heaven, even as our
delight in the law is now only in part and not yet complete. Our confession to the
goodnes of the law as God's gift is possible only in faith, and is always eschatological, in view of that final elimination of the lex all together in paradise and
where we will have it only as res.231
We now sum up our arguments for rejecting the proposal that the tertius
usus legis is in harmony with Luther's doctrine of the law as expressed in his antinomian disputations. 1) There is no evidence of a positive usus didacticus of the
law which is isolated from the usus theologicus. 2) Generally speaking, he does
not use the law to teach good works for he insists that faith does good works by
its very nature. However, he uses the pattern of apostolic parenesis to stir Christians up to love and good works; he admonishes them to be good soldiers in the
battle again sin, to be alert at all times, and to pray that God would deliver them
from temptation. 3) Parenesis is not strictly a preaching of the law, nor is it identical with the gospe1.232 Rather, it is the law acting in the service of the gospel or
231Cf. Nestingen, Luther: The Death and Resurrection of Moses, 278.
232Joest, Gesetz and Freiheit, 133, says that as sinners, Christians encounter the command [Gebot] as a destroying law [Gesetz]: du sollst, aber du kannst
nicht. However, as believers in Christ they experience this same command as
evangelical promise [Zuspruch]: Christus kann - du wirst. Joest denies that
Christians ever encounter the command as a tertium between law and gospel,
such as: zwar hat Christus - aber nun must auch du. Nor should the command ever
be understood moralistically, as if our salvation depended on our own
performance and achievement. Joest says plainly: "Das Gebot als dem Sunder
gesagt ist Gesetz in ganzer Scharfe; das Gebot als dem Glauben an Christus gesagt, als
Parainese, ist Paraklese, Zuspruch, Evangelium in vollem Maj3" (emphasis Joest's).
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faith's use of the law and hence is not law at all. Insofar as Christians are saints,
they are only to be taught the lex impleta, which faith receives as gift. But insofar
as the baptized are still sinners, they must be taught the lex implenda. But this
must be done with discretion, for the law must not overstep its bounds and
attempt to burden the conscience of the saint with its demands and accusation,
for there Christ reigns in untramelled freedom. 4) Law and gospel must be
distinguished just as carefully after justification as before. This is already implicit
in the previous point and follows from the fact that the baptized in this life are
simul iusti et peccatores. This also has implications for the way they assess the law.
On the one hand, from the stance of faith, they can delight in it and receive it as
God's good gift, which they know even serves a salutary purpose when used as
natoEia. On the other hand, insofar as they are still sinners and need the law
preached to their old Adam as lex implenda, there is the ever present risk that the
law, which faith greets as a friend, can suddenly turn around and become an
enemy by seeking to overpower faith and to bring us into captivity. Here Luther
says that unless we can properly divide the word in times of Anfechtung and
temptation, we stand to lose the gospel. Therefore, a teaching of the law to the
saints, which is faithful to the gospel (as servant), will always be distinguished
and never separated from the gospel.
In the light of the foregoing we would propose that the term evangelical
use of the law or faith's use of the law is a more helpful way of speaking about
Luther's understanding of the law from the standpoint of faith than that of tertius
usus legis. This takes cognizance of the fact, as we saw, that Luther in his mature
writings does not ascribe a positive use of the law to the vita christiana but consistently understands it in the sense of the duplex usus legis. The "positive" use
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comes out when it is pulled into the service of the gospel, but then it is no longer
really law in the strict sense, but it is working toward the same end as the gospe1.233 Although Luther never says that law and gospel are united for faith, he
does say that they now work very closely.234 On the other hand, insofar as
233Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, 197, agrees with Althaus' proposal to use

the term command [Gebot] to refer to the law in the life of the Christian (and also
life in paradise), in order to distinguish the way the law acts before and after
faith. The "Du must, damit ." (= lex implenda) of the first (before faith) must not
to linked together with the: "Du darfst, weil . . ." (= lex impleta) of the second (after
faith) as a different sub-species under the one Oberbegrzff "lex." Given this
distinction between a usus legalis of the law and a usus evangelicus of the command, Joest argues that neither Luther nor scripture opposes the view that every
aspect of the Christian life is regulated by God's command. We agree that faith's
use of the law should not be put under the Oberbegriff lex as is done with the term
tertius usus legis. However, Joest's way of solving the problem of how to talk
about the law and faith, while an improvement over the notion of tertius usus, is
still unsatisfactory, for it puts life under the command (even if it is now Gebot and
not Gesetz) instead of under faith.
234Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, 197-98, says that while before faith Gesetz
and Evangelium are diametrically opposed, and the law functions primarily as
usus elenchticus, after faith the law no longer accuses but guides the Christian, so
that in fact the gospel and the law become one, and the Gebot is changed from
Gesetz into an usus evangelii. However, he stresses that this is a contingent unity
or an Einswerden of law and gospel in the Christian life, not a prinzipielles Einssein, where the lex cam impleta, not the lex implenda, becomes the Zuspruch des
Gehorchen-diiifens. Joest tries to distance himself from Barth by pointing out that
what he is propsing is not the same as Barth's idea of the unity of gospel and law.
He says that God's real word is not just the unity of gospel and command in the
sense of a usus practicus evangelii, such as we have in the vita christiana, but first
and foremost the antithesis of gospel and command, where the command is no
gospel at all, but sheer law in the sense of lex implenda sub necessitate salutis. It is
important to note that Joest does not say that law and gospel are one but that
they can become one in the concrete case of the preaching of parenesis for faith.
Rosenberger, Gesetz und Evangelium, 103, also speaks of the unity of the law and
gospel in terms of their content as the demand and fulfillment of the will of God
and sees this unity grounded in Jesus Christ. Luther however is "unsystematic,"
and for good reasons; he never speaks of law and gospel being brought together
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Christians still have the old Adam, law and gospel remain antithetical. Furthermore, the way of speaking about the law in the Christian life which we are proposing with the term the gospel's use of the law instead of the term tertius usus
legis shows that it is truly an usus evangelicus and not an usus legalis.235
Finally, if it is true, as some claim, that the idea of the tertius usus legis is
based on the notion of the lex aeterna, this cannot find support in Luther.236 On
the other hand, we must be fair to the proponents of the third use of the law and
concede that its validity does not stand or fall on the supposition that it is
grounded on the notion of a lex aeterna. If however a correlation does exist, then
dearly the tertius usus legis is, as its name suggests, oriented to the law rather
than to the gospel. And whenever that happens there is always the very grave
into any kind of unity, even though he himself says that they work very closely
for faith.
235Faith's use of the law is evangelical because it teaches us nothing
other than what Christ wants, nothing other than the fruit of faith which redounds to his glory. Here Christ himself uses the law to teach, admonish and
instruct, not to terrify us with its demands (as in the usus legis spiritualis) because
he has already given us its entire fulfillment per fidem. Since its intention is not to
accuse the conscience, it is a joy and delight. But when we take our eyes off
Christ and look to ourselves, our conscience becomes uncertain. But it is precisely at times like these, when Satan tries to separate us from Christ, that we are
most vulnerable to the accusations of the law. By the same token, it is just at
these times that we must not give the law a hearing, but must cling to Christ
alone by faith.

case for this is put by Gerhard 0. Forde, The Law-Gospel Debate:
An Interpretation of Its Historical Development. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
House, 1969. In his latest treatment of the locus on the Christian Life (Christian
Dogmatics II, esp. 445-454) he does not use the term lex aeterna, nor does he expressly state that the third use of the law is grounded on the aristotelian idea of
the lex aeterna, he does nonetheless state, in explaning the loss of eschatology in
the dogmatic tradition: "Natural law became the structural backbone of the
theological system, displacing eschatology" (447).
236The

742
danger that the gospel will be seen as fulfilling the law in a way that brings it into
subservience to it instead of the law being the servant of the gospe1.237
Luther's Answer to Antinomianism
It only remains to pull together the threads of Luther's key arguments
against the teaching of the antinomians. There are, as we have seen in chapter 3,
many arguments that he employs, however some cardinal ones that run like a red
thread through all three disputations. It is our conviction, and we believe that
the analysis has borne this out, that if considered in their totality, Luther's arguments against the antinomians have their basis in a deep concern for the integrity
of the gospel. We are persuaded that Luther is interested here primarily with
with doctrine and not ethics, for the antinomianism he is fighting against is not in
the first instance libertinism (ethical antinomianism) but the teaching that the law
is unnecessary because it is contained in the gospel (doctrinal antinomianism).238
In other words, Luther saw in antinomianism, once he came to recognize that it
237See also Robert Kolb, "Not without the satisfaction of God's Righteousness: The Atonement and the Generation Gap between Luther and His
Students," in, Die Reformation in Deutschland and Europa, ed. Hans R. Guggisberg
and Gottfried G. Krodel, Sonderband: Archiv fiir Reformationsgeschichte.
(Giitersloh: Giitersloher 1993), 136-156, esp. pp. 153-54. Kolb points out that "in
Melanchthon the law has the final say," and "God must somehow account to the
law for the liberation of the sinners from sin. For Luther the law is no more than
God's tool." See also the first part of this chapter where we suggested that some
argue that the third use of the law is predicated on a view of the Christian life
that sees it regulated by the lex aeterna, and where faith in Christ and the gift of
the Spirit merely enable us to fulfill the law. Even if the notion of the tertius usus
legis does not necessarily require the theological construct of the lex aeterna, it is at
least very susceptible to this kind of interpretation.
238This distinction is made by Schloemann, Gesetz, 45, n. 129.
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was no mere pugna verborum,239 an attack on the very heart of his theology, that
is, the gospel, justification, and the person and work of Christ 240
The Law Must be Preached in the Church
We may recall that Luther gives two standard reasons why the law is to be
retained and taught in the church. First, on account of the impenitent 'the
praefracti et insensati] and secondly, because Christians still have the remnant of
the flesh. Thus, the law is not preached to Christians in quantum sancti, but in
quantum peccatores. However, there is a third reason why the law must be retained, and that it because it cannot be abolished. The law (and here Luther is
thinking especially of the lex naturalis) is an inescapable fact of life for it belongs
to the very structure of our world and ourselves. These are the three practical
reasons that Luther gives for why the law must be retained and taught in the
church. But there is also a vital theological reason, and it is that to which we
must now turn.
It is clear from the end of the the fifth Thesenreihe that what is important is
not the retention of the law for its own sake but for Christ's sake. Moreover, the
antinomian rejection of the law results in a diminution of Christ's atoning
suffering and death. For without the law we do not know who Christ is or what
239AS we saw in ch. 2, that was not yet the case in the prelude to our
controversy in 1527; see Gustav Hammann, "Nomismus and Antinomismus innerhalb der Wittenberger Theologie von 1524 - 1530" (Unpublished Dissertation,
Bonn, 1952), 105.
240WA 39 I, 527, 18-528, 2 (3 AD, Arg. 13): Non pugno adversus Antinomos ex odio aut invidia, sed ex summa necessitate, quia video, quid futurum sit et
secuturum ex eorum dogmate aliquando, videlicet illa ternpora extrema, de quibus
Christus et divus Petrus conqueruntur. Clearly, Luther's sees this antinomian
heresy as one of the signs of the end.

744
he has done in fulfilling the law. And if the law does not expose our sin and put
us under sentence of judgment, we would never know what law he fulfilled for
us when he died in our place. The pro nobis, and hence the gospel, would be lost.
And then Christ may become no more than a religious teacher and moral
example of some Lebensideal. The antinomians end up having to put Christ
himself in the place left vacant by the law, so that in the final analysis they come
out exactly at the place from which they wanted to escape: "The antinomians
have become nomists, the super-evangelicals moralists."241 And finally, with the
silence of the law, people are hopelessly at the mercy of sin and the power of
death. Luther therefore asserts that the teaching of the law is necessary in the
church and must be retained because without it Christ cannot be retained 242
Since however Luther only wants to retain the law for Christ's sake, what he is
saying in effect is that Law and gospel must be taught in the church.243
It may seem that the most compelling line of argument which Luther
pursues in places is that the loss of the law would inevitably mean a loss of
Christ, or conversely, that without the law Christ could not be retained.244 However, this is clearly one of those marvelous hyperboles that Luther is not beyond
Minus, Hans Joachim 'wand, Glaubensgerechtigkeit: Lutherstudien, 2d
ed., ed. Gerhard Sauter (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1991), 64.
242WA 39 I, 357, 29-34 (ATh V, Th. 66-68). Without the law, says
Luther, all you know is that he has fulfilled, not what he has fulfilled.
243WA 39 I, 383, 26-27 (1 AD, Arg. 14).
2441n addition to ATh V, Th. 67-68 noted above, see WA 39 I, 546,1719(3 AD, Arg. 23): Itaque si Christus debet manere salvator, necesse est, me manere
peccatorem, morti ac diabolo obnoxium, oportet, ut haec simul maneant ac stent. uno
ablato utrumque peribit.
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making from time to time to drive home his point.245 As a piece of rhetoric it is
very effective. However, it must not be pressed theologically. For a start, Christ
cannot be abolished or lost. Secondly, that way of speaking, if taken seriously,
ends up saying the very opposite to that which Luther intended. When the
importance of the law is magnified to the point where Christ's own destiny rides
on the fate of the law, he is no longer the Lord but in an ironic way has become
subject to the law. Clearly, Luther intends none of these things, however, those
who want to press such dicta heroica need to be aware of the consequences. It
would be better theologically to follow Luther's lead in 3 AD, Arg. 23 (see previous note) and say that if Christ is to remain savior we must remain sinners, for
Jesus himself testifies that he did not come to call the righteous but sinners. Not
only does this underscore the close and vital nexus between law and gospel, but
it reminds us that we cannot receive Christ's gift of forgiveness unless he first
works in us the recognition that we are sinners, which he does through his holy
law. To exclude ourselves at this point from the company of sinners is to put
ourselves beyond the reach of the savior who does not want to be found anywhere else than among sinners. And in that sense Luther can say that Christ is
lost—lost, that is, as savior to impenitent sinners. Therefore, his bold dicta heroica
245This

is not Luther's only hyperbolic utterance in the disputations.
See WA 39 I, 371, 8-10 (1 AD, Arg. 4): Nam sic tollendo legem tollent etiam mortem et
infernum. Nam si non est lex accusans et condemnans, quorsum opus habeo Christo, qui
se pro peccatis meis tradit? Cf. also Theses de fide (1535) where Luther says that if
ever it came to a choice between Christ and the law, the law would have to go,
not Christ (47, 23-24 En. 51]). This is proof positive that statements like these are
to be understood rhetorically, for if this latter were pressed, Luther would end up
saying the opposite to what he says in the disputations, namely, that if we lose
the law we lose Christ.
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make the point most emphatically that the law is an indispensible presupposition
to the gospel and belongs to it just as repentance belongs to faith.
Finally then, Luther's stance against antinomianism hinges on the inseparability of Christ and the law. This implies neither a confusion of law and gospel
nor a synthesis. We have already seen in connection with repentance that Luther
stresses that while law and gospel must always be distinguished, he is equally
insistent they must never be pulled apart. This has to be asserted especially
contra antinomos who want to assign to the gospel the task of exposing and condemning sin and thus leading people to repentance (duplex revelatio evangelii).
Luther, on the other hand, while not denying that the gospel plays an important
role in repentance (indeed it is the principialis pars), argues that repentance is not
ex evangelio but ex lege, for whatever preaches wrath and works repentance is law,
whether the words themselves are law or gospel. Here he insists that law and
gospel belong together and cannot be separated.246 Thus, over against the misunderstanding of the antinomians, who say that Christian prodamation is eo ipso
a preaching of the gospel and therefore has no need of the law, Luther holds that
the law is in fact necessary to preserve the purity of the officium evangelii and
ensure its proper understanding. While law and gospel are strictly antithetical
before justification (the law must be kept out of the article of justification), they
belong closely together in sanctification, for under faith the law now serves the
246We

have also seen him stress that the law serves the gospel by
means of praeparatio just as a good doctor first diagnoses the illness and informs
the patient before applying the remedium. Again, his point is that law and gospel
cannot be pulled apart. Simply to apply the remedy before informing the patient
of his illness prevents the gospel from doing its opus proprium for it cannot forgive
sins when there are no sins to forgive. The gospel loses its intelligibility as well
as its concreteness if it is not preached against the background of the law. Thus,
while the law belongs to the gospel, it must always be distinguished from it.
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gospel and no longer opposes it; the former enemy has become a friend, and the
law as lex impleta is given to faith as a gift. However, since the law in the sense of
the lex implenda must still be preached to the Christian on account of the sin that
clings to the flesh, there is the ever present danger that it might transgress its prescribed limits and try to bind our conscience to its demands.247 Whenever that
happens, faith must take a firm stand and cast the law out in the name of Christ.
In rightly distinguishing law from gospel faith recognizes that each has its
assigned task as well as its limit: the law must not claim to be the gospel, and the
gospel should not attempt to take over the role of the law.248 However, while the
law may be in the gospel, the gospel can never be in the law. Again, faith knows
how to distinguish these for it knows that if the words of the gospel are doing the
work of the law then the gospel is not acting according to its opus proprium but its
opus alienum, for its proper work is not to expose sin and convict consciences but
to absolve sin, comfort troubled consciences, and give life to the dead and
certainty of salvation to repentant sinners. However, these roles can never be
reversed. The gospel can never be in the law (contra Barth!) for the law has only
one officium, and that is to expose sin, accuse and condemn. If the gospel does
ever get into the law it becomes pure law. Whatever else the law may do that is
positive, such as give instruction, admonition, warning, encouragement etcetera,
it does not in and of itself, but under the banner of the gospel.
247Ebeling, Erwiigungen zur Lehre vom Gesetz, 288,

rightly observes that
Luther restricts the law in the theological sense to only that which pricks and
binds the conscience.
248Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: Einfiihrung in sein Denken (Tubingen: J.
C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1964), 125-26.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

In the three antinomian disputations of 1537-1538 Luther rejects the basis
of the antinomian claim that the law has already been abolished and that therefore it should not be taught in the church. The antinomianism of Luther's day
held to the following cardinal doctrines: 1) The referent of vogoc (lex) in Paul is
the lex Mosaica. 2) The lex elenchtica has been abrogated, sin is no longer reckoned
to us (Rom. 5: 13), and the law has only a civil function to perform [usus civilis =
usus paedagogicusl. 3) Christ has fulfilled the law therefore we are exonerated.
Since the law has already been abolished [simplex abrogatio legisj, there is no
already-now — not-yet tension in the Christian life, the pii are not in via, nor are
they simul iusti et peccatores, but they have already reached the heavenly port and
are perfect. 4) Only the gospel is to be taught in the church. As the one word of
God, it is has a twofold office (duplex revelatio): first, to declare the forgiveness of
sins, and then in the light of the goodness and mercy of God, to convict sin and to
lead the homo peccator to repentance. Therefore, repentance is to be taught ex
evangelio and not ex lege, or in the language of the antinomians, ex violatione filii
and not ex violatione legis. Their key texts are: Luke 24: 47; John 16: 8; Rom. 1: 18;
2: 4; Acts 9: 1-6.
Luther's doctrinal position contra antinomos as it emerges in the course of
the disputation can be summed up in the following points.
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1.He deliberately refrains from equating the vciiioc with the lex Mosi and
instead consistently identifies the vdµos with the lex naturae, which he in turn
identifies with the Decalogue in terms of content. In this way Luther overcomes
the antinomian claim that the law as been abrogated. Moreover, by equating the
decalogus with the lex naturalis, which has been inscribed on the minds of all
people (lex insculpta), he is able to uphold the universality of the law and hence
its inescapability due to the fact that it is inextricably rooted in the hearts of all
human beings. The law is schon da. This is perhaps Luther's most invincible
argument against the antinomian insistence that the law has been fulfilled and
abolished by Christ and hence is passé. He holds to the unity of all the law and
sets it in antithesis to the gospel. Hence, he does not make a distinction within
the law between the lex vetus/ lex littera and the lex nova/ lex spiritualis for he
refuses to bring the gospel under the Oberbegriff lex (as in Augustine), but instead
sees the gospel as God's great eschatological novum which, far from being on a
continuum with the law stands in radical opposition to it.
2.Luther also teaches that the gospel abrogates the law, but only for faith,
for Christ is the end of the law for justification (Rom. 10: 4). But he also knows
with Paul that faith upholds the law (Rom. 3: 31), in the sense that the law as lex
elenchticus demonstrates our utter sinfulness and inability to justify ourselves,
and thus leads us to repentance that we may receive Christ's own righteousness
as a gift. Therefore, in place of the antinomian simplex abrogatio legis Luther
teaches a duplex abrogatio legis. The first corresponds to justification whereby the
law ceases for us imputative; the second corresponds to sanctification so that the
law will also cease for us realiter at death.
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Luther holds to a duplex usus legis, not a duplex revelatio evangelii. The usus
praecipuus legis is not the usus civilis, as it is with the antinomians, but rather the
usus theologicus = usus elenchticus + usus paedagogicus. He rejects the notion that
paedagogia is to be connected exclusively to the usus civilis and links it instead to
the usus theologicus (Gal. 3: 24). The law really only performs its theological task
fully when it leads people to Christ, but it can only do that through the Spirit and
the gospel. Without this critical transition (which will be summarized below)
from law to gospel the law would drive people either to desperatio or to securitas.
3. Luther also teaches that Christ has fulfilled the law, however he speaks
of a duplex impletio just as he speaks of a duplex abrogatio. Although the law has
been fulfilled and hence abrogated for faith imputative, he says that, because of
the reliquiae peccatorum in the flesh, the law must also be fulfilled in us by the
Holy Spirit (and Christ), first of all, expurgative, in this life through the means of
grace, and then finally formaliter with the resurrection of the body. This he
especially stresses contra antinomos because by denying the continuing reality of
sin, they have no need for lifelong repentance and thus they leave themselves
wide open to be duped by Satan. The law will only be finally abolished for us
substantialiter after the resurrection when sin will be entirely destroyed and we
will fulfill it finally ex amore Dei. Luther, on the other hand, knows that the saints,
because they are still burdened by the flesh, need constant admonition, warning,
encouragement, and instruction. They need to be summoned to join the battle
against sin and Satan, to watch and pray at all times, and to be good soldiers of
Jesus Christ. He knows that even though faith does good works hilariter et sponte,
just as a tree produces fruit, it must be stirred up to love and good works, on
account of the flesh.
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This parenesis is not really a preaching of the law however, for here it is
operating under the control of the gospel. However, Luther still calls these exhortations and admonitions lex, even though he hastens to add that they are not
really lex, which for Luther is never a lex vacua but always the lex accusans, reos
agens et exactrix. There is a parallel here with the law given to Adam. Luther
calls it lex but then immediately says that it is not really lex (in the sense in which
it became the lex arguetrix et condemnatrix after the fall) at all but truly a lex
iucunda. Here he ties protology and eschatology together, for he anticipates the
same delight in the law in the heavenly paradise, except that he says that there
will be no lex in heaven but only res, for the law will have what it demands in
full.
The parenesis is not strictly law for another reason: Luther himself warns
that the lex implenda must never be addressed to the saints, only the lex impleta.
The lex implenda is only for the old Adam, that is, for the Christian in quantum
peccator. For this reason we contend that the later concept of the tertius usus legis
cannot be read back into Luther without causing serious conflict with his understanding of the law. Not only does a triplex usus legis contradict his consistent use
of the duplex usus legis, but what is worse, it is ascribing to the law a function
which for faith is now under the control of the gospel. Secondly, the tertius usus
is purportedly a specifically positive (non-condemning) usus legis for Christians,
in quantum sancti. That, in our view, stands in direct conflict with Luther's insistence that the saints are not to be burdened by the law (lex implenda) but are to be
given Christ's light yoke (lex impleta), which is really synonymous with the
gospel, for it does not demand fulfillment from the baptized, but invites them to
enter into and be a part of his own fulfillment. Here Christ is our true
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sacramentum, and now he summons us to follow him as exemplum (= exemplar),
but this is not law for he has borne the burden himself and invites us to enter into
the fruit of his labor. Thirdly, we reject the idea that the tertius usus legis can ever
be separated for the usus theologicus, and thus that it can ever be solely a positive
use. Luther could never agree that the lex qua lex can be positive. He says just
the opposite: Lex non damnans est lex ficta et picta, sicut chimaera aut tragelaphus
(sixth Thesenreihe). And where he does speaks of lex in the context of parenesis,
although he still calls it lex, it is now under the control of the gospel, and
therefore its real goal is not to accuse but to call us back to faith, to be in re what
we are in fide. Therefore, even warning and rebuke can be received by faith as
consolatio, paraclesis, for it is proof that we are loved by the Father who wants
nothing more than to be a God who gives and that we should be a people who
receive his gifts. This is the goal of parenesis: To keep calling people back ad
baptismum, to stir them up to love and good works, and ever to remind them of
the need to be armed and ready for warfare against the devil, the world and the
flesh, and always to watch and pray so that we may not fall into temptation or
use our freedom in the gospel as pretext for the (nig. This is one of the big
dangers of antinomians. Not libertinism in the first instance (at least not the
antinomianism of Agricola and his followers), but the danger of being lulled into
securitas by Satan so that he may capture a person without a struggle.
According to our reading of Luther, the sancti are not instructed to do
good works because that it is very thing that they most desire to do. However,
they need to be encouraged to do them, and also taught on the basis of scripture
what the good works are that God wants them to do, lest they are deceived by
the flesh into choosing self-serving works.
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In order to reflect the fact that this parenesis is not a usus legalis, we
suggest that a better term might be the evangelical use of the law or faith's use of
the law. Although there is something to commend the term usus practicus
evangelii (the practical application of the gospel), insofar as it sets the lex squarely
on the side of the evangelium, Luther refuses to identify exhortation with the
gospel but calls it law. However, it would seem to us that if we refer to it as the
gospel's use of the law, then we have captured Luther's understanding of parenesis in that it is not to be identified with the lex implenda, but with the lex impleta.
To refer to it as a tertius usus legis fails to orient it to the gospel.
Perhaps the most serious objection we have to a the idea of a tertius usus
legis is that it slips through the net of the law-gospel distinction or at least reduces
the law-gospel tension by giving the law preeminence over the gospel. The
danger then is that the gospel becomes subservient to the law and a means of
fulfilling it. It also does not sufficiently take into account of the fact that Christians are still sinners, and that therefore there will always be a chance that the law
as it instructs will also accuse. The proponents of the third use, it seems, tend to
assume that the law will permit itself to be a neutral guide and that it will always
obediently stay within its appointed bounds. Luther however warns on several
occasions that when the law tries to enter the conscience (which is reserved for
Christ alone), then one must know how to distinguish between law and gospel in
experientia. Luther will only permit the law in the proper sense (lex arguens et
accusans) to discipline his body and prod his old Adam, but he will never allow it
to bind his conscience for he now lives under his dear Lord Christ and not under
the authority of the law.
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On the other hand, he knows that even when the law must speak sharply
on account of the flesh, it is not unbearable because lex est valde mitigata per
iustificationem. It is in this sense that he says that the law must be softened
[mollienda] for the justified and used with some privilege [cum aliqua praerogativaj,
for the saints do not submit to the flesh but triumph over it. It is not that the lex
per se suddenly becomes softer, but that for the baptized it must never be
preached without the gospel. Moreover, the mollienda points to parenesis as the
best way of preaching the law to the faithful because it is more a indirect and
retrospective method than the straight usus elenchticus, and as such is more
appropriate for the saints in whom peccata are regnata not regnans. In all of this
Luther's concern is that the law might be kept in its place and not be permitted to
terrorize the conscience.
However, the foregoing must be balanced by the joy and delight that faith
has in the law as the lex impleta, which it receives as a gift imputative. This joy is
reminiscent of that which Adam experienced in paradise with lex iucunda and
which the writer of Psalm 119 also experienced with the Torah. And it looks
ahead to that eschatological joy of the heavenly paradise which Luther says will
far exceed even anything that Adam knew. There finally there will be no longer
any lex, not even the lex impleta, just the reality [res] itself. We too already know
something of that joy since through faith the lex impleta is for us also a lex iucunda;
however, insofar as we still have sin clinging to the flesh, our joy is overcast and
will only be complete in the life to come.
4. Because the antinomians claim that the law only condemns, they teach
that the gospel alone must be preached and that it performs a twofold function
(duplex revelatio evangelic`): first it forgives, then leads to repentance. Luther rejects
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the idea of a twofold office of the gospel and instead teaches a distinction
between law and gospel. Likewise, he polemicizes against teaching repentance
ex evangelio (= ex violatio filii), and instead maintains that repentance arises ex lege
(= ex violatione legis). Here, incidentally, we see the difference between the early
Luther and the mature Luther. Early Luther follows Augustine in teaching repentance ex amore Dei or ex iustitia Dei, which is thoroughly consistent with the
Augustinian one track view of revelation as opposed to later Luther's two track
law-gospel recognition. Therefore, in holding the view that he does, Agricola
(whose theology stands behind the positiones antinomicae even if one of his circle
wrote and circulated them) shows himself to be a true follower of Augustine. In
a sense, many of Agricola's criticisms of Luther amount to his pitting of early
Luther against late Luther. When Luther begins preaching the law in the mid
1520s against the duri et feroces, Agricola accuses him of having defected from his
early evangelical (read: Augustinian) position. This is certainly the case when
Luther leaves behind his view of repentance as ex amore Dei and teaches instead
that it is ex lege, even though he affirms that the gospel is the most important part
of repentance.
Luther comes up with a very perceptive definition of the law that not only
demolishes the antinomian position but also serves as an important rule-ofthumb for pastoral care: Whatever exposes sin, convicts, and preaches wrath is
law, even if they are the words of the gospel. Consequently, Luther acknowledges that the preaching of the gospel may bring about repentance (more
accurately, contrition) but if that should happen, it is not really the gospel in the
proper sense that is doing it (opus proprium), but the gospel is employing the
office of the law (opus alienum).
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Two important facts are tied up with this, one doctrinal, the other practical
(seelsorgerlich). Luther's definition of the law in terms of function (Amt/officium)
rather than statue is significant. On the one hand, it allows him to move away
from the Aristotelian idea of the lex aeterna, and on the other, constitutes a conclusive counterargument to the antinomian assertion that the gospel qua gospel
condemns sin (in this Barth is the twentieth century counterpart to Agricola). But
there is also an important pastoral consideration riding on this definition, and
thus on Luther's insistence that repentance is ex lege not ex evangelio (= ex amore
Dei). The gospel can actually produce in people a far profounder sense of sorrow
and remorse over sin than the law will ever evoke. However, if the gospel is
used for this purpose, and the goodness and loving kindness of God drives a
person to despair, there is nothing left, humanly speaking, to give him hope and
comfort. Here the gospel that is meant for life becomes death. For this reason
Luther cautions pastors not to make a practice of using the gospel as the instrument of repentance. On the other hand, if a penitent does become alarmed as a
result of hearing the gospel, the pastor needs to know how to preach the law in
that situation in order that the gospel may dispense its gifts as gospel and not
function as law. However, in the final analysis, we cannot control God's word
nor can we preempt how he will use his words of law or gospel, nor can we in
any way force his hand, for God is the only true "user" of the law and uses us as
his instruments for his gracious purposes. All we are called to do is to be faithful
servants of the his words, which means carefully distinguishing between law and
gospel, and never discarding either.
There are two central reasons that Luther gives for why the law must
continue to be taught in the church: 1) on account of the praefracti et insensate; 2)
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because the pii still have a reliquiae peccatortun inhering in the flesh. However,
when his arguments are read carefully it becomes apparent that he did not insist
on the retention of the law for the law's sake but for the sake of the gospel. When
Luther really wants to drive the point home he says things like: Christ cannot be
retained without the law. Although such statements cannot be taken at face
value they serve a valuable rhetorical function as dicta heroica in emphasizing that
whenever Christ and the law are pulled apart it is always the gospel which is lost
not the law, because the law belongs to the structure of this world and furthermore is inscribed on our minds of all people as the lex naturalis. Therefore,
whether the law is separated from Christ (legalism) or Christ from the law (antinomianism, in either case the gospel is lost. By and large Luther does not react to
the antinomianism of his day simply by insisting on the law all the more, which
would only lead to an nomian error in the opposite direction, but instead he distinguishes carefully between law and gospel, preaching each in its proper order
so that each can do its own appointed task. And when he has done all that he can
humanly do as servant of God's words of law and gospel, to ensure the faithful
transmission of those words, he leaves the rest to him who is Lord of his words,
to use them as he chooses in his own way and at his own time.
Soli Deo Gloria
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